Judgment :- 1. 1st plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was for a declaration that the two decrees in O. S. 544 of 1105 and O. S. 392 of 1109 on the file of the Mavelikara Munsiff's Court are not binding on the plaintiffs and their illom. The said decrees were obtained by defendants 1 and 2 respectively. The Munsiff dismissed the suit. It is represented before us by learned counsel for both sides that in so far as the appeal relates to the second of the abovesaid decrees viz., O.S. 392 of 1109 obtained by the 2nd defendant 2nd respondent, the matter has been adjusted out of court and the appeal to that extent is therefore not pressed. That part of the appeal relating to the aforesaid decree and to the 2nd defendant-2nd respondent will therefore be dismissed with costs. 2. As regards the other decree in O.S. 544 of 1105, a certified copy of which is marked in the case as Ex; A, Mr. Potti learned counsel for the appellant urges before us the following points. He contended that the form in which the decree is couched is not such as to cast any liability upon the illom. The decree purports to be passed only personally against two named members of the family who were defendants there and who are defendants 3 and 4 here. Those defendants happened to be the karnavan and the senior ananthiravan of the illom but that circumstance, it is contended, would not render the decree any the less one personally against the defendants. The decree is dated 30-6-1105. According to the law that existed then, which was customary, there was no need to describe the karnavan of an illom as such in order that the decree may bind the family. There can be a decree against the family passed against the karnavan without describing him as such. In the Travancore Malayala Brahmana Act, of 1106 there is a provision for impleading the karnavan as such in a suit against the illom. In the absence of such a statutory requirement it is possible to have a decree passed against an illom with the karnavan on record but without describing him as such. This position has been accepted all through and is well established. 3. In the absence of such a statutory requirement it is possible to have a decree passed against an illom with the karnavan on record but without describing him as such. This position has been accepted all through and is well established. 3. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit which ended in a decree having been on a promissory note, under the law merchant no decree could possibly be passed against anybody except the executant, that is to say except personally against the individuals who executed the document, in this case, defendants 3 and 4. The contention is that no decree could be passed on foot of a promissory note except against the executants personally. No decree could be passed, it is argued, against the family, on foot of such a promissory note. One of the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant is Sagarmal v. Bhikusa Tuljiram (A.I.R.1936 Nagpur 252) in which Justice Vivian Bose (of that High Court as he then was) observed as follows: "These views find strong support in a decision of the Judicial Committee in Abdul Majid Khan V. Mt. Saraswatibai [1934 P. C. 4] where their Lordships indicate that a Hindu family can be sued on a promissory note executed by the manager alone in his own name and not in the name of the family firm. They hold that the only difference is that in such case there is no presumption that the other members of the family are liable, and that consequently this must be proved like any other fact in the case with the burden on the person affirming." [Page 254]. On the previous page [page 253] it is observed: "It was decided in 44 All. 393 at page 394 that a joint Hindu family is a legal person according to Hindu Law, which acts through the managing member or head. Therefore the question always arises in such a case whether the signature is of the individual signing or of the legal entity which comprises the whole family. 393 at page 394 that a joint Hindu family is a legal person according to Hindu Law, which acts through the managing member or head. Therefore the question always arises in such a case whether the signature is of the individual signing or of the legal entity which comprises the whole family. The learned judges point out that ordinarily there can be no difference in the signatures, for as a rule a Hindu family is not known by a corporate name, and it would be impractical either to expect every member of the family to sign such notes, or for the manager to recite the names of every individual, including his own on whose behalf he is supposed to be acting. This is also the view taken by the Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts in 23 Mad 597,20 Bom. 488 and II C. W. N. 139 and was again confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 45 All. 434. In the Madras case it was pointed out by Shepard, J at p. 605, that in England, at common law, if a woman before marriage made a promissory note then both her husband and herself could be sued on it after their marriage, even though the existence of a possible husband was not so much hinted at in it. As the learned judge says, in both cases: "There is a liability which is, so to speak, external to the obligation arising on the making of the promissory note and in both cases that liability is limited, while the liability of the maker is absolute." 4. It appears to us therefore that it is too late in the day to raise the contention that based on a promissory note which is a negotiable instrument, a decree for realisation of the debt due thereunder could not be granted against the family. 5. The next point urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that no decree could be passed against a family except in respect of a debt which is supported by necessity. This is a proposition which could not be and has not been questioned. The question then is as to whether the necessity has been made out. The learned judge in the court below thought it was. He based his conclusion upon Ex. This is a proposition which could not be and has not been questioned. The question then is as to whether the necessity has been made out. The learned judge in the court below thought it was. He based his conclusion upon Ex. III, the deposition given by a witness who is now no more and was not available for examination at the trial in the court below. That deposition was given in connection with the proceedings started at the instance of the 1st plaintiff when he objected to the execution at the above decree against the family properties which were attached. He swore therein that he was acquainted with this transaction and that the money under the promissory note was borrowed for the ceremony consequent upon the death of the previous karnavan who was the father of defendants 3 and 4. There was cross-examination of the witness but we do not find a question put as regards the factum of the borrowing or the occasion or the necessity for it. In the absence of any such cross-examination, it has to be taken that the version given by him in his examination-in-chief is correct. There is no evidence adduced in this case regarding necessity except the aforesaid deposition, Ex. III. In the plaint which was drafted after the above deposition, as the order was adverse to the plaintiff, there is no Specific averment made that there was no borrowing made in connection with the ceremonies after the death of the father of defendants 3 and 4 or that such borrowing was unnecessary or was in excess of the actual necessity. The only mention made in paragraph 5 of the plaint is " LQ_101aoeja~o P29JO OJO " Viewed in the light of the evidence given in Ex. III this averment in the plaint must be characterised as not specific. There is no attempt made on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the financial position of the family was such that the ceremonies after the death of the father of defendants 3 and 4 could have been conducted without borrowing or that in fact there was no borrowing or that there was borrowing from some other quarter. There is no attempt made on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the financial position of the family was such that the ceremonies after the death of the father of defendants 3 and 4 could have been conducted without borrowing or that in fact there was no borrowing or that there was borrowing from some other quarter. In the absence of any such case or evidence, we consider that the court below did right in accepting the evidence adduced on behalf of the 1st defendant and in holding that the; debt for which the promissory note sued on in O. S. 544 of 1105 was executed was one binding on the family of the plaintiffs. 6. In the view that we take of the matter that the debt was binding upon the family of the plaintiffs, the decree passed by the trial " court has to be confirmed and it is unnecessary for us to consider the other questions urged before us by learned counsel for the appellant relating to the question of res judicata, which was considered by the court below and decided against him. The appeal should, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Dismissed.