Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises from a suit for recovery of the amount due under a simple mortgage Ext. A. dated 8.11.13 executed by the 1st defendant who died after the institution of the suit, in favour of her deceased daughter Sivakami, at the time of her marriage to the plaintiff. It was stated in the deed that it was executed in lieu of ornaments to be given to her. Sivakami died without children. The plaintiff, alleging to be the sole heir of Sivakami sued for recovery of the principal and interest due under the deed. Defendants 2 and 3 were impleaded as persons having some interest in the mortgaged property, and additional defendants 4 to 7 as the daughters of the 1st defendant. 2. The 7th defendant to whom the mortgaged property had been conveyed by her sisters, contested. She contended that the mortgage deed was not supported by consideration as Sivakami did not make any ornaments, that the parties belonging to the Chalia caste and according to the custom prevailing among the Chalias of South Travancore the plaintiff was not the heir of Sivakami. She claimed absolute title to the property under sale deed executed in her favour by her sisters. 3. The trial court passed a decree holding that the custom pleaded by the 7th defendant was not proved. On appeal by the 7th defendant, the District Judge held that the amount represented the price of ornaments and was "Sulka", which descended on Sivakami's death to her mother the 1st defendant. The trial court's decree was reversed and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal from this decree. 4. Shri Boothalingam Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, attacked the finding of the lower appellate court that the amount under the bond was "Sulka". The 7th defendant had no such case in the pleadings. This is a point which should have been pleaded by the defence as observed in Bhola Ram v. Dhani Ram (A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 25). "To attract the application of special rules of succession to Sulka, it must be distinctly alleged and proved by cogent evidence that the property given to a Hindu girl was of the character, the gift having been prompted by a desire to confer a pecuniary benefit, immediate or ultimate, on the parents who have been thereby induced to give her in marriage". Apart from the absence of pleadings, the view taken by the learned District Judge is not sustainable. According to learned commentators, Sulka was considered "Bride price" given by the bride-groom or his family to the parents of the bride in the Asura form of marriage. Sir E.J. Trevellyan says in his third Edition of "Hindu Law" at page 475, "According to the more usual views, this was the gratuity for the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage. It was originally paid to the father as the price of the bride, but when what was forbidden the father received it for the bride and it became her property as her Dowry". The following passage from Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage (p. 743-1952 Edn.) is instructive: "The Sulka in the older sense of bride-price, ultimately received, by the bride herself is obsolete; where it is now paid to the parents or the brother in the Asura marriage, it does not raise any question of succession to her stridhanam. Where it is paid to the bride herself, either as the price of ornaments or house-hold furnishings or as a complementary present, it would be her ordinary stridhana for there is no reason why any dowry given to the wife by the husband in modern times should be treated as attracting a special order of succession which was applied to some obscure form of the ancient bride-price, which really belonged to the father but which he may have handed back to his daughter". It is therefore clear that presents received by a bride from her parents cannot be considered "Sulka". From the following passage in Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law viz. "Sulks is defined as wealth received as the price of household utensils, of beasts of burden, of milk cattle or ornaments", it was wrongly assumed that ornaments given by the mother of the bride would constitute Sulka. This finding of the court below is wrong and the decree based on the same has to be set aside. 5. It was urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, that the 7th defendant had made a prayer for remand in the District Court and that the same was not considered in view of the decision reached by the learned judge on the nature of the deed. 5. It was urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, that the 7th defendant had made a prayer for remand in the District Court and that the same was not considered in view of the decision reached by the learned judge on the nature of the deed. The 7th defendant had pleaded a special custom by which the husband was excluded from inheritance. She had filed a schedule of witnesses but there was an order that the witnesses would be examined after the examination of parties. Accordingly, summons was issued twice but the witnesses failed to appear. The 7th defendant then filed a fresh schedule on 17.4.1123 and applied for permission to examine the witnesses mentioned therein. These were directed to be reported for orders on 3.4.1123 but no orders were passed on the same. The decision of this case might affect other members of the community to which the parties belong and I consider it necessary to remand the case for a proper adjudication of the question after taking evidence. It may also be mentioned that in Mahadeva Iyen Venkiteswara Iyen v. Sthanu Subramony Iyen Subramony Iyen (24 Travancore Law Reports 56), the existence of a similar custom was found to exist among the Brahmins of South Travancore. Whether the custom prevails among Chalias is a matter to be decided on evidence. 6. In the result I set aside the decree of the court below and remand the case to the trial court for fresh decision. Both sides will be at liberty to adduce evidence regarding the alleged custom. The court fee paid in this court will be refunded to the appellant and the other costs will abide the final result and will be provided for in the decree to be passed by the trial court. Remanded.