Satyanarayana Rao, J.- This appeal is against the order of the learned District Judge of Krishna dismissing the judgment-debtor’s application to set aside the sale of three lots of property held on the 16th January, 1945, in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 11 of 1942. On behalf of the appellant four questions were raised in this appeal. Firstly, it was contended that the sale, which was originally fixed for 15th January, 1945, was adjourned by the Nazir who was conducting the sale to 16th January, 1945, that is the next day, as the presiding Judge was absent on the 15th, and that therefore the sale was illegal. Secondly, that in view of the finding of the learned District Judge, that the purchasers of the properties, viz., respondents 6 and 7 in the lower Court’ were benamidars for the decree-holders, the sale contravened the provisions in Order 21, rule 72, Civil Procedure Code and was therefore illegal. With reference to lot No.2, the special plea raised was that this item was in the possession of a Receiver appointed in another suit, O.S. No.12 of 1940 on the file of the District Court of Krishna, and as no leave was obtained to execute the decree against the property in the hands of the Receiver, the sale was void. Lastly, it is contended that the finding of the learned District Judge, that there was no substantial loss and that the properties were sold for a fair price, was not jutified by the evidence on record. On the first question, the language of Order 21, rule 69, Civil Procedure Code, enables the officer conducting the sale to adjourn it, but with the proviso added that, if the sale is held within the precincts of the Court house, the leave of the Court should be obtained before adjourning the sale. In the present case the presiding officer was absent from Court on 15th January, 1945, but all the same without his leave the sale was adjourned to 16th January, 1945, on payment of batta. We do ‘not think that in the circumstances the absence or. leave of the presiding officer of the Court makes the sale a nullity. It is at the most an irregularity. We do ‘not think that in the circumstances the absence or. leave of the presiding officer of the Court makes the sale a nullity. It is at the most an irregularity. The second objection that as the auction purchasers were benam dars for the decree-holders and that as no leave to bid was obtained the sale is a nullity as it contravened the provisions of Order 21, rule 72, Civil Procedure Code, also is without force. It is no doubt true that the rule was contravened. But as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Rai Radhakrishna v. Bisheshar Sahay1the sale is only voidable, as the rule itself requires , an application by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale on the ground that no leave to bid was obtained by the decree-holder before the sale. It was further held by the Privy Council that the sale was not only voidable but that it could be set aside only if it were established that the property had not been realised to the best advantage of the judgment-d;btor meaning thereby that unless substantial injury is established a sale could not be set aside on the ground that it contravened the provisions of Order 21, rule 72, Civil Procedure Code. As regards lot No.2, it is no doubt true that a Receiver was in possession of the property. But, as pointed out by this Court in more than one dec sion, a sale of the property in the hands of the Receiver without the leave of the Court is not void but only voidable: vide Venkata Narasimha Rayanimgar v. Venkatalingama Nayanim Bahadur2 and Foulkes v. Suppan Chettiar3. It follows, therefore, that the appellant is not able to establish that the sale was a nullity and that it was illegal. But the above grounds would show that the sale was irregular. It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to establish that there was substantial less by reason of these irregularities which are complained of. The upset price of lot No.1 was fixed by the Court at Rs.3,000 and the property was actually sold, for a sum of Rs.3,600. The upset price of lot No.2 was fixed at Rs.600 and the property realized a sum of Rs.1,000. In regard to lot No.3 the upset price was Rs.600 and it actually fetched at the sale a sum of Rs.1,700. The upset price of lot No.2 was fixed at Rs.600 and the property realized a sum of Rs.1,000. In regard to lot No.3 the upset price was Rs.600 and it actually fetched at the sale a sum of Rs.1,700. It must be mentioned that the interest the judgment-debtor possessed in these items was a comparatively insignificant fraction, viz., 11/72 in all these three lots. The complaint of the appellant is particularly against the price which lot No.1 fetched at the auction, and nothing was seriously urged against the value which lots 2 and 3 fetched at the auction sale. As regards lot No.1 which consists of about six godowns, or three godowns and three small houses within a compound reliance was strongly placed upon a document, Ex. A-2 of the year 1946, under which a godown very near the godowns which were the subject-matter of this sale was sold for a sum of Rs.8,000. There is no definite data to know what exactly was the nature of the property which was comprised in lot No.1. It is no doubt true that there were three godowns. But as regards the other houses and the site no particulars have been given either in the petition or in the evidence in the case. The appellant judgment-debtor as P.W.1 admitted that prices in 1946 shot up by reason of the influx of refugees from Hyderabad. What was being sold was a fractional interest in the properties, and one cannot expect the full price to be realised in such circumstances. What is more, it is common knowledge that in Court sales properties do not fetch the full market-value of the properties. There were as many as five bidders at the time of the sale. Some of them were strangers, and one of them, at any rate was a distant relation of the judgment-debtor. So it cannot be said that the sale was a hole-and-corner affair, and that there was no proper, bidding. In these circumstances merely on the strength of Ex. A we do not see any reason to differ from the conclusion of the learned District Judge regarding the value of the lot No.1. It follows that the appellant failed to establish that as a result of the irregularities complained of there was any substantial loss. The decision of the lower Court is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. It follows that the appellant failed to establish that as a result of the irregularities complained of there was any substantial loss. The decision of the lower Court is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.