Judgment Imam, J. 1. This is an application to quash the proceedings pending in the Court below against the petitioner under Section 7, Essential Supplies Act (Act 24 of 1946). On 2-2-1952, a truck (BRL 883) was found at Kachpara Hati loaded with bales of yarn. The petitioner was in the truck. When, the truck came in front of the petitioners shop at Barhet, it was stopped by him and five bags of articles were unloaded from the truck. As one of the bags appeared to bo somewhat heavy, it aroused the suspicion of the constable Indraman Pathak and other constables who were patrolling Kachpara Hati. When the bundle was opened, it was found to contain five thans of white shirting and two thans of power-loom cloth bearing No. 38040. information of this was sent to Ihe Sub-Inspector of Police, police station Barhet, and, after investigation., charge-sheet was submitted on 17-2-1952. 2. The following charges were framed against the petitioner upon the evidence recorded : "First : That you, on or about the 2nd day of February 1952 at Barhet, P. S. Barhet, S. P. were found carrying on business of cotton cloth in conjunction with your other business without having a licence granted by the licensing authority in Form B and thereby contravened the provisions of Sec.3, Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order 1948 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7, E. S. T. P. Act 1946, and within my cognizance. Secondly : That you, on or about the same day of the same month and year at the same place were found in possession of five thans of mill-made cotton cloth and failed to furnish information regarding their place of purchase and purpose of purchase and also failed to account for their possession satisfactorily and thereby contravened the provisions of Sec.10(b), Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order 1948 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7, E. S. T. P. Act 1946, and within my cognizance." 3. It has been urged that on the evidence recorded, no offence as charged has been established and, secondly, that having regard to the provisions of Section 11 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , cognizance was wrongly taken by the Magistrate because there was no report in writing of the facts constituting an offence under the said Act. 4. 4. Dealing with the last contention first, it is necessary to state what the report of the public servant upon which cognizance was taken states. The only report which I can find on the record is the charge-sheet and, so far as the facts are concerned, all that it states is : "A prima facie case under Section 7 of Act 24 of 1946 has been made out against the accused noted in col. 3. He is sent up to stand trial in Court. The P. Ws. will be produced in Court on the date fixed in the case." The report of the constable Indraman Pathak to the Sub-Inspector of Police, and not to the Magistrate, is also on the record, and the following is its official translation made by the official translator of this Court : "I beg to submit that today we had gone to Kachpara Hati along with you for patrolling. In the evening while returning frora there when we reached Ghatiari, we found Bohra Transport (BRL 883) standing there. Bales of yarn were loaded on it. We 11 constables and the Havildar got on, the truck for returning to Barhet. Suraj Mal Singhania of Barhet was also on that truck. The bales of yarn were to be conveyed to the shop of Sagar Mal. When the truck reached in iront of the shop of Suraj Mal Singhania, he made the bus stop. He himself got down and on his instruction, a man of his shop took down five bags of goods from the truck and took it to his shop. One bag appeared to be somewhat heavy and it aroused our suspicion. We got that bag unpacked. It contained 5 thans of shikari white shirting of Calico Mills, on which price was printed, and two thans of power-loom cloth bearing No. 38040. We then sent information to you. Surajmal Singhania has got no cloth licence. It appears that he has brought the cloth licence, Bar-harwa side for the purpose of black-marketing. Proper steps may be taken." Assuming that the report of the constable may bo read along with the charge-sheet, the question for consideration is as to whether the facts stated in the report of the constable Indiaman Pathak contains any facts constituting an offence punishable under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 . Proper steps may be taken." Assuming that the report of the constable may bo read along with the charge-sheet, the question for consideration is as to whether the facts stated in the report of the constable Indiaman Pathak contains any facts constituting an offence punishable under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 . Obviously, the report oC the Sub-Inspector of Police in the charge-sheet contains no statement of facts. Strictly speaking, therefore, the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police which is the report of a public servant is not one in accordance with the provisions of Sec.11 of the Act. So far as the report of the constable Indraman Pathak to the Sub-Inspector of Police is concerned, certain facts are undoubtedly stated. For the purposes of this case, the opinion of the constable that the cloth was brought from Barharwa side for the purpose of black-marketing may be kept out of consideration as such an opinion is irrelevant. The facts stated by the constable in his report merely establish possession on the part of the petitioner of live thans of shikari white shirting of Calico Mills and two thans of power-loom cloth bearing No. 38040. I have examined the provisions of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948 and I can find therein nothing which makes unlawful merely possession of cloth. I have not been pointed out any rule whereby possession of cloth in excess of a specified quantity amounts to a contravention of any of the provisions of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948. Nor have I been shown any provision of law under which possession of cloth beyond a specified quantity is punishable as an offence under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. When a Court takes cognizance of an offence, it generally docs so either on a complaint or on a report or on information received in a criminal case. Taking of cognizance, in my judgment, implies that the Court which takes cognizance has exercised its mind upon the facts, before it that an offence is prima facie indicated. No Court can take cognizance of an offence when the facts before it at that moment disclose no offence. Taking of cognizance, in my judgment, implies that the Court which takes cognizance has exercised its mind upon the facts, before it that an offence is prima facie indicated. No Court can take cognizance of an offence when the facts before it at that moment disclose no offence. It seems to me that at the moment that the Court in this case purported to take cognizance on the report of the Sub-Inspector of Police, and I would assume on the report of the constable as well, it had no facts before it which disclosed an offence having1 been committed. 5. As to the first submission, I have already set out in full the charge which has been framed against the petitioner. As to the first count, namely, that the petitioner was found carrying on business of cotton cloth in conjunction with his other business without a licence, is concerned, there is no evidence whatsoever as far as 1 have read the record to show that the petitioner is carrying on any such business as charged, against him. Nor has any evidence on the record been shown to me on behalf of the State that the petitioner is carrying on such a business. The evidence, on the other hand, shows that the petitioner has no cloth shop at Barhet. The other bundles that were found with the petitioner, at the time they were taken off the truck, contained various articles, such as matches, biri, etc. Presumably, the business of the petitioner as a shopkeeper is not that of cloth. It was, however, stated on behalf of the State that it was premature at this stage to quash the proceedings against the petitioner so far as this count is concerned because evidence might yet be led on behalf of the prosecution that the petitioner sells cloth, although the sales might be surreptitious. To my mind, this argument is untenable because investigation had taken place and, if the prosecution were in possession of any such evidence, they ought to have led that evidence before now. When the stage arrives in a criminal trial for the framing of a charge, obviously it is at the stage when there is some evidence to justify the framing of a charge. When the stage arrives in a criminal trial for the framing of a charge, obviously it is at the stage when there is some evidence to justify the framing of a charge. At the stage when the charge was framed against the petitioner so far as the first count was concerned, there was no evidence whatsoever against the petitioner to the effect that he was carrying on a business of cotton cloth in conjunction with his other business. The charge so far as the first count was concerned was, therefore, framed without there being any evidence in support of it. 6. So far as the second count is concerned, that the petitioner was found in possession of five thans of mill-made cotton cloth and failed to furnish information regarding their place of purchase and the purpose of the purchase and also that the petitioner failed to account for their possession satisfactorily, all that the evidence so far recorded shows is that when the petitioner was asked as to what the bundle contained, he gave an answer which was false. There is no evidence that the petitioner was asked to furnish information regarding the place of purchase and the purpose of the purchase so far as the cloth found in the bundle was concerned. It is to be remembered that in the report of the constable there is not a suggestion even that the petitioner was asked a single question about the cloth found in the bundle or that he failed to furnish information upon any enquiry made. If the matter rested : merely on that, it might be difficult to quash the proceedings so far as the second count in the charge is concerned because the Court would have to decide upon the evidence as it stood as to whether an offence under this count has been made out. If the matter rested : merely on that, it might be difficult to quash the proceedings so far as the second count in the charge is concerned because the Court would have to decide upon the evidence as it stood as to whether an offence under this count has been made out. Sec.10, Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948 reads as follows : "The Controller, the District Magistrate, any Magistrate, District Supply Inspector, Supply Inspector, Assistant Supply Inspector or any other officer empowered in this behalf by the Controller or the District Magistrate may, with a view to securing compliance with this Order : (a) enter, inspect or search with such assistance as he considers necessary, any premises, godown or other place in which he had reason to believe that any violation of any provisions of this Order or of any conditions of a licence issued under this Order is taking place, or is about to take place; (b) require the licensee, owner, occupier or any other person in charge of such premises to produce any books, accounts or other documents relating to such transaction or transactions or furnish any information relating thereto." The rest of the section need not be referred to. There is no evidence that the constables in this case were persons empowered by the Controller or the District Magistrate to do any of the matters contained in Sec.10 of the Order. If the constables made an enquiry as to what the bundle contained and the answer given by the petitioner was a false one, the first question which requires to be considered is as to whether there was any obligation upon the petitioner to answer any question put to him by the constable there being, as I have said, no evidence on the record that the constable or the constables were empowered under Sec.10 of the Order by the Controller or the District Magistrate to do any of the matters contained in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sec.10. Apart from that, in my opinion, Clauses (a) and (b) of Sec.10 of the Order must bo read together. Apart from that, in my opinion, Clauses (a) and (b) of Sec.10 of the Order must bo read together. Clause (a) authorises specific persons to enter, inspect or search any premises, godown or other place and Clause (b) requires the licensee, owner, occupier or any other persons in charge of such premises to produce any books, accounts or other documents relating to transactions mentioned therein or furnish any information relating to those transactions. In the present rase, there is no question of the petitioner being called upon to produce any books or accounts or any document concerning the cloth which was found in the bundle. The evidence of the prosecution also does not show that the petitioner was asked to furnish information concerning the transactions stated in any of the aforesaid documents. The belated evidence in this case at best is that the petitioner was asked as to what the bundle contained and he gave a false answer. In my opinion, the facts so far proved do not establish that the petitioner has contravened Clause (b) of Sec.10 of the Order. 7 Suspicion against the petitioner for being in possession of five thans of white shirting of Calico Mills and two thans of power-loom cloth bearing No. 38040 may be understandable but mere possession of it is no offence, and the prosecution has led no evidence which in law can establish any of the offences charged against him. I would, accordingly, allow this application and quash the proceedings pending against the petitioner.