Subba Rao, J.- The question in this appeal is whether an appeal lay against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirapalli. The facts germane to the question may be briefly narrated. The appellant filed C.S. No. 4 of 1943 on the file of the High Court against Raja Bahadur Krishnamachariar for recovering a sum of about Rs. 59,000 towards the commission alleged to be due to him. Krishnamachariar died after the service of summons and before the date fixed for his appearance. His sons, Raju and Rangu, were added as his legal representatives. Krishnamachariar executed a Will, Exhibit P-1, whereunder among other properties, item No. 6 of the D Schedule was bequeathed to the respondents who are Raju’s sons. Raju was ex parte. Rangu, the 3rd defendant, filed a written statement denying the liability of Krishnamachariar to the appellant. Though the respondents attempted to come on record to contest the suit, this application was opposed by the plaintiff and it was dismissed by the Master. The Master held that the dispute between the legatees and the plaintiff had to be adjudicated only in a separate suit, and, therefore, they were not necessary parties. It was on this finding that their application was dismissed. Thereafter the appellant and Rangu compromised their dispute and a decree was made against Rangu on the basis of the consent memo. filed in Court and against Raju on proof of the claim. Under the decree the appellant was authorised to execute the decree against all the properties of Krishnamachari other than the share of Rangu. The said decree was transferred to the District Court, Tiruchirapalli, for execution. On 8th August, 1945, the appellant filed E.P. No. 10 of 1945 on the file of the District Court praying for the attachment of the house in dispute. The house was attached on 3rd September, 1945. The respondents, relying upon the Will executed in their favour by Krishnamachariar, preferred a claim petition for raising the attachment. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the application disposed of the same on an alternative basis, that is, as one made both under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code and under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The respondents, relying upon the Will executed in their favour by Krishnamachariar, preferred a claim petition for raising the attachment. The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the application disposed of the same on an alternative basis, that is, as one made both under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code and under section 47, Civil Procedure Code. Treating it as one made under Order 21, rule 58, Civil Procedure Code he held that the claimants had some interest in the house attached on the date of the attachment and that on that date the house was not in the possession of either judgment-debtor on his own account. On that basis he came to the conclusion that the application had to be allowed and the attachment raised. Approaching the question from the standpoint of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, he posed the following question for decision, “whether the house is liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree passed in C.S. No. 4 of 1943”. He held that it was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. In the result on the said footing also he dismissed the application. The appellant filed a suit for setting aside the said order under Order 21, Rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, and it is represented to me that the said suit was dismissed. The above appeal was filed prior to the institution of that suit against the same order. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection mat no appeal lay against the order of the lower Court. The answer to that question would depend upon the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code governing the right of appeal. Under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction. “Decree” has been defined by section 2(2) so as to include the determination of any question within section 47, Civil Procedure Code. Under section 47, all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Under section 47, all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. To enable the appellant, therefore, to maintain the appeal he should establish that the dispute now in question arose between the parties to the suit or their representatives in respect of execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. That the dispute relates to the execution of the decree is apparent. But the difficult question is whether the respondents are the representatives of the parties to the suit. If they are the representatives of the parties to the suit, the provisions of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, would be attracted and by the combined effect of section 96 and section 2(2), Civil Procedure Code, an appeal would lie to this Court. The short question, therefore, is whether the respondents (claimants) are the representatives of the parties to the suit. To state it differently, are they representatives of Krishnamachariar? The term “representatives” includes not only legal representatives but also representatives-in-interest. The leading decision on the subject is that of the Full Bench in Ishun Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar1, which was later on followed in other cases without dissent. After considering the conflicting views, the Full Bench gave a wider and comprehensive meaning to the word “representatives” by holding that the term “representative” when taken with reference to the judgment-debtor does not mean only his legal representative, that is. his heir, executor or administrator, but that it means his representative-in-interest and includes a purchaser of his interest, who, so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree. The next question is whether a legatee of a portion of an estate is a representative of the testator. The right of a creditor to proceed in execution of a money decree against such a legatee was considered in Jayachandra Ray v. Satishchandra Ray2. There it was ruled that the right of a creditor to follow the assets in the hands of a legatee is a right which has to be exercised by a suit, and that it cannot be exercised merely by levying execution against the assets in the hands of the legatee under a judgment against the legal representative. There it was ruled that the right of a creditor to follow the assets in the hands of a legatee is a right which has to be exercised by a suit, and that it cannot be exercised merely by levying execution against the assets in the hands of the legatee under a judgment against the legal representative. At page 172, Rankin, C.J., expressed his view in the following terms: “The present question, however, is not merely whether the creditor can follow the assets in the hands of the legatee, but whether he can do so by the simple process of levying execution under a decree against the executors, or, in this case, the administrators. It is reasonably clear to me that he cannot do. As Lord Eldon pointed out in the case to which I have referred, the legatee cannot be affected except by a suit and it is not possible upon a judgment against the legal representative to proceed to attach property which has years before been parted with to a specific legatee”. In Sivasankara Mudaliar v. Amaravathi Ammal3, Pandrang Row and Venkataramana Rao, JJ., pointed out that in India the entire estate, both movable and immovable property, left by a deceased person must be deemed to vest in the heir-at-law until an administrator is duly constituted and until then the heir-at-law is competent to maintain a suit on behalf of the estate. In coming to that conclusion they noticed the position of a legatee, and observed at page 541 that a legatee does not represent the estate and he has no direct right of action against the person who is claiming adversely to the estate. A more elaborate consideration of the subject is found in Natesa Sastrigal v. Alamelu Achi1. In that case, Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ., after considering the various cases cited before them, have summarised the law on the subject as follows at page 482: "The result of this discussion may be shortly put. The persons or class of persons indicated by the expression "legal representative" would depend on the context. In that case, Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ., after considering the various cases cited before them, have summarised the law on the subject as follows at page 482: "The result of this discussion may be shortly put. The persons or class of persons indicated by the expression "legal representative" would depend on the context. Subject to that qualification it includes properly appointed executors and administrators; it includes persons who have taken on themselves duties and responsibilities, which belong to the office of the executor or administrator even though only in respect of part of the estate; it includes heirs-at-law, whether they take by succession or by survivorship; it includes reversioners where the action has been brought by or against the widow as representing her husband’s estate; it includes a universal legatee; it may perhaps in some cases and for some purposes include persons in de facto possession of the entire estate of the deceased though this Court has so far not endorsed this view; but it does not include trespassers; it does not include creditors who have received payments of the debts due from the estate of the deceased; it does not include persons dealing in the ordinary course of business with the goods of the deceased received from another; it does not include persons who intervene merely for purposes of preserving the goods of the deceased or providing for his funeral or for immediate necessities of his family; it does not include legatees of a part of the estate and it does not include those taking possession of the property of the deceased from the legatees of a part of the estate ". This is a clear authority for the position that a legatee of a part of an estate is not a legal representative of the testator. Some doubt is thrown on this decision by Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Natesa Sastri v. K.S. Sunday am Chettiar2. There a decree was passed against a testator and:in execution proceedings, upon his death his widow was impleaded as his legal representative, and the property was attached. Subsequently the property attached came into the possession of the legatee unauthorisedly. The learned Judge held that the execution could proceed against the property attached. There a decree was passed against a testator and:in execution proceedings, upon his death his widow was impleaded as his legal representative, and the property was attached. Subsequently the property attached came into the possession of the legatee unauthorisedly. The learned Judge held that the execution could proceed against the property attached. At page 623 the learned Judge stated-: " The attachment therefore was validly made in the present case at a time when the estate was fully represented by Dharmambal and the rights of the execution creditor should be worked out as on the date of the attachment by bringing the properties to sale in pursuance of that attachment. The mere fact that subsequently the property vested under the Will upon other persons is, in my opinion, of no consequence. Whatever may be the position, therefore, in other cases in which the legatees alone who have not received the legacy from the executor or administrator who is charged with the duty of distributing the estate after discharging the liabilities on it may be, in the present case, in my opinion, the execution is valid and the property could be validly seized in execution of the decree so as to bind even the defendants." Those observations were enough to dispose of the case before the learned Judge. But he went further and criticised the judgment of Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ., in Natesa Sastrigal v. Alamelu Achi1, in respect of one aspect of the case. Whereas Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ., held that a legatee of a part of an estate is not the legal representative, though, as a matter of fact, in that case, the legatee took possession of the bequeathed property unauthorisedly, Satyanarayana Rao, J., expressed the view that if the legatee unauthorisedly lays his hands and takes possession of the estate of the deceased testator to satisfy his legacy, such an act is treated as an act of intermeddling, which act in law pertains to the office of an executor. Dealing with the judgment of the Division Bench, Satyanarayana Rao, J., observed at page 624 as follows: "Though the learned Judges in Natesa Sastrigal v. Alamelu Achi1, correctly defined an executor de son tori as a person who takes upon him an office of executor by intrusion not being so constituted by the testator, overlooked the fact that in the case these very defendants took unauthorised possession of the estate of the deceased to satisfy the legacy and therefore were persons who intermeddled with the estate and, therefore, became executors de son tort, as provided in the illustration." The learned Judge also pointed out that Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar, JJ., overlooked the illustration to section 303 of the Indian Succession Act. From the aforesaid discussion of the case-law, the following principles emerge: The legatee of a part of an estate is not a legal representative of the testator. The decree-holder cannot execute the decree against the assets in his possession except by way of a regular suit. But, if he is an intermeddler, in the sense that the legatee did not receive the payments in due course of the administration of the estate but helped himself to the legacy by unauthorisedly taking possession, he would be a legal representative within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code in which any decree can be executed against the property in his possession. It is not necessary to express our final opinion on the view expressed by Satyanarayana Rao, J., in dealing with the question of intermeddler, for in this case it has not been established that the legatees were intermeddlers and the said question is not therefore germane for the disposal of the appeal. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the title to a bequest will not vest in a legatee unless it is assented to by the executor or the administrator,. as the case may be, and that in this case there is no such assent and therefore the title did not pass to the respondents. The relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act are section 119 and section 332. as the case may be, and that in this case there is no such assent and therefore the title did not pass to the respondents. The relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act are section 119 and section 332. Under section 119, where by the terms, of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed, a right to receive it at the proper time shall unless a contrary intention appears by the will, become vested in the legatee on the testator’s death. But under section 332, the assent of the executor or administrator is necessary to complete a legatee’s title to his legacy. A combined reading of these two provisions leads to the legal position that the assent of the executor or the administrator, as the case may be, perfects a legatee’s title which he acquires under the Will, and till such time the legatee has got only an inchoate right to the legacy. But, in the present case under the Will no executor was appointed. Rangu instituted O.S. No. 77 of 1942 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirapalli for partition and separate possession of one-third share of the properties then held by Krishnamachariar, inclusive of the properties covered by the Will, Exhibit P-1. To that suit, Krishnamachariar, Raju and the claimants were made defendants 1 to 5. Pending suit, Rangu was appointed receiver in respect of the suit properties now in question. The appointment order stated: “The plaintiff will be receiver and will be in possession as such of item 6 of D Schedule..........and will be accountable for occupation rent and will deliver possession to the persons eventually found entitled thereto”. In 1944, Rangu entered into a compromise in O.S. No. 77 of 1942 with his sister and deceased sister’s daughters, who are brought on record as defendants 14 to 16 after the death of Krishnamachariar, and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise on 13th February, 1945. On 16th February, 1945, Rangu filed a memo.. giving up his claim in respect of the house now in question. He also asked for time for handing over possession of the house to the claimants as per the terms of the will. On 16th February, 1945, Rangu filed a memo.. giving up his claim in respect of the house now in question. He also asked for time for handing over possession of the house to the claimants as per the terms of the will. On these facts it is idle to contend that the claimants were intermeddlers of a part of the estate of the testator, for, in the absence of an executor the heir-at-law represents the estate and he gave up contest and expressed his willingness to put the legatees in possession of the property bequeathed to them. The capacity of an heir-at-law to represent the estate of a testator in the absence, of an executor has been recognised in Sivasankara Mudaliar v. Amaravathi Ammal1, where, as already stated, a Division Bench of this Court held that in India the entire estate, both movable and immovable property left by a deceased person must be deemed to vest in the heir-at-law until an administrator is duly constituted and until then the heir-at-law is competent to maintain a suit on behalf of the estate. The heir-at-law representing the estate has recognised the legatees and agreed to put them in possession. It is not, therefore, possible to hold that the legatees helped themselves to the legacies by unauthorisedly taking possession, and therefore are intermeddlers with the estate of the testator. It follows that the claimants are not the legal representatives of Krishnamachari, who was a party to the suit. It is not contended that the legatees are the representatives in interest of Krishnamachariar, for the decree was only a money-decree and the legatees cannot be said to be either transferees by private treaty or in execution of a decree of any property which is the subject-matter of the suit. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the respondents are not the representatives of any of the defendants in C.S. No. 4 of 1943, and therefore the questions that arise between the decree-holder and them fall outside the scope of section 47 Civil Procedure Code. The appeal is not, therefore, maintainable, and is dismissed with costs. C.R.P. No. 347 of 1948. This is a revision filed against the same order of the lower Court. But it is conceded that a suit had been filed to set aside that order under Order 21, Rule 63 and that it was dismissed. The appeal is not, therefore, maintainable, and is dismissed with costs. C.R.P. No. 347 of 1948. This is a revision filed against the same order of the lower Court. But it is conceded that a suit had been filed to set aside that order under Order 21, Rule 63 and that it was dismissed. The proper course for the petitioner is to pursue his remedies, if any, against the decree in that suit. The C.R.P. therefore fails and is dismissed without costs. K.C. ----- Appeal and petition dismissed.