Judgement SHARMA, J.:- This is an application by the unsuccessful respondents for leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment and decree of this court dated 2-1-1952. When the application was originally heard, two following questions raised were considered very important and we therefore referred them for decision to a Full Bench: "1 Whether in a case which involves a question of great public or private importance certificate for leave to appeal under Art.133(1)(c), Constitution of India and S.109(c), Civil P.C. can be given, even though the valuation is less than that prescribed by Cls.(a) and (b) of Art.133(1), Constitution of India and S.110, Civil P.C. and the point in dispute is measurable by money? 2 Whether a decision on the point of res judicata when there are different views of different High Courts on the point can be said to raise questions of great public and private importance?" 2. The Full Bench has given the following answers to these questions: "1 If a case involves a question of great public or private importance, certificate for leave to appeal under Art.133(1)(c) of the Constitution, and S.109(c), Civil P.C., can be given, even though the valuation is less than that prescribed by Cls.(a) and (b) of Art.133(1), Constitution of India, and S.110, Civil P. C, and the point in dispute is measurable by money. 2. Generally speaking a point of res judicata may not be said to raise questions of great public or private importance, but that sometimes it may raise questions of great public or private importance, and that in this particular case, the point of res judicata, which has been raised, does raise a question of great public importance." 3. Learned counsel for the successful appellant however argued that because the previous suit was dismissed on the ground of non-joinder, therefore, the decision about the interpretation of the rent note need not operate as res judicata in the present case. It may be noted that the interpretation of the document had a bearing on the question of non-joinder of the parties also. The important question was the interpretation of the document and it has been held by the Pull Bench that the question of res judicata as raised in this case does raise a question of great public importance. It may be noted that the interpretation of the document had a bearing on the question of non-joinder of the parties also. The important question was the interpretation of the document and it has been held by the Pull Bench that the question of res judicata as raised in this case does raise a question of great public importance. We do not think that after the decision of the Full Bench we shall be justified in withholding the leave to appeal on the ground which has now been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant, opposite party. 4. Another question which was now raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party but was not raised when the application was last heard by this Bench is that when the present suit was filed Constitution of India was not in force and no appeal lay against the judgment or decree of this Court to any other Court. Simply because, judgment of this Court was delivered after the Constitution had come into force, it could not be appealable. This question was very carefully considered in an unreported case of - Maharaja Umrao Singh v. Shri Bhagwati Singh, Misc. No.9 of 1951 (Raj) (A), decided by this very Bench on 20-8-1951. In that case too the suit was filed before the Constitution of India came into force but the judgment of this Court was delivered after the Constitution of India had come into force. It was held on a consideration of different authorities that an appeal to the Supreme Court lay against such a judgment and decree. It was argued by Mr. R.K. Rastogi on behalf of the opposite party that in that case certain authorities were not considered. These authorities have been placed before us now. They are as follows: 1. Mashedeo Khan v. B. Mahomed Azim, 5 Ind Cas 980 (LB) (B); 2. - Gajrajlal v. Ramdinlal, 8 Ind Cas 8 (All) (C); - 3. Satghuri v. Mujidan, 15 Cal 107 (D); 4. - Suri Bhatta v. Sitarama Bhatta, 7 Mad 195 (E). 5. These authorities have been placed before us now. They are as follows: 1. Mashedeo Khan v. B. Mahomed Azim, 5 Ind Cas 980 (LB) (B); 2. - Gajrajlal v. Ramdinlal, 8 Ind Cas 8 (All) (C); - 3. Satghuri v. Mujidan, 15 Cal 107 (D); 4. - Suri Bhatta v. Sitarama Bhatta, 7 Mad 195 (E). 5. In the first mentioned case, right of appeal was given during the pendency of the suit and it was held on a consideration of Lord Macnaghtens Judgment in the case of - Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369 (F) that no appeal could be allowed because the judgment was pronounced in a suit which had started before the right of appeal was given. The judgment of Lord Macnaghten in the above mentioned case was fully considered in the case of this Division Bench referred to above. In that case certain amendment was made according to which the right to appeal, which obtained before the said amendment, was taken away. It was held that the amendment could not apply to an order in a suit which had been filed before the amendment came into force. The difference between an amendment by which the right of appeal which existed previously is lost and an amendment according to which a right of appeal is given which did not exist before was not considered in the ruling of the lower Burma Chief Court cited above. 6. In the case of - Gajrajlal v. Ramdinlal (C) referred to above an application was made to have an award of arbitrators filed in Court before the passing of the new Civil P.C. of 1908. This application was refused subsequent to the passing of the Code. It was held that in as much as there was no provision in the old Code of 1882 entitling an appeal against an order refusing an application to file an award, no appeal lay in the case. This ruling certainly applies to the facts of the present case. This application was refused subsequent to the passing of the Code. It was held that in as much as there was no provision in the old Code of 1882 entitling an appeal against an order refusing an application to file an award, no appeal lay in the case. This ruling certainly applies to the facts of the present case. But there is a later ruling of a Division Bench of the same High Court in the case of - Sarju-Singh v. Harakh Chand, AIR 1928 All 143 (G), in which it was held that an appeal lay against the order rejecting the application for setting aside the ex parte decree as the right of appeal had been .conferred by the amendment of the Agra Tenancy Act during the pendency of the suit but before the order in question was made. The Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 did not provide an appeal against an order of the Assistant Collector (First Class). The suit was filed when the Tenancy Act of 1901 was in force but the application to set aside the ex parte decree was dismissed after the last Act had been amended by the Act of 1926 and a right of appeal against the orders of the Assistant Collector (First Class) rejecting an application for the setting aside of the ex parte decree was conferred. It was held that the appeal was permissible. 7. In the case of - Satghuri v. Mujidan (D) noted above, the facts were similar as the facts of the present case. Reliance was placed simply upon the case of - Hurrosundari Devi v. Bhojohari Das, 13 Cal 86 (H). No reasoning was given why it should be considered to be a substantive right of a successful party that no appeal lay against the order made in his favour according to the law in force at the time the proceedings were started. 8. The case of - Suri Bhatta v. Sitarama Bhatta (E) cited above is not a case in which an appeal was provided during the pendency of the proceedings. In that case an appeal had been declared to have abated under the Civil P.C. of 1887 on 12-12-1881 because the appellant had not applied within 60 days of the date of the death of the respondent to bring in his representatives. In that case an appeal had been declared to have abated under the Civil P.C. of 1887 on 12-12-1881 because the appellant had not applied within 60 days of the date of the death of the respondent to bring in his representatives. An application was made in January 1882 to set aside the order and was heard after the Civil P.C. of 1882 came into force. It is obvious that in that case the order of abatement had become final before the amendment relied on by the appellant was made in the Civil P.C. This is not a case in which an order was made after the amendment of law giving the right of appeal. 9. In the Division Bench case of this Court cited above the ruling in the case of - Sarju Singh v. Harakhchand (G); - Deviprasad v. Phundanlal, AIR 1942 Oudh 291 (FB) (I) and - Govindram Seksaria v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1943 Bom 122 (J) were relied upon and it was held that a distinction should be drawn between the case where the right of appeal is taken away and the case where a right of appeal has been given. Interference with the rights of the parties is clearly of a different nature in the two cases. The right of appeal is a positive right and it accrues at the time of the filing of the suit but the absence of the right of appeal cannot be called a right at all. The prohibition of appeal by the law at the time of the institution of the suit does not amount to a substantive or existing right accruing to the parties. It is a mere negation of such rights. If the law therefore chooses to give such a right during the pendency of the case, there is no principle of law which prevents it from doing so. 10. We see no reason to depart from the view taken by this Division Bench in that case. 11. In our opinion, the case is fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court within the meaning of Art.133(1)(c), Constitution of India read with S. 109(c), Civil P.C. 12. The application is allowed and the leave is granted as prayed for. Let a certificate be issued to the applicants. 13. Mr. 11. In our opinion, the case is fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court within the meaning of Art.133(1)(c), Constitution of India read with S. 109(c), Civil P.C. 12. The application is allowed and the leave is granted as prayed for. Let a certificate be issued to the applicants. 13. Mr. D.M. Bhandari on behalf of the applicants prays that he should be permitted to furnish security at least in part otherwise than in cash or in Government securities. Mr. R.K. Rastogi on behalf of the opposite party objects to it. In our opinion, the counsel for the applicants has not been able to make out a case of special hardship. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to make any order under proviso (1) to R.7 of O.41, Civil P.C. Application allowed.