ORDER : 1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the Dispute No. 8 of 1952 in the Industrial Tribunal and also an order dated 6-12-1952 passed by the Government of Bhopal and to quash the reference dated 27-11-52 and the order, or to pass such other-orders as may be deemed necessary. 2. The petitioner is a registered match manufacturing company having its place of business at Bhopal. The management of the Company, as required by the Government instructions, gave a notice dated 24-10-52 of closure of the factory from 1-12-1952 together with annexe stating the reasons therefor, to its employees, put up a similar notice with an annexe on the notice-board and sent a copy to the Director of Labour of Bhopal. 3. The reasons stated were adverse conditions of similar industries in the country and their closure and the heavy losses incurred by this petitioner factory in the business for three successive years, owing to causes stated in para 4 of the petition and the impossibility to run the factory without further loss. 4. The petitioner, however, received a copy of the Notification No. B/C.L(16)/52 dated 27-11-1952 from the Government of Bhopal and found that the matter was referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal treating it as a 'lock-out'. 5. The petitioner also received an order dated 6-12-52 from the Government to stop the continuance of the 'lock-out' of the factory. These facts are not disputed. 6. It is alleged that the Secretary, Department of Commerce and Industry, Bhopal in a verbal discussion threatened the Secretary of the management, on 17-12-52, to prosecute him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for keeping the factory closed from 1-12-52 to 6-12-52 treating the closure as an illegal 'lock-out'. 7. The petitioner contends that the reference to the Tribunal is liable to be quashed as the matter referred to related to a closure and not a 'lock-out'. 7. The petitioner contends that the reference to the Tribunal is liable to be quashed as the matter referred to related to a closure and not a 'lock-out'. It is further contended that every citizen of India had a fundamental right to carry on a business and as a necessary consequence also not to carry it on if he so chooses to do and as such the closure of the factory could not constitute an industrial dispute and the reference by the Government is against law and void as it infringes the petitioner's fundamental right. 8. It is also contended that the order dated 8-12-52 under S. 10(3), Industrial Disputes Act compelling the management to run the factory is equally against the law and void for the same reasons and was also liable to be quashed. 9. The State of Bhopal did not admit that there were losses in running the factory and the reasons therefor as stated or that it was impossible to run the factory without losses. The allegations regarding the alleged threats to prosecute the Secretary were not denied, but it was said that they were irrelevant to the rights guaranteed to the petitioner and it is contended that at any rate the Secretary could defend himself in the prosecution. 10. It is contended that the matters referred to the Tribunal were within its jurisdiction till the award was given and as such this Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon them and the petitioner having ample opportunities to agitate all the points raised before the Tribunal, no such petition under Art. 228 of the Constitution could lie. 11. The non-applicant No. 2 the Industrial Tribunal admitted only the notification dated 27-11-52 and denied other facts as not known. It was said that the Tribunal was not a necessary party to the petition. 12. The first point for determination is whether this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain, the petition. The most important questions raised in the petition are whether the action proposed to be taken by the management since 1-12-52 was a closure or a Lock-out'; and further whether the order dated 6-12-52, compelling the factory to run was valid. These questions arise because the Government, in the notification dated 27-11-52, treated the action as Lock-out in the first of the matters stated in the reference. These questions arise because the Government, in the notification dated 27-11-52, treated the action as Lock-out in the first of the matters stated in the reference. Section 15(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 runs thus : "Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government." In my opinion, the Tribunal could not enter into the question if the reference was valid or otherwise, but was bound to deal with it as it stood. At any rate the language of the above section does not seem to permit the Tribunal to go behind the validity of the reference and examine it for that consideration. 13. A similar question came up before the Madras High Court in - 'Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras', AIR 1953 Mad 98 (A) before a Bench. In that case when originally such a petition came up before the High Court it did not pass an order because it did not possess sufficient material before it to adjudicate upon the question and therefore deferred the decision to a subsequent such petition, if any, after the Tribunal had collected the material and submitted its award. When again a writ petition came up before the High Court a preliminary objection was taken to its tenability on the ground that there was an appeal against the award. Their Lordships of the Bench observed that : "There is no substance in the preliminary objection. The appeal will obviously be confined to the merits of the case. We doubt if the appellate Tribunal has the power to declare the reference by the Government to be invalid or to hold that Industrial Disputes Act itself is invalid or otherwise. In any event, the question which has been raised before us, viz. whether the owner of a business can be compelled to continue it against his will could not have been decided by the appellate Tribunal." 14. In any event, the question which has been raised before us, viz. whether the owner of a business can be compelled to continue it against his will could not have been decided by the appellate Tribunal." 14. It was urged on the other side that the order of the High Court indicated that it waited for the Industrial Tribunal to decide the question and took it up only when the award itself was challenged and, therefore, this Court also should not take up the question before the Industrial Tribunal passed its award and thus reject, the petition. I do not agree. Firstly para (1) of the order of the High Court makes it clear that the Court did not decide the question on the first petition because it did not possess sufficient material and therefore it appears to be more for collecting the material that the High Court waited for the award than for anything else. Secondly it is doubtful if the Tribunal had power to examine the validity of the reference on the test of the fundamental lights guaranteed under the Constitution and thirdly, as observed by the learned Judges of the High Court, it was doubtful if the Tribunal or even the appellate Tribunal had power to examine the validity or otherwise of the order compelling the factory to continue to be run. 15. The learned Government advocate referred to a decision of a single Judge of the same High Court in - 'Jaya Bharat Tile Works, Samalkot v. State of Madras', AIR 1953 Mad 30 (B) on a writ petition no. 630 of 1951. In my opinion, the decision is not to the point as before this Court. At page 31 after referring to the observations in the decision in - ' AIR 1953 Mad 98 (A)' 'ibid', the learned Judge felt that the Judges in that case were not called upon to decide if a closure was in fact an illegal 'lock-out' and this question alone being before him, proceeded to decide the case on that consideration alone. That decision, therefore, is distinguishable from the case on hand which involves not merely the above question, but also others. The other authority cited by the learned Government Advocate, in support of his contention, is - 'Ganesh Das Ram Gopal v. Govt. That decision, therefore, is distinguishable from the case on hand which involves not merely the above question, but also others. The other authority cited by the learned Government Advocate, in support of his contention, is - 'Ganesh Das Ram Gopal v. Govt. of U.P.', AIR 1952 All 992 (C) decided by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court. A mere perusal of the facts of this case clearly indicates that the case involved altogether a different question for decision. So also is the case with the third authority cited viz. - 'Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. A.N. Sen', AIR 1952 Punj 134 (D) decided by a Bench of the East Punjab High Court which again merely states that the remedy against an award is by way of an appeal. 16. It was then urged that no writ petition should be entertained or at any rate, no writ should be issued when the petitioner has another remedy. Reference is made to the decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court in - 'Dindigal Skin Merchants' Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Madurai', AIR 1953 Mad 102 (E) where the learned Judge observed that : "The Tribunal would be in a position to decide more satisfactorily and effectively the disputes that arise between the parties than in a writ petition and therefore no writ should be issued." A similar view seems to have been expressed in - Union of Workmen of R.S.N. and I.G.N. and Rly. Co., Ltd. v. River Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.', AIR 1951 Assam 96 (F). It would, however, appear that all the questions raised in the case on hand viz., the invalidity of the order compelling the industry to be run and the proposed prosecution did not arise in the above cases and the Judge's views must be confined to only the facts of those cases and the questions raised thereon. The facts and the questions raised in the case on hand are found to be substantially similar to those in the case in - ' AIR 1953 Mad 98 (A)' 'ibid' and being in respectful agreement with the view as expressed by the learned Judges, who decided the case, I find that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition and to issue a writ or writs if and as necessary in the circumstances of this case. 17. 17. The next point is whether the management gave a notice of closure or a 'lock-out'. The petitioner has filed a copy of the notice together with the cause that led the management to issue the notice. The notice is in two languages viz. in English and in Hindi while the statement of the reasons is in Hindi alone. The Hindi version, if properly and accurately translated, reads thus : "Information by means of this notice is given that for the reasons attached herewith, the Factory will be closed from 1-12-1952." The English version, however, runs thus : "Notice is hereby given that it is our intention to effect a lock-out of this factory with effect from the 1st of December 1952 for the reasons explained in the annexe." The learned Government Advocate contends that the very wording of the English version shows that the management intended to effect a 'lockout' while it is the case of the petitioner that the management intended a 'closure' and that the Hindi version is unfortunately incorrectly translated so as to indicate a 'lock-out'. 18. It must be noted that the reasons for the action intended to be taken are stated in Hindi and it seems to me that it is such version of the notice that must prevail and not the English version which does not necessarily and exactly indicate the mind of the management. It would also appear that it is not the heading or caption, of a document alone from which the nature of the document or the intention of the maker of it can be gathered, but it has to be determined from the contents of the document read as a whole. While doing so the rule is that in interpreting a document the common and ordinary meaning of a word or expression is to be attributed to the words or expressions used and the technical meaning may be attributed only if the circumstances call for it. The Hindi word for 'lock-out' in Dr. Raghu Vira's English-Indian Dictionary is '(Dwartal)' which is not used in the notice in Hindi. The common and ordinary meaning of the words '(Band Keeya Jayega)' is "will be closed" and this makes it clear that it was a closure of the factory that was intended and not a 'lock-out'. The Hindi word for 'lock-out' in Dr. Raghu Vira's English-Indian Dictionary is '(Dwartal)' which is not used in the notice in Hindi. The common and ordinary meaning of the words '(Band Keeya Jayega)' is "will be closed" and this makes it clear that it was a closure of the factory that was intended and not a 'lock-out'. It also looks as if the Director of Labour Bhopal also, to start with, treated it as a 'closure notice' as is found referred to in his D.O. No. 2869 dated 27-10-1952, to the Manager of the Factory a copy of which is filed on record. 19. The word 'lock-out' is defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in S. 2(1) as : "Closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him." It would appear that the word 'lock-out' has achieved a particular meaning in Industrial spheres. In para 15 of the decision in ' AIR 1953 Mad 98 at p. 102 (A)' 'ibid' it is pointed out that : "In the case of a lock-out, the industry as such is not closed down even temporarily; only particular workers are refused work. Closing down a business even temporarily is distinct and different from a lock-out, just as the discontinuance from service of an employee is not the same thing as a strike." In a decision reported in - 1951-2 Lab LJ 797 (G)', the Industrial Tribunal West Bengal in the case of - 'Bengal-Assam Metal Industries Ltd. v. Their Workmen', observed in para 8 as follows : "I must point out that 'lock-out differs from closure in many of its aspects. I mean the causes which underlie lock-out are different from those of closure. In the case of closure, the causes are more or less permanent or lasting in the case of lock-out the causes are more or less temporary or casual. The company declares a lock-out when it has to face a strike just to prevent sabotage, etc., by the mischievous workers. It may also resort to lock-out in anticipation of a strike just to forestall it. Lock-out may also be undertaken when there is a failure of raw materials or when there is a break-down of a plant. In such cases the workers are laid off till the situation improves. It may also resort to lock-out in anticipation of a strike just to forestall it. Lock-out may also be undertaken when there is a failure of raw materials or when there is a break-down of a plant. In such cases the workers are laid off till the situation improves. But in the case of closure there is no question of laying off the workers. The workers are discharged." In the case reported in - ' AIR 1953 Mad 30 (B)' on a writ petition no. 630 of 1951, Subba Rao, J. quoted the observations of another learned Judge in the decision in Civil Suit No. 448 of 1949 and the pertinent observations would bear further quotation. They are as follows : "The lock-out is the corresponding weapon in the armoury of the employer. If an employer shuts down his place of business as a means of reprisal or as an instrument of coercion or as a mode of exercising pressure on the employees or generally speaking when his act is what may be called an act of belligerency that would be a lock-out. If on the other hand, he shuts down his work because he cannot for instance get the raw materials or the fuel or the power necessary to carry out his undertaking or because he is unable to sell the goods he has made or because his credit is exhausted or because he is losing money, that would not be a lock-out...... a factory or an industry can be "sick" though not of course in the same manner as a labourer, if it is unable to pay its way......... Where an employer suspends work and the question is whether that suspension is a lock-out or not, we will have to enquire, why did he shut down." It would thus appear that the observations quoted above exactly fit in with the facts of the case on hand and as such it cannot be held that it was a lock-out' that was intended but a mere closing down of the factory. 20. 20. Examining the whole document with its annexe or schedule, which is a part of the document, it would be found that the reasons for the cessation of work were : (a) the Government had fixed the retail selling price of match-boxes which was below the cost price but the Government had not controlled all materials required in this industry; (b) scarcity of suitable wood in Bhopal and the high prices on its import; (c) levy of octroi duty on import and the consequent higher cost of the raw material; (d) levy of octroi on export of the product in the neighbouring State of Madhya Bharat; (e) keen competition by the Western India Match Company; and (f) high rate of chemicals required for the manufacture in the factory, 21. It is not said on the other side that there was any strike or even an intended strike or any warning note by the workmen of the factory nor had the factory any other reasons to keep out any particular workman or workmen. The action intended to be taken was not, therefore, by way of a reprisal. It is. therefore, clear that it was a 'closure' and not a 'lock-out' in its technical meaning that was intended by the management and it gave a notice of 'closure' and not a lock-out'. 22. The next point is whether the management had a right under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to close down the factory. No argument was addressed by the learned Government Advocate on this question. Clause (g) of the Article gives a right to every citizen of India "to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business." It thus follows that this means and includes an equal right to cease to carry on a business or not to carry on a business. He may find it impossible to carry on the business on account of his physical unfitness, on account of want of funds on account of domestic troubles, on account of non-availability of raw materials or machinery or technicians or on account of so many other factors for which he may not be responsible himself at all. He has, therefore, a guaranteed right to cease to carry on the business which he might have been, carrying on. 23. He has, therefore, a guaranteed right to cease to carry on the business which he might have been, carrying on. 23. But it is equally true that the right to carry on a business and therefore to cease to carry it on is not an absolute right as Cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution confers powers on the State to impose reasonable restrictions on this right. It must be remembered that it is not said that the action taken by the State was in the interests of the general public or that the factory was being run in such interests. Even, if it is assumed that the public have some interest in the business it is too remote and that too lasts only till the industry or the business continues so that in the case of a mere cessation, of the business on account of the reasons stated and sworn to by the management, the petitioner had a guaranteed right to close down the factory. 24. The next point is whether the reference under the notification dated 27-11-52 'ibid' or any part thereof is ultra vires of the Government. The notification states that : "An industrial dispute had arisen in these matters : (1) lock-out of the factory and consequent discharge of the workmen; (2) retrenchment of workmen as a result of any justifiable change in the present System of work; (3) in the event of lock-out and consequent discharge as mentioned in (1) above and in the event of retrenchment as mentioned in (2) above, payment of any involuntary unemployment relief, compensation or gratuity." 25. It is obvious that the reference is made under Ss. 7 and 10, Industrial Disputes Act on all the above matters on the assumption that it was a case of a lock-out. As, however, the management had no intention to effect a lock-out but only a closure of the factory or the business, which it had a right to do, there could be no industrial dispute and as such no reference could be made by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal and even if made, it is ultra vires i.e. beyond the powers of the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act under which it had acted. 26. 26. The observations of their Lordships, who decided the case in ' AIR 1953 Mad 98 (A)' 'ibid', at p. 102, are pertinent and may be quoted with advantage, viz. : "Apart from this constitutional aspect, we ere also inclined to hold that the question whether an employer could or could not close down a business permanently or temporarily falls outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. No doubt the term 'industrial dispute' has been very widely defined in Section 2(k) of the Act; but it appears to be clear to us that the definition of an 'industrial dispute' and the Act taken as a whole assume the continued existence of an industry. The Act does deal with lock-outs and strikes." "While therefore the Industrial Tribunal has got the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question whether a particular lock-out was justified or not; it cannot decide the question whether an employer can close down his business temporarily for an indefinite period or permanently. There cannot be dispute strictly so called between an employer and an employee as regards the continuance of the business itself. This question was completely out-side the Industrial Disputes Act, and we hold that the reference by the Government was without jurisdiction and consequently the award was bad." 27. It may be pointed out that the matters (2) and (3) are corollaries of the matter no. (1) in the reference and as such if the first cannot be supported as valid, the other two also cannot survive and as such the whole reference is liable to be held to be bad as ultra vires of the Government. I, therefore, hold that the whole reference, under Ss. 7 and 10, Industrial Disputes Act, under the notification dated 27-11-52, is ultra vires of the Government and bad. 28. The next point is whether the order dated 6-12-52 was invalid and against the Constitution. By this order the attention of the management was drawn to the notification dated 27-11-52 under which a reference was made to the Tribunal and then in exercise of the powers under S. 10(3) (mis-stated in the order as Sub-S. 10) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the management was ordered to stop "continuance of the lock-out of the factory". It has been held above that the management had never intended to nor did it effect a lock-out but merely a closure since 1-12-52. It has been held above that the management had never intended to nor did it effect a lock-out but merely a closure since 1-12-52. It has also been held that the management had a fundamental right to effect a closure of the business or the factory. The Government has acted under the above powers on the assumption that there was an industrial dispute, in its turn on the assumption that the management had effected and continued a lock-out. As, however, there was no lock-out, there could be no industrial dispute for reference and as such the consequent order could not be made and as it is made, it is beyond the powers of the Government and is, therefore, ultra vires and bad. 29. From another aspect also it must appear that the petitioner had a right, to cease to work the factory, guaranteed under the Constitution and as it was not said that it was in the general interest of the public or that the factory fell within the purview of "public utility service", no such order could be made under the Constitution, even under Cl. (6) of Art. 19 ibid' and as it was made, it was invalid and void being hit by the Constitution. 30. In the end I hold that the whole reference, under the notification dated 27-11-52, and the order dated 6-12-52, directing the petitioner to continue to run the factory are void. I, therefore, order that they are quashed. I further order that the reference being void the Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to act on such reference and as such the Tribunal is prohibited, by an order of prohibition, from holding its proceedings and submitting an award to the Government in the above matters. The petition is thus allowed. 31. The allegations of the petitioner-Secretary of a threat of a prosecution are not specifically denied, but it does not seem necessary to pass any order in that connection as it is doubtful if any such steps, as feared, are likely to be taken in view of the above findings and orders. 32. The petition is thus allowed. 31. The allegations of the petitioner-Secretary of a threat of a prosecution are not specifically denied, but it does not seem necessary to pass any order in that connection as it is doubtful if any such steps, as feared, are likely to be taken in view of the above findings and orders. 32. The petitioner itself appears to be, at least to some extent partly responsible for all the action taken by the Government as in the English version of the notice dated 24-10-52 the management described, even if wrongly, its intended action as a 'lock-out.' In the circumstances, as the petitioner itself was responsible for the trouble created by itself and on the other side as it appears that the Government did not examine the question closely, I make no order for costs though I fix the counsel's fee for each side at Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.