JUDGMENT : These three appeals arise out of the suits filed by Baldeosingh, Bhagga and Parshadi for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution. The facts briefly are that Jorawarsigh filed a complaint against Baldeosingh, Bhagga and Parshadi on the ground that they cut and stole a Babool tree which was in the possession of the complainant. That complaint was dismissed on the ground that it is not proved that the accused stole the Babool tree from the possession of the complainant. A revision was also filed before the Sessions Judge. But that was also disallowed. Consequently Baldeosingh, Bhagga and Parshadi filed suits for damages on the ground of malicious prosecution. The trial court decreed the suits and granted damages to Baldeosingh to the extent of Rs.300/- and Parshadi and Bhagga to the extent of Rs.50/- each. In appeal, the District Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the trial court. Consequently, all the three plaintiffs have filed these appeals. 2. As the points involved in the cases were the same, both the lower courts disposed of the cases by one judgment. As similar points have been raised before me in all the three appeals. I propose to dispose of all the three appeals by one judgment. 3. The lower appellate court has taken the view that the plaintiffs have not proved how Baldeosingh came to own the tree. The lower court has also stated in its judgment that the plaintiffs-appellants have not adduced any evidence to prove that the complainant was actuated by malice. It may be said at once that the question of ownership is absolutely immaterial for the decision of this ease. What the plaintiff has to prove in such cases is (a) that he was prosecuted by the defendant; (b) that the proceedings complained of terminated in favour of the plaintiff; (c) that the prosecution was instituted without any reasonable and probable cause; and (d) that it was due to a malicious intention. (Vide - 'Balbhaddar Singh v. Budri Sah', AIR 1926 PC 46 (A)). That the plaintiffs were prosecuted and that they were acquitted is not disputed in this case. What we have to see is whether there was any reasonable and probable cause for launching the prosecution and whether the plaintiff was actuated in instituting the proceedings by malice. (Vide - 'Balbhaddar Singh v. Budri Sah', AIR 1926 PC 46 (A)). That the plaintiffs were prosecuted and that they were acquitted is not disputed in this case. What we have to see is whether there was any reasonable and probable cause for launching the prosecution and whether the plaintiff was actuated in instituting the proceedings by malice. The trial court has definitely found that the prosecution was launched without reasonable and probable cause. This finding of the trial court is based on the facts found on the evidence that the tree, at the time of cutting, was in the possession of Baldeosingh plaintiff, and consequently no theft could be committed of the tree. This finding has not been reversed by the lower appellate court. Consequently this finding is binding on me. All that has to be determined now, therefore, is whether the prosecution was due to a malicious intention. It must be admitted at once that there is no evidence on record to prove that Baldeosingh was actuated by malice in launching the criminal proceedings. But malice can be inferred under certain circumstances from absence of reasonable and probable cause. In - 'Brown v. Hawkes', (1892) 2 QB 718 (B), Cave J. observed as follows: "Now malice, in its widest and vaguest sense, has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive; and malice can be proved, either by shewing what the motive was and that it was wrong, or by shewing that the circumstances were such that the prosecution can only be accounted for by imputing some wrong or indirect motive to the prosecutor." The same learned Judge further observed : "Of course, there may be such plain want of reasonable and probable cause that the jury may come to the conclusion that the prosecutor could not honestly have believed in the charge he made, and in that case want of reasonable and probable cause is evidence of malice." The same proposition was affirmed in -'Karup-panna Pillai v. F.W. Haughton', AIR 1936 Mad 547 (C). King J., who delivered the judgment of the court, observed as follows : "The situation reduced to its simplest terms is this, that the Chairman knew that the appellant had committed no offence and that in spite of that knowledge he decided to prosecute him. King J., who delivered the judgment of the court, observed as follows : "The situation reduced to its simplest terms is this, that the Chairman knew that the appellant had committed no offence and that in spite of that knowledge he decided to prosecute him. His motive for doing so may have been not to gratify a personal spite but to promote what he thought the best interests of the Municipality. But the fact remains that he prosecuted a person who, he knew, was not guilty of any offence. That being the case, it seems to us clear that there cannot have been any reasonable or probable cause for the prosecution, and whatever his motive may have been, to have embarked upon a prosecution of this kind without reasonable or probable cause must amount to malice in law." Both these cases have laid down a proposition that if a prosecution is launched with the knowledge that the accused has committed no offence then whatever may be the motive which actuates the prosecutor, the prosecution would be considered to be due to malicious intention in law. In the present case the possession of the tree was with plaintiff Baldeosingh. Bhagga and Parshadi were the servants of Baldeosingh. They cut the tree which was in the field of Baldeosingh. Jorawarsingh, therefore, could not honestly have believed in the charge of theft which he made against the present plaintiffs. Consequently, absence of reasonable and probable cause in this case is evidence of malice. In these circumstances, even the requirement of malicious, intention is satisfied in this case. The suits must, therefore, be decreed. 4. In the result the appeals are allowed and the decrees of the lower appellate courts are set aside. The decrees of the trial courts are restored. Appellants to get their costs throughout.