CIVIL REVISION NO. 119 of 1952. SARJOO PROSAD, C. J.: The petitioner in this case instituted Money Suit No. 50 of 1949 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Dhubri for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,210/87-as compensation for loss on account of certain goods booked at Amingaon Railway Station. The Union of India was made a party defendant to the suit as the owner of the Assam Railway to which the goods were consigned. (2) The plaintiff's case was that one Haripada Saha, an employee of the plaintiff who is also a party defendant to the suit, had pur­chased 125 pairs of 'saris' and 11 pairs of 'dhotis' on behalf of the plaintiff from a Marwar firm at Gauhati for a sum of Rs. 2,073/-. He pack­ed the cloth in gunny bags and booked them at the Amingaon Railway Station, as per Bill of Lading, Ex. 1. The goods ware kept in charge of the Guard of the train concerned and they were to be delivered to the petitioner at Sapatgrarn, but no delivery was made. Thereafter the petitioner served notices under S. 77, Indian Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P. C. on the appropriate authorities claiming a sum of Rs. 2,075/10/- as price of the cloth, and a further sum on account of interest. (3) The Opposite Party, the Union of India, appeared in the suit and filed a written State­ment challenging its maintainability and the validity of the notices, but the suit was decreed by the Additional Subordinate Judge at Dhubri. On appeal, however, the Additional District Judge, L. A. D. by his judgment, dated 6-6-52 set aside the decree of the trial Court and re­manded the case for re-trial after giving the peti­tioner an opportunity to amend the plaint by making the Assam Railway Administration party defendant to the suit; the Court did not de­cide the case on merits. It is against the said order of the learned Additional District Judge that this petition has been presented. (4) It is important to observe that at the trial, the Dominion of India abandoned the is­sue regarding the cause of action for the suit and the validity of the notices and does not appear to have pressed the same. It is against the said order of the learned Additional District Judge that this petition has been presented. (4) It is important to observe that at the trial, the Dominion of India abandoned the is­sue regarding the cause of action for the suit and the validity of the notices and does not appear to have pressed the same. The only points urged at the appeal stage, for the Opposite Party were (i) that the suit was liable to be dismissed, as not being in accordance with S. 80, Indian Railways Act, and (ii) that the plaintiff had no right to sue. The question of the right to sue does not at present arise, because the Court below has given no decision on the point, but proceeded to deal with the first question and remanded the case for re-trial. The contention which prevailed there was that under S. 80, Indian Railways Act, the plaintiff was bound to implead the Railway Administration where the booking took place or the Railway Adminis­tration where the loss occurred. (5) There is no doubt in the present case that the place of booking and that of destination were both under the Assam Railway. The learned Judge thought that the Assam Railway Administration was a necessary party to the suit and it had not been made a party. He relied in this connection upon a decision of this Court in - 'The Union of India v. Dr. O. Hussain', AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A), which followed a deci­sion of the Nagpur High Court in - 'Dominion of India v. Firm Museram Kishunprasad', AIR 1950 Nag 85 (B). He thought that the objec­tion should prevail although the point of non­joinder of necessary parties was not raised in the pleadings, and no issue had been framed thereon. He directed that the plaintiff should be given a chance to amend the plaint and bring the Assam Railway Administration, as such, on the records of the case, and the trial should proceed afresh on that footing. (6) On behalf of the Opposite Party, a pre­liminary objection has been taken to the main­tainability of the application on the ground that an' appeal lay and the application in revision is incompetent. The case, however, does not fall under O. 41, R. 23, Civil P. C., and the objection was, therefore, not seriously pressed. (6) On behalf of the Opposite Party, a pre­liminary objection has been taken to the main­tainability of the application on the ground that an' appeal lay and the application in revision is incompetent. The case, however, does not fall under O. 41, R. 23, Civil P. C., and the objection was, therefore, not seriously pressed. (7) On behalf of the petitioner, it has been contended that the point of non-joinder of par­ties not having been specifically raised at the trial, it should not have prevailed in the ap­pellate Court. Reliance is placed on R. 13 of O. 1, Civil P. C., to show that the objection not having been taken at an early stage, it should be deemed to have been waived. Rule 13, how­ever, has no application to a case where a neces­sary party to the suit is not before the Court and no effective decree can be made in the absence of such a party. The suit in such cases is inherently defective and the point can be taken at any stage provided no new facts have to be alleged or proved. If, therefore, it is held that the Railway Administration of Assam was a necessary party to the suit and has not been made a party, then the objection must prevail and the order of the Court below should be affirmed. If, on the contrary, it is held that the Railway Administration, as such need not be made a party and is adequately represented, then the order of remand must be held to be vitiated with illegality and material irregularity, and the case must go back to the Court below for disposal according to law. (8) The only point, therefore, which is impor­tant to consider is whether the Assam Railway Administration, as such, should be made a party to the suit, and whether the failure to do so was in violation of the provisions of S. 80, Indian Railways Act. As the point was of soma importance and it involved a re-consideration of the decision of this Court in - 'AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A), we directed that this case, along with Civil Revn. No. 120 of 1952, in which also the identical question arises, should be heard by a Full Bench. As the point was of soma importance and it involved a re-consideration of the decision of this Court in - 'AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A), we directed that this case, along with Civil Revn. No. 120 of 1952, in which also the identical question arises, should be heard by a Full Bench. Both parties have cited a large number of decisions to prop up their respective contentions, but before I turn to the decisions, I consider it expedient to examine for myself the relevant provisions of the law. (9) Section 80, Indian Railways Act, divested of its irrelevant parts for the present, may be thus reproduced : "Notwithstanding anything in any agreement purporting to limit the liability of a railway administration, a suit for' compensation for loss, destruction or deterioration of goods may be brought either against the railway adminis­tration to which the goods were delivered by the consignor thereof, or against the rail­way administration on whose railway the loss,, destruction or deterioration occurred." The section evidently contemplates that for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods, a suit may be brought against the railway ad­ministration to which the goods were consign­ed or, alternatively, against the railway ad­ministration on which the loss occurred. The words "railway administration" have not been defined in the section itself and, therefore, one has to look beyond the four corners of the sec­tion to find out what this expression means. It must be, however, conceded that these rail­way administrations, namely, the railway ad­ministration to which the goods were; consigned,, or the railway administration on which the loss occurred, are treated as different units and separate and distinct entities. But this is only so with the object of ascertain­ing the liability of the Administration or Admini­strations concerned as the goods may travel over various railways. The distinction acquires special si­gnificance where these railway administrations, are owned by different bodies, and not by the same owner. "Railway administration" has been defined in S. 3(6) of the Act. It says " 'railway administration' or 'administration' in the case of a railway administered by the Government or a State means the Mana­ger of the railway and includes the Govern­ment or State." Therefore, in a case where the railway is ad­ministered by a Government or State, a suit under S. 80 of the Act can be brought against the Government or the State concerned. Thus, where the railway administration to which the goods were consigned and the railway adminis­tration on which the loss occurred were both owned by the same Government or State, it follows from the language of S. 3(6) that a suit can be brought against the State or Government which owns both the railways. But the plaint must, on the face of it, state "the cause of action as to how and in what capacity the State is sought to be made liable whether as; owner of the railway to which the goods were! consigned, or as owner of the railway on which1 the loss occurred, or both. If these facts are not stated in the plaint, then there is no cause of action against the Government or the State which owns the rail­way administration concerned, and the mere fact that the Government or the State is impleaded as a party defendant to the suit, will not give a cause of action to the plaintiff where, on the recitals in the plaint itself, none exists. I do not see anything in the section to pre­vent the party from suing the Government or the State as owner of a particular railway, be­cause in that case the Government or the State is the 'railway administration' and adequately represents the railway which it administers. I do not see any reason why. if all the necessary facts are there in the plaint and it is shown how the Government concerned has been made a party to the suit, it should be, still insisted i upon that the 'railway administration', as such, should be made a party to the suit. It is, J on the face of it, a tautological fallacy, because f a Government or a State, on the terms of the definition itself, is the 'railway administration' and, as such, liable to be sued within the mean­ing of S. 80, Railways Act. (10) On behalf of Government, much stress has been laid on the expression "and includes the Government or the State" occurring in sub-s. (6) of S. 3 of the Act. It is argued on this basis that the Manager of the railway adminis­tration represents the administration as such and that the Government or the State has only a secondary position. There is no substance in this argument. It is argued on this basis that the Manager of the railway adminis­tration represents the administration as such and that the Government or the State has only a secondary position. There is no substance in this argument. In the Railways Act of 1879, the word "manager" alone occurred, because most of the railways in those days were manag­ed & administered by the railway companies &, therefore, the managers of those companies or the railway company itself represented those railway administrations. The words with refer­ence to "Government" or the "State" were in­troduced in the Act of 1890 advisedly with a view to enlarge the definition of 'railway ad­ministration' so as to include Government or State owning such Railways. It is the com­mon rule of construction that whenever any meaning, either wider or more limited, than its natural connotation is sought to be assigned to an expression occurring in a statute, it has to be defined. The word "include" or "shall be deemed to include" is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, or where it is intended that while the term defined should retain its ordinary meaning, its scope should be widened by specific enumeration of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise so as to make the definition enumerative and not exhaustive and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be considered as com­prehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include: vide - 'Mt. Surajbansi Kuer v. Larho Kuar', AIR 1946 Pat 310 (C), - 'Dilworth v. Commr of Stamps', 1899) A. C. 99 (D); - 'King v. B. C. Fir and Cedar Lum­ber Co. Ltd', AIR 1932 PC 121 (E); - 'Pro­vince of Bengal v S. M. Hingul Kumari', AIR 1946 Cal 217 (F); - 'Madras Central Urban Bank Ltd. v. Corporation of Madras', AIR 1932 Mad 474 (G); - Official Assignee of Bombay v. Chandulal Chimanlal', AIR 1924 Sind 89 (H); - 'Jeramdas v. Emperor', AIR 1934 Sind 96 (I); (1949) AC 433 (J). (11) Section 79, Civil P. C. enacts that "in a suit by or against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or defen­dant, as the case may be, shall be (a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, - the Union of India, - and (b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government - the State." (12) This section, therefore, makes it impera­tive that where the suit is against the Central Government, the Union of India must be made a party to the suit. I have already held that in the case of a. railway administration owned by the Union of India, the Union of India re­presents the railway administration and is to be sued within the meaning of S. 80, Indian Railways Act. That being so, the suit in such a case must be brought against the Uhion of India, and not against the Manager of the Rail­way Administration. If the Manager of the railway administration is impleaded as a party defendant to the suit, it will not vitiate the ac­tion, but he would be merely an unnecessary party whose presence on the record was not required by the law. In this view of the mat­ter, there is no difficulty in applying the law The suit can be brought against the Union of India or the Government concerned which owns the offending railway or the railway adminis­tration liable for the loss or damage. But the Plaint must clearly indicate, in order to esta­blish a cause of action, the facts on which the liability is sought to be fastened on the Union of India. Otherwise, the suit will have to be dismissed for want of a cause of action. I am quite conscious of the fact that the Railways Act, for certain purposes, does regard the vari­ous railway administrations as definite and separate entities; for instance, in S. 77 of the Act it is required that a person shall not be entitled to any compensation for loss, destruc­tion or deterioration of goods to be carried un­less his claim to compensation has been pre­ferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date of delivery of the goods for carriage by the railway. Similarly S. 140 provides for service of notice on railway administrations. Similarly S. 140 provides for service of notice on railway administrations. This distinction between one railway adminis­tration and another has to be maintained in order to fulfil the purposes of the Act. But the Railways Act does not profess to lay down the procedure to be followed in the case of suits instituted against a railway adminis­tration. Such suits, as all other suits, are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 80, Civil P C. also contemplates that in the case of a suit against the Central Government, when it relates to a railway, a notice under the section shall go to the General Manager of that railway, but the suit has to be against the Cen­tral Government. (13) I am fortified in laying down the above principles by various judicial pronouncements. The first case to which I would refer is an illu­minating decision of Fawcett, J., in - 'Sukha-nand Shamlal v. Oudh & Rohilkhand Ely.', AIR 1924 Bom 306 (K), where the learned Judge examines the evolution of the law in all its bearings and with reference to its historical background. With great respect to the learn­ed Judge, I would adopt most of the reason­ings given by him. In that case, a preliminary objection was raised that the Oudh and Rohilk­hand Rly., was owned and worked by Govern­ment and, therefore, the Secretary of State for India in Council, should have been the person against whom the suit should have been insti­tuted. The plaint, though amended, merely showed "The Oudh and Rohilkhand Rly. Ad­ministration by its Manager and Agent" as party defendant to the suit, and it was contend­ed for the plaintiff that the suit was main­tainable against the railway administration in that form, and that the Secretary of State for India in Council need not have been sued. The learned Judge repelled this contention and ac­cepted the preliminary objection. I am tempt­ed to quote some paragraphs from that judg­ment. The learned Judge discusses the matter thus: "Mr. Munshi's main contention is that the Indian Railways Act 9 of 1890 clearly contem­plates a State Railway Administration being sued by its Manager, and that this special enactment is not affected by the subsequent general enactment contained in S. 79, Civil P. C. 1908 that suits by or against the Gov­ernment shall be instituted by or against the Secretary of State for India in Council. In my opinion, the Indian Railways Act of 1890 contains no clear indication that a suit against a State Railway can be brought against the Manager, and on the contrary, the definition of '"railway administration" in the case of a railway administered by the Government, as including the Government, suggests that a suit like this should be brought 'against the Government. On this point, I entirely agree with the view taken in the Oudh case relating to this same railway: - 'Traffic Superintendent, E. B. and E. I & O. & R. Rlys. v. Hafiz Abdul Rahman', ' (1901) Ind Ry. Cases (2nd Edn) (L). I adopt the arguments given in the report of the Court's judgment at pp. 814, 815. I may add that the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which be­came Act 9 of 1890 clearly shows that the inclusion of the Government: or State in the definition of "railway administration" was proposed for the purposes of Chap. 7 of the Act relating to the responsibility of Railway Administrations as carriers. But, apart from that, the Act itself shows that that must have been the object. It is difficult to see what other intention could have led to this alteration of the previous defini­tion contained in S. 3, Indian Railways Act of 1879. Mr. Munshi drew my attention to Ss. 72-77, 97, 140 and 145 of the Act of 1890; but there is nothing in these which indicates that the Manager, and not Government should be sued in the case of a State Railway. Sections 72-77 use the general words "railway adminis­tration" which under the definition in the Act, includes Government. Section 97 applies only to a railway company & not to a State Rail­way; so, there is nothing incongruous in the provision that the plaintiff in the suit con­templated, shall be the Secretary of State for India in Council; and it cannot be said that this in any way suggests that the Manager, and not Government, is to be sued in the case of a State railway. Section 140 relates to notices like those provided for in S. 77, and not to suits; it is also purely permissive in its terms. Section 140 relates to notices like those provided for in S. 77, and not to suits; it is also purely permissive in its terms. Section 145, so far as it relates to Civil Courts merely contains provisions corresponding to those in O. 27, R, 2, so as to avoid the necessity of personal attendance by the Manager, as chief representative of the railway (cf. O. 27, R. 3, Civil P. C.). It cer­tainly cannot be read as implying that the Manager can be sued as sufficiently repre­senting a State Railway". The learned Judge further pointed out that a Manager of a State Railway can very well represent the railway administration in its ordi­nary business concerns and its general manage­ment; .........but "when we come to Chap. 7 of the Act, however, which deals with responsibility of railway ad­ministrations as carriers, then there is (so far as suits are concerned) "something repugnant in the subject" "in treating the Manager as a proper defendant duly representing the Stats Railway, and the Courts should, therefore, fall back an the subsidiary part of the definition in S. 3(6). which expressly says Government are included in the words "railway adminis­tration". It was, therefore, held that the Secretary of State for India in Council being the proprietor working the railway, was clearly the proper de­fendant in the action. The revenues of the Government of India were liable to pay any damages awarded to the plaintiffs, and the suit lay against the Secretary of State under S. 32(2) of the Government of India Act. 1935, correspond­ing to S. 65, Government of India Act 1858. In coming to that decision, the learned Judge re­lied upon the leading cases of - - 'P. & O S. N. Co. v. Secy, of State', vide 5 Bom H' C. R. App. A. 1, at pp. 12, 13, (M) and - 'Shivabhajan v. Secy, of State', vide 28 Bom 814 (N) and held that S. 79, Civil P. C. clearly applied. Section 79. Civil P. C., 1908, it was rightly point­ed out, was not really an enactment subsequent to the Indian Railways Act of 1890, because it merely reproduced the provision contained in, S. 416 of Act 10 of 1877 and Act: 14 of 1882. (14) The above decision of Fawcett, J., was followed by a Division Bench decision of the same Court in-'Hirachand Succaram v. G.I.P. Rly. Co. (14) The above decision of Fawcett, J., was followed by a Division Bench decision of the same Court in-'Hirachand Succaram v. G.I.P. Rly. Co. Bombay', AIR 1928 Bom 421 (O), Pat-kar, J., who delivered the judgment in the case, laid down the law as follows: "The next question is whether a suit against a State railway must be brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council. Under S. 3, Cl. (6), Indian Railways Act, "railway administration" includes the Government, and the Secretary of State being the proprietor of the railway, the suit must be brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council under S. 79, Civil P. C. and the revenues of the Government of India would be liable to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff and the suit would lie against the Secretary of State under S. 32, cl. (2), Government of India Act, 1915. See vide - 5 Bom H. C. R. (App. A.) 1, at pp. 12, 13, (M)'. We agree with the view of Fawcett, J. in - 'AIR 1924 Bom 306 (K)', that a suit against a State Railway must be brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council". This view has also found favour in two deci­sions of the Patna High Court, which are both Division Bench judgments of that Court. The first is in - 'Shaikh Elahi Bakhsh v. E. I. Rly. Administration'. AIR 1931 Pat 326 (P). There the learned Judges held that where the adminis­tration of a railway vests in the Government, a suit against the Railway must be brought against the Secretary of State in Council, the Government being a necessary party, and a suit against the railway administration through their ageint is not a proper suit against the Secretary of State in Council as contemplated by S. 79. Civil P. C. and must be deemed to be instituted against a wrong person. The language is quite emphatic. I need not for the present say anything in regard to the observation of the learned Judges as to the service of notice under S. 80, Civil P. C., because the Code has been amended since, and it now provides that notice in such cases should go to General Manager of the railway concerned. The other decision is in - 'N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dwarka Ram Srikrishun Ram', vide AIR 13T31 Pat 393 (Q). The other decision is in - 'N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dwarka Ram Srikrishun Ram', vide AIR 13T31 Pat 393 (Q). In this case, the suit was against two State Railways belonging to Government, but was not instituted against the Secretary of State for India in Council, but against the Chief Operating Superintendent, and , the Chief Commercial Manager, respectively, it was held that having regard to the provisions of S. 79, Civil P. C., the suit had to be institut­ed against the Secretary of State for India in , Council and that not having been done, the suit was not maintainable. Here again it is not necessary for me to examine the reason­ings of the learned Judges in regard to the service of notice under S. 80, Civil P. C., be-cause of the change in the law indicated by me already. (15) From the above decisions, it clearly fol­lows that a suit against the Railway Adminis­tration represented by the Manager, where the said railway is owned by Government, is not a competent suit. The suit in all such cases must be against Government, which is a neces­sary party to the action. (16) The decision in - 'AIR 1950 Nag 85 (B)', which WES followed by this Court in- 'AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A),' now needs to be examined in the light of the principles discussed above. I may say at the outset that these decisions are justifiable on their own facts. In the Nagpur case, certain goods were consigned from Rajahmundry Station on the M. S. M. Railway to be delivered at Howbagh Station on the B. N. Railway. When the wagon containing the goods was received at Howbagh some of the goods were found missing. On these alle­gations, the plaintiff, after serving a notice upon the Secretary to the Central Government Commerce and Railway Department, instituted a suit for recovery of damages. The defence was that the loss did not occur on the B. N. Ry. It was also contended that no notice had been served upon the M. S. M. Railway, to which the goods were consigned, nor was that railway made a party to the suit. It had not been proved that the loss occurred on the B. N. Railway. Indeed the finding .was that there was no proof of any loss at all. On these facts, the suit had to be dismissed. It had not been proved that the loss occurred on the B. N. Railway. Indeed the finding .was that there was no proof of any loss at all. On these facts, the suit had to be dismissed. There are, however, some general observations made in the judgment which have encouraged the argu­ment that the railway administration, as such should have been made a party to the suit. I have already said that for certain purposes the railway administrations are to be treated as separate entities with, separate existence and personalities; but if their Lordships proposed to lay down that the railway administration, as such, through its Manager, should have been made a party defendant to the suit, although the Government, as owner of the railway, was a party, then I may respectfully point out that the observation is not only obiter but against the correct view of the law propounded in the earlier part of this judgment. It would not be correct to' say that suing the Governor-General as representing the entire State-owned railways was not a proper form of suit because that would render S. 80, Civil P. C. otiose and meaningless. On the contrary, as I have ex­plained, S. 80 has to be read in the light of the definition of "railway administration" as given in S. 3 (6), Railways Act, and in the case of State-owned railways, it would not be right to hold that a suit against a railway administra­tion would include Government, but not 'vice versa'. Observations of the nature indicated above, as I have shown, are merely obiter, and I, therefore, need not tarry to examine the deci­sion any further. The decision of this Court was also a decision on similar facts. The suit had not been brought either against the rail­way administration to which the goods were delivered, namely, the G. I. P. Railway or the E. I. Railway on which the loss occurred. The suit was brought, on the contrary, against the Union of India as owner of the B. B. C. I. Railway and the Assam Railway. The suit had, therefore, to be dismissed, because, on the face of it, no cause of action could be established against the Union of India as owner of those two railways. The suit was brought, on the contrary, against the Union of India as owner of the B. B. C. I. Railway and the Assam Railway. The suit had, therefore, to be dismissed, because, on the face of it, no cause of action could be established against the Union of India as owner of those two railways. The law required that notices under S. 77, Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P. C., had to be served on the appropriate authorities mentioning the cause of action and the inten­tion to sue the railway administration where the goods were consigned or where the loss oc­curred. There is nothing to show in the deci­sion that these necessary formalities of the law had been complied with, and quite obviously it seems they were not. In those circumstances, the learned Judges were justified in dismissing the suit. But the decision is no authority for holding that a suit would be defective although the Government as owning a particular rail­way administration against which there is a good cause of action, is a party defendant to the suit. Before I close, reference may also be made to a decision in •- 'Radha Shyam Basak v. Secy, of State', AIR 1917 Cal 640 (R), which was cited at the Bar. This case also supports the view which I have taken of S. 3(6), Indian Railways Act. There, Chatterjee, J., who deli­vered the leading judgment, observed thus: "I think S. 140 has not the effect of cutting down jthe connotation of the words "Railway Administration" as contained in S. 3 (6). It only provides for the convenience of the party aggrieved that if he wants to serve the notice on the Manager of the State Railway or the Agent of the Railway Company, he must do so in one of the ways mentioned there. If the party chooses to give notice to the Gov­ernment or the Native State or the Railway Company, there is nothing in the Act to pre­vent his doing so, the latter alternative may enhance his trouble, but it cannot take away his rights. I think the clause "includes the Government" has the effect of extending the meaning of the words Railway Administration as the said words might not mean the Gov­ernment when there was a Manager." The decision, however, is not very material so far as the present discussion is concerned. I think the clause "includes the Government" has the effect of extending the meaning of the words Railway Administration as the said words might not mean the Gov­ernment when there was a Manager." The decision, however, is not very material so far as the present discussion is concerned. Indeed in - 'B & N. W. Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Kameshwar Singh', AIR 1933 Pat 45 (S), it was held that S. 140 merely provides a safe and unans­werable method for serving a claim on the rail­way administration and enacts in effect that service upon the agent is service upon the com­pany. But S. 77 enacts that the service must be upon the administration, and inasmuch as a company must conduct its business through its authorised agents, the question to be decid­ed in each case is - whether the particular official served is, in fact, in the circumstances of the case, the duly authorised agent of the railway company. If the company, by its course of business, holds up any particular official as competent to deal with claims, then service of notice upon such an official must be taken, as against the company, to be service upon the company. This view was affirmed by a Full Bench decision of the same Court in - 'Gov­ernor General in Council v. Gouri Shankar Mills Ltd.', AIR 1949 Pat 347 (T). I need not, how­ever, dilate upon this point of service of notice under S. 77, Indian Railways Act. I have al­ready held that for certain purposes, railway administrations have to be treated as separate units under the Indian Railways Act. (17) To sum up, I hold that, in the circum­stances, the Union of India being a party de­fendant to the suit as owner of the Assam Rail­way adequately represents the railway adminis­tration concerned, and that it is not necessary that the Assam Railway Administration, as such, though the Manager or anybody else, should be impleaded as a party defendant to the suit. The suit, as .framed, is .quite compe­tent. It would be a different matter if the cause of action alleged in the plaint is not found to 'be established by the Court of appeal be­low. The question whether the plaintiff has established his cause of action is to be decided on the evidence adduced in the case. The suit, as .framed, is .quite compe­tent. It would be a different matter if the cause of action alleged in the plaint is not found to 'be established by the Court of appeal be­low. The question whether the plaintiff has established his cause of action is to be decided on the evidence adduced in the case. (18) The order of remand cannot, therefore, be sustained as the procedure adopted by the Court of appeal below was illegal and material­ly irregular. The case should now go back to the Court of appeal below for disposal of the appeal according to law and on the merits, after an adequate consideration of the points in­volved. (19) CIVIL REVISION NO. 120 OF 1952. The facts in this case are somewhat different, though the point involved is common. In this case also, the plaintiff petitioner sued for re­covery of a sum of Rs. 3,128/- as compensation for the loss of cotton seeds etc. The goods were consigned at the Dhubri Railway Station and were to be delivered at Jamuna Bridge. The plaintiff's case is that the railway receipt .was not handed over to him and, therefore, he could not get delivery of the goods. He then served notices under S. 77, Indian Railways Act and S. 80, Civil P. C., on the appropriate autho­rities, but having received no satisfaction, in­stituted the suit. The Union of India was impleaded as a party defendant to the suit as owner of the Assam, Railway, and the O. T. Railway, now known as the North Eastern Rail­way. The station to which the goods were con­signed was on the Assam Railway. But the de­fendant challenged the validity of the notices and the plaintiffs' right to sue for damages. The first Court decreed the suit, but. on ap­peal, the same Additional District Judge, rely­ing upon the decision of this Court already dis­cussed by me in - 'AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A), remanded the case to the trial Court for giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his claim by making the O. T. and the Assam Railways, as such, parties to the suit. on ap­peal, the same Additional District Judge, rely­ing upon the decision of this Court already dis­cussed by me in - 'AIR 1952 Assam 51 (A), remanded the case to the trial Court for giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his claim by making the O. T. and the Assam Railways, as such, parties to the suit. (20) It is not in question that the plaint spe­cifically stated that the Dominion of India was being sued as owner of both the Assam and the O T. Railways: In my opinion, the order of remand in this case also is misconceived and unjustified and for the reasons already given by me, has to be set aside. (21) This case is also remitted to the Court of Appeal below for decision of the appeal ac­cording to law. (22) The application in each case is allowed but without costs (23) RAM LABHAYA, J.: I agree. (24) DEKA, J,: I agree. Revision allowed.