Judgment :- 1. Defendants 1 and 2 are the appellants and the matter arises in execution. The decree was for recovery of possession of immovable property on foot of a lease and the suit was O. S.12 of 1116. The defendants claimed value of improvements and did not contest redeemability as they could not do so then. A commission was issued by the Court and a report submitted in the year 1117 detailing the various items of improvements existing on the property. The improvements comprised trees as also a certain building. The lease sued on was of a vacant site and all the improvements on the property were effected by the defendants after the lease. This is not disputed. 2. After Act VIII of 1950 which came into force on 25-3-1950, an application for execution (E.P. No. 351 of 51) was presented by the decree-holder on 6-11-1951. No claim was made therein for eviction on the ground that the defendants committed waste on the property. It is conceded that the Act applies to the case and unless it is brought under the exceptions which would entail forfeiture of permanency conferred upon the tenant, viz., either that the tenant has defaulted payment of rent or that he has committed waste a decree for eviction cannot be executed and the possession of the defendants disturbed. So far as the arrears of rent are concerned, it is admitted that the defendants have deposited all that is due. That was not a ground on which eviction was granted. As already stated even in the execution petition dated 6-11-1951, eviction was not sought on any of the grounds mentioned in Act VIII/1950. In the objection petition (C.M. P. 13230) dated 23-11-1951 presented on behalf of the defendants, they claimed immunity from eviction based on two Acts, (1) Act XXII/1124 and (2) Act VIII of 1950. To this application an objection was filed by the decree-holder on 30-11-1951 (C.M.P.13501). The courts below considered the matter and reached the conclusion that the defendants have committed waste on the property and that they have rendered themselves liable to be evicted notwithstanding the Act VIII of 1950. In other words the courts below found that a ground for eviction in the matter of waste has been made out by the decree-holder. 3. The courts below considered the matter and reached the conclusion that the defendants have committed waste on the property and that they have rendered themselves liable to be evicted notwithstanding the Act VIII of 1950. In other words the courts below found that a ground for eviction in the matter of waste has been made out by the decree-holder. 3. The only ground relied upon by the courts below to sustain the finding that the defendants have committed waste upon the property is that out of the improvements that are found to exist in the first commissioner's report submitted in 1117, there were a few trees which are non-existent and the branches of certain other trees have also ceased to exist. A commission was issued to assess the non-existence either of the whole trees or of branches and a report was submitted on 19-1-1952. It says that the removal of the trees and branches would be about two years ago. It is upon the basis of this evidence and nothing else that the courts below found that the defendants were guilty of waste which would entail forfeiture of immunity from eviction conferred upon them by Act VIII of 1950. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that waste which should be a ground for eviction under Act VIII of 1950 must be one committed after the Act as otherwise the result would be that immunity from eviction conferred by the Act would have ceased to exist long before the right was conferred. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that waste which should be a ground for eviction under Act VIII of 1950 must be one committed after the Act as otherwise the result would be that immunity from eviction conferred by the Act would have ceased to exist long before the right was conferred. Clause (a) of the proviso to section 4 reads as follows: "Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall preclude the Court: [a] from ordering the delivery of possession of the holding to the decree-holder if the Court is satisfied either that the lessee has committed intentional and wilful acts of waste or that he has failed to pay the rent of the holding which has accrued due after the commencement of this Act; " Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the words "after the commencement of this Act" in the above clause can have relation only to the second part which says:- "or that he has failed to pay the rent of the holding which has accrued due" and cannot have relation to the first part as regards "intentional and wilful acts of waste." The two parts are disjoined by the word "or" with the result that the application of the last portion viz.. "after the commencement of the Act" must be equally to both parts or to none at all. There are two contingencies in which the court may be entitled to direct delivery of property from the lessee to the decree-holder each of which must satisfy the condition that it must be "after the commencement of the Act." I am unable to accept the contention urged by learned counsel for the respondent that the last portion "after the commencement "of the Act" applies only to the accrual of arrears of rent and not to intentional and wilful acts of waste. A similar provision contained in the Cochin Verumpattamdars' Act, VIII of 1118, in section 8 was considered by Cochin High Court in two Full Bench decisions reported in 1122 Cochin 510 and 1123 Cochin 693 and it was held that the waste which should be a ground for forfeiture of permanency conferred upon a verumpattamdar under the Act must be one committed after the date of the Act because it was the Act which conferred permanency and any circumstance that will take away that permanency must be one that occurred subsequent to the conferment of that permanency. 5. In my judgment, the waste contemplated under clause (a) of the proviso to section 4 of Act VIII of 1950 must be one committed after the commencement of the Act. In this case the only evidence on which the order is based is the commissioner's report dated 19-1-1952 which says that the removal of the trees and branches would be about two years ago. Taking two years back from the date of the report we come to January 1950. That will be a date prior to the passing of the Act which came into force only on 25-3-1950. Therefore, there is no evidence in the case to show that whatever waste was relied upon by the decree-holder to claim eviction, notwithstanding Act VIII of 1950, was waste that happened before the date of the Act, VIII of 1950. The result is that, assuming as found by the courts below, there is waste in this case, the immunity from eviction conferred upon the defendants by the Act is not taken away because the alleged waste happened not after, but before the commencement of the Act. 'Waste' in law means "any unauthorised act of a tenant in possession which tends to the destruction of the tenement or otherwise to the injury of the inheritance." In this case improvements are effected by the tenant on the property. The tenant is entitled to remove those improvements as he pleases and if such removal is made without impairing the soil which was leased by the landlord, no complaint can be raised by the landlord against the tenant. In I. L. R. 24 Madras 47 F.B., the Madras High Court held that the tenant is entitled to remove the improvements made by him. In I. L. R. 24 Madras 47 F.B., the Madras High Court held that the tenant is entitled to remove the improvements made by him. That case arose before the Transfer of Property Act came into force and the decision is based upon the general principles obtaining under the law of Landlord and Tenant. This Court has accepted the above Full Bench decision in more than one case The decision is expressly followed in some cases and the principle has been applied in several others. A tenant to whom the improvement belongs is entitled to remove it. The ownership of an asset or property includes a right in the owner to deal with it in his own way and unless such conduct injures the land or reversion of the landlord, it would not constitute 'waste' within the meaning of the law. In this case all the improvements belong to the defendants and their removal therefore constitutes no waste under the law. 6. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is not necessary to dilate more upon the question because in no view of the matter can it be said that the decree-holder is entitled to evict the defendants from - the property. Neither of the courts below referred to the important document namely the execution petition dated 6-11-1951 which though presented after the coming into force of Act VIII of 1950, does not claim eviction on the ground of waste. That, in my view, is proof positive that in the estimate of the decree-holder whatever was done by the defendants does not constitute waste. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether the courts below are right in their conclusion that a lessee can never be a Kudikidappukaran under Act XXII of 1124. 7. The result is that the second appeal is allowed and the orders passed by both the courts below set aside. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellants here. Leave refused. Allowed.