Judgment.- The appellant is the 3rd defendant. The appeal is against a wholly untenable order passed by the learned District Judge of Coimbatore remanding O.S.No.188 of 1947 on the file of the District Munsiff’s Court, Dharapuram, for fresh disposal with an opportunity to be given to the parties to adduce additional evidence. The plaintiff, who sued in forma pauperis for partition and separate possession of some property, is the son of the appellant’s brother. The appellant was in the position of an alienee of certain items of property. The District Munsiff who first heard the suit partially decreed it and in A.S.No. 63 of 1949, the suit was remanded for fresh disposal on the ground, it would appear that the evidence and the findings were incomplete. Subsequent to this remand P.Ws.2 and 3 and D.Ws.3 to 6 were examined. The learned District Munsiff found on all the issues framed and again gave the plaintiff a partial preliminary decree. The learned District Judge again remanded the suit for fresh disposal after confirming the finding of the learned District Munsiff on issue No.2 to the effect that a sale dated 8th December, 1937, was not binding on the plaintiff. As regards the finding on issue No.1 he expressed his dissatisfaction as to the manner in which the learned District Munsiff dealt with it and remanded the whole suit for fresh disposal in the light of certain observations which are extremely difficult to follow giving the parties a second opportunity to adduce additional evidence. Nowhere in his order is there reference to the first remand. The learned District Judge criticised the learned District Munsiff as regards the following observation he made: “A perusal of the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 6 will convince that Rangasamy Naicken was a trustee not only to the 1st defendant but to various persons of his village.” It may be mentioned that the 1st defendant was no other than the grandfather of the plaintiff and the father of the 3rd defendant. The District Judge considered that the trial Court had perfunctorily left the task of going through the evidence and discussing it to be done by someone else. In a prior portion of his judgment the District Munsiff expressed the view that the evidence of D.Ws.3 to 6, that is, those examined after remand had been purchased. The District Judge considered that the trial Court had perfunctorily left the task of going through the evidence and discussing it to be done by someone else. In a prior portion of his judgment the District Munsiff expressed the view that the evidence of D.Ws.3 to 6, that is, those examined after remand had been purchased. The learned District Judge should certainly not have remanded the suit a second time for disposal, in the circumstances with a further opportunity to the parties to adduce additional evidence. All the evidence was on record and it was the clear duty of the lower appellate Court to have gone into it, found also on the other issues and finally disposed of the appeal. The learned District Judge in his remand order considered further that two other issues were necessary and directed them also to be tried and determined. Both the learned advocates agree that the learned District Judge should not have in this case proceeded under Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code. This provision of law by which the appellate Court is empowered to remand a case for fresh disposal is, as it appears to me, becoming subject to grave abuse by lower appellate Courts in studious disregard of Order 41, rules 25 to 28 which make specific provision for a call to the trial Court to submit a finding on any further issue which may be considered necessary after taking additional evidence if directed. Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate an appellate Court confirming substantial findings of fact and then remanding the entire suit for fresh disposal because it considers a finding on some other issue unsatisfactory or that findings on some further issue is necessary. This partial confirmation of the trial Court’s judgment is wholly incompatible with the remand of the suit for fresh disposal. Such a remand is most embarrassing to a trial Court and also to the appellate Court which may hear the matter after remand, partially bound as it is by the confirmation of one or two findings by the first appellate Court which directed the remand. Such a remand is most embarrassing to a trial Court and also to the appellate Court which may hear the matter after remand, partially bound as it is by the confirmation of one or two findings by the first appellate Court which directed the remand. There is another objection to such remands in that the findings can only be set aside in a second appeal, though of course, such partial findings when made as in the present case can be set aside as wholly objectionable and nowhere contemplated under any of the provisions of Order 41, Civil Procedure Code, in an appeal such as this. It must finally be remembered by lower appellate Courts that whereas orders of remand under Order 41, rule 23, are appealable, orders passed under Order 41, rules 25, 26 and 28 are not appealable for the simple reason that the appeal has not been finally disposed of. In cases such as this where the obvious course which the lower appellate Court should take is one under these non-appealable provisions, a wholesale remand under Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code, which gives an easy statistical final disposal to the appeal, so far as the lower appellate Court is concerned, must be strongly deprecated. In Veeramma v. Lakshmayya1, the judgment of the trial Court was open to serious criticism. Horwill, J., nonetheless set aside the order of remand and directed the lower appellate Court to dispose of the appeal on its merits. He made the following observations:- “It is not necessary in this case to go so far as to say that if the judgment of the trial Court is so completely incomprehensive as to be of no value at all the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to order the trial Court to write another judgment; but the judgment in this case as already pointed out does contain the findings on all the material questions of fact and law.” The judgment of the trial Court before me does not appear to be anything like as unsatisfactory as the one considered in that judgment and what is also of more importance is that in that decision there was not as in the present case a second remand with a permission to adduce further evidence for the second time. The order of remand by the learned District Judge cannot possibly be permitted to stand and become the storting point of a third cycle of litigation. I have no hesitation in setting it aside in toto including the finding on issue No. 2 which he has seen fit to confirm and I direct the present District Judge of Coimbatore to hear and dispose of the appeal finally and as expeditiously as possible afresh in accordance with law. Costs of this appeal will abide the result and will be provided for in the ultimate decree to be passed. V.P.S. ----- Appeal allowed. isposable property. Property may be inalienable, but yet a person may be entitled to hold it as in the case of inalienable service mams." On the same principle the fact that the trustees have no right to participate in the income from the endowment or its emoluments, is not a ground for holding that it is not property for the purpose of Article 19(1)(f). The word ‘hold’ is wider in its significance than the word ‘enjoy’ and trustees who are in management of religious endowments can be said to hold office, though they may have no beneficial interest to enjoy. We are accordingly of opinion that hereditary trusteeship is within the protection afforded by Article 19(1)(f) even though there are no emoluments attached to the office. We may add that the allegations in the affidavits in support of these petitions disclose that the petitioners have also beneficial interests in the endowments. In the result, we must hold that the provisions in the schemes in so far as they encroach upon the rights of the petitioners as hereditary trustees are void under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. It remains now to consider what reliefs could be granted to the petitioners. We have held that the impugned Act is not invalid, and therefore the schemes framed under the repealed Act, which are declared by section 103(a) to be schemes framed under that Act, will be valid. We have also held that, the provisions in the schemes abridging the rights of the hereditary trustees would be void as repugnant to Article 19(1)(f). The schemes would, therefore, require to be suitably modified and that could satisfactorily be done only by proceedings taken under the Act and that would be a ground for our declining to interfere in these proceedings. The schemes would, therefore, require to be suitably modified and that could satisfactorily be done only by proceedings taken under the Act and that would be a ground for our declining to interfere in these proceedings. But then, it is argued that as the relief claimed by the petitioners is the issue of a writ of prohibition, the fact that another remedy is available is not a ground for refusing it. Reliance was placed on the following observations of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ., in Sri Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment Board1. "It must be remembered that we are dealing with a writ of prohibition and not certiorari. A writ of prohibition lies to prevent an inferior tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction or even from assuming a jurisdiction which does not vest in it under law. It also lies if a provision of a statute is contravened by the tribunal or even if any principles of law are contravened. In deciding the question, whether a writ of prohibition should issue or not, the existence of an alternative remedy is, in our opinion, an irrelevant consideration when the complaint is that an inferior tribunal is exceeding its jurisdiction or is assuming a jurisdiction not vested in it by law." Reference was also made to the following statement of the law in Halsbury, Volume 9, page 822, (Hailsham Edition): "The Court, in deciding, whether or not to grant a writ of prohibition, will not be fettered by the fact that an alternative remedy exists to correct the absence or excess of jurisdiction or an appeal lies against such absence or excess." It is also argued that the immediate cause which led up to the filing of these petitions was the appointment of Executive Officers in some cases and issuing of notices in others, calling upon the petitioners to hand over possession of the temple, its properties and accounts, that they constituted an invasion of their rights as hereditary trustees and that they were entitled to move this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for appropriate relief. The learned Advocate-General also invited us to give a decision on the question raised, as they arise for the first time for determination and the authorities would prefer to have guidance in the matter. The petitions will accordingly be posted for further hearing on the merits. The learned Advocate-General also invited us to give a decision on the question raised, as they arise for the first time for determination and the authorities would prefer to have guidance in the matter. The petitions will accordingly be posted for further hearing on the merits. V.P.S. ----- Petitions posted for further hearing on the merits.