Judgment :- 1. This is a second appeal by the judgment-debtor from an order in execution of a decree for redemption of usufructuary mortgage. The respondents who had acquired the equity of redemption obtained a decree on 10.10.1952. When they applied for delivery of possession, the judgment-debtor objected, contending that he was a Kudikidappukaran under Act 22 of 1124 and that he could not be evicted. This objection was overruled by the courts below and he has preferred this second appeal. 2. The first point raised by Shri Narayanan Potti, learned counsel for the appellant, was that the courts below had no jurisdiction to decide whether Kudiyirippu rights as claimed by the appellant really existed. Basing his argument on the dictum of Willis, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 C.B. (H.S.) 336, 356) that when statute creates a liability not existing in common law and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it, the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute, it was contended that since S.12 of the Travancore Prevention of Eviction Act 22 of 24 provides that Government shall cause a register of Kudikidappukaran to be maintained in each Pakuthy and that Government shall have power to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions contained in S. 12, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide whether a claim for Kudiyirippu is valid or not and that the sole remedy of the owner of the land holder was to raise his objection at the time of preparation of the register. It was stated that the power to make rules under the Act was the special remedy under the Act, as the rules when made would contain suitable provisions for hearing objections of land-holders or owners. It was stated that rules have not yet been made and that the registers have not yet been prepared. All that the appellant can now say is that he has made an application as contemplated in S.12 of the Act, to be registered as a Kudikidappukaran in the properties sought to be redeemed. I am unable to accept the appellant's argument for more reasons than one. All that the appellant can now say is that he has made an application as contemplated in S.12 of the Act, to be registered as a Kudikidappukaran in the properties sought to be redeemed. I am unable to accept the appellant's argument for more reasons than one. A section in the statute for making rules, with a possibility that such rules will contain suitable provisions for the adjudication of the existence of disputed Kudiyirippu rights, cannot in my opinion oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question. S. 9 of the Act is as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law to the contrary, all claims in respect of any Kudiyirippu arising in any suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property shall be tried and settled in such suit, and the decree shall contain a description of the Kudiyirippu on any such property sufficient for the purpose of fixing the location thereof." It was argued that the clause "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law to the contrary" makes it clear that the section excludes the provisions of this Act and that a restricted interpretation was to be given to the words "All claims in respect of Kudiyirippu". The restricted construction was that the section was intended to apply only to cases where the existence of the Kudiyirippu was not in dispute, the 'claims' contemplated being such as those arising between rival heirs of a Kudikidappukaran. In my opinion what S. 9 means is that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law which would exclude consideration of the question of the existence of a Kudiyirippu in any suit for recovery of possession, courts are bound to adjudicate on the same if raised by any of the parties. S. 9 is an answer to the question of jurisdiction raised on behalf of the appellant. On the merits, it was contended that the execution court did not afford an opportunity to the defendant to adduce evidence. The documents filed in the case show that the course adopted by court was perfectly correct. At the time of mortgage the property was in the possession of a lessee against whom the respondents had filed a suit for eviction. The documents filed in the case show that the course adopted by court was perfectly correct. At the time of mortgage the property was in the possession of a lessee against whom the respondents had filed a suit for eviction. It was expressly stated in the deed that in case the equity of redemption was sold by the mortgagors at any time, the defendant was to surrender possession, notwithstanding the term in the deed. On behalf of the appellant it was stated that sometime before the mortgage, the owner had permitted him to have the use and occupation of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead in the property. But what is actually stated in paragraph 7 of the objection petition is that the defendant had made a request to the original owner for grant of the land and the old building which stood therein for habitation and industrial purposes and that the mortgagor had agreed to the same and had accordingly given the property on usufructuary mortgage (AiALvWLwR(DaO3/4M RRWvwU fgOWpOU RpVfO). This makes it clear that the property was given to the defendant for the first time under the mortgage. It is therefore clear that the relationship between them was that of a mortgagor and mortgagee and not owner and Kudikidappukaran. This and the other reasons stated in the judgment of the courts below support the finding that the appellant was not a kudikidappukaran. No interference is therefore called for. In the result the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.