JUDGMENT : DIXIT, J. 1. In this appeal the question for determination is whether a suit by a person claiming a declaration that an alienation of a certain joint family property made by his uncle is not binding on him and for possession of the property is for the purposes of court-fees governed by S. 4, Cl. (iv)(c) or by S. 4, Cl. (v) of the Indore Court-fees Act. These sections correspond to Ss. 7(iv), (c) and 7(v), Indian Court-fees Act. The plaintiff appellant paid court-fees on Rs. 9000/- which was the consideration for which the property was alienated. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that inasmuch as the plaintiff's suit was in effect one for possession of the property, the plaintiff should have paid court-fee under S. 4(v), Indore Court-fees Act on the market value of the property. The learned Civil Judge found that the market value of the property of which the plaintiff sought possession was Rs. 45000/-. He, therefore, returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. 2. Shivdayal, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that it was necessary for the plaintiff-appellant to obtain a declaration from the court that the alienation was not binding on him, before he could claim the possession of the alienated property and the relief of possession being thus consequential, the plaintiff's suit fell under S. 4(iv), (c). In support of this contention learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Nagpur High Court in - 'Hajrabi v. Mohammad Ibrahim', AIR 1948 Nag 219 (A), and of the Lahore High Court in - 'Harkishan Lal v. Barkat Ali', AIR 1942 Lah 209 (B). On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Motilal Gupta relying on - 'Ranjit Singh v. Birinder Kumar', AIR 1952 Pepsu 168 (C) and the cases relied on therein, argued that though the plaintiff had claimed a declaration that the sale of the joint family property by his uncles was not binding on him, his suit was in substance one for possession of the property; that the relief regarding declaration was unnecessary and that, therefore, the plaintiff should have paid court-fees on the market value of the property and filed his suit in the court having jurisdiction to entertain suits of the valuation of Rs. 45000/-. 3. 45000/-. 3. On a consideration of the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and the cases relied upon by them, I am inclined to think that the learned Civil Judge was correct in holding that the plaintiff appellant should have paid court-fees on the market value of the property, Which in this case was Rs. 45000/- and when so valued, the plaintiff's suit was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court of Civil Judge First Class. To me it is plain from the wording of S. 4(iv), (c), Indore Court-fees Act that it applies only to suits where the principal relief claimed is of declaration and the further relief, if any, claimed is merely consequential or incidental to the main relief of declaration. The two reliefs are so connected that if it be found that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration, he would not ipso facto be able to claim the further relief. It has no reference at all to a suit where the plaintiff claims possession of the property and a declaration about his title to the property. The declaration prayed for in such a case is really a declaration of a finding of fact as to the plaintiff's title. In the present case, the plaintiff has no doubt framed his suit as one for a declaration that the alienation is not binding on him and that, therefore, he is entitled to the possession of the property in dispute. His suit is not one for cancellation of the document of sale. As he was not a party to the sale deed, his suit cannot be regarded as one for cancellation of the sale deed. The plaintiff is not bound to have the sale deed cancelled or declared inoperative before claiming possession of the property. That in suits such as the present one the plaintiff is not obliged to pray for a declaration that the alienation was inoperative is clear from the Privy Council decision in - 'Bijoy Gopal v. Sm Krishna Debi', 34 Cal 329 (D). In that case the plaintiff as a reversionary heir brought a suit for a declaration that a lease executed by a Hindu widow was void, and for possession of the lease property. The question arose whether the plaintiff could recover possession of the lease property without having the lease deed set aside within the limitation period. In that case the plaintiff as a reversionary heir brought a suit for a declaration that a lease executed by a Hindu widow was void, and for possession of the lease property. The question arose whether the plaintiff could recover possession of the lease property without having the lease deed set aside within the limitation period. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows : "A Hindu widow is not a tenant for life, but is owner of her husband's property subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon her husband's heirs upon her death ...... ...... ...... ...... ........ Her alienation is not, therefore, absolutely void but it is, 'prima facie' voidable at the election of the reversionary heir. He may think fit to affirm it, or may at his pleasure treat it as a nullity without the intervention of any Court and he shows his election to do the latter by commencing an action to recover possession of the property. There is in fact nothing for the Court either to set aside or cancelas a condition precedent to the right of action of the reversionary heir ...... ...... ...... ........ It is true that the appellants prayed by their plaint a declaration that the ijara was inoperative as against them, as leading up to their prayer for delivery to them of 'khas' possession. But it was not necessary for them to do so, and they might have merely claimed possession, leaving it to the defendant to plead and (if they could) prove the circumstances which they relied on, for showing that the 'ijara' or any derivative dealings with the property were not in fact voidable but were binding on the reversionary heirs." 4. The principle laid down by the Privy Council was applied by the Madras High Court in - 'Kalianna Goundar v. Bala Subramaniam', AIR 1947 Mad 237 (E); - 'Ramaswami Ayyanger v. Rangachariar', AIR 1940 Mad 113 (FB) (F), and by the Patna High Court in - 'Ram Sumran Prashad v. Govind Das', AIR 1922 Pat 615 (SB) (G). The Madras cases dealt with the question of the possession of joint family property alienated by the father of the plaintiff. In the Patna case the plaintiff claimed to be the reversionary heir and sued for possession of property which the last male holder had gifted during his life time. The Madras cases dealt with the question of the possession of joint family property alienated by the father of the plaintiff. In the Patna case the plaintiff claimed to be the reversionary heir and sued for possession of property which the last male holder had gifted during his life time. In all these cases it was held that the plaintiff was not bound to sue for a declaration or cancellation of the deed of alienation and that the plaintiff's claim was, in essence one for possession of the property alienated. I do not propose to refer to numerous other cases taking this view. Some of them have been considered by the Pepsu High Court in the case of - 'Ranjit Singh v. Birinder', AIR 1952 Pepsu 168 (C), which is in line with the Madras and Patna view. 5. I do not find myself in agreement with the contrary view taken by the Lahore High Court in - 'AIR 1942 Lah 209 (B)'. In that case it was observed that when it is open to the plaintiff to bring a suit for possession or to bring a suit for declaration with consequential relief for possession, it is entirely for him to choose the form of the suit and pay court-fees accordingly. With due deference to the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court, I think the learned Judges thought they accepted the principle that the question whether the plaintiff's suit was really one for a declaration with a consequential relief or whether the consequential relief claimed was in fact the substantive relief sought, must be determined on the substance of the plaint, did not take sufficient account of this principle in holding that it was at the option of the plaintiff to choose the form of the suit and pay Court-fees accordingly. The learned Judges of the Lahore High Court also did not consider the Privy Council decision in - 34 Cal 329 (D)'. The case reported in - 'AIR 1943 Nag 219 (A) does not appear to me to be in point here. It is distinguishable on the ground that in that case the plaintiff claimed a relief of possession of property on the allegation that a deed of gift executed by him along with others with regard to that property was void and inoperative as against him on account of misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence. It is distinguishable on the ground that in that case the plaintiff claimed a relief of possession of property on the allegation that a deed of gift executed by him along with others with regard to that property was void and inoperative as against him on account of misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence. The plaintiff's suit was, therefore, a suit of a party to a document for having it cancelled. 6. For all these reasons, I think the learned Civil Judge was correct in holding that the court-fees on the plaint should be computed under S. 4, Cl. (v) Indore Court-fees Act. In my opinion this appeal should be dismissed with costs. 7. CHATURVEDI, J. – I concur. Appeal dismissed.