ORDER : 1. Two revisions, one by Laxmi Kumar and another by his minor son Krishna Kumar have been filed in this Court against an order dated 11-8-52 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Civil Criminal Suit No. 4 of 1950 valued at Rs. 5,54,697/-. This judgment will dispose of both the revisions. The suit as originally framed was filed against them by Krishna Ram Baldev Bank, Lashkar, through its Manager Mr. Jal Bharucha, on the basis of three mortgage deeds dated 22-3-48, 13-4-48 and 13-4-48 alleged to have been executed by Laxmi Kumar in favour of the Bank. The defendants having objected to the suit filed by the Bank an application was made by Mr. Jal Bharucha and another by His Highness Maharaja Jiwaji Rao Scindia for amendment of the plaint. It transpired that the said Bank is neither a juristic person, nor a firm as defined in Order 30, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is the private property of His Highness Maharaja Scindia, and during the days when the Ruler of Gwalior State had* sovereign rights, a notification had been published in the Gwalior Government Gazette dated 19th July 1924 authorising the said Bank to sue and be sued in its own name. The learned Additional District Judge thought that this Notification having been made under the provisions of the Gwalior Civil P.C. is still in force as it is saved by S. 157, Indian Civil P.C. I have perused the Notification and I find that there is no reference anywhere in it to the Gwalior Civil Procedure Code or to any other Act of Gwalior State. Moreover it appears to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Civil P.C. which is today in force in Madhya Bharat State. I am, therefore, of opinion that S. 157, C.P.C. could not have saved this Notification and it could not have been in force at the date of institution of the suit. Of course, I concede that the Notification of 1924 was responsible for the mistake, which cannot be but a bona fide one within the meaning of R. 10 of O. 1 which runs as follows : "Where a suit has been instituted in the name of wrong person as plaintiff ...... Of course, I concede that the Notification of 1924 was responsible for the mistake, which cannot be but a bona fide one within the meaning of R. 10 of O. 1 which runs as follows : "Where a suit has been instituted in the name of wrong person as plaintiff ...... the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, order any other person to be substituted." 2. The learned Additional District Judge has allowed the amendment on payment of Rs. 500/- as costs to the defendants petitioner and the plaintiff's name now stands as "Lt. General His Highness Maharaja Jeewaji Rao Madhava Rao Scindia, sole proprietor of, and carrying on business under the name and style of, Krishna Ram Baldev Bank, Jayaji Chowk, Lashkar. "Through some inadvertence, it appears that the words" through Mr. Jal S. Bharucha Manager" still remain on the plaint and ought now to be deleted. 3. Shri Kanhyalal, learned counsel for the petitioners, contends that where the original plaintiff had no right of suit, the suit must be deemed not to have been validly commenced and such a defect could not be cured by an amendment and so the plaint ought to be rejected and that a fresh suit must be filed. I do not think there is any substance1 in this argument; for, the words in Rule 10 Order 1 of Civil Procedure Code are in direct contrast with the argument addressed. The words "where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff" are quite clear and must be construed to include those suits which are instituted by persons who had no right to do so. If it is laid down in any ruling that no amendment is possible or permissible in a case where the original plaintiff had no right to sue, I should, with all respect, disagree with that interpretation as it would contravene the clear provisions embodied in O. 1 R. 10. I am fortified in this view by a ruling reported in - 'Krishna Bai v. Collector and Govt. Agent, Tanjore', 30 Mad 419 (A) and another reported in - 'Municipal Committee, Katol v. Imran Ali Hasan Ali', AIR 1934 Nag 159 (B). 4. In - 'Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co. I am fortified in this view by a ruling reported in - 'Krishna Bai v. Collector and Govt. Agent, Tanjore', 30 Mad 419 (A) and another reported in - 'Municipal Committee, Katol v. Imran Ali Hasan Ali', AIR 1934 Nag 159 (B). 4. In - 'Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co. Ltd. (No. 2)', (1902) 2 KB 485 (C) the Court of Appeal clearly held that where an action has, through a bona fide mistake, been commenced in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the fact that the original plaintiff has no cause of action does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to order the substitution of another person as plaintiff. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee followed this ruling in - 'Monghibai v. Cooverji Umersey', AIR 1939 PC 170 (D). In fact, the trial Court is vested with wide discretion under O. 1, R. 10 and when the Court has exercised this discretion to prevent the suit being defeated upon a purely technical ground, this Court will not interfere, in its revisional jurisdiction, with the orders passed allowing the, amendment. 5. The second point taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in this revision, is that the three mortgage deeds concern separate properties in different districts and that the Gwalior Court has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the suit. According to the learned Counsel, these suits ought to have been filed, one in Gwalior, another in District Bhind, and the third in District Shivpuri, and, that the mortgaged properties being situate in different districts a consolidated suit was not permitted by law. The learned counsel also draws my attention to para eight of the plaint which alleges that as the defendants reside in Lashkar and the debts had to be paid in Lashkar, the Gwalior Court has jurisdiction to decide the suit. Hs attacks the reasoning of the trial Court which is very brief on this point and is contained in para 27 of his judgment which is as follows : "I carefully considered this question and I do not find much force in this argument. If Section 17, C.P.C., is read with O. 2, R. 3, the whole suit becomes triable by this Court, vide - 'Nilkanth Balwant v. Vaidya Narasinh Bharathi', AIR 1930 PC 188 (E) and - 'Harchandar Singh v. Lal Bahadur Singh', 16 All 359 (F). If Section 17, C.P.C., is read with O. 2, R. 3, the whole suit becomes triable by this Court, vide - 'Nilkanth Balwant v. Vaidya Narasinh Bharathi', AIR 1930 PC 188 (E) and - 'Harchandar Singh v. Lal Bahadur Singh', 16 All 359 (F). Again under S. 67-A of the Transfer of Property Act, it is necessary for the mortgagee to include all the mortgage claims in one suit. It has been held in - 'Corporation of Calcutta v. Kumar Arun Chandra Singh', AIR 1934 Cal 862 (G) that the section is wide enough to include cases where different properties are mortgaged by the mortgagor to the same mortgagee." I agree with the learned counsel that so far this point is concerned, the para of the judgment quoted above is riddled with defects and the rulings cited do not lay down the proposition which the learned Judge thought they do. Section 67-A, T. P. Act was added to the T. P. Act by Act 20 of 1920 and was intended to benefit the mortgagor by cutting down the former rights of the mortgagee. In the case of a number of mortgages in which the only remedy is sale, it was thought that the property would never realise its fair and proper value if it be sold subject to another mortgage and so the mortgagee was not allowed to enforce one mortgage and keep the other mortgages alive. But from the language of S. 67-A it is clear that only those mortgages could be consolidated which the Court, in which the mortgagee sues, has jurisdiction to enforce. See - 'Prem Sukh Mahata v. Mangal Chand', 41 Cal WN 851 (H). This ruling has been followed by Dunkley, J. in - 'Daw Kyn v. Ko Ba Tin', AIR 1939 Rang 247 (I) and on the basis of these rulings I am clear in my mind that the provisions of S. 67-A can have no application unless a suit on all the three mortgages could be brought in the same Court. As regards R. 3 O. 2, Civil P.C., the provisions embodied in it allow a plaintiff ordinarily to unite in. the same suit several causes of action, against the same defendants. As regards R. 3 O. 2, Civil P.C., the provisions embodied in it allow a plaintiff ordinarily to unite in. the same suit several causes of action, against the same defendants. But I agree with the opinion expressed in - 'Karamsingh v. Kunwar Sen', AIR 1942 All 387 (J) that the provisions are subject to the condition that the Court has jurisdiction in respect of all the causes of action involved. Respectfully I also agree with the opinion expressed in that case that the main body of Civil P.C., sets forth the fundamental principles which cart be amended by the Legislature itself and that the rules in Sch. I deal with matters of detail which can be modified by the High Courts with the previous approval of certain authorities and that no rule in the Schedule can confer upon any civil Court jurisdiction which it would not have under the provisions is the body of the Code. I agree with Sari Kanhyalal, learned Counsel for the petitioners, that neither S. 67-A, T. P. Act nor Order 2 Rule 3 had any application to the facts of this case as neither of the two could amend the provisions embodied in S. 16, Civil P.C. 6. It follows that' it is only S. 16, Civil P.C. that is relevant in this connection and on the construction of this section and of S. 17 should depend the fate of this revision. Under S. 16, a suit to enforce a mortgage on land must like any other suit for land be brought in the Court within whose jurisdiction the land is situated, although the remedy on the covenant may nave to be sought in a different forum. If the mortgagee had sued only for the mortgage money there would have been no difficulty in applying the provisions of Rule 3 Order 2 or the theory that the debtor must find his creditor. But as the suit is only for enforcing the mortgages the cardinal principle of law that the forum suit is the only one in which all rights concerning land must be tried will be applicable. But as the suit is only for enforcing the mortgages the cardinal principle of law that the forum suit is the only one in which all rights concerning land must be tried will be applicable. This principle has been adopted by the Legislature in S. 16 of our Civil P.C. which enacts that suits concerning immovable property of the description mentioned in Sub-Sections (a) to (e) of that section will have to be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate. Section 17 supplements the provisions of S. 16 and reads as follows : "Where a suit is to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit may be instituted in any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate. Provided that, in respect of the value of the subject matter of the suit the entire claim is cognisable by such Court." Clearly the provisions of S. 17 are intended to solve a difficulty which would arise if there is a dispute about some immovable property which is situated partly within one jurisdiction and partly within another. A single example may be furnished by a thousand acres field part of which may be conterminous or adjacent but may stretch in several districts. Shri Kanhyalal draws my attention to the words "any portion of the property" and refers to the observations of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1942 All 387 (J) that the property must be one property and must be capable of being described as a single entity. Whether it can or cannot be described as such will, of course, depend upon the nature of the dispute between the parties, and also in my opinion, upon the intention of the parties when they struck the bargain or entered into a contract about such property. If, for example, there is a dispute, about an estate or about a portion of it that property for the purposes of that suit will obviously be considered to be a single entity. The entire estate (comprising of sixty villages) may be mortgaged and the villages may be situated in different jurisdiction. Yet the whole estate will be regarded as one property. The entire estate (comprising of sixty villages) may be mortgaged and the villages may be situated in different jurisdiction. Yet the whole estate will be regarded as one property. There may then be joint property or joint family property consisting of houses, stables, offices, go-downs, factories, gardens, fields etc. scattered in several districts and for a partition suit all this property will be considered to be a single entity. So a suit in District A for recovery of possession of immovable property within the territorial jurisdiction of different Courts was held to have been properly brought - ('Har Chander Singh v. Lal Bahadur Singh', 16 All 359 (F)). 7. An extreme example of the application of S. 17 is furnished by - 'Krishnaswamy Reddiar v. Venugopala Reddiar', AIR 1942 Mad 614 (K) where the defendants resided in Rangoon and the plaintiff had filed a suit against them in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Trichnopoly praying, inter alia, for the recovery of possession of certain movable and immovable properties, or in the alternative for partition of those properties, the large part of which was in Burma and the small part was in the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Trichnopoly. During the course of proceedings S. 46(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the India and Burma (Existing Laws) Act, 1937 came into operation and Burma ceased to be part of India. The defendant's contention that the Court ceased to have jurisdiction in respect of the properties situated in Burma was upheld by the Subordinate Judge; but the Madras High Court overruled the objection on the ground that once the Court has seisin of the case it has jurisdiction to try it to its conclusions and that the right to continue in a Court in India a suit properly filed in that Court before 1st April 1937 was not taken away by the Government of India Act, 1935. 8. This decision was upheld by the Federal Court - 'Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswamy Reddiar', AIR 1943 FC 24 (L) on the ground that a right to continue a duly instituted suit is in the nature of a vested right and. it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication of intention to that effect, and as there was no indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination the suit must proceed. it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication of intention to that effect, and as there was no indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination the suit must proceed. The application of the principle embodied in Section 17, C.P.C. to the facts of this case is clearly seen when we notice that Justice Yardachariar who delivered the judgment of the rederal Court prefaced his judgment with the following sentences : "On 1st April 1937 Burma ceased to be part of India, During the time that it remained part of British India, it was permissible under S. 17, C.P.C. to include immovable property situate in Burma as part of the subject matter of a suit instituted in any other province. What is the effect of the separation on a suit of this kind which was pending at the time in a South Indian Court ?" I need not multiply authorities for the proposition that in suits for the possession of, or sale of, immovable property in different districts the principle embodied in S. 17 can be made applicable. If it was not made applicable to the facts in AIR 1942 All 387 (J) it was due to the fact that the plaintiffs in that case were not claiming the estate of the deceased Badri Das as a whole against any rival claimant to the estate, but they were claiming two different properties against two different sets of defendants whom they alleged to be trespassers and who had no connection with each other. The decision was based upon the principle that unconnected transfers by a Hindu widow of properties comprised within the husband's estate did not give rise to one cause of action against the various transferees. It was also rightly laid down in that case that it an owner of an estate has a claim against unconnected trespassers who have trespassed upon different parts of the estate or different properties situated within it, those parts or those properties would not for the purpose of the dispute between him and the trespassers be one entity but several entities, and, in these circumstances, the provisions of S. 17 would not, apply. From a perusal of the ruling I have no doubt in my mind that if in that case the plaintiffs had claimed possession of the properties situated in Hardwar and Amritsar from one set of defendants only the properties would have been considered by their Lordships to be one single entity so as to attract the application of S. 17, C.P.C. 9. Applying the principles enunciated in that case to the facts of the present case, I find that there would have been no difficulty in applying S. 17 to the present case if the mortgagor had executed a single mortgage deed in favour of the mortgagee. But, there are three different-mortgage deeds. By the first deed dated 23-3-48, nine houses in Lashkar (Gwalior) are mortgaged for a sum of Rupees three lakhs. By the second deed dated 13-4-48, the Shri Ram Seeta Ram Oil and Dal Mill at Bhind (with Kothi Quarters, Godown, Room, well and machine) has been mortgaged for a sum of Rupees one lakh and forty thousand. By the third deed dated 13-4-48, the Lakshmi Sugar and Oil Mill at Shivpuri (with Kothi, Quarters, Godown, Room, Well and Machinery etc.) was mortgaged for a sum of Rupees eighty-five thousand. If the three mortgage deeds had been independent of one another, I would have had no difficulty in holding that S. 17 has no application and that according to S. 16 the mortgages on Bhind and Shivpuri properties could be enforced only in those Districts. But every mortgage deed in clear terms refers to other mortgage-deeds and in each is also found a preface Which may be rendered into English thus : "We are proprietors of the firms Shri Ram Shubha Karan and Shri Ram Sita Ram and in these names we carry on our business at Lashkar, Bhind and Shivpuri. Owing to the-rates of commodities having gone down we are feeling difficulty in carrying on our trade. In order to remove this difficulty, and in order to carry on our business with good name and with convenience we require money. We have, therefore, entered into a contract with Krishna Ram Baldeo Bank, Sarrafa, Lashkar, to raise a loan of Rs. 5,25,000/- by mortgaging all our immovable property (houses, and factories etc.) situated at Lashkar, Bhind and Shivpuri and have agreed to pay interest at the rate of seven annas per cent per month." 10. We have, therefore, entered into a contract with Krishna Ram Baldeo Bank, Sarrafa, Lashkar, to raise a loan of Rs. 5,25,000/- by mortgaging all our immovable property (houses, and factories etc.) situated at Lashkar, Bhind and Shivpuri and have agreed to pay interest at the rate of seven annas per cent per month." 10. What does this preface indicate ? This is a connecting link between the three deeds and signifies that the three mortgage-deeds, though separately written, were in fact part and parcel of a single mortgage contract entered into by the parties. The substance of the contract is the pledge of the whole property of the firms for the debt. The complexity given to the bargain between the parties by the execution of three documents cannot alter its true character, the precise legal description of which must be determined by the preface and by reading all the three along with it as a single mortgage contract. The dominant intention of the parties as displayed by each of the deeds was clearly that the whole property situated at three places, Lashkar, Bhind and Shivpuri, should be regarded as a single entity. Under these circumstances, it can be held that S. 17, Civil P.C. applied to the facts of this case, and, only on this basis, the Gwalior Court can be deemed to have jurisdiction to try this suit. 11. Shri Kanhyalal then places reliance on certain observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 'Sardar Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan', AIR 1932 PC 172 (M) the relevance of which can be considered only by referring to the facts of the case. The suit in that case related to four properties : (1) Estate of Nawabganj in Oudh; (2) Rakhkhamba property in District Lahore; (3) Julians property in Tahsil Lahore and (4) Khalikabad property in the Punjab. On the death of Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan, his son asserted possession over the estates both in Oudh and in the Punjab but his title was challenged by the plaintiff- who claimed reversion to the whole estate under the will of the former holder Nawab Nasil Ali Khan. On the death of Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan, his son asserted possession over the estates both in Oudh and in the Punjab but his title was challenged by the plaintiff- who claimed reversion to the whole estate under the will of the former holder Nawab Nasil Ali Khan. The plaintiff brought the suit before a single Judge (original jurisdiction) of the Oudh Chief Court, See - 'Mohammad Ali Khan v. Nisar Ali Khan', AIR 1928 Oudh 67 at p. 69 (N), and, at first, asked the Court to decide only the question of title to the Oudh property and prayed for permission to file a separate suit in the Punjab for the property situated there. This prayer was not accepted and the plaint was accordingly amended. The plaintiff then framed his claim so as to include all the property in the Punjab. It transpired that by virtue of a deed of endowment dated 17-6-1892 the Khalikabad property was included in the Waqf. The plaintiff, however, included this property also in his suit. The defendant denied the jurisdiction of the Oudh Court as to the Waqf property but admitted the jurisdiction as to the rest of the property in the Punjab, the cause of action being substantially the same for all the property except that included in the Waqf. The learned Single Judge, however, held that he was empowered to decide plaintiff's claim to waqf property also and decreed the claim. The defendant went in appeal before the Division Bench, see - 'Nisar Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ali Khan', AIR 1929 Oudh 494 (O). At page 514 of the judgment delivered by Stuart, C.J., we read : "Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru on his (i.e. defendants) behalf, while recognising that the plaintiff had a right under the provisions of S. 17, C.P.C. to ask for possession of the Punjab property other than the Khalikabad property argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to declare the plaintiff Mutawalli of the Khalikabad property as the Punjab Courts alone would have jurisdiction to decide that point. His case was that in so far as the Khalikabad property was concerned the suit was not to obtain relief in respect of property but to obtain a declaration of title as Mutawalli under the terms of Ex. 4 which this Court has no jurisdiction to grant." The Division Bench decided the point in favour of the defendant. His case was that in so far as the Khalikabad property was concerned the suit was not to obtain relief in respect of property but to obtain a declaration of title as Mutawalli under the terms of Ex. 4 which this Court has no jurisdiction to grant." The Division Bench decided the point in favour of the defendant. When the case went to the privy Council the same point was canvassed there. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the claim must fail as to Khalikabad property and that so far as this property was concerned S. 17 had no application. Lord Tomlin who delivered the judgment of the Board gave the reasoning at p. 177 of AIR 1932 PC 172 (M) in the following words : "There remains the question of the Khalikabad estate. Here the respondent cannot succeed unless he shows that under the terms of the deed creating the Waqf he is the trustee. The question depends upon the construction of the deed. It is a separate and different cause of action from those which found the proceedings in respect of other three properties. "Their Lordships are unable to find any justification for bringing the suit in respect of this property elsewhere than in the Court of District where the property is situate. Such justification cannot in their Lordships judgment be found in S. 17, Civil P.C. upon which the respondent relied." 12. It will be seen from above that though the observations quoted above and relied upon by Shri Kanhyalal have no material bearing upon the facts of the case before me, yet the fact that in that case the suit for possession of immovable properties in Punjab and Oudh could be tried at Lucknow under S. 17, Civil P.C. clearly goes against all the arguments addressed to me by learned Counsel for the petitioner. 13. I need only briefly refer to another Privy Council case AIR 1930 PC 188 (E) on which the Learned Court below has placed reliance. This was an appeal from a judgment of the Bombay High, Court reported in - 'Nilkanth Balwant v. Vidyashankar', AIR 1924 Bom 387 (P). 13. I need only briefly refer to another Privy Council case AIR 1930 PC 188 (E) on which the Learned Court below has placed reliance. This was an appeal from a judgment of the Bombay High, Court reported in - 'Nilkanth Balwant v. Vidyashankar', AIR 1924 Bom 387 (P). The suit was filed in the Court of First Class Subordinate Judge at Satara against the mortgagors or their representatives in interest for recovery by sale or foreclosure of a sum of Rupees five lakhs and interest charged upon certain immovable properties in Belgaum, Kolhapur, Sawantvadi, Kurundwad and Satara. The mortgages were entered, into between the years 1840 and 1844 and were subject to the provisions of Regulation V of 1827. The various bonds entered into by the defendants' predecessors were all in the same form, and the debts due under all the mortgage deeds were a charge upon all the properties. It was assumed by both sides that the mortgages were consolidated. It transpired that the possession of properties in British territory was given up in 1860 and no steps were taken to recover possession until the suit was filed in Satara Court. According to the High Court, the presumption was that the Kolhapur properties only were considered as security for the debt. The claim for possession of properties in British India was therefore held to be time-barred and a decree was given on the footing that only the claim for possession of the properties in Kolhapur State was in time. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reversed this judgment and decree on the ground that the words in Section 17 "within the jurisdiction of different Courts" must mean within the jurisdiction of different Courts to which the Code applies i.e., Courts in British India and, therefore, held that British India Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit so far as it related to the mortgage properties situate in an Indian State outside British India. Owing to the peculiar facts of this case, this ruling does not help either party in the present case, unless, in an indirect way, it can be inferred from the judgment that If Kolhapur property had been in British India S. 17 would have been held to be applicable. 14. Owing to the peculiar facts of this case, this ruling does not help either party in the present case, unless, in an indirect way, it can be inferred from the judgment that If Kolhapur property had been in British India S. 17 would have been held to be applicable. 14. I need not refer to other authorities on the interpretation of S. 17, for, I am clear in my mind that the three mortgage-deeds in the present case must be taken as connected with one another and as forming part of the same transaction i.e. they were part of the mortgage contract entered into by the parties, the foundation for which exists in the allegation contained in para two of the plaint. I however feel that I should safeguard myself from giving any impression that I have expressed any opinion on the points whether the three mortgage-deeds are genuine or were executed by defendant No. 1 or whether there is any joint or joint family property which, was mortgaged. These points will be adjudicated upon only by the trial Court. My decision rests only upon the allegations in the plaint and upon the recital in the three mortgage-deeds filed along with the plaint, in this case, and on the basis of the mortgage contract, I am of opinion that the Court at Gwalior has jurisdiction to try the suit. In this view of the matter I dismiss the revisions with costs. Revision dismissed.