Mohd. Karrar Ali and 2 others v. State of U. P. — 1953 DIGILAW 259 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Malik, CJ. - This is an application on behalf of three minors that they have been cultivating portions of two plots Nos. 4450 and 4471 in village Allra-tahsil Utraula, district Gonda, since 1948, and a patta was executed in their favour in August 1951, that in March, 1952, when certain labourers and servants of the applicants were falling certain mahua trees, the District Forest Officer took exception under the provisions of the U.P. Private Forest Act, 1948 (No. VI of 1949) and prevented them from cutting down trees or from cultivating the portion of the land which had been under cultivation since 1948. 2. It is urged that the Act is ultra vires as it offends against the provisions of Article 31 Clause (3) and Article 19 Clause (1)(f) of the Constitution. In the affidavit it was said that this land was banjar land and the notification No. 1927/XIV-134-47 dated 3rd January, 1949, by which the U.P. Government declared all forest lands in Uttar Pradesh to be forest for the purposes of the said Act was an invalid notification inasmuch as it did not specify the area which was to be treated as forest land. A counter-affidavit was filed in which it was denied that this was banjar land and it was said that these two plots along with several other plots were situated in a forest area to which the U.P. Private Forests Act applied. It was also urged that these plots had a large number of trees on them and they were forest land and were not brought under cultivation in 1948 as was stated in the affidavit in support of the application. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit it was mentioned that 7.07 acres of land was brought under cultivation by the aforesaid minors in 1359F, that is after 3rd June, 1949, when the U.P. Private Forests Act, 1948, had come into force and this was done without obtaining the previous permission of the Forest Officer as required by Section 7 of the Act. That the applicants, therefore, had no right to cultivate the said plots. In the rejoinder affidavit, it was mentioned that the applicants had been paying rent for the portions brought under cultivation and had paid rent as late as the 20th of June, 1953. That the applicants, therefore, had no right to cultivate the said plots. In the rejoinder affidavit, it was mentioned that the applicants had been paying rent for the portions brought under cultivation and had paid rent as late as the 20th of June, 1953. It was again asserted that they had been in cultivation since 1948 and that Tribeni Prasad qanungo, who had inspected the plots and had made his report on the 26th February, 1952, had found on the spot that 5 acres of rabi crops were standing, that the rest of the land had been ploughed and that he had been informed by some villagers that the land was under cultivation for about four years. An additional counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the opposite party in, which it is said that the trees standing on the two plots in dispute are about 33,000 in number. 3. The two points urged before us were that the applicants were entitled to cut the trees and the Forest Officer had not right to prevent them from cutting the same. This argument was advanced on two grounds, firstly, that the whole Act was bad under Article 31(2) of the Constitution and secondly that even if there was no question of appropriation of the rights of the applicants or of taking possession of the property and the Act merely imposed restrictions then the restrictions were unreasonable and under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution the restrictions must be deemed to be bad. The second point raised was that the applicants were entitled to cultivate the land already under cultivation and the Forest Officer had no right to prevent their doing so. Both these points can be easily disposed of. 4. As regards the second point, the real dispute relates to a question of fact, the applicants contention being that the land was under cultivation since 1948, that is, before the notification, to which Section 7 of the Act did not apply while the contention of the opposite-party is that the land was brought under cultivation after 3rd June, 1949, and the section therefore, was illegal in view of Section 7 of the Act. The applicants claim that they were tenants of the two plots and their tenancy rights have been recognized by Government and the Government have been realising rent from them. The applicants claim that they were tenants of the two plots and their tenancy rights have been recognized by Government and the Government have been realising rent from them. Learned Counsel for the applicants does not deny that if his clients are tenants of these plots they have a right under the general law to go to the appropriate Court for relief. That Court would be in a better position to decide the question of fact in dispute as to whether the land was brought under cultivation before the 3rd June, 1949 or afterwards. As the applicants have another suitable and effective remedy, it is not necessary for us in this writ petition to decide whether they have the right to cultivate the portion of the land which had already been under their cultivation. 5. The other point raised by learned Counsel was that the Act is in contravention of the provisions of Article 31(2) and is, therefore, invalid. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India AIR 195l S.C. 41, wherein Mr. Justice Mukherjea discussing the meaning of the word 'property' as used in Article 31 of the Constitution expressed the opinion that it does not necessarily mean a totality of the rights which the ownership of the object connotes and the question whether a person has been dispossessed from the property depends upon the answer to the question whether he has been dispossessed substantially from the rights held by him or the loss is only in regard to some minor ingredient of the proprietary right. Reliance was placed on a decision of the High Court of Australia in The Minister of State for the Army v. Detziel 68 C.L.R. 261. The case before the Australia High Court was entirely distinguishable. There the exclusive possession of property for an indefinite period had been taken by the Commonwealth of Australia under regulation 54 of the National Security Regulations and the question was whether this amounted to acquisition of property. The case before the Supreme Court is also distinguishable from the case before us. There the exclusive possession of property for an indefinite period had been taken by the Commonwealth of Australia under regulation 54 of the National Security Regulations and the question was whether this amounted to acquisition of property. The case before the Supreme Court is also distinguishable from the case before us. In that case by an Ordinance the Central Government had notified that they could appoint as many persons as they thought fit as directors of a company and in case they appointed certain directors, the powers of the directors elected by the shareholders, the functions of the managing agents and the rights of the shareholders mentioned in detail in para 36 would cease. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that the shareholders still had the right to transfer their rights and to get the dividends on their shares. It was, therefore, held that the Ordinance did not amount to dispossession of the share-holders of their rights in the company. We have looked into the provisions of the U.P. Private forests Act and we cannot say that the provisions of this Act can be said to be bad because of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. Article 3l(2) of the Constitution provides that: No property, moveable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owing, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. 6. There is no question in this case of either possession or acquisition of the rights of the applicants. The U.P. Private Forests Act was passed as its preamble shows, for the conservation of forests and groves and for afforestation of waste lands which were not vested in the Government. It cannot be denied that the denuding of the countryside of trees and extensive overfelling causes great national loss as forests are not only a national asset but they prevent erosion of soil and also help in the increase of rainfall. It cannot be denied that the denuding of the countryside of trees and extensive overfelling causes great national loss as forests are not only a national asset but they prevent erosion of soil and also help in the increase of rainfall. With that object in view, the State Legislature passed an Act which is in line to some extent with the Central Act, the Indian Forests Act (XVX of 1927). Private owners have not been divested of any of their rights in forests, groves or trees. All that the Act provides is that they cannot cut, collect or remove timber without the permission of the Forest Officer. The restrictions imposed are all subject to permits being given by the Forest Officer. The property remains the property of the owner. His right to transfer the same is left intact. Certain restrictions have, however, been imposed on the exercise of ownership in the larger public interest. It cannot be said that the provisions of the Act amount either to a dispossession of the owners or to the acquisition of property of private owners by the State. Article 31(2), therefore, has no application at all. 7. Learned Counsel has urged in the alternative that the provisions of the Act are bad being in contravention of the provisions of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Art 19(1)(f) provides that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. It is subject, however, to Clause (5) that the State can impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the sub-clause in the interest of the general public, it is urged by learned Counsel that some of the restrictions imposed by the section cannot be said to be reasonable restrictions. He has relied on the case of Chintaman Rao Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 , for the definition of the words 'reasonable restrictions'. The only restrictions with which we are concerned in this case is the restriction against the falling of trees. It is not possible to hold that the State was not entitled to impose restrictions against the indiscriminate falling of trees in forests and groves when it is now well known that such forests are a national asset of great value. The only restrictions with which we are concerned in this case is the restriction against the falling of trees. It is not possible to hold that the State was not entitled to impose restrictions against the indiscriminate falling of trees in forests and groves when it is now well known that such forests are a national asset of great value. In our view the State was entitled to see that there is no indiscriminate cutting down of trees in order to sell the wood and get money before the landlords lost their zamindari rights and the trees or the forests vested in the State. Section 12 of the Private Forest Act lays down that: A Forest Officer may on the application of the landlord grant a felling licence for the felling of trees for such purpose and with such conditions as he may deem proper and thereupon it shall be lawful for the landlord to carry out felling in accordance with the terms of the felling licence. 8. Section 13 of the Act provides that The Forest Officer may direct any owner of a notified forest to prepare within a specified period a working plan in the prescribed manner for the management of the forest. 9. A study of these provisions makes it clear that the only object behind the restriction was to see that the forest wealth of the country is not denuded by the shortsighted policy of some of the owners. We are not called upon in this case to express any opinion whether any harm would be done to the national wealth if restrictions are not imposed on the gathering of forest produce. That question has not been raised. 10. We are, therefore, of opinion that the provision of the Act restricting the right of an owner, or a transferee from him, to fell a tree is not unreasonable specially as there is no absolute restriction and he has been given a right to obtain a permit from the Forest Officer.