JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal on behalf of Sowgaijam Ningthemjao Singh plaintiff against the decree dated 14-7-52 passed against him by the Sub Judge, Manipur dismissing his suit No.153 of 1951 for declaration that the sale deed in dispute has been duly executed by defendant No.1 and Abdul Miya predecessor in interest of the other defendants and is, therefore, fit for registration. 2. The facts of the case are simple enough. It is alleged that Jabar Mia and Abdul Mia predecessor in interest of defendants Nos.2 to 8 executed a sale deed of land under patta No.93/134 Kh. situated at Phoudal village on 5-6-49 for consideration of Rs.1400/- duly received. They promised to get the deed registered, deferred it on some pretence or the other for some time and eventually refused to do so. On the Sub Registrars refusal to register the document on the denial of execution of the deed by the vendors, an appeal was made to the District Registrar, which also failed, hence the suit under S.77, Registration Act as per direction in the order. The defendants denied the transaction and raised various other pleas on which the following issues were struck for determination : 1. Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit? 2. Is the suit maintainable in its present form? 3. Is the suit barred by limitation as prescribed in S.77 of the Indian Limitation Act? 4. Is the suit bad for defect of parties? 5. Did the defendant 1 and the late Abdul Mia sell the land under patta No.93/134 Kh. P. to the plaintiff for Rs.1400/- and executed a sale deed on 5-6-49 in favour of the plaintiff? 6. Was the sale deed not admitted to registration by the Sub Registrar and the Registrar? 7. Is the deed genuine and fit for registration? 8. What extent, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to in this suit? The case has been argued before this court on the point of limitation alone. The learned counsel for the respondent defendant touched other points also but not seriously. The main contention between the parties remains about limitation for filing the suit. 3. The learned Sub Judge has found that though the sale deed is genuine and fit for registration, plaintiff is not entitled to get the declaration independently of S.77, Registration Act, and also that the suit is barred by limitation. The main contention between the parties remains about limitation for filing the suit. 3. The learned Sub Judge has found that though the sale deed is genuine and fit for registration, plaintiff is not entitled to get the declaration independently of S.77, Registration Act, and also that the suit is barred by limitation. All the other issues have been determined by him in favour of the plaintiff. 4. It becomes abundantly clear by going through the plaint that the present suit has been filed under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act and according to the direction of the District Registrar as contained in his order dated 5-10-51 refusing to register the document. The only mention of O.21, Rule 34(5), C.P.C., does not take away that merit from it. Accordingly answer to issue No.2 is in the affirmative and it is held accordingly. 5. As for limitation the District Registrar refused registration of the document on 5-10-51 and directed the plaintiff to seek his remedy in a Civil Court. The plaintiff applied for a copy of the above order the same day i.e., 5-10-51 and got it on 2-11-51. He filed the suit on 28-11-51. The suit comes within limitation, if the time of 28 days spent in obtaining the copy is excluded from the statutory period of 30 days provided by S.77, Registration Act. The contentious point is whether time spent in obtaining copy of the above order should be excluded or not. 6. The effect of the amended S.29, Limitation Act, as it stands, undoubtedly is to extend the operation of the Limitation Act. According to Sub-section 2(a), the provision contained in S.4, Ss.9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no such exclusion of the above Section in the Indian Registration Act. It is thus clear that general principles laid down in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 of the Limitation Act, prima facie apply to the period of limitation prescribed for a suit by any special or local law unless they are especially excluded by such law. In face of this further point for determination would be whether according to S.12, Limitation Act, a suit is also covered by Sub-section (2). In face of this further point for determination would be whether according to S.12, Limitation Act, a suit is also covered by Sub-section (2). 7. It is at this point that the suit fails. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act only applies to an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of the judgment only. It does not apply to suits. The learned counsel for the respondents also says that in the present suit under S.77, Registration Act, it is not even necessary to file a copy of the order of the District Registrar. There is no reply from the opposite side to this. This appears to be correct. It is found out, therefore, that there is no application of S.12, Limitation Act to the present case. The suit fails as barred by limitation as it was filed more than 30 days after making of the order of refusal by the District Registrar as provided by S.77, Registration Act. 8. The result is that this appeal fails and it is dismissed. Under the circumstances of the case I order the parties to bear their own cost in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.