Judgment :- The appellant, the State of Madras represented by the Secretary, Revenue Department, Madras, has preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Second Additional City Civil Judge, Madras, decreeing the suit brought by the respondent-company for a declaration that the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer levying commercial tax on the respondent-company was illegal and that the tax demanded by the Commercial Tax Officer was not payable. The respondent-company are dealers in groundnut oil and cakes and they manufacture groundnut oil and cake. In November, 1946, the respondent-company started a new oil expeller at Melwarampet, Karunguzhi, Chingleput District. An application was made by the respondent-company to the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Mount Road, Madras, on 11th November, 1946, to be registered as manufacturers of groundnut oil and cake under rule 18(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, and they were accordingly registered as such manufacturers. For the year 1946-47 the respondent submitted a return showing their net sales for the period ending with 31st March, 1947, and also produced the accounts as directed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. After allowing the necessary deductions and exemptions, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer duly assessed the respondent-company to sales tax for the year 1946-47 in the sum of Rs. 37, 151-14-9 and the tax due thereon was paid. For the year 1947-48, the respondent-company did not file the monthly returns as required by the rules and, in consequence thereof, a provisional assessment notice was issued to the respondent-company on the basis of the net turnover for 1946-47. The respondent-company were thereafter called upon by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to submit a return in Form "A" and the same was submitted on the 30th April, 1948. In that return, the respondent-company showed their turnover to be Rs. 2, 68, 716-8-10 for oil only. While submitting this return, the respondents claimed deduction of the value of groundnut crushed in the sum of Rs. 2, 62, 046-11-9 under rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer made a provisional assessment on 1st May, 1948, on the basis of the turnover submitted by the respondents. Subsequently, on 11th March, 1949, the Deputy Commercial Tax officer issued a notice to the respondents intimating that the proposed to tax the respondents on their gross turnover of Rs. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer made a provisional assessment on 1st May, 1948, on the basis of the turnover submitted by the respondents. Subsequently, on 11th March, 1949, the Deputy Commercial Tax officer issued a notice to the respondents intimating that the proposed to tax the respondents on their gross turnover of Rs. 4, 74, 890-15-1 on the ground that they were not registered dealers and therefore not entitled to deduction of the purchase value of groundnut. When it was pointed out to the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer that the respondents were already registered manufactures in groundnut oil and cakes, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer disallowed the deduction of the purchase of groundnuts on a new ground, viz., that the monthly returns had not been submitted by the respondents for 1947-48 as required by rule 18(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules and thereupon confirmed the assessment on the gross turnover of Rs. 4, 82, 572-4-6 by his order dated the 20th March, 1949, Ex. B. 2, in the case. The total amount of sales tax payable on this turnover was Rs. 4, 848-14-11 out of which after deducting a sum of Rs. 421-8-0 paid by the respondents till then, a balance of Rs. 4, 447-6-11 was demanded from the respondents. The respondents paid the admitted sales tax payable by them and defaulted in the payment of the balance of Rs. 2, 131-3-11. By notice dated 13th August, 1949, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer demanded this sum from the respondents. Thereupon, the respondents filed the suit for a declaration that they were entitled to the deduction of the value of the groundnut purchased, that the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer refusing to allow this deduction was unjust and illegal and that the respondents were entitled as of right, being registered dealers, to the said exemption of tax on the value of the groundnut purchased under rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules. Various other averments were made in the plaint by the respondents but it is not necessary for me to go into them at present.In the written statement filed on behalf of the State of Madras, the State of Madras contested the suit on various grounds, the important of them being that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain in suit for the reason that the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, itself provided a complete code of remedies by way of appeal and revision to the aggrieved party, that, as the respondents did not submit the monthly returns as required by rule 18(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules for any of the months during the assessment year 1947-48 and did not also furnish the particulars in Form A9, the respondents were not eligible for any of the reliefs claimed by them, that rule 18(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules under which monthly statements had to be submitted was mandatory, that, under rule 5(1)(k), any claim for exemption was subject to the conditions specified in rule 18 and that therefore the respondents were not entitled to question the legality of the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, in his having disallowed the deduction claimed by the respondents. On these pleadings, the learned Second Additional City Civil Judge framed three issues for determination and they are : (1) Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit; (2) Whether the right claimed by the respondents under rule 18(2) for exemption for the value of the groundnut purchased by them was an absolute right without being dependent upon their complying with the conditions prescribed in rule 18(3); and (3) whether the assessment order dated 20th March, 1949, was illegal and unjust. The learned Second Additional City Civil Judge, after considering the documentary evidence adduced in the case and hearing the arguments advanced by both the parties on the question of law involved in the suit, accepted the case of the respondents and gave a decree declaring that the levy of sales tax to the extent of Rs. 2, 313-3-11 was illegal and outside the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, and that the respondents were not liable to pay the same to the Government. 2, 313-3-11 was illegal and outside the provisions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, and that the respondents were not liable to pay the same to the Government. Against this decree and judgment, the State of madras has now preferred this appeal.When this appeal was taken up for hearing, the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit brought by the respondents was not pressed by the learned counsel Mr. Veeraswami appearing for the State of Madras. The main question argued by the learned counsel on both sides was whether or not the respondents were entitled to the exemption claimed by them which was not granted by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. Mr. Veeraswami has invited my attention to the various rules framed by the Government under the Madras General Sales Tax Act which govern the turnover and assessment under the said Act and which arise for consideration in this case. The first rule is rule 5(1)(k). Rule 5(1) is in the following terms :- "The tax or taxes under Section 3 or 5 or the notification or notifications under Section 6(1) shall be levied on the net turnover of a dealer. In determining the net turnover the amounts specified in clauses (a) to (k) shall, subject to the conditions specified therein, be deducted from the gross turnover of a dealer." * Sub-rule (k) of rule 5(1) is to the following effect :- "All amounts which a registered manufacturer of groundnut oil (other than refined groundnut oil) and cake may be entitled to deduct from his gross turnover under rule 18 subject to the conditions specified in that rule". It is beyond dispute that the respondents in this case are dealers and that they are also registered manufacturers of groundnut oil and cake. If such be the case, all amounts which such a manufacturer may be entitled to deduct from his gross turnover under rule 18 will have to be exempted by the taxing authority in determining the net turnover. In both the rules 5(1) and 5(1)(k) it has been specified that the deductions allowed under sub-rules (a) to (k) shall be subject to the conditions specified therein and in sub-rule (k) it is further provided that such deductions shall be under rule 18 subject to the conditions specified in that rule. In both the rules 5(1) and 5(1)(k) it has been specified that the deductions allowed under sub-rules (a) to (k) shall be subject to the conditions specified therein and in sub-rule (k) it is further provided that such deductions shall be under rule 18 subject to the conditions specified in that rule. Rule 18(1) of the said Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, is to the following effect :- "Any dealer who manufacturers groundnut oil and cake from groundnut and/or kernel purchased by him may, on application to the assessing authority having jurisdiction over the area in which he carries on his business, be registered as a manufacturer of groundnut oil and cake." * It is common ground as already stated that the respondents in this case have made the necessary application to the assessing authority and have been registered as manufacturers of groundnut oil and cake. Therefore, they have complied with the condition prescribed in rule 18(1) of the rules. Rule 18(2) is to the effect that every such manufacturer shall be entitled to a deduction under clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 equal to the value of the groundnut and/or kernel purchased and concerted by him into oil and cake, provided that the amount for which the oil is sold is included in his turnover. It is not disputed that the proviso contained in this sub-rule (2) of rule 18 has been complied with and that the amount for which the oil is sold has been included in the turnover of the respondent company. The explanations to this sub-rule (2) of rule 18 are not material for the purpose of this appeal and so they need not be considered. Sub-rule (3) of rule 18, however, is to the effect that every such manufacturer shall submit so as to reach the registering authority not later than the 25th day of every month, a statement in Form A9 in respect of the transactions relating to the previous month. The finding of the learned City Civil Judge is to the effect that the respondents in this case have not complied with sub-rule (3) of rule 18. The finding of the learned City Civil Judge is to the effect that the respondents in this case have not complied with sub-rule (3) of rule 18. It cannot be denied that, apart from their failure to submit a statement in Form A9 in respect of the transactions relating to the previous month, the respondents have not also furnished the particulars required to be furnished in sub-rule (3) of the said rule 18. The fact remains, however, that, notwithstanding such failure on the part of the respondents, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer accepted the claim of the respondents for the deductions which they made in their letter, dated 1st May, 1948, Exhibit A2, and made a provisional assessment on the same date, 1st May, 1948. It is only after making the provisional assessment accepting the claim of the respondents for the exemption in respect of the groundnut purchased that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer sought to make the assessment on the gross turnover of Rs. 4, 82, 572-4-6 in his proceedings dated the 20th March, 1949, ignoring the claim of the respondents to the deduction for the value of the groundnut purchased. It is also in evidence that, in pursuance of the provisional assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on the 1st May, 1948, who allowed the deductions claimed by the respondents under rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, the respondents applied for and got permission of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to pay the tax levied in monthly instalments for the said year. At that time, it is in evidence that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer did not insist upon the requirements of rule 18(3) being complied with, but straightaway took into consideration the accounts and the statements submitted by the respondents as correct and allowed the deductions for the purchase of groundnuts. Even for the previous year, no such insistence seems to have been made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in the matter of assessing the sales tax due from the respondents.Sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18, however, gives power to the Commercial Tax Officer, in his discretion, to condone the delay or omission, or both, in the matter of the submission of the statement in Form A9 referred to in sub-rule (3) or the furnishing of the particulars required by that Form A9. It is argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that, in so far as the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer did not insist upon the strict compliance by the respondents of the requirements of rule 18(3) in the matter of the submission of the statement in Form A9 and the particulars required by that form, but proceeded straightaway to levy the assessment of sales tax in respect of the net turnover shown by the respondent-company for the year 1947-48, he must be deemed to have condoned not merely the delay in the submission of the statement and the particulars to be inserted in the said Form A9 but also the failure on the part of the respondents to furnish any statement at all and that, having once done so, it was not open to the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to go back upon his previous condonation and reopen the issue once again to the detriment of the respondents. As against this, it is contended by the learned Government Pleader for the State of Madras that sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18 could come into operation only if and when the monthly statements happen to be submitted out of time and only if the particulars required by Form A9 are already furnished by the assessee and not otherwise. He also urges that this sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18 does not empower the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to condone the total failure to submit the statement in Form A9 or the particulars required thereunder. His point is that the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer's powers in this regard are very limited, namely, that he can condone only the delay if and when the statement is submitted every month, or, he can only condone the failure to furnish the particulars if any such statement is furnished every month. In view of the fact that the respondents did not submit, admittedly, the monthly statements or furnish the particulars to be contained in that Form A9, it is contended that the question of the condonation by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer does not arise at all. In view of the fact that the respondents did not submit, admittedly, the monthly statements or furnish the particulars to be contained in that Form A9, it is contended that the question of the condonation by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer does not arise at all. So that the effect of the argument of the learned Government Pleader is that the total failure on the part of the respondents to furnish the monthly statements in Form A9 or the particulars required by that Form A9 will not entitle either the respondents to claim deduction in respect of the value of the purchase price of the groundnuts or the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer to condone such total failure and omission. On a careful reading of the entire scheme of the rules and in particular the language employed in sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18, I do not think that it is possible for me to accept the interpretation put forth by the learned Government Pleader on the scope of sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18. Taking the intention underlying the relevant rules of the said Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, it cannot be stated that sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18 restricts the power of the Commercial Tax Officer to condone only the mere delay in the submission of the returns in Form A9 from month to month or the omission of the particulars to be mentioned in Form A9. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that when power is given to condone the delay and also the omission to furnish the statement or the particulars required in that statement, it would not be doing any violence to the language of the said rule (3-A) to infer by implication that the Commercial Tax Officer has also the power to condone any total failure to submit the statement or the particulars required in that statement in Form A9. I am therefore of the view that the action of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer in not having insisted upon the fulfilment of the requirements of sub-rule (3) of rule 18 in the first instance, when the proceeded to make the provisional assessment of sales tax as against the respondent-company, must be deemed to have been a condonation of the total failure on the part of the respondent-company to submit the statement or the particulars in Form A9 required as per sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18, and that he was well within his power to do so.Sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18, as has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents, appears to have been enacted to mitigate the rigour of the condition of sub-rule (3) and appears to have been provided mainly in order to meet situations which usually arise in the failure of the assessee to comply strictly with the requirements in regard to furnishing of the statements from month to month and the particulars to be given in such statements. There, is therefore, much substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that, if it were the intention of the rule-making authorities that if sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18 were not complied with, the assessees should not be entitled to the deductions claimed by them, then there would not have been any necessity at all for the framing of sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18. Therefore, the existence of sub-rule (3-A) points to the fact that the non-compliance of sub-rule (3-A) could not have been intended to deprive the assessee of his right to deduction of the value of the groundnuts purchased by him. Otherwise, there would be no meaning in the discretion having been vested with the Commercial Tax Officer for condoning the delay in the submission of the statements or the particulars required thereof. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that rule 18(2) gives a very substantial and absolute right to the respondent company to claim deduction in respect of the value of the groundnuts purchased by them and that it is not made dependent upon any other conditions. Such an indefeasible right, it is contended on behalf of the respondent-company, cannot be defeated by any failure on the part of the respondent-company to comply with any provision in any sub-rule in rule 18. Such an indefeasible right, it is contended on behalf of the respondent-company, cannot be defeated by any failure on the part of the respondent-company to comply with any provision in any sub-rule in rule 18. Though sub-rule (k) of rule 5(1) mentions that all amounts which a registered manufacturer of groundnut oil (other than refined groundnut oil) and cake may be entitled to deduct from his gross turnover under rule 18 subject to the conditions specified in that rule, still the conditions laid down in rule 18 are not conditions precedent. On the other hand, they are in the nature of regulating the procedure in the matter of determining the net turnover of the assessee for purposes of levying the assessment. As against this, the learned Government Pleader would argue that unless and until all the conditions laid down in the sub-rules of rule 18 are complied with by the assessee, the assessee will not be entitled to claim any deduction in respect of the value of the groundnuts purchased by him. The language used is "subject to the conditions specified in that rule" and when the language itself described the requirements to be complied with under rule 18 to be conditions, it is not open to the respondents to argue that they are merely a matter of procedure or that they are directory in character, the non-compliance of which will not disentitle the assessee to the exemptions claimed by him. The learned Government Pleader contends that the exemption that is intended to be allowed in favour of the assessee in the matter of deductions in respect of the value of the groundnuts purchased is not, as a matter of right, to be availed of by the assessee without fulfilling the conditions stipulated in sub-rule (k) of rule 5(1), which, in turn, refers to the conditions mentioned in rule 18. Rule 18 lays down a series of conditions to be complied with by the the assessee. In the first place, it requires that the assessee should be registered as a manufacturer of groundnut oil and cake. This is covered by rule 18(1). Rule 18 lays down a series of conditions to be complied with by the the assessee. In the first place, it requires that the assessee should be registered as a manufacturer of groundnut oil and cake. This is covered by rule 18(1). In the second place, rule 18(2) provides that every manufacturer, i.e., the registered manufacturer, shall be entitled to a deduction under clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 equal to the value of the groundnut and/or kernel purchased and converted by him into oil and cake, provided that the amount for which the oil is sold is included in his turnover. In the third place, sub-rule (3) says that every such manufacturer should submit a statement in Form A9 before the 25th day of every month and furnish the particulars required in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of that sub-rule (3). To this sub-rule is attached a further provisions that the delay in the matter of submission of such statements and particulars can be condoned in the discretion of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. On a proper understanding of the provisions contained in rule 18, it is difficult to accept the contention of the Government Pleader that because the assessee failed to comply with one of the several conditions or requirements contained in this rule 18, the assessee should be deprived of the benefit of the exemption which has been provided for by sub-rule (2) of rule 18 or by the provision of sub-rule (k) of rule 5(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, notwithstanding the fact that he had complied with the rest of the requirements contained in the said rule 18. There is no proviso that has been included in this rule 18 to the effect that if the assessee failed to comply with any of the requirements or conditions contained in rule 18, the assessee should lose the benefit of the exemption given to him under sub-rule (2) of rule 18. If it were the intention of the rule-making authority that if the assessee failed to comply with any of the conditions he should not be entitled to the exemption, then nothing prevented the authority to frame a rule to that effect or at any rate, to have made that intention clear by the use of appropriate language. If it were the intention of the rule-making authority that if the assessee failed to comply with any of the conditions he should not be entitled to the exemption, then nothing prevented the authority to frame a rule to that effect or at any rate, to have made that intention clear by the use of appropriate language. In the absence of any such penal provision, which would have the effect of depriving the assessee of the benefit of the exemption in respect of the value of the groundnut purchased, I am of the opinion that it will not be valid or legal to import such a prohibition by means of implication to the detriment of the assessee. The Sales Tax Act and the rules framed thereunder being of the nature of a fiscal legislation, unless there is a specific provision to the effect that the exemptions and the concessions that are intended by the specific language of the rules of the enactment could not be availed of by the assessee unless and until the assessee complies with every one of the requirements, it will not be legal or within the rules of proper interpretation of the statutory enactment to infer that the assessee should be penalised and should be deprived of the benefits given to him as a substantial right.The question then arises as to whether the right to claim exemption given under rule 18(2) is absolute and substantive or whether it is conditional upon other factors such as those mentioned in the other sub-clauses of rule 18. Though it is vehemently contended by the learned Government Pleader for the State that this right to claim exemption is only conditional upon the assessee fulfilling certain requirements, still I do not think that there is sufficient warrant for this contention. The learned Government Pleader further relies upon the terminology employed in rule 5(1)(k) and the sub-clauses (3) and (3-A) of rule 18. In my view, these rules do not seem to support the view put forth by the learned Government Pleader. Rule 5(1) and the sub-clauses following thereafter including sub-rule (k) are intended to lay down the procedure that should be followed by the taxing authority in order to determine the net turnover of the assessee by taking into account the deductions that have to be allowed in favour of the assessee from the gross turnover. Rule 5(1) and the sub-clauses following thereafter including sub-rule (k) are intended to lay down the procedure that should be followed by the taxing authority in order to determine the net turnover of the assessee by taking into account the deductions that have to be allowed in favour of the assessee from the gross turnover. The language of rule 5(1)(k) and the other sub-clauses clearly indicates that they relate only to the procedure to be observed by the taxing authority, whereas the language of sub-rule (2) of rule 18 is clearly to the effect that every such manufacturer "shall be entitled" to a deduction under clause (k) of sub-rule (1) of rule 5 with the simple proviso that the amount for which the oil is sold is included in his turnover. The effect of sub-rule (1) of rule 18 is that it is within the discretion of the manufacturers of groundnut oil and cake to get themselves registered as such manufacturers and once such registration takes place, the manufacturers become entitled to the deductions. The combined effect of sub-rule (3) and sub-rule (3-A) of rule 18 is not such as to defeat this right which is given to the manufacturer of oil and cake under sub-rule (2) of rule 18. If the manufacturer has maintained a true and correct account of his business showing all the particulars required by sub-rule (3), the failure to furnish the statement under sub-rule (3) will not disentitle him from claiming deduction which he is entitled to, especially in view of what is contained in sub-rule (3-A), that the failure or the delay can be condoned by the taxing officer. Therefore, in so far as the relevant parts of rule 5(1)(k) or rule 18 are only intended to regulate the procedure that has to be kept in view by the taxing authority in arriving at the net turnover of the assessee or dealer, the legal effect of these rules could be nothing beyond their being merely directory and not absolute. In my view, there is considerable force in the contention put forward on behalf of the respondent-assessee that any omission or failure to comply with the provisions of the sub-rules of rule 18 will not entail the assessee being denied the deductions which otherwise he is entitled to under sub-rule (2) of rule 18. In my view, there is considerable force in the contention put forward on behalf of the respondent-assessee that any omission or failure to comply with the provisions of the sub-rules of rule 18 will not entail the assessee being denied the deductions which otherwise he is entitled to under sub-rule (2) of rule 18. It has to be noted that sub-rule (3) of rule 18 is not enacted in the form of a proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 18, which would have been the case, if it was the intention of the rule-making authority that the deduction should be allowed only if and when sub-rule (3) of rule 18 was fully complied with. Therefore, if these rules are only intended to be directory in their nature and not as conditions precedent to the assessee being allowed the deductions claimed by him in respect of the value of groundnut purchased, there is no reason why the assessee should not be entitled to the deductions, if he has otherwise substantially complied with all the other requirements of rule 18, which is the fact in the present case.In Craies "On Statute Law" (5th Edn.), the learned author, at pages 240 and 241, has drawn the distinction between absolute enactments and diretory enactments and has observed that the difference between the two is, as explained in Woodward v. Sarsons (1875 L.R. 10 C.P. 733, 746) that, "an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially." The learned author proceeds to observe that the act permitted by an absolute enactment is lawful only if done in accordance with the conditions annexed to the statutory permission. Under the heading "absolute enactments" the learned author observes in the following manner :- "If an absolute enactment is neglected or contravened, a court of law will treat the thing which is being done as invalid and altogether void, but if an enactment is merely directory, it is immaterial, so far as relates to the validity of the thing which is being done, whether it is complied with or not." * Under the heading "directory enactments", the learned author at page 241 of the book observes as follows :- "But, on the other hand, if a statute is merely directory, it is immaterial, so far as relates to the validity of the thing to be done, whether the provisions of the statute are accurately followed out or not." * At the bottom of the same page, the learned author under the caption, "No general rule as to when enabling Acts are absolute and when directory" observes thus :- "It being, then, well settled that the neglect of the requirements of an Act which prescribes how something is to be done will invalidate the thing being done, if the enactment is absolute, but not if it is merely directory, we have now to consider whether there is any general rule as to when as enactment is to be considered absolute and when merely directory. 'Provisions with respect to time, ' said Grove, J., in Barker v. Palmer (1881 8 Q.B.D. 9, 10) are always obligatory, unless a power of extending the time is given to the court".Applying this dictum to the present case, sub-rule (3A) provides the power to the taxing authority to extend the time, and, as I have already observed, in the exercise of such power, the taxing authority had already, once before, condoned even the non-furnishing of the statement and the particulars to be mentioned in the said statement not to speak of the delay in doing so. The author proceeds further to observe as follows :- "Except as to time, there is no general rule, for while on the one hand we find that enactments expressed in negative and prohibitory language are not universally considered as being absolute, on the other hand, enactments expressed in merely affirmative language have sometimes been held to be so. The author proceeds further to observe as follows :- "Except as to time, there is no general rule, for while on the one hand we find that enactments expressed in negative and prohibitory language are not universally considered as being absolute, on the other hand, enactments expressed in merely affirmative language have sometimes been held to be so. This was plainly stated by Lord Campbell in Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner 1861 (30) LJCh 379, 380), with regard to enactments expressed in merely affirmative language. 'No universal rule', said he, 'can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed." "In Howard v. Bodington (1877 2 P.D. 203, 211), Lord Penzance, after citing this dictum of Lord Campbell, added as follows : 'I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory .......... I have been very carefully through all the principal cases, but upon reading them all the conclusion at which I am constrained to arrive is this, that you cannot glean a great deal that is very decisive from a perusal of these cases. They are on all sorts of subjects. It is very difficult to group them together, and the tendency of my mind, after reading them, is to come to the conclusion which was expressed by Lord Campbell in the case of Liverpool Bank v. Turner 1861 (30) LJCh 379, 380)." * It is unnecessary to extract further quotations from this book either on the question of inferences to be drawn from negative language or inferences from affirmative language in any enactments. As I have already observed, taking the entire scope of the rules and the purposes underlying the rules, I am of the opinion that the rule-making authority did not intend to give by the one hand a right to the party to claim deductions and take the same away by the other hand. This view of mine is also further supported by the observations contained in "Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes" (10th Edn.) pages 374 and 376 where, in Section 3, the learned author discusses the scope of enactments, imperative or directory. Applying the principles of interpretation contained in Section 3 in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes at the pages referred to above, I am of the opinion that if the interpretation of the learned Government Pleader is to be accepted, it would tantamount to defeating the very object underlying the enactment of the rules and the procedure contemplated therein, that the assessee should not be mulcted with taxation twice over in respect of the same transaction or parts thereof. A reading of the rules 5(1)(k) and 18 indicate to my mind that the rule-making authority wanted to provide in the interests of the assessee that the net turnover alone should be taxed and not the gross turnover. If the gross turnover were to be the subject of taxation, then obviously in a case like the present one, the assessee would have to pay not merely for the groundnut which he had purchased for purposes of oil but would also have to pay a similar tax on the oil and cake which he had actually manufactured. Therefore, the rule-making authority did not provide for any consequence to follow, to the detriment of the assessee, if the conditions and the requirements laid down in rule 18 were not strictly complied with, for the entire object was merely to confer upon the assessee a benefit, namely, that he should be exempted from the process of double taxation and for that purpose sough to devise the procedure for the determination of the net turnover and the conditions which the assessee should substantially comply with. If it were otherwise then the object of exempting the assessee from taxation twice over would be clearly defeated.Further, the Madras General Sales Tax Act being a fiscal enactment and the rules framed thereunder also partake of the same character, the words of the statute should be strictly adhered to and no construction such as would favour the Government as against the subject should be put thereupon. In the matter of taxation as laid down in Attorney-General v. Selborne (Earl of) 1902 (1) KB 388 at 396) and Brunton v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties for New South Wales 1913 LJPC 139), the interpretation of statutes involving fiscal measures cannot be such as to ensure to the benefit of the State and to the disadvantage of the subject. On the other hand, they should be so interpreted as not to cause any undue advantage either to the State or disadvantage to the subject. It will not also be proper to draw inferences unfavorable to the subject from ambiguous terms in the matter of taxing enactments. It has however been pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that if the contention of the respondents in this case is to be accepted, all the rules framed by the Government under the General Sales Tax Act will become ineffective. I do not think that there is force in this contention. If, for any reason, the State Government thinks that its intention in the rules framed by it has not been expressed in the language employed by the rules, it is open to the rule-making authority to make clear its intention by making the necessary amendments to the rules. But, taking the language as it stands, I do not think that there is any danger of all the rules becoming ineffective if, as I have held, the assessee cannot be deprived of the benefit of exemption from taxation twice over, for the simple reason that he did not comply with the directory provisions contained in rule 18. Mr. Veeraswami on behalf of the Government submitted that some value should be attached to the words "subject to the conditions" appearing in rule 5(1)(k). But, as already observed, the effect of these words "subject to the conditions" depends upon what is intended to be achieved by the rules and what exactly is the scope and purpose of the rules framed. Veeraswami on behalf of the Government submitted that some value should be attached to the words "subject to the conditions" appearing in rule 5(1)(k). But, as already observed, the effect of these words "subject to the conditions" depends upon what is intended to be achieved by the rules and what exactly is the scope and purpose of the rules framed. In my view, the conditions that have to be satisfied under rule 18 are not absolute and it is sufficient if they are substantially complied with, which has been the case in this appeal.I am therefore of the view that the decision arrived at by the learned Second Additional City Civil Judge is correct and the decree of the lower Court has to be upheld. This appeal is therefor dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.