Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs who are two in number are the appellants. The suit is for setting aside alienations relating to the plaint properties and for partition of plaintiffs' 2/11 share in them. It was instituted in forma pauperis. Plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 9 are members of an undivided Nair Tarwad. Plaint schedule properties which are 13 in number belong to the tarwad. Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are the children of deceased Karthiayani Amma. They had another brother Bhaskaran by name who died in 1116. Defendants 6 and 7 are the children of the 4th defendant. The 6th defendant died after the institution of the suit. Defendants 8 and 9 are the children of the 5th defendant. The alienations impeached are those covered by Exts. C, D, E, G, Q R, II, XIII, XV, XXIII and XXIV. Ext. C is a mortgage relating to item No. 11 for Rs. 140 executed defendants 1, 2,4 and deceased Karthiayani Amma in favour of the 10th defendant on 8.9.1101. Ext. D is another mortgage relating to item No. 5 for Rs.190 executed by the same persons in favour of the 17th defendant on 15.2.1102. Ext. E is a sale deed for item No. 13 for Rs.15 executed by them in favour of the 22nd defendant on 31.9.1105. Ext. G is a sale deed for item No. 12 executed by them for Rs.150 in favour of the 18th defendant on 13.6.1102. Ext. Q is another sale deed for item No. 11 for Rs. 150 executed by them in favour of the 20th defendant on 16.11.1103. Ext. R is a sale deed relating to item No. 6 executed by them in favour of the 23rd defendant for Rs.54 on 2.5.1103. Ext. II is a sale deed for item No.1 for Rs. 1,800 executed by them in favour of the 19th defendant on 30.9.1102. Ext. XIII is another sale deed for items 8,9 and 10 executed by them in favour of the 19th defendant for Rs. 620 on 21.11.1103. Ext. XV is a mortgage relating to item No. 7 for Rs. 558 executed by the same persons in favour of the 11th defendant and Madhavi Amma, deceased mother of defendants 11 to 15, on 25.10.1101. This mortgage right was sub-mortgaged to DW. 8 and another who assigned the sub-mortgage right to the 24th defendant. Ext. 620 on 21.11.1103. Ext. XV is a mortgage relating to item No. 7 for Rs. 558 executed by the same persons in favour of the 11th defendant and Madhavi Amma, deceased mother of defendants 11 to 15, on 25.10.1101. This mortgage right was sub-mortgaged to DW. 8 and another who assigned the sub-mortgage right to the 24th defendant. Ext. XXIII is a sale deed for item No. 3 for Rs.98 executed by defendants 1, 2,4 and Karthiayani Amma in favour of the 21st defendant on 5.9.1104. Ext. XXIV is another sale deed for items 2 and 4 for Rs. 244 executed by defendants 1 to 5 in favour of the 21st defendant on 23.6.1103. It is alleged that these documents were executed without consideration and tarwad necessity and that they are not binding on the plaintiffs' 2/11 share in the properties covered by them. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek for recovery of possession of their 2/11 share in the plaint properties with mesne profits. 2. Defendants 3, 8 and 9 filed a joint written statement supporting the plaintiffs and claiming their share in the properties. Defendants 6 and 7 also filed a joint written statement supporting the plaintiffs and claiming their share. The 19th defendant contended that Exts. II and XIII executed in his favour were fully supported by consideration and tarwad necessity and that they were not liable to be set aside. The 21st defendant contended that Exts. XXIII and XXIV executed in his favour were also supported by consideration and tarwad necessity and that those documents were not liable to be set aside. The 24th defendant contended that the mortgage, Ext. XV, relating to item No. 7 was supported by consideration and necessity and that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The other alienees did not contest the suit. On that ground the court below set aside Ext. C (in favour of the 10th defendant), Ext. D (in favour of the 17th defendant), Ext. E (in favour of the 22nd defendant), Ext. G (in favour of the 18th defendant), Ext. Q (in favour of the 20th defendant) and Ext. R (in favour of the 23rd defendant) and allowed the plaintiffs to recover possession of 2/11 share in the properties covered by those documents. As regards the remaining documents, namely, Exts. II and XIII (in favour of the 19th defendant) Exts. G (in favour of the 18th defendant), Ext. Q (in favour of the 20th defendant) and Ext. R (in favour of the 23rd defendant) and allowed the plaintiffs to recover possession of 2/11 share in the properties covered by those documents. As regards the remaining documents, namely, Exts. II and XIII (in favour of the 19th defendant) Exts. XXIII and XXIV (in favour of the 21st defendant) and Ext. XV in favour of the 11th defendant and his mother, it was held that they were fully supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. It was also held that the suit for setting aside those documents was not maintainable by reason of the fact that other members of the tarwad who were minors at the time of the execution of the documents had not sued for setting aside the same within the statutory period of limitation. The suit was, therefore, dismissed with costs as regards those alienations. 4. The appeal relates to the alienations which were not set aside by the Court below, namely, Exts. II and XIII in favour of the 19th defendant, Exts. XXIII and XXIV in favour of the 21st defendant and Ext. XV in favour of the 11th defendant and his mother. It was contended that these documents are not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity and that the court below has gone wrong in holding that the suit is not maintainable by reason of the fact that the other members of the tarwad who had come of age had not sued for setting them aside within the period of limitation prescribed by law. According to learned counsel for the appellants the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the latter part of S. 8 of the Travancore Limitation Act (S.7 of the Indian Act). The argument is that none of the other members of the tarwad who omitted to sue within three years of their attaining majority was capable of giving a discharge within the meaning of the section without the concurrence of the other members so far as the alienations in question are concerned. 5. Of the five alienations which are impeached in this appeal four were effected more than 12 years before the date of the suit. Ext. XV is dated 25.10.1101, Ext. 1130.9.1102, Ext. XIII 21.11.1103 and Ext. XXIII 5.9.1104. The suit was instituted on 16.11.1118. 5. Of the five alienations which are impeached in this appeal four were effected more than 12 years before the date of the suit. Ext. XV is dated 25.10.1101, Ext. 1130.9.1102, Ext. XIII 21.11.1103 and Ext. XXIII 5.9.1104. The suit was instituted on 16.11.1118. So far as these documents are concerned the question for consideration is whether the plaintiffs have forfeited their right to sue for setting them aside by reason of the fact that the other members of the tarwad who were minors on the date of the respective documents omitted to sue for setting them aside within the statutory period. As regards Ext. XXIV it was executed on 23.6.1118, namely, a few months before the date of the suit. Therefore, so far as that document is concerned no question of limitation arises. In the case of the other documents, if the question of limitation is decided against the appellants it will not be necessary to go into the question whether those documents are supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. 6. On the dates of the execution of Exts. XV, II, XIII and XXIII there were as minors in the plaintiffs' tarwad, besides the plaintiffs, Bhaskaran and defendants 3, 5 and 6. Of these, Bhaskaran came of age in 1106 and the 5th defendant in 1109 as can be seen from the ages given in Exts. II, VI, VII and IX to XI. Bhaskaran died in 1116 only. The third defendant was 22 on the date of suit according to the age given in the plaint. The 6th defendant also was 22 on the date of suit according to the plaint. It was thus be seen that four members of the tarwad who were minors on the dates of the impugned alienations came of age more than three years before the date of suit. The question for consideration is whether their failure to sue to set aside the alienations within the period prescribed by law would bar the plaintiffs' right to sue for that relief. 7. The question depends upon the interpretation of S. 8 of the Travancore Limitation Act, corresponding to S. 7 of the Indian Act. The question for consideration is whether their failure to sue to set aside the alienations within the period prescribed by law would bar the plaintiffs' right to sue for that relief. 7. The question depends upon the interpretation of S. 8 of the Travancore Limitation Act, corresponding to S. 7 of the Indian Act. It provides: "Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all. But where no such discharge can be given time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of others or until the disability has ceased." According to learned counsel for the appellants the first part of the section will not apply to this case and it is the second part that applies, the reason being that those members of the tarwad who came of age more than three years before the date of suit could not give a valid discharge in the sense contemplated by the section without the concurrence of the plaintiffs. This question was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Narayanan Potti v. Sekharan (ILR 1950 TC 467). It is true that it was a case of Hindu Mithakshara family and not of a marumakkathayam tarwad. But it was observed in that case that the same principle would apply to marumakkathayam tarwards also. This is what was held in that case: "S. 8 of the Limitation Act is to the effect that where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit is under a disability and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all, and where no such discharge can be given time will not run against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased. The term'discharge' used in the section is not confined to the discharge of a pecuniary liability but has a wider significance and includes release of rights in respect of immovable property and even the right to institute a suit. The term'discharge' used in the section is not confined to the discharge of a pecuniary liability but has a wider significance and includes release of rights in respect of immovable property and even the right to institute a suit. The right of junior members of a joint family or an undivided tarwad to impeach alienations made by the Manager or Karnavan, as the case may be, is a right common to all such junior members. Any one of them is entitled to institute a suit on behalf of the joint family or the tarward to set aside such alienations. The adult members in the joint family could effect a valid discharge of that right by either electing to institute a suit or not to institute a suit. The concurrence of the minor members in the joint family is not necessary for effecting such a valid discharge by the adult member or members in the family. It follows, therefore, that the right of suit available to junior members of a joint family to set aside alienations made by the Manager is governed by the first part of S. 8 of the Limitation Act and that, when any of them is under no disability to institute such a suit, the period of limitation will run against all the members in the joint family." The decision of a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Pankajakshi v. Krishnan (1947 TLR 320) and that of a Full Bench of the Cochin High Court in Ikkanda Warrier v. Parameswaran Elayath (38 Cochin 379) were followed by this Court in the above case. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that these decisions are opposed to the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Jawahar Singh v. Udaya Parkash (1926 PC 16). That was a case under the Hindu Law. The suit was to set aside an alienation by the father. Of the three sons, the eldest had attained majority more than three years before the date of suit. The two younger sons instituted the suit joining as defendants the father and the eldest son. As the father was alive the eldest son was not the manager of the family. The Allahabad High Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The Privy Council in one brief sentence concurred with the view of the High Court. The two younger sons instituted the suit joining as defendants the father and the eldest son. As the father was alive the eldest son was not the manager of the family. The Allahabad High Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The Privy Council in one brief sentence concurred with the view of the High Court. This is all that was said in the judgment on the question: "On the question of limitation Their Lordships concur with the High Court." There was no discussion of the question by their Lordships. In fact it was conceded by counsel for the alienee that the plea of limitation could not be sustained. This decision was differently interpreted by different High Courts in India. It had been held that in the case of a Hindu Mithakshara family only the manager can give a valid discharge under S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act so as to bind the other members of the family and that, therefore, it is only in case the person who omits to sue within the statutory period was the manager of the family that the first part of the section will apply so as to make the period of limitation run against all the members of the family. Reference may be made to Jaddu Podi v. Chokkappu Boddu (1934 Madras 469), Bhakthavatsaludu v. Venkatanarasimha (1940 Mad. 530) and Subba Rao v. Pattabhiramiah (AIR 1945 Mad. 498). In the last mentioned case Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ. held: "It seems to us well established that although a suit by the younger of two brothers filed within three years of his attaining majority would be barred by limitation if the elder brother had failed to sue within three years of his majority if the former was the manager of family, S. 7, Limitation Act, would not operate as a bar if the adult brother was not the manager of the family during the relevant period." On the basis of these rulings it was argued that since none of the junior members of the tarwad who omitted to sue within three years of their attaining majority was the Karnavan of the tarwad the first part of S. 7 of the Limitation Act (Indian) corresponding to S. 8 of the Travancore Act would not apply to the case. We are unable to accept this argument. We are unable to accept this argument. It is opposed to the principle laid down in the Full Bench cases referred to above and to the uniform trend of rulings of the Travancore High Court beginning from 4 TLR 34, Parameswaran v. Mathen, Ormsby, J. held in that case: "Where in a Malabar tarwad there are adult members competent to contest an alienation of tarwad property, and they neglect to do so for a period of 12 years in is not competent to a member who happened to be a minor on the date of alienation to reopen the question for its validity after the expiry of that period". Narayana Pillai, J., the other learned judge who took part in the decision observed: "The right to bring an action to set aside an improper alienation made by a karnavan is the right of the tarwad, and the tarwad, at the time of the alienation in question was represented by competent adult members, both male and female. They one and all allowed the alienation to go unchallenged for over 12 years and the tarwad's right to sue became thereby barred (Cl. 7, S. 2 of the Limitation Regulation). The plaintiff, who has no separate right in the property, as distinguished from that of the tarwad, cannot claim the benefit of S. 9 of the Regulation which applies to cases where the person suing has an individual right of his own and was under legal disability when the cause of action first accrued to him". This decision was followed in Neelakantan Kesavan v. Mathevan Kesavan & Ann (12 TLR 99). The two cases were followed in Kesavan v. Govindan (21 TLR 174 FB). All the three cases were followed in Mathevan Krishnan v. Marthandan Krishnan (23 TLR 139). They were again cited with approval in Madhavan v. Padmanabhan (35 TLR 26) and followed in Subramonia Pillai v. Kumara Pillai (31 TLJ 159). The next case in which the question was dealt with is Krishna Kurup v. Thankamma (1947 TLR 106). It was held in that case that the term 'discharge' as used in S. 8, Travancore Limitation Act, includes a release of rights in immovable property or a release of other rights, as for instance, a right to institute a suit. 9. The question was discussed in detail in Vaikuntan Nambudiri v. Krishnan Nambudiri (1947 TLR 544). It was held in that case that the term 'discharge' as used in S. 8, Travancore Limitation Act, includes a release of rights in immovable property or a release of other rights, as for instance, a right to institute a suit. 9. The question was discussed in detail in Vaikuntan Nambudiri v. Krishnan Nambudiri (1947 TLR 544). Abraham, J. observed: "The 'discharge' in this section is not confined to discharge of a liability in the nature of a debt alone. There might be a liability so called in this instance as a liability to be sued in respect of the right of the tarwad to set aside the mortgage deed. That right of the tarwad may be exercised by each of the junior members; and when a junior member exercises that right, it is still on behalf of the tarwad so that the suit might be said to be the suit of the tarwad for asserting its right. Such a suit, when successfully defended, releases the liability of the alienee to be further sued in respect of the same right by the tarwad through any of its members-unless, of course, the prior suit had been fraudulently or collusively left off. Thus a suit by one of the junior members releases the liability of the alienee to be sued - which same idea has been expressed with reference to the right to sue on behalf of the tarwad in form adopted that a'discharge' of the right has been made". The learned judge further observed: "The second question is whether the major members or any of them who were or was capable of suing to set aside the alienation, could have given a valid discharge of the right or liability. The authority in this court seems to be conclusive on the question and we propose to discuss the Case Law in other jurisdictions only out of respect for the learned arguments for the appellant. It has already been stated that a suit by a junior member to set aside alienations by the karnavan is but a suit on behalf of the tarwad which concludes the right of other members except on proof of fraud or collusion in the conduct of the same. It has already been stated that a suit by a junior member to set aside alienations by the karnavan is but a suit on behalf of the tarwad which concludes the right of other members except on proof of fraud or collusion in the conduct of the same. In Mundan Raman's case (21 TLR 41) it was observed that where a suit to set aside a decree against the tarward or an alienation of tarwad property has been instituted by the karnavan or by some of the members on behalf of the tarwad a second suit would be barred by res judicata. It is the tarwad right that is being agitated by any or all of the members, and the benefit of the suit goes to the tarwad. A bonafide suit in such circumstances must be considered a suit on behalf of the tarwad. As the tarwad would be entitled to give a discharge, the inaction of the junior member or members capable of exercising the right must be deemed to have affected a discharge on behalf of the tarwad which did not choose to exercise the right in that manner." The argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants that it is only in case the person who omits to sue is the manager or the karvanan that the first part of S. 8 of the Limitation Act (Travancore) would apply was met by the learned judge in the following words: "The learned Advocate for the appellant contended that the above cases left out an important aspect of consideration, namely, that the only member who would be competent to give a discharge in the circumstances would be the next managing member if he comes into office within the time. In other words, the person who failed to sue must be a person who was in himself competent to give a discharge. This was stated partly on the authority of 21 TLR 174, which was but a case of alienation of movables by a karnavathy and the question in the case was the powers of a female karnavan. Partly also the argument rested on British Indian Cases to be presently noticed. This was stated partly on the authority of 21 TLR 174, which was but a case of alienation of movables by a karnavathy and the question in the case was the powers of a female karnavan. Partly also the argument rested on British Indian Cases to be presently noticed. In Jawahir Singh v. Udai Parkash one of the minors at the time of the alienation had failed to sue within time after he came to age: but he and two other minors who had attained majority after the expiry of the period of limitation sued together to set aside the alienation. The trial judge dismissed the suit as barred, but in appeal the Allahabad High Court relied on the decisions of that Court and allowed the suit, differing from the view taken in Madras in 16 Madras 436, and 38 Madras 118. The judgment of the Privy Council on this point was merely in the following words: "On the question of limitation Their Lordships concur with the High Court". The appellant had conceded that there was no bar under the relevant section. We do not think that the case could be relied on for the appellant's contention. The case cannot be an authority for the position that the manager of a joint family cannot give a discharge in such cases. That the manger can give a discharge has been held in Jaddu Pashi v. Chokkapa Bhodu (1934 Madras 469). The case in 1940 Mad. 530 is authority only for the position that the eldest member of a joint family is presumably the manager thereof- and can give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the other members. But that the Hindu Manager can give a discharge, does not involve the theory that only the managing member of a Malabar tarwad can in any circumstance given a discharge effective for the purpose of S. 8. That other members of the tarwad by their conduct or acquiescence can give a discharge so as to bind minors who later came of age has been established by this Court in the rulings cited above. We unhesitatingly follow these rulings and hold that the plaintiff's suit is barred." 10. The question was again considered by a Full Bench in Pankajakshi v. Krishnan (1947 TLR 320). We unhesitatingly follow these rulings and hold that the plaintiff's suit is barred." 10. The question was again considered by a Full Bench in Pankajakshi v. Krishnan (1947 TLR 320). This case was decided after the decision of Vaikuntan Nambudiri v. Krisnan Nambudiri (1947 TLR 544) Although it was reported earlier. The argument advanced by learned counsel for appellants in this case was advanced in that case also. Krishnaswamy Iyer, C.J. met the argument in the following words: "The case of an unjustified alienation of tarwad property is a spoliation and a breach of trust. It is a tort committed against the tarwad. The task of setting aside the wrongful alienation and to obtain judicial remedies for tarwad protection cannot be entrusted by Law into the hands of the very tort¬feasor who committed the wrong. The robust common sense of the law would abhor such a situation. The alienating karnavan or manager is necessarily relieved of his representative position in the matter of the adjudication of the binding character of the alienation that is questioned. The alienation is either lawful or unlawful. If it is lawful a suit by any of the junior members questioning the alienation fails. If it is unlawful the alienation is set aside at the instance of any of the members of the tarwad who for the purposes of questioning an unlawful alienation is permitted to occupy a representative position qua ad the tarwad Under the law and the Marumakkathayam usage the karnavan loses his right to represent the tarwad only in respect of acts which are beyond his competence to do and any member of the tarwad may take on himself the karnavan's duty of protecting the affairs of the tarwad by establishing a justifiable claim to set aside an act of spoliation or an unwarranted alienation of the karnavan". The learned Chief Justice further observed at page 324: "Where one member brings a suit to set aside an unequal partition or an alienation and a judgment is obtained on a fair trial, the decision becomes res judicata binding on all the members. The ground is that a common right was agitated and a fair decision has been obtained which will bind all persons having such right. The ground is that a common right was agitated and a fair decision has been obtained which will bind all persons having such right. Where no suit has been instituted at all, but one available member of the tarwad who was sui juris and who could have challenged by suit the alienation or partition did not file a suit in time and allows the cause of action to become barred, the loss of the cause of action and the right of suit is the loss of the entire tarwad and no subsequent suit could be brought by anybody else. The bar arises by virtue of the provision of substantive law which gives the right to any major member to represent the tarwad as against the breach of trust of the karnavan. This I understand to be the true jural basis of the one opportunity rule as it has been compendiously described in judicial decisions". Sankarasubba Iyer, J. dealt with the question in the following manner: "The word 'discharge' in the Section means any form of quittance by which the rights and liabilities of the parties can be put an end to. All that is necessary is that the quittance must be one which can be given without the concurrence of the plaintiffs. When the rights is a joint right, the omission of any joint owner of that right to vindicate the same within the period of limitation, concludes the other joint owners also. Such omission operates as an effective discharge, for which the concurrence of the other joint owners is not necessary. The object underlying S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act was lucidly explained by Justice Seshagiri Aiyar in C. Varamma v. Gopaladasayya (41 Madras 659): "The principle of that Section is that if there are some persons in exercise who are adults who could have safeguarded the common rights of themselves and of others similarly situated, the failure of the persons who are to litigate the right will start the cause of action not only against themselves but also against persons in similar circumstances". "In the words of Fawcett, J. in Babu Tatya Desai v. Bala Ravji Desai (45 Bombay 446 at 453): "The main object of the Legislature in S. 7 is to limit the indulgence which is otherwise given to minors, so that if there are several minors who are entitled to claim the benefit of S. 6 (Indian Limitation Act) that concession does not extend to cover the whole period of time up to the youngest of the minors becoming a major, but can only be availed of by the eldest of them". The learned judge further observed at page 327: "Where the karnavan and the other adult members have not exercised the right of suit within the period of limitation, a minor member cannot agitate the right. There may be transactions which are participated in by a karnavan alone or by a karnavan along with other members of the tarwad, to the detriment of the tarwad. By being parties, the karnavan and such of the members as have taken part in the transaction, disable themselves from taking steps for setting aside the transaction, for the benefit of the tarwad. Such right devolves on the other members of the tarwad. When these people do not exercise the right, the right is lost to the tarwad and no minor member who comes of age can challenge it by way of suit. The reason for this rue, though not stated so in those terms, appears to be either the senior-most man in the tarwad, after the karnavan and those members who have disabled themselves from acting for the benefit of the tarwad, can be treated in Law as the inchoate karnavan competent to act for the tarwad or he and the other adult members not parties to the transaction are competent to represent the tarwad". 11. The Madras High Court also has taken the same view in Moidin Kutty v. Beevikutti Ummah (18 Madras 38) and Devaki v. Kannan (AIR 1941 Madras 678) which are both cases of Marumakkathayam tarwad. The Cochin High Court discussed the question in Ikkanda Warrier v. Parameswaran Elayath (38 Cochin 379, FB) already referred to. 11. The Madras High Court also has taken the same view in Moidin Kutty v. Beevikutti Ummah (18 Madras 38) and Devaki v. Kannan (AIR 1941 Madras 678) which are both cases of Marumakkathayam tarwad. The Cochin High Court discussed the question in Ikkanda Warrier v. Parameswaran Elayath (38 Cochin 379, FB) already referred to. In that case the majority of the Judges, Krishnaswamy Iyengar, C.J. and Koshi, J. (as he then was) took the same view as that taken by the Travancore High Court in the cases referred to above while Krishna Menon, J. took a different view. We find no reason why we should not follow the principle laid down in these cases. We, therefore, hold that the suit is barred as regards the prayer for setting aside Exts. XV, II, XIII and XXIII. In this view of the case it is not necessary to consider the question whether those documents are supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. We agree with the court below in dismissing the suit as regards the prayer for setting arise the alienations covered by these documents. 12. As regards the sale deed, Ext. XXIV, the suit is within time. It is, therefore, necessary to go into the question whether the document is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. It was executed by defendants 1 to 5. On the date of the sale deed plaintiffs and defendants 6 and 7 were majors and they have not joined the execution of the document. Defendants 6 and 7 have impeached it in their written statement. The sale deed offends S. 25 of the Nair Act which provides that without the written consent of all the major members of the tarwad no karnavan or other managing member can sell immovable property belonging to the tarwad. The sale deed has, therefore, to be set aside on the sole ground that it was not executed with the written consent of all the major members of the tarwad. In the circumstances it is not necessary to consider the question whether the document is supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. It has, however, to be observed that plaint items 2 and 4 covered by the sale deed had been outstanding on a mortgage, Ext. XXV, dated 27.3.1094. This mortgage debt is recited in the partition in the tarwad, Ext. I, dated 29.12.1099. It is therefore, a debt binding on the tarwad. It has, however, to be observed that plaint items 2 and 4 covered by the sale deed had been outstanding on a mortgage, Ext. XXV, dated 27.3.1094. This mortgage debt is recited in the partition in the tarwad, Ext. I, dated 29.12.1099. It is therefore, a debt binding on the tarwad. The 21st defendant has acquired this mortgage right also. It is the first item of consideration in Ext. XXIV. Although the sale deed, Ext. XXIV, has to be held to be invalid the 21st defendant is entitled to be in possession of plaint items 2 and 4 as per the mortgage, Ext. XXV, until that mortgage is redeemed by a separate suit brought for the purpose. Subject to this direction, we set aside the sale deed, Ext. XXIV, and give the plaintiffs a preliminary decree for partition of 2/11 share in the equity of redemption of items 2 and 4. 13. In the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the court below except to the extent mentioned in paragraph 12 above, and dismiss the appeal in other respects. The plaintiffs will pay the costs of defendants 19 and 24 in this Court. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 21 will suffer their respective costs both here and in the Court below. Dismissed.