Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage. 2. The property mortgaged in a tank. According to the defendants, the mortgage in question is a kanom under the Cochin Tenancy Act, XV of 1113, and is therefore irredeemable. The plaintiff contended in the Courts below that, for constituting a kanom under the Cochin Tenancy Act, the holding should be a parcel of land as distinguished from water and that there could be no kanom in respect of a sheet of water like a tank. The trial Court accepted the plaintiff's case and decreed the suit. The lower appellate Court upheld the defendant's contention and dismissed the suit. Hence this Second Appeal. 3. Ext. IV is the mortgage sought to be redeemed. It was executed by the Kodassery Sthanam on 4.12.1081 in favour of the ancestors of defendants 1 to 6 and the defendants are now admittedly in possession of the plaint tank under it. The document is styled a kozhuverakkapanayadharam; and it was only the plaint tank and nothing more that was mortgaged by it. There is no provision in it for renewal, and it is expressly stated therein that the mortgagees are to hold the tank on mortgage for Rs. 11-3-2 realising the interest on the mortgage amount from the income from fishing and paying certain annual dues to the mortgagor. From Ext. IV it is also seen that there was a prior mortgage of 1014 in respect of the plaint tank and certain other properties and that, on 4.12.1081, the Sthanam gave Ext. IV mortgage to the ancestors of defendants 1 to 6 for the plaint tank and another mortgage to them for the properties other than the plaint tank comprised in the mortgage of 1014. According to the defendants, Ext. IV is not a redeemable mortgage but a kanom under the Cochin Tenancy Act, XV of 1113. 4. IV mortgage to the ancestors of defendants 1 to 6 for the plaint tank and another mortgage to them for the properties other than the plaint tank comprised in the mortgage of 1014. According to the defendants, Ext. IV is not a redeemable mortgage but a kanom under the Cochin Tenancy Act, XV of 1113. 4. 'Kanom' has been defined in S. 2(d) of the said Act as: "(d) 'Kanom' means a demise with the following incidents: (1) an initial lump sum consideration in money or in kind or both given or deemed to be given by the tenant to the landlord which is mentioned as such in the demise and bears a specified interest; (2) the payment of michavaram, if any, by the tenant to the landlord; (3) the right of the tenant to occupy the property demised for 12 years or for any other longer period which is specified; (4) the liability to pay a renewal fee on renewal of the demise. Explanation:- A transaction called 'panayam' in the document evidencing it may create a kanom within the meaning of this section." To this definition, Act VI of 1115 (Cochin) has added the following explanation also; "Explanation II: (i) A transaction called 'panayam' in the document evidencing it and possessing the incidents mentioned in sub-clauses (1) and (2) of this clause shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be a kanom within the meaning of this section, if it is a renewal of a previous document or if in respect of it a counter-part has been executed by the panayam tenant or there is a provision for renewal or for the payment of puravaka dues; kaivasapanayam, kozhuverukkapanayam or nadappupanayam. (ii) A provision in any document of the kind referred to in clause (i) providing for surrender of the holding on demand to the landlord shall not, by itself, give rise to any presumption contrary to that provided for in clause (i) of this Explanation." From this definition, it is clear that a kanom must be a demise by a landlord to a tenant. The term landlord is defined in S. 2(f) of Act XV of 1113 as "a person immediately under whom a tenant holds"; and the term 'tenant' has been defined in S.2(o) of the same Act as follows: "(o) 'Tenant', with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes a person who as kanom-tenant, lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be kanom-tenant, lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub mortgagee of land is in possession thereof or who, with the bona fide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land, but without the permission of such person brings such land under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator". A tenant under the Act must, therefore, be a lessee, mortgagee, etc., of land, or a person who intends to attorn and pay a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land. From these definitions, it is clear, that there could be a kanom only in respect of land and not in respect of anything else. 5. The short question for decision in this Second Appeal is whether the expression 'land' used in defining the term'tenant' in clause 2(o) of Act XV of 1113 would mean only'land' as understood in common parlance, ie., land as distinguished from water, or whether that expression would include also mere sheets of water like tanks, ponds etc. The term'land' itself has not been defined in the Cochin Tenancy Act. But it has been frequently used in that Act. While it is possible to contend that a tank is only land covered with water and that the term'land' would therefore include a tank also, the plain meaning of the term'land' and what is generally understood by that expression is 'ground' ie., the solid portion of the surface of the globe as distinguished from water or the watery surface. There is nothing in the Tenancy Act to indicate that the expression used in that Act has to be given a larger connotation than its plain and natural meaning. On the other hand, some of the sections of the Tenancy Act show that the word 'land' has been used in the Act as meaning only ground and not including both ground and water. On the other hand, some of the sections of the Tenancy Act show that the word 'land' has been used in the Act as meaning only ground and not including both ground and water. The term 'holding' is defined in S. 2(b) as meaning a parcel or parcels of land held under a single engagement by a tenant from a landlord. S. 34(b)(1) provides that the pattom may be proportionately reduced, if during the currency of the kanom or of the last renewal as the case may be, the area of the holding has been diminished by causes beyond the control of the tenant, such as action of the sea, river or lake. If the holding which is a parcel of land will include water also one fails to understand how the area of the holding could be diminished by the action of the sea, river or lake. The land, ie., the ground as distinguished from water, could no doubt be submerged by the sea, river, or lake, or might even be washed away. But the space occupied by that land would not be destroyed and would be there even after the submerging and the washing off. The action of the sea, river and lake would only result in the solid surface being converted into a watery surface. If the watery surface would also be included in the expression 'land' the area of the holding could never be diminished by the action of the sea, river or lake. It is, therefore, clear that what is contemplated in S. 34(b)(1) as diminution of the area of the holding is the diminution of the ground or solid surface as distinguished from the watery surface; and since 'holding' is only a parcel or parcels of 'land' it necessarily follows that 'land', for the purposes of the Act, is only ground or solid surface and not watery surface. The inclusion of 'nilam' in the expression 'land' does not in any way militate against this conclusion. It is true that some nilams may be under water during a part of the year. But they do not always remain under water, and the nilam is essentially land adapted for the cultivation of paddy. That also is the definition given in the Act for the term'nilam'. It is true that some nilams may be under water during a part of the year. But they do not always remain under water, and the nilam is essentially land adapted for the cultivation of paddy. That also is the definition given in the Act for the term'nilam'. It may be that, where a tank or sheet of water is only a part of the property leased or mortgaged and is surrounded by the land or ground leased or mortgaged, or lies within the boundaries of the property leased or mortgaged, that tank or sheet of water would also be included in the kanom as a part of the grant of land or an appurtenance to the land. There is no warrant whatever in the Tenancy Act for holding that the expression 'land' used therein includes tanks or sheets of water let or mortgaged by themselves independently of any ground or solid surface of the earth. The mortgage deed in this case shows that it was a tank, and tank alone, that was mortgaged and that the purpose for which the mortgagees took the mortgage was to use the tank for fishing. The mortgage was, therefore, purely one of water and not of any ground at all. 6. Our conclusion, is also supported by the decisions reported in 19 Weekly Reporter 200 Siboo Jelya v. Gopal Chunder Chowdhry and 20 Weekly Reporter 341 Nidhi Krishna Bose v. Ram Doss Sen. In Siboo Jelya v. Gopal Chunder Chowdhry,19 W.R. 200, it was held that the provisions of the Bengal Rent Act X of 1859 (which is a similar piece of legislation as the Cochin Tenancy Act) would not apply to a tank used only for the preservation and rearing of fish and not forming a part of any grant of land or appurtenance to any land, even though possession may have been held for more than twelve years. In Nidhi Krishna Bose v. Ram Doss Sen, 20 Weekly Reporter 341, it was held that a right of occupancy cannot be acquired in a tank which was the principal subject of the lease. 7. In Nidhi Krishna Bose v. Ram Doss Sen, 20 Weekly Reporter 341, it was held that a right of occupancy cannot be acquired in a tank which was the principal subject of the lease. 7. It was contended by the respondent's counsel that, as the plaint tank was included in the mortgage of 1014 and as other properties which were admittedly 'land' within the meaning of that term as used in the Tenancy Act were also included in that mortgage, the plaint tank must be deemed to be part of a grant of land or an appurtenance to the land and that, in view, it is part of a kanom holding and cannot be redeemed. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on S. 23 of the Tenancy Act which reads: "23. The provisions contained in Ss. 24 to 36 both inclusive of this Act shall apply only to kanom tenants who by themselves or through their predecessor-in, interest have uninterruptedly held the holding under kanom tenures created on or before the 8th day of Thulam 1090. Explanation 1. The omission, addition or substitution of an item of land from to or in a holding shall not be taken to have interrupted the continuity of the holding. The substituted item shall be considered to have been in the original demise in place of the term for which it was substituted. Explanation 2. Where a holding is by partition, assignment or otherwise served, the severance shall not be taken to have interrupted the continuity of the holding and each of the severed properties shall be recognised as a distinct holding unless such recognition would materially affect the rights of the landlord." The short answer to this contention is that there is no evidence in the case to show that a kanom tenure had been created by the mortgage of 1014. The mortgage deed itself is not before Court. There is no knowing whether there was any provision in it for payment of michavaram. All that the defendants have attempted to prove in this case is that Ext. IV has all the four incidents mentioned in S. 2(d) for constituting a kanom and not that the mortgage of 1014 had those four incidents and was a kanom. It is the plaint tank alone that has been mortgaged under Ext. IV, and so Ext. All that the defendants have attempted to prove in this case is that Ext. IV has all the four incidents mentioned in S. 2(d) for constituting a kanom and not that the mortgage of 1014 had those four incidents and was a kanom. It is the plaint tank alone that has been mortgaged under Ext. IV, and so Ext. IV cannot be relied upon in support of the contention based on S. 23 of the Tenancy Act. After Ext. IV, no part of the holding has been severed by partition, assignment or otherwise. The plaint tank was severed from the other properties by Ext. IV; and it is only if the defendants, are able to show that, at the time of the severance, the tank was being held under a previous kanom that they can get the benefit of S. 23. They have not attempted to show, and there is absolutely no evidence, that the tenure at the time of the severance in 1081 was a kanom tenure. 8. Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that on the analogy of the definition given in the Land Acquisition Act, the expression'land' used in the Tenancy Act may be taken to include ponds and tanks also. Reliance was placed in this connection on the Commentaries of Om Prakash, under S. 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was mainly because it accepted this contention that the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The passage from Om Prakash's commentaries relied upon by the respondent's counsel has been quoted in the lower appellate Court's judgment and reads as follows: "Land is not the less land for being covered with water. A pond or piece of water island covered with water', Land, according to the Land Acquisition Act, does not mean merely firm land but also land covered with water, and in estimating the market value of such land, the benefit derived from such water should also be taken into account." The expression, 'land' has been defined in the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of that Act, and the definition is wide enough to include ponds and tanks. But that definition cannot be accepted in construing another Act enacted for a wholly different purpose and from which it is clear that the connotation given to the same expression in the Act is entirely different. But that definition cannot be accepted in construing another Act enacted for a wholly different purpose and from which it is clear that the connotation given to the same expression in the Act is entirely different. If the Legislature intended to include tanks and ponds also in the expression 'land' used in the Tenancy Act, there was no difficulty for including in S. 2 of the Tenancy Act a clause containing a similar definition of the expression. Or it could have used an expression like 'immovable property' which would have included both land and water. The Tenancy Act, read as a whole, shows that there was no intention on the part of the Legislature to give to the expression'land' the same meaning in the Tenancy Act as in the Land Acquisition Act. On the other hand, it is obvious that the expression as used in the Tenancy Act has only a narrower connotation. 9. We, therefore, hold that the expression'land' used in S. 2(o) of the Cochin Tenancy Act, XV of 1113, means only land as understood in common parlance, ie., ground or solid surface of the earth including such sheets of water as may be parts of the grants of such land or appurtenances to such land, and does not include tanks and ponds leased or mortgaged by themselves and not forming part of any grant of land or being appurtenance to such land. It follows that Ext. IV mortgage is not a kanom under the Cochin Tenancy Act and can, therefore, be redeemed. This Second Appeal is hence allowed and the decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The plaintiff-appellant will get his costs from the contesting defendants in all the courts. Allowed.