JUDGMENT :- This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit to pre-empt the sale of land situate in the former State of Baghal. In the alternative, the plaintiffs prayed for a declaration as reversioners that the sale will not be binding on them after the death of the vendor. Their suit was dismissed by the trial Court and their appeal by the District Judge. 2. The plaintiffs did not press their claim on the basis of their reversionary right in the lower appellate Court. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants however pressed it in this Court. He contended that if due to an erroneous conception of the law the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs-appellants in the lower appellate Court failed to press the plea there, that is no bar in law to that point being pressed in second appeal before this Court. This position was not controverted by the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents. But the alternative case of the plaintiffs on the basis of their reversionary rights is really hopeless. In fact, the counsel appearing for them in the lower appellate Court was right in not pressing the point there. It has been found by the trial Court, and the finding was not challenged by the learned counsel for the appellants here, that the common, ancestor Radda had only a lessees rights in the land in suit, and that proprietary rights in it were acquired by Kadaru, father of the vendor defendant. That being so, it cannot be said that the condition of the land being held by a common ancestor was satisfied in the present case. On the contrary, the land will be deemed to be self-acquisition of Kadaru - Sangat Singh v. Ishar Singh, AIR 1927 Lah. 536 (1) (A); - Hurji v. Chanan Map AIR 1921 Lah 63 (2) (B); and - Sewa Singh v. Mst Bholf, AIR 1916 Lah 100 (C). 3. The plaintiffs case for pre-emption is equally unfounded. The Punjab Pre-emption Act is not applicable since it came into force subsequent to the sale in suit. The plaintiffs based their claim on the allegation that the custom of pre-emption prevailed in the former State of Baghal. In proof of this custom they produced two judgments of the manager of Baghal State, one dated 17-9-1968 B. and the other dated 21-11-1982 B., and seventeen witnesses. The plaintiffs based their claim on the allegation that the custom of pre-emption prevailed in the former State of Baghal. In proof of this custom they produced two judgments of the manager of Baghal State, one dated 17-9-1968 B. and the other dated 21-11-1982 B., and seventeen witnesses. So far as the witnesses are concerned, it was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants that they cited no instances. Their testimony was therefore relevant under S. 48, Evidence Act, as constituting opinions in regard to the existence of the custom. But mere expression of opinion in regard to a custom is of no value unless, as laid down in S. 48, the persons expressing the opinion are persons who would be likely to know of its existence if it existed. Nothing was pointed out in the statements of the appellants witnesses which might show that they satisfied this condition. In fact, as they cite no instances of the exercise of the, right of pre-emption, it is patent on the face of it that they were not likely to know of the existence of any custom of pre-emption. The oral evidence, as remarked by both the Courts below, is therefore worthless. 4. As regards the aforesaid two judgments, the latter of which cited and relied upon a previous judgment, they are off-set by a subsequent judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Baghal State dated 28-7-2001 B. wherein it was specifically held that no custom of pre-emption existed in the State. They are also off-set by the fact that in para 24 of the State Wajib-ul-arz setting forth the custom relating to sales and mortgages of land there is no mention of the existence of the right of preemption in the State. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to the oral evidence produced on behalf of the defendants respondents in which witnesses have spoken of instances of sale which were not pre-empted, and he argued on the basis of - Maula Bakhsh v. Deviditta, 6 Pun. Re. 1907 (D), and Buta Singh v. Tara Singh, 122 Pun Re. 1907 (E), that want of claim of pre-emption did not necessarily negative the existence of the custom since the failure to pre-empt the sales may be due to other causes. Re. 1907 (D), and Buta Singh v. Tara Singh, 122 Pun Re. 1907 (E), that want of claim of pre-emption did not necessarily negative the existence of the custom since the failure to pre-empt the sales may be due to other causes. That may be true, but it is hardly necessary to refer to the evidence produced on behalf of the defendants-respondents when, as already held, the plaintiffs-appellants themselves have failed to establish the existence of the alleged custom of pre-emption in the former Baghal State. This appeal accordingly fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are affirmed. Appeal dismissed.