Judgment.- This revision petition raises a question relating to court-fee. The petitioner filed a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Valangiman for recovery of properties described in A, B and C Schedules annexed to the plaint claiming to be the reversioner to the estate of one Chinnayya Nayudu against the alienees of those properties from the widow of the said Chinnayya Nayudu. He valued the suit at Rs.2,797 and paid an ad valorem court-fee of Rs.247-7-0. Pending the suit, but before it came on for trial, the plaintiffs filed compromise petitions settling their claim with defendants 5, 7, 9 and 11 in respect of items 1 and 3 of the plaint Schedule properties. Subsequently, that is, after the issues were framed the court-fee examiner issued a checkslip that the suit properties were not correctly valued though none of the parties has raised any objection as to the valuation or to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Thereupon the District Munsif appointed a Commissioner who reported that on a proper valuation of the properties, the suit would be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. Accepting this report of the Commissioner, the District Munsif returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. After taking back the plaint, the plaintiff struck off the claims as regards items 1 and 3 and re-presented it in the same Court. It may be mentioned here that if those items were excluded, the plaint could be entertained as it would be within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. The District Munsif returned the plaint again for the reason that he thought that the plaintiff could not be allowed to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction by abandoning some of the reliefs, as they had already obtained interim decrees as per the compromise filed into Court. On an appeal to the Subordinate Judge, the order of the trial Court was set aside and the District Munsif was directed to receive the plaint as amended, if presented in his Court. The ground of decision of the lower appellate Court was, that it was not open to a Court to insist on the plaintiffs asking for a relief which they did not want, or call upon them to re-instate into the plaint, the properties and defendants whom they had chosen to give up. The ground of decision of the lower appellate Court was, that it was not open to a Court to insist on the plaintiffs asking for a relief which they did not want, or call upon them to re-instate into the plaint, the properties and defendants whom they had chosen to give up. Secondly the lower appellate Court found that the trial Court was wrong in assuming that interim decrees have been passed. It was also observed by the appellate Judge that if the trial Court considered that it was a new plaint, it might call upon the plaintiffs to pay fresh court-fees. When the plaintiffs sought to re-present the plaint again with the court-fee originally paid, the trial Court directed the plaintiffs to pay fresh court-fee on the ground that the claim alleged to have been settled was realised during the pendency of the suit and therefore the court-fee paid in O.S. No.243 of 1949 should not be utilised for the plaint. It is urged in support of the petition that the court-fee paid already in O.S. No.243 of 1949 is sufficient and no fresh court-fee need be paid. There is substance in this contention. There is clear authority for the position that when a plaint is returned under Order 7, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, for presentation to proper Court, credit should be given for the court-fee already paid on the plaint as orginally filed. “The return of plaint” as observed in Visweswara Sarma v. T.M. Nair1, “for presentation to a proper Court is to enable the plaintiff to present that document without paying the stamp over again”. In this case the Full Bench expressed the opinion that when a plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court, the plaintiffs were entitled to get credit for the fee originally levied by the former Court. The learned Judges followed the view expressed by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhakara Bhatt v. Vishwambar Pandit2. In this case the Full Bench expressed the opinion that when a plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court, the plaintiffs were entitled to get credit for the fee originally levied by the former Court. The learned Judges followed the view expressed by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhakara Bhatt v. Vishwambar Pandit2. The observations of the learned Judges in the last mentioned case are appropriate: “Where a court-fee on the institution of a suit has been paid in a Court which cannot possibly afford relief sought, it does not seem consistent with sound principle that the plaintiff should be condemned to lose the fee thus paid or that he should not be allowed to ask without paying a second fee for an adjudication from a Court which can really give one.” That the principle is the same even if some of the reliefs originally sought are abandoned and thereby the suit is brought within the jurisdiction of the original Court and plaint re-presented to the same Court is seen from a ruling of this Court in Varada Pillai v. Thilla Govindaraja Pillai3. Ramesam, J., relying on the earlier rulings of this Court, held that the court-fee paid originally on the plaint could be utilised and that additional court-fee need not be paid. It is not necessary to multiply authority even on principle. When once it is established that credit should be given to court-fee already paid when presented in the proper Court as directed under Order 7, rule 10, the same principle should govern the re-presentation of the plaint to the same Court. If, in law, the plaintiff is entitled to strike off properties or parties when he takes back the plaint and represent it to the same Court, it will follow that he should be permitted to use the same court-fee. The only question is whether it makes any difference, if before the plaint was returned under Order 7, rule 10, a petition compromising the claim in respect of some items which are subsequently struck off was filed into that Court. In my opinion there can be no difference in principle. It is conceded that if the striking off properties was the result of a compromise with some defendants but no compromise petition is filed, it can in no way affect the right of the plaintiff to use the same court-fee. In my opinion there can be no difference in principle. It is conceded that if the striking off properties was the result of a compromise with some defendants but no compromise petition is filed, it can in no way affect the right of the plaintiff to use the same court-fee. Can it be said that the fact the compromise petitions were filed would in any way alter the situation? Although the petitions were filed at a time when it was thought that the Court had pecuniary jurisdiction these compromise petitions had no validity or legal effect, as it was subsequently found that the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit; much less to compromise petitions. As such, no notice of these petitions could be taken as they were filed into the Court which had no jurisdiction. The learned District Munsif thought that really the claim as regards items 1 and 3 was not abandoned, but it was realised during the pendency of the suit. First of all, it must be observed that no order was passed on the compromise petition. Even if any such order was passed, it would be of no legal effect as it would be an order coram non judice. The filing of the compromise petition does not amount to a realisation of the claim. Whatever might be the position if a valid decree was passed in respect of some claim by a Court of competent jurisdiction, thus enabling the plaintiff to execute the decree, the position is different in a case where there is no such decree and in fact where the Court was not competent to entertain even the compromise petition. If any advantage was gained by him, it was not his fault. If the court-fee examiner had examined the plaint earlier, perhaps all these difficulties would have been avoided. The bona fides of the plaintiffs are not in any way questioned. In my opinion, the view of the trial Court that a fresh court-fee need be paid is unsustainable. The same court-fee already paid by the petitioners in O.S. No. 243 of 1949 could be utilised for the plaint as re-presented. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. K.C. ----- Petition allowed.