Judgment :- 1. The only question arising for decision in this second appeal by the judgment debtor is whether the amendment of the decree gives a fresh starting point of limitation. The judgment-debtor objected to execution of the decree on the ground of limitation, contending that the amendment was a formal one relating to the description of the 1st plaintiff and that the decree was an executable one in its unamended form or that the amendment was unnecessary. Though there was divergence of judicial opinion at one time, it may now be taken as settled law that the words of Art. 182 are to be given their plain meaning. Following the construction of the word "Appeal" in Art.182(2) by the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey. (AIR 1932 PC 165) it was held by Beasley, C.J. in Lekshmikanta Rao v. Medella Ramayya (AIR 1935 Madras 97): "It is argued here that the amendment of the decree was merely a formal one and that the final decree was an executable one even in its unamended form. In our view, we are not concerned with that. The fact that the final decree had already become barred or that the amendment applied for was unnecessary were matters to be dealt with by the Court to which the application has been made for the amendment and we agree with the view of the District Judge that the effect of Art. 182(4) Limitation Act, must be that it is an answer to any objection taken with regard to the plea of limitation so far as the earlier final decree is concerned. The words of Art. 182 (4), Limitation Act, are where the decree has been amended a period of three years' limitation is given starting from the date of the amendment of the decree. It was the amended decree that the decree-holder sought by his subsequent applications to execute. We propose to give the words of that article of the Limitation Act their plain meaning following the principle of construction laid down by the Privy Council in 1932 PC 165 Equitable considerations are out of place in the construction of the statute of Limitation and the strict grammatical meaning of the words must be given effect to". 2. This view has been adopted by other High Courts also. 2. This view has been adopted by other High Courts also. A Full Bench of the Travancore High Court accepted this principle in Subramonia Pillai v. Kali Pillai (1946 TLR 956). It is not competent for the court executing the decree to sit in appeal on the decision of the Court amending the decree. The order of the court below is correct and this Second Appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs. dismissed.