Judgment.- This revision petition is directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Mayuram dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner against the order, dated 4th April, 1950, passed by the District Munsif of Mayuram in I.A. No. 230 of 1949, in O.S. No. 96 of 1948 as being incompetent. I.A. No. 230 of 1949 giving rise to this Revision Petition was filed in O.S. No. 96 of 1948 which was a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff and defendants 7 to 12 were the next heirs to the estate of one Mathurathammal and for partition and allotment of an 1/7th share to each of the plaintiff and defendants 7 to 12 and for future mesne profits, etc. The suit ended in a compromise under which division and allotments were to be effected in a particular way and that the 1st defendant should be appointed Receiver of the suit property till the end of the samba harvest or the final decree proceedings whichever was later and that he should maintain and render proper accounts for the management. The interlocutory application mentioned above was filed inter alia for a direction to the 1st defendant as Receiver to submit his accounts with vouchers and on his doing so and the parties filing surcharges and objections thereto the Court should decide ascertaining the Receiver’s liability and directing him to pay the amounts due to the parties. The trial Judge on the materials placed before him ascertained the total income to be Rs. 2,920-7-0 and the total expenses as Rs. 937-6-0 and the liability of the Receiver was fixed at Rs. 1,983-1-0. The Receiver was directed to pay this amount into Court. It was also observed in that order “as to how this amount has to be apportioned among the legatee group and the residuary group will be decided after hearing the parties.” The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the trial Court contending that a much larger sum was due and payable by the Receiver to the estate. It was also observed in that order “as to how this amount has to be apportioned among the legatee group and the residuary group will be decided after hearing the parties.” The petitioner filed an appeal against the order of the trial Court contending that a much larger sum was due and payable by the Receiver to the estate. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it as the order appealed against would not come under Order 40, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, for the reason that the order determining the liability of the Receiver was not a final one as the question as to how the amount to be deposited by the Receiver was to be distributed amongst the legatee group and the residuary group was left open. In this revision petition, Mr. Chandrasekara Sastri urged that for a consideration of the question as to whether the order appealed against falls under Order 40, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, or not, the fact that the mode of distribution was not decided is absolutely irrelevant. I think there is substance in this contention and I have to hold that irrespective of whether the apportionment of the amount deposited into Court was made or not, the matter falls within the ambit of rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Thyagaraja Ayyar on behalf of the respondent sought to support the Judgment of the lower appellate Court on different grounds. He urged that unless and until the liability of the Receiver fixed by the Court was enforced by the attachment of the properties of the Receiver, it could not be said that there was any order under rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a Bench ruling of this Court in Palaniappa Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1. There a Receiver was ordered to pay a certain stun of money into Court and he appealed against that order. The appeal was rejected on the ground that it was not an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code. It was held that the order was not attracted by the provisions of rule 4 as it was not followed by an order of attachment of the Receiver’s properties. The appeal was rejected on the ground that it was not an order under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code. It was held that the order was not attracted by the provisions of rule 4 as it was not followed by an order of attachment of the Receiver’s properties. It was observed by the learned Judges that the order contemplated by rule 4 is an order for attachment of the Receiver’s property and for realisation of money by means of such attachment and therefore obviously the order appealed from was not an order of attachment under rule 4. The learned Judges followed the decisions of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts which took the view that unless the order comes under rule 1 or rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies against the directions given to the Receiver. With great respect I must state that the rulings are perfectly sound being based on the provisions of law as they existed then. These are decisions rendered prior to the amendment of rule 4 of Order 40 and Order 43, rule 1(s) Civil Procedure Code by this Court in P. Dis. No. 60 of 1933. Before this amendment rule 4 of Order 40, Civil Procedure Code, ran as follows: " Where a receiver- (a) fails to submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the Court directs or (b) fails to pay the amount due from him as the Court directs, or (c) occasions loss to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence, the Court may direct his property to be attached and may sell such property, and may apply the proceeds to make good any amount found to be due from him or any loss occasioned by him, and shall pay the balance (if any) to the receiver". It is seen that it was the operative portion of rule 4 that enabled the Court to pass an order for attachment and sale of the Receiver’s property on any of the three grounds mentioned in that rule. It is clear that there would be no final order passed under rule 4 unless the operative part of that rule is complied with. It is clear that there would be no final order passed under rule 4 unless the operative part of that rule is complied with. It is obviously for these reasons that this Court in Palaniappa Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, held that the Receiver could wait till the order of attachment contemplated in the operative portion of that rule was passed. Subsequent to this ruling in Palaniappa Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, rule 4 was substituted by an altogether new rule in P. Dis. No. 60 of 1933. The present rule 4 is divided into three paragraphs. We are concerned here with only the second paragraph as the order was passed under sub-ride (2) which provides: "The Court may, at the instance of any party to any suit or proceeding in which a Receiver has been appointed or of its own motion, at any time make an enquiry as to what amount, if any, is due from the receiver as shown by his accounts or otherwise, or whether any loss to the property has been occasioned by his wilful default or gross negligence, and may order the amount found due or the amount of the loss so occasioned to be paid by the receiver into court or otherwise within a period to be fixed by the Court. All parties to the suit or proceeding and the receiver shall be made parties to any such enquiry. Notice of the enquiry shall be given by registered post to the surety, if any, for the receiver; but the cost of his appearance shall be borne by the surety himself unless the Court otherwise directs: Provided that the Court may, where the accounts are disputed by the parties and is of a complicated nature or where it is alleged that loss has been occasioned to the property by the wilful default or gross negligence of the Receiver, refer the parties to a suit. In all such cases the Court shall state in writing its reasons for the reference". By the aforesaid P. Dis. No. 60 of 1933, rule 1(s) of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, was also amended by introducing the words "except an order under the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 4." It has not been disputed in this case that the order passed by the trial Court does fall within the scope of sub-rule (2). By the aforesaid P. Dis. No. 60 of 1933, rule 1(s) of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, was also amended by introducing the words "except an order under the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 4." It has not been disputed in this case that the order passed by the trial Court does fall within the scope of sub-rule (2). But what is argued is that despite the amendment, the law as laid down in Palaniappa Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, holds the field and that an appeal does not lie unless an order is passed directing the attachment of the Receiver’s properties. In other words, the argument of Mr. Thyagaraja Ayyar is that no appeal lies against an order passed under sub-rule (2) of rule 4 because that sub-rule does not contemplate an order for attachment of the Receiver’s properties and it is only sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (3) that provide for the attachment of the properties of the Receiver under the conditions mentioned therein. I do not think I can accede to this contention. Under the amended clause (s) of rule 1 of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, an order under rule 4 of Order 40, except one under the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 4 is made appealable, which means every order passed under rule 4 except under the said proviso, can be appealed against viz., where the parties are referred to a suit by the Court. If that is so, I fail to see how an order passed under sub-rule (2) to rule 4 cannot come within the purview of rule 1(s) of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code. It cannot be disputed that an order under sub-rule (2) is also an order passed under rule 4. Clause (s) of rule 1 of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code, does not lay down that an appeal lies only against an order passed under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (3) of rule 4. It is couched in general terms and exception is made only in respect of an order passed under the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 4. In this situation I fail to see how it can be said that no appeal lies against an order passed under sub-rule (2) of rule 4. It is couched in general terms and exception is made only in respect of an order passed under the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 4. In this situation I fail to see how it can be said that no appeal lies against an order passed under sub-rule (2) of rule 4. For the reasons indicated above, I feel that the principle laid down in Palaniappa Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, is not applicable in view of the changes effected in rule 4 of Order 40 and clause (s) of rule 1 of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code. It follows that the order of the Subordinate Judge holding that the appeal is unsustainable ought to be set aside. The appeal will be remitted to the Subordinate Judge for disposal on the merits. Although the 1st respondent has not preferred a Revision, his cross-objections also will be revived as a result of the allowing of this Civil Revision Petition. The petitioner will get his costs in this Court. The costs in the lower appellate Court will abide the result of the appeal. K.S. ----- Order set aside and appeal remitted.