JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Civil Judge First Class Guna reversing the judgment and decree of the Tappa Court Chanderi, and dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suit for the recovery of Rs. 362/- with interest thereon on the basis of an acknowledgment dated 8-5-44. The defendant respondent resisted the suit on several grounds which are not material here. His main ground was that the acknowledgment sued upon was in respect of a debt barred by time and did not give any fresh cause of action to the plaintiff. This contention of the defendant was accepted in appeal by the learned Civil Judge of Guna. 2. The acknowledgment dated 8-5-44 which forms the basis of the suit is signed by the defendant Khetsingh and says "Balance struck. Rs. 362/- due". Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta argued that the debt dated back to the year 1927 when in the plaintiff's account books Rs. 1114/- were shown as due from the defendant on Miti Kartik Vadi 2 Samvat 1984 (Ex. P. 6); that this amount comprised of Rs. 525/- advanced to the defendant on the basis of a bond and other cash payments; that there was an acknowledgment on Miti Savan Sudi 15 Samvat 1985 for Rs. 1001/- (Ex. P. 5); that on 2-11-30 the respondent signed a second acknowledgment for Rs. 1251/- (Ex. P. 4). On 30-10-38 there was another acknowledgment for Rs. 925/- (Ex. P. 3); and again on 27-10-42 there was yet another acknowledgment for Rs. 852/- (Ex. P. 2), and later on in. 1944 the respondent signed the acknowledgment in suit on 8-5-44 (Ex. P. 1). It was said that, the first acknowledgment of Miti Sawsn 15 Samvat 1985 was within six years of the dates of the loans given to the respondent i.e., within the period prescribed by the Gwalior Limitation Act for a valid acknowledgment and that the later acknowledgments were all within six years of each other and that, therefore, the acknowledgment of 8-5-44 could not be said to be one in respect of a debt barred by time. 3. This contention must be rejected for the simple reason that the entry Ex. P. 6 in the plaintiff's account books showing the loan transaction is not signed by the defendant and the plaintiff-appellant has apart from tendering in evidence Ex. 3. This contention must be rejected for the simple reason that the entry Ex. P. 6 in the plaintiff's account books showing the loan transaction is not signed by the defendant and the plaintiff-appellant has apart from tendering in evidence Ex. P. 6 made no attempt whatsoever to prove by other evidence the dates of the original loan transaction. There is thus nothing to show that the acknowledgment of Miti savan Sudi 15 of Samvat 1985 was itself within time. If, therefore, the first acknowledgment is not shown to have been made within six years of the original loan advances, the later acknowledgments though within six years of each other can be of no avail to the appellant. 4. It was then stated that the acknowledgment of 8-5-1944 was a promise to pay in writing within Section 25(3), Contract Act and the plaintiff was entitled to sue on it even if the amount shown in the acknowledgment represented a time barred debt. This point also does not help the appellant. The promise to pay necessary to bring a case within Section 25(3), Contract Act must be an express promise, which is absent in the present case. The words of the acknowledgment of 8-5-44 amount to a mere acknowledgment and do not import a promise to pay. No doubt as held by the Privy Council in - 'Maniram v. Rupchand', 33 Cal 1047 (PC) (A) an unconditional acknowledgment by a debtor implies a promise to pay. But to take an implied promise to pay as a "promise in writing to pay" for the purposes of Section 25(3), Contract Act is to make Section 19, Limitation Act otiose (see - 'Tulsiram v. Zaboo', AIR 1949 Nag 229 (B); - 'Shadi Ram v. Prabhu', AIR 1953 Punj 28 (C)). In the absence of such words as 'I promise to pay' the acknowledgment dated 8-5-44 cannot be regarded as one falling under Section 25 (3), Contract Act and sufficient to sustain the appellant's claim. 5. Mr. Gupta then relying on a Division Bench decision Of this Court in - 'Sarjerao Shitole v. K.B. Bank Ltd.', 1949 Madh-B. LR 157 (D) argued that there was an "account stated" between the parties and therefore the plaintiff's suit was governed by Article 19, Gwalior Limitation Act (corresponding to Art. 64, Indian Limitation Act). I am unable to accede to this contention. I am unable to accede to this contention. I do not think the decision in - 'Sarjerao's case (D)' is of any assistance to the appellant. The question whether in any particular case the striking of a balance is an "account stated" for the purposes of Article 64, Indian Limitation. Act or Article 19, Gwalior Limitation Act depends on the facts ind circumstances of the case. In 'Sarjerao's case, (D)', the Privy Council decision in - 'Bishun Chand v. Girdhari Lal', AIR 1934 PC 147 (E), was relied upon and it was found as a fact that there was an 'account stated' between the parties. As pointed out in the! Privy Council decision the essence of an "account stated" is the fact that there are cross-items of account and that the parties mutually agree the several amounts of each and, by treating the items so agreed on the one side as discharging the items on the other side pro tanto, go on to agree that the balance is payable. This is not the case here. The appellant made no attempt to prove any cross-items of account or any agreement and adjustment. Ex. P. 1 contains nothing more really than a statement of account with an acknowledgment by the defendant, but there is neither agreement nor adjustment. A mere balancing of account is not necessarily an 'account stated' within the meaning of the articles referred to above. To me it seems, this is not a case of account stated. 6. The result is that the appeal fails on all the points and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.