Satyanarayana Rao, J.- This case was referred to a Bench by our learned brother Subba Rao, J., in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Kailasa Thevar1, which was followed subsequently by a Full Bench in C.M.A. No. 399 and 642 of 1946, to consider the effect of these two decisions on the earlier decisions of this Court. The plaintiff is the appellant. On 29th September, 1926, defendants 1 and 2 mortgaged under Exhibit D-3 two items of property to the 9th defendant. The first item is R.S. No. 3/2, 2 acres 15 cents and the second item is a tiled house. We are concerned in this appeal only with the first item. On 8th August, 1927, defendants 1 and 2 sold item 1 to the third defendant. On 5th July, 1930, the third defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to mortgage the property to him. As there was default on the part of the third defendant, a suit, O.S. No. 21 of 1931, was instituted by the plaintiff to enforce the agreement. The suit was decreed, and in pursuance of the decree a deed of mortgage was executed by the third defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 8th April, 1933. That was the second mortgage on the property. To enforce that mortgage, the plaintiff filed O.S. No. 21 of 1935 against the third defendant, but without: impleading the first mortgagee that is the ninth defendant, as a party. On 28th November, 1941, there was a compromise decree in the suit. In pursuance of this decree, item 1 of the present plaint schedule was brought to sale and was purchased by the plaintiff on 6th October, 1943. Meanwhile the fourth defendant obtained a simple money decree in O.S. No. 105 of 1931 against the third defendant and brought to sale item 1, which was purchased by him in court-auction. He obtained delivery of the property on 20th March, 1932. He sold his interest in the property to the fifth defendant who obtained delivery for him on 26th April, 1934. The 9th defendant assigned his right under the first mortgage to the 10th defendant. The 10th defendnt thereafter filed O.S. No. 300 of 1942 to enforce the mortgage against the 5th defendant and the mortgagors. He sold his interest in the property to the fifth defendant who obtained delivery for him on 26th April, 1934. The 9th defendant assigned his right under the first mortgage to the 10th defendant. The 10th defendnt thereafter filed O.S. No. 300 of 1942 to enforce the mortgage against the 5th defendant and the mortgagors. He claimed in the suit an amount, which was due after scaling down the debt in accordance with the provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938. To this suit, however, the plaintiff was not made a party. On 2nd October, 1942, there was a preliminary decree in the suit, which was followed by a final decree, on 10th March, 1943. Ultimately in pursuance of the final decree the 10th defendant purchased the item in court sale on 19th November, 1943. The plaintiff, who had purchased this item in an earlier court sale instituted this suit out of which this second appeal arises, to declare that the debt due under the mortgage of 29th September, 1926, was discharged or in the alternative to determine the balance of the amount due thereunder so that the plaintiff might redeem the mortgage. His main contention was that by reason of the fact that he was not impleaded in O.S. No. 300 of 1942 as a party, his right to redeem the first mortgage either as a puisne mortgagee or as a purchaser of the item in court sale was not affected and that he is entitled now to redeem the mortgage, and is bound to pay only the scaled down amount, for which the decree was passed in O.S. No. 300 of 1942 and no more. This contention was negatived by both the courts on the ground that the plaintiff and the 5th defendant were not agriculturists and since the personal covenant was barred and the entire interest of the property was lost to the mortgagors the mortgagors also could not claim the benefit. In this second appeal by the plaintiff it was strenuously contended by Mr. Bhimasankaram, the learned advocate for the appellant, that as the mortgagors are agriculturists whatever may be the position as regards the 5th defendant, and as the benefit of the scaling down was admitted by the 10th defendant in the earlier mortgage, he is entitled to that benefit by reason of his "lucky purchase". Bhimasankaram, the learned advocate for the appellant, that as the mortgagors are agriculturists whatever may be the position as regards the 5th defendant, and as the benefit of the scaling down was admitted by the 10th defendant in the earlier mortgage, he is entitled to that benefit by reason of his "lucky purchase". It has been well established by decisions of this Court that if the mortgagor is entitled to the benefit of scaling down of the debt under Act IV of 1938, that benefit would also enure to the alienee of the hypotheca, in whole or part whether he is an agriculturist or not. The benefit enures under general law, by reason of the property being relieved of the burden by the scaling down of the debt at the instance of the agriculturist mortgagor. See Arunachalam v. Seetharam1, Marina Ammayi v. Mirza Bakhar Beg Saheb2, Satyanarayanamurthi v. Sathiraju3, Nachiappa Chettiar v. Ramachandra Reddiar4. If however, the mortgagor is not an agriculturist and the question arises between purchasers of different portions of hypotheca, the fact that one of such purchasers is an agriculturist, who is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Act would not enable the other non-agriculturist purchaser to claim the benefit of such scaling down. This was the principle also enunciated by this court and firmly established now by various decisions beginning from Ramier v. Srinivasiah5 and Srinivasa Thatachariar v. Sivasubramania Chettiar6. If the agriculturist mortgagor, is, however, not entitled to the benefit of the scaling down because the personal remedy against him is barred by limitation, and he lost all that interest in the hypotheca by alienation, the non-agriculturist purchasers of the entire hypotheca or portions of it are not entitled to claim that the debt should be scaled down. It is no doubt true that notwithstanding the fact that mortgagor’s personal liability became barred and that he had parted with the entire interest in the equity of redemption, he is entitled under the statute to redeem the mortgage, but that circumstances would not entitle him to claim the benefit of the provisions of Act IV of 1938. This principle was laid down in Subbaraya Goundan v. Nachimuthu Mudaliar7 which was followed and applied to a recent case, Suryaprakasa Rayanimgar v. Balarama Reddi8. This principle was laid down in Subbaraya Goundan v. Nachimuthu Mudaliar7 which was followed and applied to a recent case, Suryaprakasa Rayanimgar v. Balarama Reddi8. This is also the ratio decidendi of the decision in Viswasundara Rao v. Kusalaramayya9 in which case the mortgagors abstained from claiming relief under Act IV of 1938. The 6th defendant in that case who was an alienee, however, claimed on their behalf that they were entitled to the relief as agriculturists, that relief should be granted at his instance so as to enure to his benefit though he was not an- agriculturist. The answer given at page 75 may be quoted in the own words of their Lordships: "They do not claim any relief under Act IV of 1938. It has been urged by the sixth defendant that the Court should, without any claim on their behalf, find that they are entitled to relief as agriculturists, so that the relief which is given to them as mortgagors may enure to the benefit of the sixth defendant who is not an agriculturist . We have no doubt, held that when the mortgagos are given relief under Madras Act (IV of 1938) and the burden upon the property is thereby lightened, the fortuitous benefit of that relief will be enjoyed by a subsequent purchaser, though the latter is not himself entitled to claim the benefits of the Act. This fortuitous benefit, however, cannot be claimed as of right by the purchaser who is not an agriculturist. It is the accidental result of a claim successfully advanced by the mortgagors. In the present case, the mortgagors have not claimed such a benefit nor have they adduced any evidence to show that they are agriculturists. We therefore cannot accede to the request of the sixth defendant that the right of the mortgagors to relief should be investigated merely with the object of giving an accidental relief to the non-agriculturist purchaser." These principles, in our opinion, have not in any manner been affected or altered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Kailasa Thevar1 which was an appeal against the decision of Happel and Govindarajachari, JJ., in Kailasa Thevar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar2. The question that arose in that case was in execution of a decree which was of a composite character. The question that arose in that case was in execution of a decree which was of a composite character. The decree against the first defendant was for a larger sum that is the full amount due under the mortgage. But as against the defendants 2 to 7 the debt was scaled down, and there was only a decree for a lesser amount as against them. The first defendant made an application in the executing court after depositing a sum of Rs. 3,250 that as the amount deposited by him together with the payments already made by him discharged the debt as scaled down by the High Court in favour of defendants 2 to 7, full satisfaction should be entered. The High Court took the view that the benefit, which defendants 2 to 7 obtained could be claimed also by the first defendant and that satisfaction of the decree should be entered as with the deposit made by the first defendant the scaled down amount was paid up. But this view was not accepted by the Supreme Court. It was observed that it is not open to the executing Court to go behind the decree, and it was its plain duty to give effect to the terms of the decree that was already passed, it was also pointed out that though under the general law, the mortgage-decree was one and indivisible, exceptions to the rule are admitted only where the integrity of the mortgage was broken at the instance of the mortgagee himself. The Madras Act IV of 1938, however, made a further inroad as it was not intended to give relief to the debtors in general, but only to debtors who are agriculturists. Therefore it follows that, if some of the other debtors are agriculturists and others are not, it was the duty of the Court to pass a decree for the full amount against the non-agriculturists and for the scaled down amount against the agriculturists-debtors. The Supreme Court accepted the principle of the decision in Ramier v. Srinivasiah3. But the Supreme Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the general question whether a non-agriculturist purchaser of a portion or whole of the equity of redemption is entitled to the benefit of the scaling down at the instance of the agriculturist-mortgagor. The Supreme Court accepted the principle of the decision in Ramier v. Srinivasiah3. But the Supreme Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the general question whether a non-agriculturist purchaser of a portion or whole of the equity of redemption is entitled to the benefit of the scaling down at the instance of the agriculturist-mortgagor. This was particularly so because in the case before their Lordships, the question arose only in execution of the decree, and not in the suit itself. This decision, therefore, does not in any way alter or affect the principles, which have been established by a number of cases already referred to in this Court. It was not open to us therefore, to go behind a catena of decisions, which have formally established the principles applicable to cases of this kind. In the present case it is an admitted fact that the agricultirst mortgagors own now no interest in the property and that the personal covenant against them became barred long ago. Though they may be persons entitled to redeem the mortgage under the general law, they are not however according to the decisions already referred to, entitled to seek the aid of the Act to have the debt scaled down. If they are not entitled to invoke the benefit of the Act, we fail to see how the plaintiff can get any advantage under the principles, which have been established in this case. The facts of the case, which came up before the Full Bench of this Court, are analogous to the facts in the case, which was before the Supreme Court. For the reasons already stated, we think the Full Bench decision (Venkatavadhamulu v. Bachi Ramayya1 also does not affect any change in the principles above stated. The plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to redeem the mortgage by paying only the scaled down amount as decreed in O.S. No. 300 of 1942. The decision of the Court below is affirmed and the second appeal is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.