ORDER : This is a petition for revision filed by the defendant-petitioner against the decree of Small Cause Judge, Indore. Plaintiff P.V. Bhagwat filed a suit on 12-12-1949 for recovery of Rs.259/2/6 in respect of arrears of rent, electric and water charges due from the defendant on account of the leased premises in the possession of the defendant. The claim 'inter alia' consisted of Rs.4-15-0 as balance due in respect of dues of June 1949 and Rs.2-9-0 as balance of dues of July 1949. Along with the plaint the plaintiff submitted an application for attachment before judgment supported by an affidavit. Both the application and the affidavit were based on the allegations that the defendant had closed his business of medical practice, he was a resident of other State, and the defendant himself had stated that he would sell away his truck. There were further allegations that all this, probably meant closing of business and intended disposal of truck, was meant for defeating the plaintiff's claim. An order for attachment was passed ex parte on this application and the affidavit of the plaintiff and defendant's property consisting of furniture and type-writer was attached. The defendant thereupon appeared the next day and submitted an application complaining that the attachment was secured by misrepresentation and he offered to furnish security and prayed for its release. The security bond was furnished. This was accepted on reference to the plaintiff's counsel on 13-12-1949. The property however was delivered back to the defendant on 29-12-1949. In pursuance of notice to show cause why the order for attachment before judgment or for security be not made absolute the defendant submitted a reply denying substantially the allegations as regards the stoppage of business of medical practice, his being a resident of outside Madhya Bharat and his intended sale of the truck. He also claimed compensation for the wrongful attachment. 2. The defendant denied the items of Rs.4-15-0 and Rs.2-9-0 in respect of the dues for the month of June and July 1949. The rest of the claim was admitted omitting a small item of Rs.7/- for notice charges which were disallowed. 3. The trial Court decreed the claim of the plaintiff even in respect of the items of Rs.4-15-0 and Rs.2-9-0. The rest of the claim was admitted omitting a small item of Rs.7/- for notice charges which were disallowed. 3. The trial Court decreed the claim of the plaintiff even in respect of the items of Rs.4-15-0 and Rs.2-9-0. It further held, while considering the question regarding the grant of compensation to the defendant for the alleged wrongful attachment that there were reasonable grounds for apprehending for the plaintiff that the defendant would leave this place, thereby defeating his claim of arrears of rent. He further held that the defendant had not proved any special pecuniary injury. Therefore relying on - 'Gyan Prakash v. Kishorilal', AIR 1942 All 261 (A) and - 'Chandulal Seraogi v. Purna Chandra', 164 Ind Cas 73 (Cal) (B) he disallowed the claim for compensation. The defendant has now come up in revision. 4. Mr. Dubey who appears for the petitioner has urged firstly that the finding of the Court below regarding the liability of the defendant for the items of Rs.4-15-0 and Rs.2-9-0 is not legal. Secondly, it is contended that the decision on the question of award of compensation under S.95, Civil P.C. has resulted in failure of justice. 5. As regards the first point I am inclined to hold, on the materials as they stand that the view of the lower Court is not legally supportable. The defendant had denied these items for the months of June and July 1949. In his statement on oath he denied existence of any liability in respect of any period prior to August 1949. The plaintiff therefore ought to have shown by tangible evidence how the sum was made up. The sum did not relate to an admitted monthly liability for rent but to the dues in respect of electric charges as will appear from plaintiff's notice Ex.P/1. It was for the plaintiff therefore to prove this part of the case. The trial Court holds that the plaintiff had demanded these items by notice Ex.P/1 to Which no objection was raised by a reply to that effect. It was further said that according to plaintiff, receipts for rent paid, to be paid and the balances were mentioned in the original receipts and as original receipts are not produced plaintiff would be held entitled to these sums. I am afraid this course is not permissible. It was further said that according to plaintiff, receipts for rent paid, to be paid and the balances were mentioned in the original receipts and as original receipts are not produced plaintiff would be held entitled to these sums. I am afraid this course is not permissible. Receipts Ex.P/7 and P/8 which purport to be duplicates of the original receipts are not proved to have been delivered to the defendant. A question was put to the defendant to the effect that the duplicates bore the receipts of his son which he did not admit In his examination-in-chief plaintiff leaves these items sublimely vague. The decision therefore on these points of the lower Court cannot stand. These items are disallowed. 6. As regards the other point the finding of the Court below is that it was natural for the plaintiff to apprehend from the circumstances of the defendant closing his place of business of medical practice, by pledging his truck and irregularity in payment of rent, that the defendant might leave this State suddenly without satisfying his dues and the mere fact that he possessed considerable valuable furniture was not enough for him as the same was liable to be disposed of any moment. It was further observed that the defendant had expressed before Mr. Pande that as his business did not flourish in Indore he might go elsewhere and this was sufficient to unsettle the plaintiff's mind. For these grounds, he holds that the attachment was obtained on sufficient grounds. In my opinion this is far from correct. The entire approach to the question by the trial Court is erroneous. The question of reasonability or justifiability of apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff regarding the fact that his dues might remain unpaid or his justifiability of his being nervous about their recovery are not factors which should weigh in determining the fact whether the attachment before judgment was applied for on sufficient grounds. The sufficiency of grounds will have to he determined with reference to the legal requirements under O.38, R.5, Civil P.C. for obtaining attachment before judgment and a finding whether they have been complied with or not. 7. Neither the statement of plaintiff nor that of Pushpasheelrao Pande are enough to satisfy the Court that the order for attachment before judgment was obtained on sufficient grounds. 7. Neither the statement of plaintiff nor that of Pushpasheelrao Pande are enough to satisfy the Court that the order for attachment before judgment was obtained on sufficient grounds. The contents of the application for the purpose of the affidavit do not in any way improve the matter. There is hardly any material worth the name to establish that the defendant was about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property or was about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, Indore, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him. 8. Mr. Bhalerao for the plaintiff contended that since the defendant furnished security and attachment was therefore withdrawn he cannot claim compensation and in support cited - 'AIR 1942 All 261 (A)'. But in the Allahabad case the defendant did not appear and show cause why the attachment should not be made. On the other hand, he paid the amount in suit and at a later stage applied under S.95, Civil P.C. when the entire amount in suit was paid in Court. This is not the case here. The defendant appeared before the removal of attachment and protested that the attachment was on insufficient ground. No doubt the attachment was withdrawn on his furnishing security but the matter did not end there and the question with regard to validity of attachment continued to be the only material and vital issue on which parties came to grips. They led evidence and the Court gave a finding that the attachment was justifiable. It cannot, in this case, therefore, be urged that the attachment was taken lying down and later after the Court had become 'functus officio' or in a subsequent suit the matter is sought to be agitated without an adjudication having been pressed for at an earlier stage. It would he strange result if the view were to prevail that no compensation would be claimable in case the defendant whose property is conditionally attached objects to the validity of attachment but furnishes security and gets his property released. It would he strange result if the view were to prevail that no compensation would be claimable in case the defendant whose property is conditionally attached objects to the validity of attachment but furnishes security and gets his property released. This would mean that a person in order to claim compensation must suffer the inconvenience of allowing his goods to remain under attachment until the question of sufficiency of grounds for the attachment is determined and an order for vacating the attachment on that ground is obtained. 9. The next point decided by the trial Court and pressed on behalf of the plaintiff before me is that no compensation would be claimable under S.95, Civil P.C., in the absence of proof of special damages thereby meaning that the actual pecuniary loss resulting from wrongful attachment ought to be proved and that no compensation for loss of reputation or mental pain and suffering can be claimed. Reliance is placed on the cases reported in - 'AIR 1942 All 261 (A)' and - 164 Ind Cas 73 (Cal) (B)'. In the former case this point is not decided the case turning on another point which is discussed above. The latter seems to support this view. There are authorities which take a contrary view such as - 'Palanisami Goundar v. Kaliappa Goundar', AIR 1940 Mad 77 (C). 10. Viewing the matter on the wording of S.95, Civil P.C., the question would be whether the word injury would cover the cases of pecuniary loss or would also include other kind of injury such as one contemplated for the award of general damages. In my opinion there is nothing to limit the meaning of the word injury to actual pecuniary loss. On the other hand the use of the words "expenses or injury" would indicate actual pecuniary loss suffered as also other kind of injury in respect of which compensation can be awarded. In many cases such injury may be quite as substantial as actual pecuniary loss. 11. In - 'Mudhun Mohan Doss v. Gokul Doss', 10 Moo Ind App 563 (D), their Lordships considered the question whether general damages apart from actual pecuniary loss can be awarded for wrongful attachment and it was held that the same were claimable. In many cases such injury may be quite as substantial as actual pecuniary loss. 11. In - 'Mudhun Mohan Doss v. Gokul Doss', 10 Moo Ind App 563 (D), their Lordships considered the question whether general damages apart from actual pecuniary loss can be awarded for wrongful attachment and it was held that the same were claimable. Their Lordships held; "The principle ordinarily applied to actions of tort is, that the plaintiff is never precluded from recovering ordinary damages by reason of his failing to prove the special damage he has laid, unless the special damage is the gist of the action. Thus, in an action of slander of words actionable 'per se', when the plaintiff lays special damages, and fails to prove it, he is nevertheless entitled to such damages as the jury think right to give him. It would be otherwise if the words were not actionable 'per se'. In the present case, the gist of the action is not the special damage, but the unlawful attachment; and the plaintiff would not have been precluded from recovering ordinary damages for that actionable wrong, even if he had wholly failed to prove the special damage laid." There is no reason why the principle underlying this view cannot be applicable to the case under consideration. 12. I therefore hold that general damages or compensation for injury on account of pain, suffering, humiliation etc. can be awarded under Section 95, Civil P.C. 13. In this case I consider Rs.50/- as the sum that should be awarded on this account to the defendant. 14. The result is that the revision is allowed. Plaintiff's claim in respect of the two items of Rs.4-15-0 and Rs.2-9-0 is reduced. The decree of the lower Court is modified in that respect. The defendant is awarded Rs.50/- as compensation under S.95, Civil P.C. 15. The petitioner is awarded costs of this revision petition. The costs in the trial Court will be according to the success or failure of the parties.