Subba Rao, J.†- This is a court-fee reference made by the Master. When the matter came before one of us it was found that there were conflicting decisions on the question raised and therefore the matter was referred to a Bench of two Judges. The appeal arises out of a suit for a declaration that the sale deeds in respect of the B Schedule properties alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff’s mother in favour of defendants 1 to 4, 5th defendant’s husband and the 25th defendant and the transfers in favour of defendants 6 to 32 by the 5th defendant’s husband were all void and not binding on the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s father executed a gift deed on 2nd October, 1928, in favour of their mother in respect of items 1 to 5 of the B Schedule. Again on 17th December, 1932, the same donor executed another gift deed in favour of their mother in respect of item 6 of the B Schedule. The mother sold them under six sale deeds of various dates to defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5th defendant’s husband and the 35th defendant. Defendants 6 to 32 are alienees from the 5th defendant’s husband. In the plaint in respect of each declaration a fixed fee has been paid aggregating to Rs. 1,400. The plaintiff’s suit was dismissed and the present appeal is filed with a court-fee of Rs. 500 The question is whether the court-fee paid is correct. It would be correct if the appeal does not involve distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. Section 17 of the Court-Fees Act reads as follows: “Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act. Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, section 9.” Section 9, Civil Procedure Code, corresponds to Order 2, rule 7 of the present Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908). The question is what is the true meaning of the words “distinct subjects” in the aforesaid section. The question is what is the true meaning of the words “distinct subjects” in the aforesaid section. To answer this question it is necessary to notice the frame of suits permitted under the Civil Procedure Code. Order 1, Civil Procedure Code, allows the joinder of one or more plaintiffs if the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact. Order 1, rule 3 provides that two or more persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist. Under Order 1, rule 3 the plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly. So too, two or more plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or defendants jointly may unite such cause of action in the same suit. If the different causes of action are joined against defendants separately, it is called multifarious. The aforesaid rules, subject to the conditions laid down therein, enable a party to club up different causes of actions in one suit. But for the enabling provisions separate suits should be brought in respect of the separate causes of action, in which case separate court-fee would have to be paid. But for convenience if they are clubbed together, it becomes necessary to provide for the forum wherein such a suit should be filed and also in regard to the court-fee payable therein. Order 2, rule 3 lays down that the amount or value of the aggregate subject-matter at the date of instituting the suit should govern the question of jurisdiction. Section 17 of the Court-Fees Act regulates the court-fee payable on such a plaint. The marginal note in section 17 shows that the said provision is intended to govern multifarious suits. The second paragraph saves the power conferred on the Court to order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient if the cause of action joined in one suit cannot conveniently be tried or disposed of together. This indicates that the first paragraph is intended to prescribe court-fee for the multifarious suit in respect whereof the said power is conferred. This indicates that the first paragraph is intended to prescribe court-fee for the multifarious suit in respect whereof the said power is conferred. Section 17, therefore, prima facie indicates the intention of the Legislature to prevent an evasion of court-fee by a plaintiff taking advantage of the enabling provision clubbing up two or more distinct causes of action. In such a multifarious suit the plaintiff is directed to pay the aggregate amount of the fee which he would have to pay if he filed separate suits embracing each of such subjects. Otherwise he would total up the value of all the subjects and pay ad valorem court-fee on the total. Calculations would show that the amount payable on the latter basis would be lower than on the former basis. While the Legislature allowed clubbing of causes of action for convenience of parties and for proper disposal of suits, it insisted upon court-fee to be paid as if separate suits were filed. No other reason would justify the enacting of the said provision. If the meaning of the word “subject” is clear and unambiguous, the purpose behind the enactment or the intention of the Legislature are irrelevant, but where the meaning of the word is ambiguous, as in the present case, and where it is not susceptible of precise definition, it is permissible to discern its meaning, having regard to the aforesaid circumstances without doing any violence to the language. The dictionary meaning of the word “subject” is “matter.” A matter again may mean a property which is the subject-matter of the suit or the controversy involved in the suit. The context in which those words are used and the contradistinction brought out by the section itself between a plaint embracing two or more subjects and a suit embracing each of such subjects is indicative of the intention qf the Legislature that the suit governed by section 17 is one that comprises a number of subjects on which several suits could have been filed. If “subjects” means “properties,” several suits could not be filed if the cause of action was the same. If it indicates controversy, the same difficulty would prevent the filing of several suits if the controversy arose in respect of the same cause of action. If “subjects” means “properties,” several suits could not be filed if the cause of action was the same. If it indicates controversy, the same difficulty would prevent the filing of several suits if the controversy arose in respect of the same cause of action. One can therefore steer clear of these difficulties if the words “distinct subjects” are understood to mean “distinct matters” in respect of which separate suits could be filed but for the enabling provision allowing them to be clubbed up in one suit. If so interpreted, the distinctness or the identity of the cause of action is the only test for. the applicability of the section. But the real difficulty is to reconcile the various views expressed by the learned Judges on the interpretation of the words “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Act. The question was placed before a Full Bench in In re Parameswara Pattar1, but unfortunately the learned Judges did not define the words for future help but contented themselves with disposing of the particular question that arose in that case. There the suit was for possession of the immoveable property and mesne profits. The contention was that the claim for possession and the claim for mesne profits were separate causes of action and therefore they were distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The learned Judges observed that the word “subject” in the section was somewhat obscure in its meaning and was not capable of precise definition. They noticed the two views, expressed by Courts in regard to the meaning to be attached to these words, namely, cause of action and the subjects of suits enumerated in section 7 of the Court-Fees Act but preferred to base their opinion on the long continued practice. But the observations at page 2 are strongly relied upon by the appellants. They noticed the two views, expressed by Courts in regard to the meaning to be attached to these words, namely, cause of action and the subjects of suits enumerated in section 7 of the Court-Fees Act but preferred to base their opinion on the long continued practice. But the observations at page 2 are strongly relied upon by the appellants. They read: “Ordinarily, the right or title to the land is the basis for the claim for possession of the land as also for mesne profits, and it cannot therefore be deemed that the two claims are so disconnected, without any inter-relation, as to form distinct subjects, under section 17 of the aforesaid Act.” We do not think that the Full Bench intended to lay down such an elastic test for future guidance, we believe that the learned Judges based their judgment more upon the long existing practice than on an attempt to define the words “distinct subjects” in section 17. We agree with the learned Chief Justice in Ramaswami Gupta v. Pasuparthi Krishnayya2, when the learned Judge observed: “The learned Judges merely took notice of two possible views as to the meaning of that word, viz., one that the word ‘subject’ relates back to section 7 where the various subjects of suits are put under different heads; and the other that the word ‘subject’ means a cause of action. The decision in ‘that case therefore is only authority for the limited position that in a suit for possession of immoveable property and past mesne profits, court-fee is payable on the aggregate value of both the reliefs and the claim for possession of land and for mesne profits are not distinct subjects’ under section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The ground of the decision was expressly stated to be the ‘long course of practice’.” In Ramaswami Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar3, Jackson, J., held that in a suit to recover moneys due to the plaintiff under three deposits made on different dates with the defendant’s firm in their character of trustees of the plaintiff’s family, court-fee should be paid on the amount of each of the deposits separately and not merely on the aggregate amount. The learned Judge observed at page 681: “The petitioner contends that the demand of 29th March, 1927, gathers all his claims into one cause of action, and therefore the subjects are not distinct. The learned Judge observed at page 681: “The petitioner contends that the demand of 29th March, 1927, gathers all his claims into one cause of action, and therefore the subjects are not distinct. This would turn upon whether the demand was an essential part of the cause of action, and petitioner frankly concedes that it is not. He could have sued for any of the deposits without previous demand, and the plaint would itself have been part of the cause of action in any of such suits. Nor, if he had sued for only one of these deposits, would he be precluded from suing in his own good time for the others.” The learned Judge therefore understood the subject-matter to mean causes of, action. In The Rajah of Vizianagaram v. The Government4, Anantakrishna Iyer, J., held that a suit filed by a landholder against the ryots of a village under section 193 of the Madras Estates Land Act does not comprise ‘distinct subject’ within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. After referring to the Full Bench decision, the learned Judge observed at page 76: "The suit is one for enhancement of rent on common grounds. It is not for enhancement of rent and for some other reliefs............The word ‘ subject’ has not been defined, and it is, I think, not unreasonable to hold that a suit under section 193 does not comprise distinct subjects." This decision does not lay down any principle but only holds on the facts of that case that as the suit was for enhancement of rent on common grounds, it did not comprise distinct subjects. But the learned Judge obviously did not accept that the word "subject" means cause of action. Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Muthuswami Chettiar v. Krishna Aiyar1, held that in a suit to enforce two security bonds, the court-fee should be payable on the two bonds as on distinct subjects. There is no discussion in regard to the scope of the words "distinct subject." In Venkatarama Mohandas v. Kamini Kondiah2, Bell, J,, had to deal with a suit where a father executed a settlement deed in respect of his properties in possession of lessees under leases created by the settlor himself. Some of the tenants refused or neglected to attorn to the owner. He filed one suit against them for ejectment and mesne profits till date of delivery of possession. Some of the tenants refused or neglected to attorn to the owner. He filed one suit against them for ejectment and mesne profits till date of delivery of possession. The learned Judge held that the suit comprised different subjects. At page 572 he observed: "It seems to me on the whole that, bearing in mind the words of the plaint the plaintiff is seeking -it may be similar reliefs against these defendants but not the same relief. There appears to be no legal inter-connection between the defendants. They have nothing in common with each other and they are joined merely as a matter of convenience. Against each defendant the plaintiff will have to prove a similar but a separate case. The amount claimed is different against each defendant. If the plaintiff is right each defendant committed a different although a similar act of trespass. As the correction slip points out there must probably also be a different question of costs arising in each case and depending upon each defendant’s attitude." On these facts he held that they were different subjects within the meaning of the Act. In Ramaswami Gupta v. Pasuparthi Krishnayya3, Rajamannar, C.J., held that a suit where a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale, or in the alternative for a decree directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 4,482, under the suit promissory note was claimed comprised two distinct subjects. At page 106 the learned Chief Justice observed: "It is true that the consideration for the sale was to be adjusted towards part of the amount due under the promissory note, but the cause of action for the relief of recovery of the amount due under the promissory note is distinct and apart from the agreement to sell. . Though the fact that separate suits could be brought for the two reliefs may not be a conclusive test, I consider that that fact should also be taken into consideration in deciding whether the two reliefs are different subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act." Though the learned Judge held that the said test was not a conclusive or a decisive one, he was inclined to take that into consideration in deciding the question. In Sundaram Ayyangar & Sons v. Province of Madras4, Viswanatha Sastri, J., held that a suit wherein a relief was asked against the Government and the agent alternatively for recovery of the amounts alleged to have been paid by the plaintiffs twice over court-fee need not be paid under section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The learned Judge realised that the cause of action against the first and second defendants was different but relying upon the Full Bench decision held that section 17 of the Court-Fees Act did not apply. In Oruganti Appa Rao, In re5, Panchapagesa Sastry, J., held that where four anomalous mortgages were of the same date, of the same property and the mortgagors and the mortgagees were the same, section 17 did not apply. The learned Judge held that it was an exceptional case where it ought to be held on the facts that there was only one subject and not distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. In Thangasami Pillai v. Dhanabagyammal6 Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., held that where the plaintiff sued for possession of several properties in the possession of defendants who game into possession under different titles from the first defendant who in violation of a trust alienated them, the suit did not embrace distinct subjects but only one subject. The basis of the judgment is found at page 567: “Applying the principle laid down in the Full Bench decision in In re Parameswara Pattar1, the test whether a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects does not depend upon the cause of action on which the plaint is based but depends upon the basis of the claim and the right under which the plaintiff claims”. Govinda Menon, J., held in Rajaratna Vaduganatha Pillai v. Srinivasa Raghava Aiyangar and others2, that a suit to set aside the alienations in favour of different persons at different times is covered by section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. On the other hand Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., in Venkatanarayana Ayyar v. State of Madras3, held that a suit for a declaration that an order of resumption passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in respect of nine distinct inams in favour of distinct individuals and under nine title-deeds was illegal and a nullity would be governed by section 17 of the Act. At page 233 the learned Judge gives the reason for his decision thus: “On a reading of the entire provisions of the Act as a whole I am inclined to the view that the terminology, namely ‘distinct subjects’ used in section 17 of the Act should be interpreted to mean distinct subject matters only, and it should also be understood to mean such subject-matters as are distinct but which can be clubbed together in a single suit. Otherwise, if the words ‘distinct subject’ are to be construed as including distinct categories of subjects taking the word ‘subject’ in a very comprehensive sense, then the meaning of section 17 would become absurd; for distinct categories of subjects could not be embraced in a single suit. Obviously, the intention underlying this section 17 seems to be to provide for suits which involve multifariousness and which do not offend against the other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code such as misjoinder of causes of action and so forth.” We have referred to the long catena of cases cited at the Bar not in the attempts to reconcile them but only to show that they are not supported by any definite principle. Each case was decided on the facts. To avoid conflict of decisions and confusion in the minds of the clients and subordinate Courts, it is necessary that some workable principle should be evolved. Particularly in a matter of Court-fee it is undesirable that the law should be kept in a state of flux. Though we are inclined to apply the simple test, namely, that section 17 would apply to matters in respect where of separate suits could and should have been filed but for the enabling provisions enacted by the Legislature for convenience, we do not think we are justified to express our final opinion in this case, particularly in view of the observations of the Full Bench in Parameswara Pattar, In re1. It would be more convenient to have an authoritative decision of a Full Bench on this matter. We therefore refer the following question to the Full Bench. “What is the meaning of the words ‘distinct subjects ‘in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act?” In pursuance of the aforesaid order of reference the matter was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Subba Rao, Venkatarama Ayyar and Ramaswami, JJ. P.S. Sarangapani Ayyangar and S. Varadachari, Advocates, for the Appellants. “What is the meaning of the words ‘distinct subjects ‘in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act?” In pursuance of the aforesaid order of reference the matter was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Subba Rao, Venkatarama Ayyar and Ramaswami, JJ. P.S. Sarangapani Ayyangar and S. Varadachari, Advocates, for the Appellants. D.L. Narasimha Raju for the Government Pleader (P. Satyananayana Rqju) on behalf of the State. The Full Bench delivered the following Opinion: †Subba Rao, J.-The following question was referred to the Full Bench by a Divisional Bench of this Court of which I was a member: “What is the meaning of the words ‘distinct subjects’ in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act?” The facts that gave rise to the reference may be briefly stated. The appellants father executed a gift deed on 1st October, 1928, in favour of their mother in respect of items 1 to 5 of the B schedule annexed to the plaint. On 17th December, 1932, the appellants’ father executed another gift deed in favour of their mother in respect of item 6 of the B schedule. The mother sold them under six sale deeds on various. dates to defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, fifth defendant’s husband and the 35th defendant. Defendants 6 to 32 are alienees from the 5th defendant’s husband. In the plaint in respect of each declaration a fixed fee was paid aggregating to Rs. 1,400. The plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed and the present appeal was filed with a court-fee of Rs. 500. It was contended before the Division Bench that the court-fee paid was correct. It would be correct if the appeal did not involve distinct subjects, within the meaning of section 17 of the Court Fees Act (hereafter called the Act). As there were conflicting views as regards the connotation of the words distinct subjects in the said section, we referred the aforesaid question to a Full Bench for an authoritative decision. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants may be briefly stated thus: Order 2, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code enables a plaintiff to unite different causes of action subject to the conditions laid down therein. Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3 enabling the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants are wider in scope than Order 2, rule 3. Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3 enabling the joinder of plaintiffs or defendants are wider in scope than Order 2, rule 3. Under the said rules parties may be added and causes of action joined if the right to relief arises out of the same act or transaction and where there is a common question of law or fact. The matters allowed to be united under Order 2, rule 3 are distinct subjects whereas matter based upon the same act or transaction involving common questions of fact or law, even though there are two or more causes of action, would be one distinct subject. Learned counsel appearing for the Government contended that “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Act are synonymous with distinct causes of action. At the outset it may be convenient to consider the provisions of section 17 of the Act unhampered by the long catena of cases cited at the Bar. Section 17 reads: “Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act. Nothing in the former part of this section shall be deemed to affect the power conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, section 9”. The section consists of the main part and a saving clause. A simple illustration makes the meaning of the section clear A files a suit against B on two promissory notes executed by B in A’s favour. The value of the relief in respect of the first promissory note is taken and the court-fee on such value is calculated. Then the value of the relief on the second promissory note is taken and the court-fee payable on such value is arrived at. Thereafter the said two sums are added and the total amount is the court-fee payable on the plaint. The plaint comprises two subjects in respect whereof two plaints could have been presented. The aggregate value of the court-fee payable on each of the plaints is the court-fee payable on the consolidated plaint. The second clause saves the power of the Court in appropriate circumstances to direct the plaintiff to split up the plaint into its component parts and have separate trials. The aggregate value of the court-fee payable on each of the plaints is the court-fee payable on the consolidated plaint. The second clause saves the power of the Court in appropriate circumstances to direct the plaintiff to split up the plaint into its component parts and have separate trials. The aforesaid simple illustration brings out the meaning of the section; but it does not completely explain it in its application to complicated situations. That would depend upon the meaning attributable to the crucial words “distinct subjects” in the section and the consideration of the internal indications afforded by the section itself. The word “subject” has not been defined; nor is it susceptible of precise definition. Consequently there is a welter of judicial opinion in this Court and elsewhere, with the result learned Judges naturally and necessarily applied the Chanceller’s foot to the facts of the each case. When learned and experienced Judges failed to provide a simple key to the meaning of the section, I cannot obviously afford one of universal satisfaction. I am content, if I can evolve a| workable rule without doing violence to the language of the section. Order 7, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, prescribes the particulars to be contained in a plaint. The relevant provisions of the said rule read: (e) the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose; (f) the facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction; (g) the relief which the plaintiff claims; * * * * (i) a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fees, so far as the case admits. The plaint, therefore, shall contain, among others, the cause of action, the relief and the valuation of the subject-matter for the purpose of jurisdiction and court-fee. Cause of action is a bundle of essential facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit. A Court is called upon to decide the existence of those facts and the legal consequences following therefrom for giving the relief claimed by the plaintiff. Other questions relating to court-fee and jurisdiction are in essence extraneous to the main and substantial controversy between the parties, though they may depend upon it. A Court is called upon to decide the existence of those facts and the legal consequences following therefrom for giving the relief claimed by the plaintiff. Other questions relating to court-fee and jurisdiction are in essence extraneous to the main and substantial controversy between the parties, though they may depend upon it. The controversy relating to the said bundle of essential facts constituting the cause of action can legitimately be called the subject of the suit, for the granting or refusing of the relief claimed would depend upon the decision on the said controversy. This interpretation will not do violence to the language used in the section. The relevant dictionary meaning of the word "subject" are: "the substance or substratum of anything as opposed to its attributes; theme of matter (to be) treated of or dealt with". See The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Chambers English Dictionary gives the following meanings: (1) that which is treated or handled; (2) Matter or materials. The matter or subject involved in the suit is the controversy in respect of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. The first part of section 17 is a pointer towards the same direction. It presupposes that in respect of the two distinct subjects two separate suits could be filed. On that assumption the court-fee payable on the consolidated plaint is the aggregate court-fee payable separately on each of the plaints. Obviously there cannot be two suits in respect of the same cause of action except under the special circumstances permitted by the Civil Procedure Code with which we are not now concerned. It is therefore apparent that there must be two distinct causes of action for the application of section 17 of the Act. But it may be suggested that if two or more distinct causes of action are the foundation for the application of the section, the adjective ‘distinct’ would indicate that in addition to the cause of action, questions raised on the basis of the separate causes of action must be unconnected with each other. There is no acceptable principle for this contention, for invariably there will not be any unbridgeable gulf between two causes of action allowed by the statute to be clubbed together in one suit. The saving clause makes the meaning of the Legislature clear. There is no acceptable principle for this contention, for invariably there will not be any unbridgeable gulf between two causes of action allowed by the statute to be clubbed together in one suit. The saving clause makes the meaning of the Legislature clear. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code referred to therein corresponds to Order 2, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908). Under that rule: " Where it appears to the Court that any causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient." This also implies that the first part of the section applies to a case where two causes of action are clubbed up together in one suit and therefore the clause expressly saves the power of the Court conferred on it under Order 2, rule 6, to order separate trials. A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code enabling the joinder of parties and causes of action in one suit would afford a clue to the purpose behind section 17 of the Act. Orders 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code provide for joinder of parties and causes of action for convenience of satisfactory disposal. Under Order 2, rule 3, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly and two or more plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action in the same suit. Ordinarily every cause of action must be a basis for a single suit. But by reason of the aforesaid rules, subject to the provisions mentioned therein, several causes of action may be united in one action. To illustrate, if a defendant executed two promissory notes in favour of a plaintiff, one suit can be instituted for recovery of the amounts due under the two promissory notes. So too, if several defendants jointly borrow money on different promissory notes from a plaintiff, he can file one suit for recovery of the amounts due to him from all the defendants jointly. So too, if several defendants jointly borrow money on different promissory notes from a plaintiff, he can file one suit for recovery of the amounts due to him from all the defendants jointly. In the same manner, if the plaintiffs are joint promisees in respect of different promissory notes from the same defendant singly or defendants jointly, one suit could be filed. Under Order 1, rule 1: "All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise." Order 1, rule 3 provides for a converse case. Under that clause "All persons may be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if separate suits were brought against such persons any common question of law or fact would arise." Under the aforesaid two rules several plaintiffs or defendants may be added as parties to a suit if the right to relief arises for or against them out of the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law or fact. The said two rules are wider in scope than Order 2, rule 3. Even if the plaintiff or plaintiffs are not jointly interested in the several causes of action against a defendant or defendants, the several causes of action can be united in one suit if they arise out of the same act or transaction and give rise to a common question of law or fact. To put it differently, though the frame of a suit would not be supported by rule 3 of Order 2 it may be justified by Order 1, rule 1 or Order 1, rule 3. A combined operation may be illustrated by the facts of the case in Smurthwaite v. Hanny1. Several shippers of different shipments of cotton on the same ship for the same voyage jointly sued the ship-owner for damages for short delivery. The causes of action were distinct and separate. A combined operation may be illustrated by the facts of the case in Smurthwaite v. Hanny1. Several shippers of different shipments of cotton on the same ship for the same voyage jointly sued the ship-owner for damages for short delivery. The causes of action were distinct and separate. It was held by the House of Lords that persons injured by the same act of negligence could not join in one action as plaintiffs for damages against the wrongdoer. If Order 2, rule 3, were the governing provision, on the facts, the same decision would be given in India also. But under Order 1, rule 1 where the identity of the act or transaction is the governing factor, the joinder 6f the plaintiffs would be valid. As at present a rule similar to Order 1, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, has been enacted in England, the same result would follow even in that country. Under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, a suit would relate to enforce the claim or claims arising out of the same cause of action. But the Legislature intended to provide a machinery for the quick and satisfactory disposal of disputes arising between the same parties provided such disposal can be conveniently effected without causing confusion in the trial of the suit. With this object Order 2, rule 3 and Order 1, rules 1 and 3 were enacted. Originally, under the old Code, sections 26 and 28 corresponding to Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3, were confined only to reliefs arising out of the same cause of action, and section 45 corresponding to Order 2, rule 3 was confined to joinder of causes of action. But Act (V of 1908) so enlarged the scope of Order 1, rule 1 as to take in reliefs arising even out of different causes of action. The result is that the scope of Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3 is now wider than that of Order 2, rule 3. At the same time Order 1, rule 2 enables the Court to order separate trials if it appears to it that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or, delay the trials of the suit. So too Order 2, rule 6 empowers the Court to order separate trials if the cause of action cannot be contiveniently tried or disposed of together. At the same time Order 1, rule 2 enables the Court to order separate trials if it appears to it that any joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or, delay the trials of the suit. So too Order 2, rule 6 empowers the Court to order separate trials if the cause of action cannot be contiveniently tried or disposed of together. It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that the ordinary rule is that one suit should be filed in respect of one cause of action, but under certain circumstances strictly circumscribed by the Act, clubbing of two or more causes of action is allowed. The jurisdiction of the Court in respect of such consolidated suits is governed by Order 2, rule 3 whereunder: Where causes of action are united, the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of the aggregate subject matters at the date of instituting the suit. But there is no indication in the Civil Procedure Code that the Legislature intended that the Government should forego court-fee if the plaintiff took advantage of the enabling provisions. There is also no reason why the court-fee should be reduced or given up by the Government when a plaintiff seeks and gets the same, reliefs in one which but for the enabling provisions he could have got only by filing separate suits. Section 17 of the Court-Fees Act, in my view, is designedly enacted to prevent such evasion of court-fee. If the words “distinct subjects” are understood to mean distinct causes of action, the result would be that though for convenience one suit is allowed to be filed in respect of separate causes of action for the purpose of court-fee they should be treated as distinct subjects; otherwise no intelligible explanation can be offered for the enactment of section 17. Learned counsel attempted an explanation. He contended that section 17 would apply to several causes of action clubbed up under the provisions of Order 2, rule 3, but it would not govern a suit wherein different causes of action were united under Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3. Learned counsel attempted an explanation. He contended that section 17 would apply to several causes of action clubbed up under the provisions of Order 2, rule 3, but it would not govern a suit wherein different causes of action were united under Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3. The principle of distinction, according to the learned counsel, is that in the latter case the same act or transaction and common questions of law and facts unite the causes of action to such an extent that for practical purposes the matter involved in the suit may be treated as one subject. This argument ignores the fact that under sections 26 and 28 of the old Act the said sections were confined only to matters arising but of the same cause of action and therefore no question of uniting two causes of action could have arisen under those sections. But Order 1, rules 1 and 3 of the present Code enlarge the scope of Order 2, rule 3, in respect of separate causes of action. When Order 2, rule 3, which enables the clubbing of causes of action in which the parties are jointly entitled comprise of distinct subjects, I find it difficult to hold that causes of action in which the parties are not jointly interested but are allowed to be clubbed up together by reason of common factors such as the same act or transaction and similar questions of law could be treated as one subject. If the causes of action covered by Order 2, rule3, are different subjects, it follows that causes of action more remotely connected under Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3, must also be different subjects. If section 17 of the Court-Fees Act is read with the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it shows that section 17 is intended to prescribe court-fee on a consolidated plaint uniting distinct causes of action in respect whereof the plaintiff if he chose could file separate suits. I shall now proceed to consider the cases of the various High Courts cited at the Bar to test the correctness of my conclusion and, if possible to discover the principle or principles laid down by them. I shall now proceed to consider the cases of the various High Courts cited at the Bar to test the correctness of my conclusion and, if possible to discover the principle or principles laid down by them. In Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar1, the phrase “the subjects in dispute” in section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code corresponding to Order 2, rule 1 came under judicial scrutiny. It was argued before the learned Judges that the phrase “the subjects in dispute” occurring in section 42 connotes the corpus or subject-matter of the claim and that therefore all possible claims to the same should necessarily be offered for a decision in the suit. Repelling that argument, the learned Judges held that in their opinion the expression “the subjects in dispute” signifies the jural relation between the parties to the suit, for the determination of which the suit is brought. At page 766 the learned Judges said: "It is clear that the expression "subjects in dispute" means the cause of action or the subject-matter of litigation, i.e., the right which one party claims as against the other and demands the judgment of the Court upon ". In Masilamani Pillai v. Thiruvengadam Pillai1, a question arose whether a particular decision was res judicata by reason of section 13, Explanation II of the Civil Procedure Code. The first suit was filed as reversionary heir to the deceased. That was dismissed. The second suit was instituted as reversionary heir under a different kind of relationship. The question was whether the plaintiff’s suit was barred by res judicata. The learned Judges accepted the definition of the expression "subjects in dispute" given in Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar2and held that the suit was barred under section 13 and section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code. A similar question arose under Order 23, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) in Singha Reddi v. Subba Reddi3. The suit was by the next presumptive reversioners of a deceased Hindu against his widow and her alienee for a declaration that the alienation made was invalid. Pending the suit the widow died and the reversioners withdrew the suit without permission of the Court. They subsequently brought another suit against the alienee for the recovery of possession of properties from him. The question was whether the second suit was in respect of the subject-matter of the previous suit. Pending the suit the widow died and the reversioners withdrew the suit without permission of the Court. They subsequently brought another suit against the alienee for the recovery of possession of properties from him. The question was whether the second suit was in respect of the subject-matter of the previous suit. The Full Bench held that the suit was not barred and expressed their view in regard to the definition of the words "subject-matter" at page 996 as follows: "Without attempting an exhaustive definition of all that may be included in the term "subject matter" we are of opinion that where, as in the present case, the cause of action and the relief "claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit". Now coming to the decisions of our High Court bearing on the interpretation of the words "distinct subjects" in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act, it is not necessary to travel beyond the decision of the Full Bench in Parameswara Pattar, In re4 for that was the basis for the conflicting views expressed by the learned Judges in the latter decisions. There the appellant filed a suit for possession of immovable property and past mesne profits. He paid court-fee on the aggregate value of both the reliefs. The Full Bench held that the claims for possession of land and for mesne profits were not "distinct subjects" under, section 17 of the Court-fees Act, and, therefore, the court-fee paid was correct. It may be noticed at the outset that the respondent in that case was not represented by any counsel and the learned Judges had not the advantage of the assistance of counsel for the party supporting the contrary view. Nonetheless the judgment therein being that of a Full Bench deserves all respect. If that judgment had in explicit terms defined the words "distinct subjects" in a different manner than that which found favour with me, I would have certainly followed it and would not have attempted to express a conflicting opinion, particularly after so many years since that judgment was delivered. In my view, the learned Judges did not lay down in the judgment a principle of universal application. In my view, the learned Judges did not lay down in the judgment a principle of universal application. The following two relevant passages from the judgment may be extracted: "The word ‘subject’ in this section is somewhat obscure in its meaning, and has been held in some decisions to be not capable of precise definition. Ordinarily the right or title to the land is the basis for the claim for possession of the land, as also for mene profits, and it cannot therefore be deemed that the two claims are so disconnected, without any inter-relation, as to form distinct subjects, under section 17 of the aforesaid Act. In a case dealt with by the Patna High Court, it is stated that two views are possible as to the meaning of the word ‘subjects’ in this section. One is that the word ‘subject’ relates back to section 7 where the various subjects of suits are put under different heads. The other view is that the word ‘subject’ means cause of action; See Nauratan Lal v. Wilford Joseph Stephenson5. But, however, it was held, on the strength of the Full Bench decision in Kishori Lal Roy v. Sharut Chundar Mozumdar6, that the long continued practice should not be disturbed, and that court-fee may be paid on the aggregate value of the reliefs, viz., claim for possession and claim for mesne profits. The preponderance of authority is in favour of not treating these two claims as distinct subjects under section 17 of the Court-Fees Act". Though in the first passage the learned Judges were inclined to hold that the words ‘dinstinct subjects' were wider in scope than the words ”cause of action“ they expressly abstained from expressing their final opinion on the question. After-pointing out the two conflicting views on the meaning of the said expression, they were content to base the judgment on the long continued practice and on the preponderance of authority. The judgment, therefore, is only an authority for the position that the reliefs for possession and mesne profits are not”distinct subjects “within the meaning of section 17. Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J., in The Rajah of Vizianagaram v. The Government1 held that a suit filed by a landholder against the ryots of a village under section 193 of the Madras Estates Land Act does not comprise”distinct subjects“within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J., in The Rajah of Vizianagaram v. The Government1 held that a suit filed by a landholder against the ryots of a village under section 193 of the Madras Estates Land Act does not comprise”distinct subjects“within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. That was a statutory suit and the landholder of a particular area was empowered to file a suit for enhancement of rent under section 193 of the Act on the limited grounds open to him under that section. A perusal of the judgment shows that the learned Judge was influenced by the view expressed by the Full Bench in Patameswara Pattar, In re2 for he premised the judgment with the observation that the words used in section 17 are”two or more distinct subjects“and not”two or more distinct causes of action“. It is not necessary to express my view on the question whether the conclusion could be sustained on the basis that there was only one cause of action, for the learned Judge did not purport to do so. As already pointed out, the Full Bench did not lay down that”distinct subjects“are not distinct causes of action”. Pandalali, J., held in Muthuraman Chetty v. Sivasubramania Chetty3, that where creditors had taken for their common protection a mortgage for the entire sum due to them in lieu of their separate claims against the debtor the court-fee was payable on the entire amount claimed as one subject and that the suit did not embrace distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Act. The learned Judge referred to the Full Bench decision in Parameswara Pattar, In re2 and held that as the suit was for enforcing one mortgage, it did not involve distinct subjects as the entire amounts were due under a single mortgage. A division Bench of this Court consisting of Pandrang Row and Venkataramana Rao, JJ. in Rangaswami Reddiar v. Venkataperumal Reddiar4 held that a suit by a reversioner to set aside a certain deed of settlement, and, in the alternative for the recovery of the amount, being the consideration for the deed, did not involve “distinct subjects” within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. in Rangaswami Reddiar v. Venkataperumal Reddiar4 held that a suit by a reversioner to set aside a certain deed of settlement, and, in the alternative for the recovery of the amount, being the consideration for the deed, did not involve “distinct subjects” within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The following reasons were given by the learned Judges for the decision at page 141: “The cause of action is the execution of the deed of settlement and two reliefs have been claimed in respect thereof, one on the footing of the validity of the deed and the other on the footing of its invalidity. The test which is sometimes laid down in order to ascertain whether two or more claims constitute different subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act, namely whether different suits might have been instituted in respect thereof, has not been held to be a decisive one by the Full Bench of this Court. See Parameswara Pattar, In re2, by which we are bound. In view of this decision as the cause of action is based on the settlement deed, we are not inclined to consider that the reliefs claimed are distinct subjects within the meaning of the said section”. Though the learned Judges referred to the Full Bench, the basis of the judgment was that the two reliefs arose out of the same cause of action. It is not necessary to express my view on the question whether the two reliefs claimed really arose on a single cause of action. But the reason of that decision is consistent with the view-expressed by me. In Venkatarama Mohandas v. Kamini Kondia5, Bell, J., had to deal with a suit where a father executed a settlement deed in respect of his properties in possession of lessees under leases created by the settlor himself. Some of the tenants refused or neglected to attorn to the owner. He filed one suit against them for ejectment and mesne profits till date of delivery of possession. The learned Judge held that the suit comprised different subjects. At page 572 he observed: “It seems to me on the whole that bearing in mind the words of the plaint the plaintiff is seeking it may be similar relief against these defendants but not the same relief. There appears to be no legal inter-connection between the defendants. The learned Judge held that the suit comprised different subjects. At page 572 he observed: “It seems to me on the whole that bearing in mind the words of the plaint the plaintiff is seeking it may be similar relief against these defendants but not the same relief. There appears to be no legal inter-connection between the defendants. They have nothing in common with each other and they are joined merely as a matter of convenience. Against each defendant the plaintiff will have to prove a similar but a separate case. The amount claimed is different against each defendant. If the plaintiff is right, each defendant committed a different although a similar act of trespass. As the correction slip points out there must probably also be a different question of costs arising in each case and depending upon each defendant’s attitude”. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., held in Narasimham, In re1, that a suit by a purchaser for possession of the property purchased by him and in the alternative for the recovery of the consideration money paid by him did not embrace two distinct subjects, within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The reason for the conclusion was that there was only one cause of action on which two reliefs were claimed. In Thangaswami Pillai v. Danabagyanimal2, Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., held that where the plaintiff sued for possession of several properties in the possession of defendants who came into possession under different titles from the first defendant who in violation of a trust alienated them, the suit did not embrace distinct subjects but only one subject and that the court-fee was payable on the total value of the properties. The ground of the decision was expressed by the learned Judge at page 567 in the following terms:- “Applying the principle laid down in the Full Bench decision in In re Parameswara Pattar3, the test whether a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects does not depend upon the cause of action on which the plaint is based but depends upon the basis of the claim and the right under which the plaintiff claims. The basis of the claim in this suit is that the sale in favour of the 11th defendant in execution of a decree that was passed against the first defendant is null and void, the sale being of properties which are trust properties. The basis of the claim in this suit is that the sale in favour of the 11th defendant in execution of a decree that was passed against the first defendant is null and void, the sale being of properties which are trust properties. That was the only ground on which the plaint is based and if the plaintiff could succeed in establishing that the property was trust property and that the sale was null and void the plaintiff has to succeed in the case”. The learned Judge’s view was obviously based upon the decision in In re Parameswara Pattar3. I have already pointed out that the Full Bench did not lay down any such principle but only decided the case on the basis of long established usage. In Sundaram Ayyangar & Sons v. Province of Madras4, Viswanatha Sastri, J., held that where the plaintiffs’ firm instituted suits against Government and against the agent for recovery of the amounts alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff twice over, the suits did not embrace two or more distinct subjects within the meaning of the Act. At page 500 the learned Judge observed: “If the first defendant is found liable, then on that very finding the second defendant has to be exonerated. Alternatively, if it is proved that the money alleged to have been paid to the second defendant was in fact paid by the plaintiff but was not transmitted to the first defendant and the first defendant is exonerated from liability, then on that very ground the second defendant must be made liable to repay the money paid to him and not duly accounted for. The causes of action aginst the first and the second defendants are different, but, as observed by the Full Bench in In re Parameswara Pattar3, the test under section 17 is not whether the causes of action are distinct. Nor is it a conclusive test to apply that different suits could have been brought separately against each of the defendants in respect of the relief claimed in the suit”. This judgment also was based upon an incorrect appreciation of the Full Bench decision. The scope of the Full Bench decision was clearly stated by Rajamannar, C.J., in Ramaswami Gupta v. Pasuparthi Krishnayya5. There the defendant executed a promissory note in favour of a third person who assigned it in favour of the plaintiff. This judgment also was based upon an incorrect appreciation of the Full Bench decision. The scope of the Full Bench decision was clearly stated by Rajamannar, C.J., in Ramaswami Gupta v. Pasuparthi Krishnayya5. There the defendant executed a promissory note in favour of a third person who assigned it in favour of the plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant entered into an oral agreement of sale with plaintiff under which he agreed to sell certain property and it was agreed that the consideration should be adjusted towards part of the amount due under the promissory note. The defendant did not execute a proper sale deed. The plaintiff instituted a suit against him and sought a decree granting specific performance of the contract of sale and directing the defendant to pay the balance of the amount due under the promissory note after adjusting the consideration for the sales and in the alternative for a decree directing the defendant to pay the entire amount due under the promissory note with interest, if for any reason it was found that the contract of sale was unenforceable. The learned Judge held that there were two separate and independent causes of action and the two reliefs were distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Act. When the Full Bench was cited, the learned Judge distinguished the same with the following observations at page 105:- "In Parameswara Pattar, In re1, which is a decision of a Full Bench of this Court, the learned Judges did not attempt a definition of the word ‘subject’ in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The learned Judges merely took notice of two possible views as to the meaning of that word, viz., one that the word ‘subject’ related back to section 7 where the various subjects of suits are put under different heads; and the other that the word ‘subject’ means a cause of action. The decision in that case therefore is only authority for the limited position that in a suit for possession of immovable property and past mesne profits, court-fee is payable on the aggregate value of both the reliefs and the claim for possession of land and for mesne profits are not ‘distinct subjects’ under section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The ground of the decision was expressly stated to be the ‘long course of practice’." I respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations. The ground of the decision was expressly stated to be the ‘long course of practice’." I respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations. In Oruganti Appa Rao, In re2, Panchapagesa Sastry, J., held that where four anomalous mortgages were of the same date, of the same property and the mortgagors and the mortgagees were the same, section 17 did not apply. The learned Judge held that it was an exceptional case where it ought to be held on the facts that there was only one subject and not distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. I cannot accept the conclusion of the learned Judge. The suit was clearly based upon different causes of action and if even a wider connotation is given to the words ‘distinct subjects’ I do not see how a suit on four distinct mortgages can be treated as one subject. Govinda Menon, J., held in Rajaratna Vaduganatha Pillai v. Srinivasa Raghava Ayyangar3, that a suit to set aside alienations in favour of different persons at different times is covered by section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. There was no discussion. In the judgment. It was presumably because the conclusion was self-evident. The learned Judge observed; "There is no doubt that each of the alienations is a different subject and court-fee has to be paid on them separately." Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., gave a considered judgment in Venkatanarayana Ayyar v. State of Madras4. There a number of plaintiffs joined together and instituted a single suit for declaring that an order of resumption passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and Collector on appeal in respect of nine distinct inams in favour of distinct individuals and by nine inam title deeds was illegal and a nullity. The learned Judge held that the suit comprised nine distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. At page 233 the learned Judge gives the reason for his decision thus: "On a reading of the entire provisions of the Act as a whole I am inclined to the view that the terminology, namely, ‘distinct subjects’ used in section 17 of the Act should be interpreted to mean distinct subject-matters only, and it should also be understood to mean such subject-matters as are distinct but which can be clubbed together in a single suit. Otherwise, if the word "distinct subjects’ are to be construed as including distinct categories of subjects taking the word ‘subject’ in a very comprehensive sense, then the meaning of section 17 would become absurd; for distinct categories of subjects could not be embraced in a single suit. Obviously, the intention underlying this section 17 seems to be to provide for suits which involve multifariousness and which do not offend against the other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, such as misjoinder of causes of action and so forth." I agree with the learned Judge that section 17 provided only for suits which involve multifariousness. From the aforesaid resume of the Madras decisions the position may be stated thus: In the earlier decisions the expression ‘subjects in dispute’ was defined to mean the cause of action or the subject-matter of litigation, i.e. a right which one party claims as against the other and demands judgment of the Court upon. The said decisions affording a workable definition of the word ‘subject’ were not brought to the notice of the Full Bench in In re Parameswara Pattar1. The Full Bench did not purport to lay down a rule of universal application. They definitely and in express terms confined the scope of that judgment to a case of possession and mesne profits on the sole ground of long practice. The latter conflict in cases was mainly due to the misapprehension of the scope of the Full Bench decision. The fact that the terms “distinct subjects” did not yield to a precise definition gave scope for varying and conflicting decisions based on the facts of each case. But the analysis of the aforesaid judgments shows that in most of the cases the existence of separate causes of action was taken as the test, though not the sole test, for the applicability of section 17 of the Act. I shall now turn my attention to the decisions of other Courts. The Calcutta High Court in Haru Bepari v. Kshiteeshbhooshan Ray1considered the words “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Act. In that case several plaintiffs joined in a suit and prayed for declarations affecting the title to their respective jotes and for a removal of cloud upon their tides occasioned by one compromise decree. The Calcutta High Court in Haru Bepari v. Kshiteeshbhooshan Ray1considered the words “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Act. In that case several plaintiffs joined in a suit and prayed for declarations affecting the title to their respective jotes and for a removal of cloud upon their tides occasioned by one compromise decree. The learned Judges (Henderson and Kundhkhar, JJ.) held that the proceedings embraced as many distinct subjects as the titles affected, within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act and separate court-fees must be paid for each of them. At page 171 the learned Judges observed: “We are of opinion that the word ‘subject’ in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act covers a multitude of matters which cannot be confined within a precise formula. We find it difficult to see how distinct causes of action can ever be one subject within the meaning of section 17. But converse does not necesarily hold good, for it may well be that a suit based on one cause of action alone, may nevertheless embrace more than one subject within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act.” I cannot see how two or more reliefs arising out of the same cause of action could ever be “distinct subjects.” Though the extreme position adumbrated in this judgment is not acceptable to me, the learned Judges’ observation that it was difficult to see how distinct causes of action can ever be one subject within the meaning of section 17 appears to be sound. In Kapail Charan v. Gitanjali2, a suit was filed for recovery of the properties described in the schedule which were acquired by the plaintiff under different documents of title. It was argued that the suit involved distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Act. The learned Judges negatived the contention and observed: “The relief asked for is only one and that is a declaration of his own title in respect of the properties which are the subject-matter of the suit. It may be that the properties were purchased by the plaintiff on the basis of different documents of title but that is no part of the real relief which is asked for by the plaintiff. It may be that the properties were purchased by the plaintiff on the basis of different documents of title but that is no part of the real relief which is asked for by the plaintiff. The declaration is one and for that reason, we hold that section 17 does not apply to the facts of the present case.” That suit was really based upon one cause of action. The Calcutta view may, therefore, be stated thus. When there are several causes of action, they are distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17 of the Act. Even if there is a single cause of action, under certain circumstances different reliefs based upon that cause of action may constitute distinct subjects. Now coming to the Patna High Court, in Ramadhin Singh v. Baijnath Pd. Singh3, Rowland, J., held that the word “subject” in section 17 is not the same as cause of action. The learned Judge observed at page 356: “It will be enough for me to say that I entirely agree with the learned Calcutta Judges in the view that ‘subject’ in section 17 is not the same as ‘cause of action’ that on the one hand it is difficult to see how distinct causes of action can ever be one subject within the meaning of section 17, while on the other hand it is possible for a suit based on one cause of action to embrace more than one subject within the meaning of the section, and it will be sufficient for the determination of this reference if I express my clear conviction that separate claims to relief are ordinarily to be considered as separate and distinct subjects.” I shall make the same comment on this decision as I made on the Calcutta decisions. A Bench of the same High Court consisting of Manohar Lall and Das, JJ., expressed a different view in Salahuddin Hyder Khan v. Dhanoo Lal4. A person sued for possession of joint family properties some of which had been transferred by his father by private sale and the rest sold in execution of mortgage decrees. The private sales were void but the Court sales were binding on the plaintiff till they were set aside. The learned Judges held that the two sets of properties should be valued separately and that section 17 of the Court-Fees Act would not apply. The private sales were void but the Court sales were binding on the plaintiff till they were set aside. The learned Judges held that the two sets of properties should be valued separately and that section 17 of the Court-Fees Act would not apply. At page 424 Das, J., stated: “As observed in Ulfat Khan v. Emperor1, the word ‘subject’ used in Section 17 means ‘cause of action’ and is not to be interpreted with reference to the different subjects mentioned in section 7.” I respectfully agree. Another Bench of the same High Court took a different view in Tunna Lal Pathak v. Shankar Lal Parbatia2, and expressed themselves as follows: “Hence it must depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In some cases ‘Subject’ in section 17, Court-Fees Act, may be equivalent to ‘cause of action’. But in other cases it may not be so. Distinct cause of action cannot form one subject. But the converse is not necessarily true.” The Patna view, therefore, may be summarised thus: There are conflicting decisions, one view being that “subject” in section 17 of the Act is synonymous with cause of action. The other view is that though distinct causes of action cannot be the same subject, distinct reliefs arising out of the same cause of action may, under certain circumstances, form distinct subjects within the meaning of section 17. I agree with the former view but in regard to the latter view, the comment made by me in regard to the Calcutta view holds good. There was a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealing with the subject as early as 1878-the decision of the Full Bench in Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai3. The majority view was expressed by Stuart, C.J., at page 553 in the following words: “This, I think, can only mean that the two or more distinct subjects are to be so chargeable as being distinct causes of action. The majority view was expressed by Stuart, C.J., at page 553 in the following words: “This, I think, can only mean that the two or more distinct subjects are to be so chargeable as being distinct causes of action. The words ‘plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits in the section’ show this to my mind conclusively, and it is not enough that the distinct subjects should be merely separate and distinct matters embraced in the claim.” Turner, J., expressed a view much to the same effect when he said: “I am inclined to think that ‘distinct subjects’ mean ‘distinct causes of action’ or ‘distinct kinds of relief.” Spenkie, J., would hold that the words meant every separate matter distinctly forming a subject of the claim. Another Full Bench of the same High Court in Mulchand v. Shib Charan Lal4, held that the words “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act meant distinct and separate causes of action. There the plaintiff sued his brothers and a nephew for his share, according to the Hindu Law of Inheritance and under a will, of the moveable and immoveable property of his deceased uncle, by the cancelment of a deed of gift of the immoveable property in favour of the nephew. The Full Bench held by a majority that the court-fees should be paid under section 17 of the Act. At page 670 Stuart, C.J., observed: “On the general question of the construction to be applied to the case, I am not aware that I can express myself more clearly than I did in my judgment in Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai3. I there stated that the meaning of the words ‘distinct subjects’ in section 17 of the Act VII of 1870 is shown with sufficient clearness in that section itself, when it stated that ‘the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under the Act. This I think can only mean that the two or more distinct subjects are to be so chargeable as being distinct causes of action. This I think can only mean that the two or more distinct subjects are to be so chargeable as being distinct causes of action. The words ‘plaints or memoranda of appeals in suits’ in the section show this to my mind conclusively, and it is not enough that the distinct subjects should be merely separate and distinct matters embraced in the claim.” Straight, J., agreed with the views and conclusions of the Chief Justice. Spankie, J., explained what he meant in his previous decision. At page 681 he stated: “I would, therefore, say regarding the two or more ‘distinct subjects of a suit’ that they are the subject-matters of a suit in which several ‘causes of action’ have been united, under the provisions of section 45 subject to the rules contained in section 44 of Act X of 1877, and, therefore, in such a suit the plaint or memorandum of appeal is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which each plaint or memorandum of appeal would be chargeable under the Act.” Old field, J., observed in the same page: “The words ‘multifarious suits’ in the margin of section 17, Court-Fees Act and the reference in the last part of the section to section 9, Act VIII of 1859, with which part of section 45, Act X of 1877, corresponds sufficiently show, in my opinion, that section 17, Court-Fees Act, has reference to a suit which embraces two or more distinct subjects under separate causes of action which might or ought to have been made subject of separate suits, in fact, when the suit is multifarious and the nature of those referred to in section 9, Act VIII of 1850, and section 45, Act X of 1877.” In Muhammad Malik Khan v. Nirhai Bibi1, another Bench of that Court held that in a suit for recovery of profits under section 93(h) of the North-West Province Rent Act in respect of several years, the proper court-fee leviable on the memorandum of appeal is one calculated on the aggregate amount of the profits claimed and not one calculated separately on the amount of profits claimed for each year. They held that a claim to all arrears of rent was a single cause of action and, therefore, section 17 had no application. The. They held that a claim to all arrears of rent was a single cause of action and, therefore, section 17 had no application. The. Allahabad High Court, therefore, equated “distinct subjects” in section 17 with “distinct causes of action” and the view so expressed in Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai2, of the year 1878 and reaffirmed in the year 1880 stood the test of time. To sum up, while the Madras decisions are conflicting, the test of separate causes of action was invariably applied to ascertain whether a suit comprised distinct subjects, though it was not recognised as an unerring test. The Allahabad High Court consistently took the view that the words “distinct subjects” are synonymous with “distinct causes of action.” Though there is some conflict in the Patna High Court, the preponderance of authority is that separate causes of action can never form “distinct subjects” within the meaning of section 17 of the Act. But it swung to the other extreme and held that even if there was one cause of action distinct reliefs arising therefrom might form distinct subjects. The Calcutta view is in consonance with the Patna view. I am in entire agreement with the Allahabad view which lays down a simple test and equates the words “distinct subjects” with separate causes of action. Indeed the other decisions taking the contrary view did not attempt to give any precise definition to these words, but left the question at large, introducing thereby confusion in a matter of court-fee which should not be allowed in the interests of the litigating public. I would, therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, give the following answer to the question referred to the Full Bench. “Distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act mean distinct causes of action in respect of which separate suits should be filed but for the enabling provisions allowing them to be clubbed up in one suit. The distinctness of identity of the cause of action is the only criterion for the applicability of the section. Venkatarama Aiyar, J.-I agree. Ramaswami, J.-I agree. This matter was then set down for final disposal before Subba Rao and Ramaswami, JJ. T.S. Sarangapani Ayyangar for Appellants. D.L. Narasimha Raju for the Government Pleader on behalf of the State. The distinctness of identity of the cause of action is the only criterion for the applicability of the section. Venkatarama Aiyar, J.-I agree. Ramaswami, J.-I agree. This matter was then set down for final disposal before Subba Rao and Ramaswami, JJ. T.S. Sarangapani Ayyangar for Appellants. D.L. Narasimha Raju for the Government Pleader on behalf of the State. The Judgment* of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, J.-This court-fee matter is placed before us again after the Full Bench answered the reference made to it. The Full Bench held that “distinct subjects” in section 17 of the Court-Fees Act meant “distinct causes of action” in respect of which separate suits should be filed, but for the enabling provision allowing them to be clubbed up in one suit. The question is whether in the present case distinct causes of action are united in the same action. What does “causes of action” mean? Learned counsel appearing for the appellants and or the Government put forward two conflicting views. Learned counsel for the appellants would argue that cause of action means unity of title, whereas the Government Pleader would contend that the cause of action means any fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. We shall now proceed to test the validity of the respective arguments. There is no definition of “cause of action” in the Civil Procedure Code; but it is the fundamental right around which many of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code revolve. It is the basis for the maintainability of the suit. It is the foundation for the adding of parties, and it is an important ingredient in working out the principle of res judicata and that embodied in Order 2, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. It has therefore necessarily become the subject of judicial scrutiny. It is the basis for the maintainability of the suit. It is the foundation for the adding of parties, and it is an important ingredient in working out the principle of res judicata and that embodied in Order 2, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. It has therefore necessarily become the subject of judicial scrutiny. Brett, J., defined it in Cooke v. Gill1, a leading case on the subject, to mean “every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed-every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse.” In Read v. Brown2, Lord Esher adopted the same definition, but expressed it in more felicitous language as follows: “Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.” Lord Watson in Chand Kour v. Partab Singh3, approved of the definition, but added a rider that the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff.“Subsequent decisions have followed the lead given by the earlier decisions. It is not necessary to multiply cases, for it is now fairly well-settled that”cause of action“means the bundle of essential facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit. Or to put it differently, it refers to the media upon which the Court arrives at a conclusion in his favour.” To define it is comparatively easier but to apply it to the facts of each case is more difficult. Ordinarily either in an action based on contract or founded on tort the plaintiff cannot get his relief unless he alleges and proves that he has a right and that the said right is infringed by the defendant. Mere assertion of a right or even the proof thereof cannot be the foundation for a relief, unless the defendant questions the right, casts a cloud on it, or does some act in derogation of it. To illustrate, A purchases a property from B under a sale deed. He takes possession. C trespassed on it. Mere assertion of a right or even the proof thereof cannot be the foundation for a relief, unless the defendant questions the right, casts a cloud on it, or does some act in derogation of it. To illustrate, A purchases a property from B under a sale deed. He takes possession. C trespassed on it. A cannot recover possession unless he proves his title and also the factum of trespass by C. A defendant may raise different pleas to non-suit the plaintiff such as paramount title, adverse possession, etc. Though the pleas taken by the defendant may not form part of the cause of action, the act of trespass by the defendant is a part of the cause of action, for without proof of that fact, no relief can be given to the defendant. To take another illustration, A, the widow, alienated portions of her husband’s property, to B, C and D on different dates. After her death, the reversioner filed a suit to recover the entire property from all the alienees on the ground that the widow had no power to alienate the same. Here the reversioner has a unity of title. He succeeds to the estate of the last male-holder on the basis of the title. He can sue to recover property alienated by the widow. Though his title is the same in respect of all the properties, the validity of each alienation depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each case. He may elect to question some and decide to abide by others. The various defendants’ possession is to be traced to the respective sales in their favour. Some alienations may be void and some may be valid. Before the reversioner can succeed, he must allege and prove (1) he is the reversioner; (2) the widow has no right to sell the property; and (3) the defendants are in possession under invalid sales. The cause of action in such a suit is the bundle of all the aforesaid facts. In the case of each alienee, an additional and a different fact has to be proved, namely, his possession under a particular invalid alienation; for without such proof his claim to that extent will be rejected. This additional fact added to the common bundle makes it a different cause of section. In the case of each alienee, an additional and a different fact has to be proved, namely, his possession under a particular invalid alienation; for without such proof his claim to that extent will be rejected. This additional fact added to the common bundle makes it a different cause of section. A + B, A + C and A + D are not the same as A. So too in the case of alienation by members of a joint Hindu family. Can a different principle operate in the case of void transactions? Indeed, even in the case of an alienation by a limited owner, it is voidable in the sense that it is open to the reversioner to elect to abide by it when the estate falls into his possession. If it is not for necessity, it is not required to be set aside by him; he can treat it as a nullity. We may take another illustration. If a trustee alienates his ward’s property as if it were his own, the alienation is void. The alienee would be in the position of a trespasser. The fact that the alienee is in unlawful possession of the trust property under a colourable void transaction is an important faggot in the bundle constituting the cause of action. As in the case of trespassers his unlawful possession must be alleged and proved, for without such proof no relief can be given against him. At this stage we may notice some of the cases at the Bar. In Sami Chetti v. Ammani Achy1 the plaintiff’s father having died while he was young his father’s widows during his minority alienated the whole of the estate in portions to different people at different times. The plaintiff brought a suit against all the alienees to recover the estate as a whole. The lower court dismissed the suit on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Holloway, Acting C.J., held on appeal that the plaintiffs cause of action on the right, was his relation to the family to which the property appertained, and on this right, if established, and if it was not otherwise barred he was entitled to that charge wherever found and the fact that various persons during his minority have affected to purchase parcels of the property does not destroy the unity of his ground of action. It is true that this decision supports the plaintiffs’ contention: but this is a decision under the old Code. By that time, the conception of a cause of action as a bundle of facts necessary for the plaintiff to prove to secure a judgment in his favour had not been developed. We cannot therefore equate the cause of action with the plaintiffs’ title to the property. In the same Report there is another case bearing on the point, Vasudeva Shanbhaga v. Kuleadi Narnapai2. There the plaintiffs who were members of a joint Hindu family brought a suit against a number of alienees of a deceased member of an undivided family for the recovery of family property illegally alienated by him It was argued that the suit should be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness. In dealing with that argument, the learned Judges held that: “It is most desirable that the whole of the alienations should be at once before the court is called upon to decide the question in order to secure the soundness of the particular decision and perhaps the avoidance of discordant decisions in different cases upon facts nearly the same.” This judgment only recognised the necessity for uniting all the causes of action in one suit for convenience of disposal and for ensuring finality. This principle is now embodied in Order 1, rule 1 and Order 1, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. In Mahomed v. Krishnan3, Muttuswami Ayyar and Parker, JJ., discussed the scope of the judgment in Vasudeva Shanbhaga v. Kuleadi Narnapai2. In that case also a number of alienees were added to the suit. The contention was raised that the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties. It was argued that each of the alienees had a distinct interest in some of the items of property specified in the schedule annexed to the plaint and no interest whatever in the rest of the property in litigation, that the cause of action regarding each was separate, and that the union of several such causes of action in suit was contrary to section 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In dealing with that contention, the learned Judge observed at page 111: “In our judgment, it makes no difference whether the right enforced is that of a coparcener or a reversioner, for the object in both is to reduce to possession a vested interest as well in property illegally alienated as in the property held by the managing member by the tenant for life In the view that the primary ground of action is the interest vested in possession as regards the whole of the property in suit, there is a unity of title, and the claim made is one in respect of the same cause of action.” We cannot agree with the learned Judges that the cause of action is the same though such a suit would not now be bad for multifariousness by reason of Order 1, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. In Gangi v. Ramaswami1, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., struck a different note which is more in consonance with the later view regarding the meaning of the word "cause of action". There a first suit was brought by the plaintiffs for the recovery of some land which was in the possession of the defendant on the ground that they succeeded to the father’s estate, and that the alienation made by the mother during her lifetime was bad. They obtained a decree therein but subsequently they filed another suit to recover possession against another defendant in respect of another item which they claimed as part of the same inheritance. It was contended that the later suit was barred by section 43 of the old Code of Civil Procedure. In dealing with that contention Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., made the following pertinent remarks at page 105: "The former suit was instituted against the defendant therein, by reason of his wrongfully withholding from the plaintiffs, on the death of their mother, possession of the land in Schedule B, and the present suit is brought on the defendants herein similarly withholding the land comprised in Schedule A the defendants in both the causes having respectively come into possession of the lands comprised in Schedules B and A under separate alienations made by the mother in favour of each on a different occasion. It will thus be seen that though the ground of title is one and the same in both the suits and the cause of action in respect of both arose at the same time, viz., the date of the mother’s death, yet the persons who wrongfully withheld the land in Schedule A are quite different and there was no manner of combination or privity between them in respect of the lands which they severally withheld. The words ‘cause of action’ have all along been held to mean ‘every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed: every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse and have no relation whatever to the defence, but refer entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action. (Cooke v. Gill2, Sankar v. Day Sankar3, Chand Kour v. Partab Singh4.) Though the ground of title in both suits are founded in one and the same and the causes of action also arose at the same time, yet the properties comprised in the two suits are different and the persons who severally withheld the same are also different. A reference to section 50, Civil Procedure Code, clearly shows that in every suit the plaint must show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in the subject-matter and that he is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff’s demand. This clearly shows that the cause of action is not an abstract one something independent of the defendant but that the plaint should disclose a cause of action against the defendant." We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observation of the learned Judge and this passage clearly brings out the distinction between the ground oft title and the cause of action. A cause of action is something more than a ground of title. It not only includes the facts necessary to support the plaintiff’s title but also the facts which entitle him to relief against a particular defendant. An interesting and instructive discussion, if we may so say, on the question raised is found in Bahadur Singh v. Sultan Hussain Khan5. A cause of action is something more than a ground of title. It not only includes the facts necessary to support the plaintiff’s title but also the facts which entitle him to relief against a particular defendant. An interesting and instructive discussion, if we may so say, on the question raised is found in Bahadur Singh v. Sultan Hussain Khan5. Syed Wazir Hasan, A.J.C., held that: "A reversioner has a separate cause of action in respect of each alienation made by the widows and a suit to recover property comprised in one alienation is not barred by Order 11, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code by reason of a prior suit for the recovery of property comprised in another alienation." The learned Judge traced the history of the meaning of the words ‘cause of action’ and then made some weighty observations to the following effect at page 459: "Though the cause of action has no relation to the defence which may be set up by the defendant yet it would be an error to suppose that it has no relation to the defendant and his acts preceding the suit. A ‘cause of action’ is not a theoretical term entirely picked up from text books and placed on a plaint. In cases of torts, the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant will generally make up the ‘cause of action’ in Williams v. Morland6, cited by Bowen, L.J., in Brunsdon v. Humphrey7, Littledale, J., said: ‘Generally speaking, there must be a temporal loss or damage accruing from the wrongful act of another, in order to entitle a party to maintain an action on the case.‘ Order 7, rule 5 (Act V of 1908) is based on the same principle. It is as follows: ‘The plaint shall show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in the subject-matter and that he is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff’s demand’. Now, in the present case the defendant’s connection with the land in suit is wholly different from his connection with the lands covered by the other sales both in point of time and the subject-matter of the alienations. Now, in the present case the defendant’s connection with the land in suit is wholly different from his connection with the lands covered by the other sales both in point of time and the subject-matter of the alienations. Their act of infringement of the plaintiff’s right qua the property suit is different from their act or acts of infringement of the plaintiff’s right qua one or the other of the properties previously in suit." It would be seen from the aforesaid decision that though under Act VIII of 1859 this Court was inclined to take the view that the unity of title was synonymous with cause of action, the later decisions clearly laid down that cause of action was something more than unity of title, and that it would include not only the right of the plaintiff but also the facts disclosing the infringement of that right. If the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the instant case we have no hesitation in holding that the suit comprised distinct causes of action. The appellants’ father executed two gift deeds in favour of their mother. The mother sold them under sale deeds on various dates to defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5th defendant’s husband and 35th defendant. Defendants 6 to 32 are alienees from 5th defendant’s:husband. The plaintiff asked for a declaration that the alienations in favour Of the different defendants are not binding on him. The plaintiff has a separate cause of action against each of the alienees in respect of the property alienated in his favour. Each declaration relates to a ‘distinct subject’ within the meaning of section 17 of the Court-Fees Act. The appellant should therefore pay court-fees in respect of each declaration and the total amount of court-fee payable by them on that basis would be Rs. 1,400. Two months’ time granted for the payment of additional court-fee. V.P.S. ----- Order accordingly.