Judgment.- In Original Suit No.357 of 1944 on the file of the District Munsiff of Vellore a preliminary mortgage decree was passed on 8th November, 1944. The suit was by the first mortgagees making the mortgagor the first defendant, and the puisne mortgagees, defendants 2 to 5, parties to the action. The preliminary decree provided inter alia that if the defendants 2 to 5 paid into Court the amount adjudged due to the plaintiffs the first mortgagees and if the first defendant mortgagor made default in making the said payment, defendants 2 to 5, shall be at liberty to apply to the Court to keep the plaintiffs’ mortgage alive for their benefit and to apply for a final decree in the same manner as the plaintiffs might have done under clause 4 thereof. Subsequently, a fresh preliminary decree was passed on the 19th March, 1945 which also provided for an application by defendants 2 to 5 for the passing of a final decree after paying into Court the amount due to the plaintiffs. On 27th April, 1945, defendants 2 to 5 made an application, I.A.No.537 of 1945, for the passing of a final decree ; but they did so without paying into Court the amount due to the plaintiffs. This application was, however, not pressed and was dismissed on 14th September, 1943. They filed another application, I.A.No.489 of 1946, again praying for the passing of a final decree, but again without paying the amount due to the plaintiffs. The petition was dismissed on 26th June, 1946, on the ground that they were not entitled to a final decree unless and until they paid the amount due to the plaintiffs. The Court also observed that they might renew the application if they liked after paying the said amount. Subsequently the defendants 2 to 5 paid into Court the amount due to the plaintiff and applied by I.A.No.1613 of 1946 for the passing of a final decree. The first defendant-mortgagor, opposed the application on the ground that in view of the dismissal of the two prior applications, namely, I.A.No.537 of 1945 and I.A.No.489 of 1946, the present application was not maintainable. Both the Courts below upheld this objection and held that the present application was incompetent on account of the dismissal of the prior applications. The first defendant-mortgagor, opposed the application on the ground that in view of the dismissal of the two prior applications, namely, I.A.No.537 of 1945 and I.A.No.489 of 1946, the present application was not maintainable. Both the Courts below upheld this objection and held that the present application was incompetent on account of the dismissal of the prior applications. They came to this conclusion on the authority of two decisions of this Court, viz., Subbalakshmi Ammal v. Ramanuja Chetti 1, and Mummadi Venkatiah v. Boganatham Venkatasubbiah 2 , wherein it was held that when an application for final decree is dismissed even erroneously the party’s remedy is only to appeal against that order and if he did not do so, a second application" for final decree was barred. In my opinion the Courts below completely overlooked the essential difference between the facts in these two cases and in the present case. In neither of these two cases does it appear that the person applying for final decree was not entitled to apply on the date of his application. They were cases where it was urged that the prior application had been wrongly dismissed. The learned Judges point out and if I may say so with great respect I entirely agree with these decisions which are binding on me that if the party considered the order dismissing his application to be erroneous his remedy was to appeal against the order, and if he did not do so, a second application would be barred. In the present case on the dates on which defendants 2 to 5 made the two prior applications they were not entitled to ask for the passing of a final decree because they had not paid the amount due to the plaintiffs. They became entitled to apply for the passing of a final decree only after making the payment, and after they had clone so, the only application they made was the present application. The principle of the above decisions would not apply to the facts in this case. The second appeal must therefore be allowed and the application made by the appellants should be restored to file and a final decree passed by the trial Court. The application is accordingly remitted to the Court of the District Munsif of Vellore. The appellants will have their costs of the second appeal. The second appeal must therefore be allowed and the application made by the appellants should be restored to file and a final decree passed by the trial Court. The application is accordingly remitted to the Court of the District Munsif of Vellore. The appellants will have their costs of the second appeal. The court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal will be refunded. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.