Judgment :- 1. O.S. No. 466 of 1123 of the Court of the District Munsiff, Cochin, was a suit for eviction of the defendants from an item of property described in the plaint schedule. The learned District Munsiff decreed eviction without compensation for improvements effected and in A. S. No. 36 of 1125 the learned Additional District Judge of Anjikaimal reversed the decision regarding improvements and directed as follows: "In the result, an amount of Rs. 866-9-6 is decreed to the appellants as the value for the improvements effected on the plaint site. The site with the building will be surrendered to the plaintiff on receipt of the above amount. From the date of deposit till the site is surrendered the amount will carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The appeal is allowed to the above extent and dismissed in all other respects. The parties will suffer their costs here as well as in the court below." 2. The successful appellants before the District Court were the successors-in-interest to one Cheeku who had a usufructuary mortgage of the property under Ext.1. The amount advanced under Ext.1 by the deceased Cheeku was Rs. 400/- and the lower court in M. P. No. 1665 of 1951, an application by the respondent for a review of the decision in A.S. No. 36 of 1125, came to the conclusion that the value of improvements which the appellants were entitled to get should not exceed the Rs. 400/- advanced under Ext.1 and modified the decretal portion of his original judgment as follows: "In the result an amount of Rs. 400/- is decreed to the appellants as value for the building; the site with the building will be surrendered to the plaintiff on receipt of the above amount. From date of deposit till the site is surrendered, the amount will carry interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. The appeal is allowed to the above extent and dismissed in other respects. The parties will bear their costs here as well as in the court below." 3. There was no justification for restricting the value of improvements payable to the successors-in¬interest of the usufructuary mortgagee to the amount advanced under the usufructuary mortgage. The appeal is allowed to the above extent and dismissed in other respects. The parties will bear their costs here as well as in the court below." 3. There was no justification for restricting the value of improvements payable to the successors-in¬interest of the usufructuary mortgagee to the amount advanced under the usufructuary mortgage. The whole amount should have been directed to be paid to them as was originally done, the claims of the mortgagor being purely a matter for adjustment between himself and the appellants. There was no sufficient ground for review and the lower court was clearly in error in not rejecting M. P. No. 1665 of 1951. 4. Two questions regarding the maintainability of this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal were raised before us: (1) That as the order in M. P. No. 1665 of 1951 granted the review and modified the decree at the same time there should have been an appeal from the decree itself; and (2) that the appeal is incompetent as the conditions of Order XLVII Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, have not been fulfilled. 5. The first objection is based on the wording of the last clause in sub-rule (1) of Order XLVII Rule 7 which reads: "Such objection may be taken at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in any appeal from the final decree or order passed or made in the suit." A similar objection was taken in Radha Krishna v. Beni Madhabi A. I. R. 1932 Calcutta 553 and negatived as follows% "It has been contended that these words suggest that if there has been only an order granting a review, an appeal from that order would be sufficient and if successful, the result of that appeal would restore the decree or order which had been ordered to be varied by the review; but if a decree or order has been made in accordance with the review that is granted then it would be necessary for the aggrieved party to prefer another appeal from the said decree or order and that even if the appeal from the order granting the review be successful the result of that would not affect the order or decree that may have been subsequently made. It seems to us that this contention cannot be allowed to prevail, The provision to which we have referred first came into existence under the Code of 1877. Before that in the Code of 1859 there was no such provision. But in a long series of cases before the Code of 1877 came into being it had been held that if the order granting a review is set aside, all subsequent proceedings taken under that order are also to be regarded as having been set aside Our attention has not been drawn to any authority decided either under the Code of 1877 or the Code of 1882, or the present Code, in which nothing has been said suggesting that the practice should be departed from. It is only reasonable to think that if it was intended by the legislature by the introduction of the clause to which we have referred, to insist upon a separate appeal being preferred from the final order or decree after the previous ore was actually reviewed, then the matter would have been expressly stated or provided for." 6. An objection similar to objection No. (2) was taken in Anantha-lakshmi v. H. L & F. Trust, A.I.E. 1951 Madras 927 and though that point did not directly arise for consideration in that case it was fully dealt with as follows: "A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the company by its managing director, that the appeal was not maintainable, as the conditions of Order 47, R. 7, Civil P. C, were not fulfilled. According to that rule an order granting an application for review could be objected only on the ground that the order was in contravention of the provisions of R. 4 or R. 4 or that the application for review was barred by limitation and there was no sufficient cause. This objection though very plausible and has some support in decided cases, does not appear to us to be invulnerable. An appeal would lie on the ground that an order granting review was in contravention of the provisions of R. 4. Rule 4 [1] says that:- "Where it appears to the court that there is no sufficient ground for a review it shall reject the application." So if the court does not reject the application where there is no sufficient ground for review but grants the application, then it contravenes R. 4. Rule 4 [1] says that:- "Where it appears to the court that there is no sufficient ground for a review it shall reject the application." So if the court does not reject the application where there is no sufficient ground for review but grants the application, then it contravenes R. 4. We do not see any justification for construing "R. 4" in R. 7 [1] [b] as confined to R. 4 [2]." 7. We are in entire agreement with the reasoning adopted and the conclusions arrived at in A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 553 and A. I. R. 1951 Madras 927 and as the lower court was in error as stated in paragraph 3 above in not rejecting M. P. 1665 of 1951, we allow this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal with costs here and in the court below. Allowed.