Judgment :- 1. These Second Appeals are directed against an appellate decree of the District Judge of Alleppey by which the learned judge reversed the trial court's decree dismissing a suit for redemption of an otti and granted to the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for in their plaint. 2. The owners of the plaint schedule property created three successive mortgages in respect thereof in favour of three different persons. The first one was in 1090 and was by way of a hypothecation in favour of a church. The second mortgage was in 1100 and was in the form of an otti in favour of defendant 1. On the self-same date as the otti deed the mortgagors took back the properties under a lease arrangement. While thus in possession the mortgagors executed the third mortgage in 1102, a melotti in favour of plaintiff 2. 3. The melotti was soon followed by a suit by the hypothecatee-church to realise the amounts due under the bond in its favour. To this suit the melottidar (plaintiff 2) and the mortgagors were made defendants, but not defendant 1, the ottidar. In execution of the decree passed in the suit the plaint property was brought to sale and the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 purchased the same. The purchaser was however not able to obtain possession as in the meanwhile defendant 1 brought a suit on foot of the lease- back and in execution of the decree passed therein recovered possession from plaintiff 2, who by that time had also taken a sale deed from the mortgagors. 4. The court sale in the suit brought by the hypothecatee church was in 1105. Notwithstanding that sale, in 118 plaintiff 2 executed a sale deed in favour of plaintiff 1 in respect of the bulk of the plaint property and the two together brought the present suit for redemption of the mortgage in favour of defendant 1. The trial court dismissed it on the ground that the court sale in the hypothecatee's suit had effectively cut off the rights of plaintiff 2 over the plaint property and that he had therefore no subsisting title to the property on the date of the sale in favour of plaintiff 1, or on the date of the institution of the suit. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were therefore held to have no locus standi to maintain the action. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 were therefore held to have no locus standi to maintain the action. On appeal by them the District Court reserved the decision and hence these two second appeals. 5. Second Appeal No. 477 is by defendant 1 and Second Appeal 511 by defendants 5 to 9, the legal heirs of defendant 4, on whom the rights of defendant 2 had come to vest. While the plaintiff's title to redeem is questioned in both the second appeals, in S.A. No. 511 there is a further contention that in case redemption is allowed the plaintiffs should be asked to redeem defendants 5 to 9 also by paying off the sale price at the execution sale, or the hypothecation amount and interest thereon. 6. The lower appellate court reversed the trial court's decree on the ground that the equity of redemption had not effectively passed to the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 1 in as much as he had not reduced the property to possession pursuant to the sale certificate. According to the learned judge the title of a court-auction-purchaser becomes perfected only by delivery of possession. The Judge also pointed out that the hypothecation decree had become time-barred. A further ground mentioned is that by reason of a subsequent suit by defendant 2 (in 1115) against defendant 1 for the auction amount and the decree obtained therein, the right of the auction purchaser had dwindled into a mere right to recover the said amount from the property. On these grounds it was held that the equity of redemption remained vested in the original owners or their assignees. The learned judge would have it that as the auction-purchaser's title was not perfected by delivery of possession, when the decree became time barred or when defendant 2 sued for the auction amount, the equity of redemption became revested or revived in the original owners or their assignees. Hence the decision that the plaintiffs were competent to redeem the mortgage in favour of defendant 1. 7. Before us Mr. N. Varadaraja Iyengar, who appeared for the respondents did not seek to support the position that without delivery of possession the auction purchaser would not get a proper title. Hence the decision that the plaintiffs were competent to redeem the mortgage in favour of defendant 1. 7. Before us Mr. N. Varadaraja Iyengar, who appeared for the respondents did not seek to support the position that without delivery of possession the auction purchaser would not get a proper title. He conceded that the execution sale in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant 2 had effectively cut off all the rights of plaintiff 2, whether as melottidar or as purchaser of the property pending the hypothecation decree. However to sustain the title of the plaintiffs to redeem defendant 1 learned counsel depended upon two facts. One was that the lower appellate court had referred to as the second ground viz., the institution of a suit by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the auction amount or the hypothecation money, as the case may be. The other was the circumstance of defendant 1 having brought a suit and obtained a decree for redemption of the hypothecation. The rights of the church had, of course, passed to defendant 2. According to Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar each one of these two circumstances had the effect of reviving the equity of redemption in the original owners, the mortgagors or their assignees. 8. It is convenient to deal first with the second circumstance mentioned above, viz., the suit for redemption of the hypothecation by defendant 1 and the decree therefor. The suit was brought in 1106 and the decree was passed in 1110. Defendant 1 however allowed that decree to get barred by time. Evidently after dispossessing plaintiff 2 in execution of the decree obtained on foot of the lease-back he did not want to spend any money to redeem defendant 2, the auction-purchaser. Be that as it may, the contention raised by Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar about this aspect was that the passing of a decree to redeem the auction purchaser had the effect of divesting the latter's title to the equity of redemption and revesting it in those in whom it vested prior to the auction sale. Reliance was placed in support of this argument upon the decision in Dhana Keori v. Ram Kewal, AIR 1930 Pat. 570. We cannot however agree that that case is an authority for the position contended for. Reliance was placed in support of this argument upon the decision in Dhana Keori v. Ram Kewal, AIR 1930 Pat. 570. We cannot however agree that that case is an authority for the position contended for. There, like here, in the prior mortgagee's suit the subsequent mortgagee was not a party and the prior mortgagee-purchaser was obliged to bring a suit calling upon the subsequent mortgagee in possession to redeem him or in the alternative to permit him to redeem the subsequent mortgagee. The decree gave the option as asked for and the subsequent mortgagee choose to redeem the prior mortgagee-purchaser and actually redeemed him. Thereafter the legal heirs of the original owner (mortgagor) brought the suit giving rise to the decision to redeem the usufructuary mortgage by payment of the amount due thereunder and the amount the usufructuary mortgagee had paid to the prior mortgagee-purchaser. The learned judges held that when the subsequent mortgagee redeemed the prior mortgagee-auction-purchaser, the equity of redemption revived in favour of the original mortgagor and that he was therefore entitled to redeem. The consequence of the redemption was to satisfy the prior mortgage and ipso facto the decree and the sale got vacated. The equity of redemption came back into the hands of the original mortgagor. The second mortgagee paid only the first mortgage. That gave him the rights of the first mortgagee as such and no more. It is clear from the judgment that the revival of the equity of redemption in favour of the original mortgagor was consequent on the redemption effected of the first mortgage and not because of the suit for redemption or decree therefore. Only by actual payment of the prior mortgage money did that mortgage get discharged. That alone would bring the equity of redemption back into the hands of the mortgagor. Mulla's comments on this case at page 596 of the 3rd Edn. of his Transfer of Property Act may usefully be referred to here. The case is noticed under foot-notes (r) & (s). In the case in hand there is no such discharge and there is therefore no scope for any revival or revesting of the equity of redemption in the original owners. 9. The authority cited is therefore of no avail to the respondent. The case is noticed under foot-notes (r) & (s). In the case in hand there is no such discharge and there is therefore no scope for any revival or revesting of the equity of redemption in the original owners. 9. The authority cited is therefore of no avail to the respondent. While we are in respectful agreement with the decision given in the case, we desire to point out that we cannot see eye to eye with an observation occurring in the middle of column 2 of page 572 of the report. The said observation reads: "The decree for redemption by the usufructuary mortgagees was meaningless unless it was based on the assumption that the sale had gone, ". We venture to observe that in that case the decree for redemption by the usufructuary mortgagees was made because there was no sale at all binding them and not because the sale had gone in toto, that is, even as against those with whom on record it was held. When persons not bound by the decree or the sale discharged the mortgage the decree or the sale cannot continue to remain in force. The purchaser cannot have both the mortgage money and the property. Since there was no discharge of the prior mortgage in the present case by one who was not bound by the sale (or for that matter, by any body) no question of revival arises here. The lower appellate court's decree cannot therefore be sustained on the ground now discussed. 10. The other ground viz., that by the institution of a suit by defendant 2 against defendant 1 for the sale amount the former must be deemed to have abandoned his rights under the Court purchase is in our opinion equally unsound. A prior mortgagee, who in his suit for the mortgage money omitted to implead a pusine mortgagee or the owner of the equity of redemption can bring a second suit in that behalf against the omitted party provided he brings the suit within the period prescribed. Cherian v. Meerkhan,1950 KLT 383. This is because there was no suit at all on the mortgage against the omitted party and he had therefore no opportunity to redeem the mortgage. As against the omitted party the prior mortgagee was still a mortgagee and not a decree holder or a court auction purchaser. Cherian v. Meerkhan,1950 KLT 383. This is because there was no suit at all on the mortgage against the omitted party and he had therefore no opportunity to redeem the mortgage. As against the omitted party the prior mortgagee was still a mortgagee and not a decree holder or a court auction purchaser. The suit defendant 2 brought against defendant 1 was a suit on the prior mortgage and its object was to foreclose it. That does not mean that by instituting such a suit he stands to lose his rights as an auction purchaser. No doubt, as in the case in AIR 1930 Patna 570, that would have happened if he had received payment pursuant to the decree against the omitted party; but if no payment is received his title as the ultimate owner of the equity of redemption would remain in tact. In that capacity he could still redeem defendant 1. 11. The question of election does not arise at all as the second suit for the mortgage money was in the capacity of a prior mortgagee and the right defendant 2 had to redeem the intermediate mortgage was as the owner of the equity of redemption. As prior mortgagee he could not as of right claim to redeem the puisne mortgage. That he could claim to do only in the other capacity. If in one and the same capacity a person has two remedies, it may well be that having elected to choose one he may not afterwards be at liberty to seek the other; but if the two remedies open to him are in different capacities, his conduct in choosing the remedy in one right cannot debar him from seeking the remedy in the other right, if that too becomes necessary. It was admitted that the decree against defendant 1 for the auction amount had become time barred. We cannot agree that the institution of that suit or the passing of a decree therein in favour of defendant 2 had the effect of divesting him of his right to the equity of redemption. Without such divesting no question of a revival or revesting of the title in somebody else can possibly arise. When there is no question of any election the question of abandonment does not arise. The result is that the lower appellate court's decree cannot be sustained on this ground either. 12. Without such divesting no question of a revival or revesting of the title in somebody else can possibly arise. When there is no question of any election the question of abandonment does not arise. The result is that the lower appellate court's decree cannot be sustained on this ground either. 12. The Second Appeals are therefore allowed, the lower appellate court's decree is set aside and the trial court's decree dismissing the suit is restored. In the special circumstances of the case the parties will bear their costs throughout. The respondent's memorandum of objections against the lower appellate court's refusal to award him costs fails automatically and it is dismissed. Order accordingly. Allowed.