JUDGMENT The following two questions have been referred under section 23(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, for decision by this Court :- "(1) A dealer is guilty of an offence under section 24(1)(a) of the Act - not even having applied for registration by the 31st August, 1947, which is the date prescribed by the Provincial Government under the proviso to section 8(1). He, however, gets the offence compounded under section 25(1) whereafter he is granted a registration certificate. Can registration in such circumstances be regarded as having become effective from the very commencement of the Act and can sales made to him during the period when he was not actually registered be regarded as sales to a registered dealer for the purposes of section 2(j)(a)(ii) ?" "(2) Should the word 'contract' occurring in the proviso to section 4(1) of the Act be understood in its general sense or in the special sense given to it in section 2(b) of the Act ?" 2. Since the name of the purchaser dealer does not appear in the order, he is referred to in this judgment as dealer B. 3. The facts of the case bearing on the first question are : The assessee Hirji Govindji was a registered dealer for the chargeable accounting period from the 1st June, 1947, to the 12th November, 1947. During this period he made four sales to B who had not applied for registration though in view of section 4(1) of the Act he was liable to pay tax from the 1st June, 1947, when the Act came into force. On being prosecuted for contravening section 8, sub-section (1), of the Act, B was permitted by the Commissioner under section 25(1) to compound the offence and the Commissioner granted him a certificate of registration. This was sometime after he made the purchases in question from the assessee. The sales made to B were not excluded in computing the taxable turnover of the assessee on the ground that they were sales to an unregistered dealer. 4. Section 8(1) of the Act prohibits any dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act from carrying on business as a dealer unless he has been registered as such and possesses a registration certificate. 4. Section 8(1) of the Act prohibits any dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act from carrying on business as a dealer unless he has been registered as such and possesses a registration certificate. Time was extended to the 31st August, 1947, to make applications for registration by persons liable to pay tax since the commencement of the Act; and any person who made an application within that period was deemed not to have contravened the provisions of section 8(1). Sub-section (2) of that section requires a dealer liable to registration under sub-section (1) to make an application in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed authority. Sub-section (3) provides that if the said authority is satisfied that the application is in order, i.e., it satisfies the requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2), and in case of dealers liable to pay tax for sales made from the 1st June, 1947, it is made within the time allowed by law, it shall register the applicant in accordance with such rules as may be made under the Act and grant him a certificate of registration in the prescribed form. Section 24(1)(a) provides that whoever carries on business as a dealer in contravention of sub-section (1) of section 8 shall, without prejudice to the recovery of any tax that may be due from him, be punishable with simple imprisonment for six months or a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or with both. By section 4 of the Amending Act LIX of 1948 the words "simple imprisonment which may extend to six months" have been substituted for "simple imprisonment for six months". Under section 25 the Commissioner can grant permission to the defaulter to compound the offence. Section 8(5) requires that where a dealer pays composition money under section 25 in respect of any contravention of section 8(1), the Commissioner shall register the dealer and grant him a certificate of registration. The section further provides that such registration shall take effect as if it had been made under sub-section (3) of section 8 on the dealer's application. 5. The section further provides that such registration shall take effect as if it had been made under sub-section (3) of section 8 on the dealer's application. 5. In view of these provisions the learned counsel for the assessee argues that having paid the composition money, B must be deemed to have been registered under sub-section (3) of section 8 and consequently he must be deemed to possess the certificate from the commencement of the Act as he was carrying on business and was liable to pay tax from that date. It is further argued that sales made to such a dealer during the chargeable accounting period in question are liable to be excluded in computing the taxable turnover of the assessee under section 2(j)(a)(ii). It is not disputed that the other conditions of this provision have been complied with in the instant case. 6. These contentions are sound and must prevail. Certificates under sub-section (3) of section 8 could not be issued to dealers on the 1st June, 1947, even if they had made applications on that date. Some time had to be allowed to them to make the applications and considerable time was necessary for the prescribed authorities to scrutinize the applications and to issue the necessary certificates. To obviate the hardship resulting from the effect of section 8(1) the proviso to that sub-section provides that the dealer registered before prescribed date shall be deemed not to have contravened that sub-section, that is, he shall be deemed to be a registered dealer as from the commencement of the Act. This is not disputed. According to the learned counsel for the assessee a similar fiction is also created by sub-section (5). 7. The learned counsel for the Commissioner submits that the fiction created by sub-section (5) must be limited to the making of an application for registration. Reliance was placed on Radha Kissen Chamria v. Durga Prosad Chamria ([1940] I.L.R. (1940) 2 Cal. 493, 503 (P.C.)), where their Lordships have observed :- "As the analogy only arises by legal fiction, it must be limited to the purposes indicated by the context and cannot be given a larger effect." The fiction in the instant case is being limited to the purposes indicated by the context. 493, 503 (P.C.)), where their Lordships have observed :- "As the analogy only arises by legal fiction, it must be limited to the purposes indicated by the context and cannot be given a larger effect." The fiction in the instant case is being limited to the purposes indicated by the context. The fiction is that a certificate, issued by the Commissioner under sub-section (5) on registration, shall be deemed to be a certificate issued under sub-section (3), i.e., it shall be deemed to be a certificate issued on an application under sub-section (2) which was in order. The application, to be in order, must, as already stated, satisfy the conditions laid down in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) and must, as in the instant case, be made before the 31st August, 1947. In the event of a composition, the making of such an application is dispensed with; and the dealer is registered as if he had made the application required by law, i.e., before the prescribed date, and had thus not contravened sub-section (1). The certificate issued under sub-section (5) thus takes effect in a case like present from the commencement of the Act. 8. Section 2(j)(a)(ii) provides that the amount of sales to a registered dealer shall be excluded in computing the taxable turnover of a dealer provided the other conditions mentioned in that provision are satisfied. The only dispute in the instant case is whether B should be regarded as a registered dealer on the dates sales were made to him by the assessee. Since B's registration certificate takes effect from the commencement of the Act, sales made to him are liable to be deducted in computing taxable turnover of the assessee. Our answer to the first question is therefore in the affirmative. 9. The facts leading to the other question are : Prior to the 1st June, 1947, the assessee had made several agreements to sell goods. Those goods were supplied and price was received after the Act came into force. It is not disputed that the property in the goods passed to the purchasers after the Act came into force. 9. The facts leading to the other question are : Prior to the 1st June, 1947, the assessee had made several agreements to sell goods. Those goods were supplied and price was received after the Act came into force. It is not disputed that the property in the goods passed to the purchasers after the Act came into force. The learned counsel for the assessee however contends that the sales were exempt from tax under the proviso to section 4 which runs thus :- "Provided that the tax shall not be payable on sales made in the course of the execution of a contract which is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been entered into before the commencement of this Act." According to the learned counsel the sales in question were made in the course of execution of the contract to sell goods to the purchaser. He relies on the definition of "contract" given in section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act and the definition of "contract of sale" in section 4(1) of the Sale of Goods Act. 10. This contention cannot be accepted. The definitions of words embodied in a statute are ordinarily binding upon Courts in interpreting that statute since they form part of it. Section 2(b) of the Sales Tax Act defines the term "contract" thus :- "In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant is the subject or context, 'contract' means any agreement for carrying out for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration - (i) the construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of any building, road, bridge or other immovable property, or (ii) the installation or repair of any machinery affixed to a building or other immovable property, or (iii) the overhaul or repair of any motor vehicle." The transactions in question admittedly do not fall within this definition of "contract". Where the word defined is declared to "mean" so and so, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. The word "contract" should therefore be given this restrictive meaning unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Under section 4(1) all sales effected after the commencement of the Act are liable to tax. The proviso excludes sales made in the course of the execution of contracts made before the commencement of the Act. Such contracts must fall within the definition of the word "contract" given in the Act. Under section 4(1) all sales effected after the commencement of the Act are liable to tax. The proviso excludes sales made in the course of the execution of contracts made before the commencement of the Act. Such contracts must fall within the definition of the word "contract" given in the Act. The learned counsel has not drawn our attention to any rule or precedent in support of the submission that the term "contract" in the proviso should not receive the meaning given to it by the definition in the Act but receive the wider meaning of the term under the Contract Act. The learned counsel does not contend that there is anything repugnant in the subject of the aforestated proviso or context to entitle the Court to discard the definition. We do not find anything repugnant in the subject or context to entitle us to give a different meaning to this word. 11. A sale as defined by section 2(g) of the Act includes a transfer of property in goods made in the course of execution of a contract and the term "turnover" as defined in section 2(j) includes sale price in respect of sale or supply of goods in carrying out any contract. The intention of the Legislature as appearing from there provisions is to impose sales tax on transactions which are not sales strictly so-called. The expression "transfer of property in goods made in the course of execution of a contract" is not easy to interpret if the word "contract" is construed as defined in section 4(1) of the Sale of Goods Act. By the definition of "contract" in section 2(b) of the Sales Tax Act the intention of the Legislature to include in sale price the amounts received in execution of what are popularly known an "labour-cum-material contracts" is made clear. A bill for such a contract is usually paid on the completion of the undertaking. There must have been a large number of such contracts made prior to the commencement of the Act which were not fully executed when the Act came into force. It would have been well-nigh impossible for the taking authority to determine the "sale price" and "turnover" of such contracts which was liable to tax under section 4(1) without unmerited hardship to such contractors. It would have been well-nigh impossible for the taking authority to determine the "sale price" and "turnover" of such contracts which was liable to tax under section 4(1) without unmerited hardship to such contractors. But for the proviso, all bills received subsequent to the commencement of the Act would have been liable to sales tax although most of the work may have been completed before the commencement of the Act. The intention of the Legislature in enacting the proviso was to give relief to persons who had entered into contracts as defined by section 2(b) prior to the commencement of the Act. 12. The tax is on the sale or supply of goods; and if sale or supply is made after the commencement of the act the seller is prima facie liable to pay the tax unless exemption granted under some provision of the Act. In our view, the exemption granted by the proviso is limited to the contracts as defined in section 2(b) of the Act and not to any other contract for sale of goods made prior to the commencement of the Act. Our answer to the second question therefore is that the word "contract" occurring in this proviso to section 4(1) is to be understood in the special sense given to it by its definition in section 2(b) of the Act. 13. In view of the divided success, the costs of the reference will be borne by the parties as incurred. The paper book costs will be paid by the applicant. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Board of Revenue as required by section 23(5) of the Act fore necessary action. Reference answered accordingly.