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1953 DIGILAW 269 (MAD)

Mathapalli Komath Gopalan Nair v. Komath Kunhikanna Nair

1953-08-27

P.V.RAJAMANNAR

body1953
Judgment.- I agree with the learned District Munsif that the case is covered by authority. The terms of the mortgage-deed and indeed the very appellation which the petitioner chose to give it show that the mortgage was usufructuary and the mortgagee was allowed to appropriate the profits of the properties which were in the possession of tenants towards interest. Such perception of profits would not amount to payment to the creditor by the debtor within the meaning of section 9 of the Madras Agriculturists’ Relief Act which is admittedly the governing section.. This point was decided in Jagannatha Aiyangar v. Senniveera Chettiar1, Manavala Aiyar v. Mohammad Yoosaf Maracair2, and Vasudevan Nambudri v. Valia Thirumalpad3. Those were decisions under section 8 of the Act, but the same principle would be applicable in a construction of section 9 of the Act. Mr K.P. Ramakrishna Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, sought to distinguish these cases on the ground that in those cases the mortgagee was put in actual possession of the properties whereas in this case the mortgagee was asked to collect the rents from the tenants on the properties In my opinion this is a distinction without substance. The petitioner himself described the mortgage as a usufructuary mortgage. The terms show that the mortgagee was to enjoy the the profits of the properties. The mortgagee was also empowered to recover the properties if necessary. The fact that he was also entitled to collect the rent from the tenants on the land does not mean that legally the possession is not with him. Reference was made to the case in Mylan v. Annavi Madan4. But that case has no bearing on the point under consideration. Nor is there any substance in the next contention of the petitioner’s learned counsel that the amendment to the definition of the term ‘interest" in 1948 has brought about a change in the petitioner’s favour. Whatever be the nature of the amendment, the main point to notice is that the amount or other thing must be paid or payable. I fail to see how the definition as amended takes the present case out of the scope of the application of the three decisions above-mentioned. The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs of respondents 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12. K.C. ----- Petition dismissed.