JUDGEMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. This first appeal by the defendant is directed against a decree and judgment dated 6-3-1950 of the learned Additional District Judge, Gwalior, declaring that the adoption deed of defendant 2, Suraj Singh, is invalid and that the said Suraj Singh is not the adopted son of the late Kunwar Shambu Singh. 2. The plaintiff respondent is a Jagirdar of former Gwalior State and it appears that there was some dispute going on between him and his younger brother the late Shambhu Singh who desired more maintenance than was given to him by his brother Jagirdar. The matter was then referred to the Muntazim Jagirdaran under S.16 of the Gwalior State Manual for Jagirdars Samvat 1970 on which an order was passed by the Gwalior Durbar on 16-7-1919 that in lieu of maintenance, Shambhu Singh would enjoy the revenue of village Saipura and that in addition to it the Jagirdar will pay Rs.8,000/- per year. It was also ordered that he would also be given five bighas land in Baroda for constructing a house of his own and in lieu of ornaments, houses, utensils and arms, etc., he would be given Rs.15,000/- in cash. It was also mentioned in this order that those houses and ornaments which are already in possession would remain so with Shambhu Singh. The said Shambhu Singh, who was a Naib Suba in the State, died on 15-8-1936, and, on 2-6-1938 his widow adopted defendant 2, Suraj Singh, as a son to her deceased husband. This adoption deed was registered on 30-3-1940. The Village Saipura reverted to the Jagir after the death of Shambhu Singh. But other properties remained in possession of Shambhu Singh's widow. The plaintiff filed this suit on 5-8-1941 alleging that he was the nearest reversioner and that the adoption deed was invalid and prayed for a declaration to that effect which was granted by the Court. 3. The suit was resisted by the widow (defendant 1) and by defendant 2, Suraj Singh on the ground that Kunwar Shambhu Singh had bequeathed his property in favour of his widow by virtue of a will executed by him in favour of his wife on 16-6-1928, and in this will he had also given authority to his widow to adopt a son to her husband. It was contended in the written statement that all the property left by the deceased belonged to him and was his separate property and that he had the power to make a gift of it in favour of his widow. On the pleadings the trial Court framed 12 issues and issue 7 was: whether the plaintiff is the nearest reversioner of Shambhu Singh deceased? The learned Trial Court thought (and in our opinion wrongly) that this issue was unnecessary and has therefore not expressed any opinion on this point. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, rightly contends that unless the plaintiff is found to be the nearest reversioner, the suit could not have been decreed. The learned counsel has also invited our attention to the observations made by Varadachariar J. in a Division Bench case - 'Desu Reddiar v. Srinivasa Reddi', AIR 1936 Mad 605 (A), to the effect that in dealing with a suit by the reversioner a distinction has been drawn between relief in respect of the individual and personal title of the particular person and relief claimed by the presumptive reversioner for the benefit of the body of reversioners. While relief of the former kind has generally been refused on the ground that an anticipatory declaration of the kind may be rendered valueless by future events, relief of the latter kind is not open to the same objections, especially after the recognition of the representative character of a reversioner's suit and of the consequent applicability of the rule of res judicata even in favour of or against the actual reversioner. Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta on the basis of these observations thinks that in the present suit relief was not claimed for the benefit of the body of reversioners and therefore the suit was not maintainable. 4. In our opinion, the observations have not been rightly understood by the learned counsel. What was meant was that a suit merely for a declaration that the plaintiff is the next or nearer reversioner or that some person is not a reversioner at all is not maintainable. Such a suit seeks only an adjudication of the status of a particular person and is not necessary in the interest of the reversioners or to protect the reversion. Such a suit seeks only an adjudication of the status of a particular person and is not necessary in the interest of the reversioners or to protect the reversion. The declaration may also be rendered nugatory by future events as till the succession opens it is difficult to predicate who the reversionary heir would be. But a suit will be maintainable if it is necessary to protect the estate such as a suit for restraining waste or to decree an alienation or an adoption invalid, it being immaterial that it may involve indirectly or incidentally such a declaration. 5. In a suit by a reversioner against the widow to prevent waste their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had observed in - 'Janaki Ammal v. Narayanaswamy Ayer', AIR 1916 PC 117 (B) that the right of a widow succeeding to her husband's property is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited but so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession. Their Lordships then pointed out that a reversionary heir although having only a contingent interest, differing little, if at all, from a 'spes successionis', is recognised as having a right to bring a representative suit against the widow for the conservation and due administration of the estate so that the corpus may go unimpaired to those entitled to the reversion. In - 'Duni Chand v. Mt. Anarkali', AIR 1946 PC 173 (C), their Lordships further explained that the Indian law permits the institution of suits in the life-time of the female owner to remove a common apprehended injury to the interests of all the reversioners and whenever action is taken by the presumptive reversioner it is in a representative capacity and on behalf of all the reversioners. 6. It was pointed out in - 'Balmakund Lal v. Mt. Sohano Kueri', AIR 1929 Pat 164 (D), that S.42, Specific Relief Act, speaks of "any right is to any property" and there can be no doubt that a person in whom the reversion of an estate is vested has such a title as will support and justify a decree that an adoption set up by the widow to her deceased husband is not valid. Then, in - 'Chinnasawmy Mudaliar v. Ambalavana Mudaliar', 29 Mad 48 (E) and - 'Bai Shri Vaktuba v. Agarsinji', 34 Bom 676 (F), it was held that the setting up of an adoption by the widow is an infringement of the right of reversioner and a suit to declare the adoption invalid is maintainable. The adoption by a widow to her husband divests her own estate and vests it in the adopted son and thus defeats the reversioners. The view adopted in - 'Thayammal v. Venkatarama', 7 Mad 401 (G), was also to the same effect. It is also to be noted that one of the illustrations to S.42, Specific Relief Act, is in the following words: "(f). A Hindu widow in possession of certain property adopts a son to her deceased husband. The person presumptively entitled to possession of the property on her death without a son may, in a suit against the adopted son, obtain a declaration that the adoption was invalid." The whole object of such suits as have been illustrated in illustrations (e) and (f) is to dispel the cloud that may have been thrown on the reversionary right which, if left to gather and not dispersed in time would be used to embarrass or affect the reversionary interest when it falls into possession. The principle is that a reversioner can question the acts of the Hindu widow without waiting for her death because evidence to which show that the act was unauthorised may by lapse of time be not available for that purpose: - 'Jeka Dula v. Bai Jivi', AIR 1938 Bom 37 (H). Section 42 and illustrations (e) and (f) do not seem to make any distinction between the rights of the nearest and those of a remote reversioner. But in the leading case of - 'Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards', 6 Cal 764 at p.772 (PC) (I), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee laid down the general rule that a declaratory suit "must be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir, that is to say, by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment". This rule of law was reaffirmed by their Lordships in the case of - "Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal', AIR 1915 PC 124 (J), where it was observed that "a suit by the presumptive reversioner is a representative suit on behalf of the general body of reversioners, and on the death of presumptive reversioner the next presumable reversioner is entitled to continue the action. The right to relief on the part of reversioners exists severally in order of succession and arises out of the one and the same transaction impugned as invalid and not binding against them as a body." So the rule that the next immediate reversioner should have the right of suit in the first instance is now very well settled (See - 'Mt. Deoki v. Jwala Prasad', AIR 1928 All 216 (K); - 'Mt. Barro v. Narain Prasad', AIR 1937 Oudh 243 (L) and - 'Raghavulu Naidu v. Kamsalya Bai', AIR 1937 Mad 607 (M)). 7. There is no doubt that a more distant reversioner can bring such a suit if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have precluded themselves from interfering. In such a case the Judicial Committee pointed out in 6 Cal 764 (PC) (I), that "the Court must exercise a judicial discretion in determining whether the remote reversioner is entitled to sue, and would probably require the nearer reversioner to be made a party to the suit." Thus a reversioner allowed to maintain such a suit does thereby act, not only for himself, but also on behalf of all the rest; for, the selection of one out of a body of persons' possession a common or similar interest as the individual empowered to carry on legal proceedings for the vindication of such interest involves the concession to him of a representative capacity in the matter. It is also well settled that a decision in such a suit would be binding on all the reversionary heirs, provided the suit is honestly brought and conducted (- 'Brojo Kishoree Dassee v. Sreenath Bose', 9 Suth WR 463 (2) at p.465 (N). It is also well settled that a decision in such a suit would be binding on all the reversionary heirs, provided the suit is honestly brought and conducted (- 'Brojo Kishoree Dassee v. Sreenath Bose', 9 Suth WR 463 (2) at p.465 (N). In - Katama Natchier v. Rajah of Sivagunga', 9 Moo Ind App 539 (PC) (O), Turner L.J. delivering the judgment of the Board observed: "The same principle, which has prevailed in the Courts of this country as to tenants-in-tail representing the inheritance would seem to apply to a Hindu widow; and it is obvious that there would be the greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding heirs were not bound by the decree fairly and properly obtained against the widow." In - 'Ranee Surnomoyee v. Maharajah Sutteeschunder Roy', 2 Suth WR 13 (PC) (P), a similar view had prevailed and the rule in Katamanatchier's case (O), was affirmed by the Privy Council in - 'Pertab Narain Singh v. Trilokinath Singh', 11 Cal 186 (PC) (Q); - 'Hari Nath v. Mothur Mohun', 21 Cal 8 (PC) (R) and in - 'Risal Singh v. Balvant Singh', AIR 1918 PC 87 (S). The case law was reviewed in a Division Bench case by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee in - 'Pramatha Nath v. Bhuban Mohan', AIR 1922 Cal 321 (T) and the learned Judge observed that the principle of res judicata has been applied rightly by the Courts so as to bind reversioners by decisions in litigation, fairly and honestly conducted, given for or against Hindu females who represented the estate, although they had only a qualified right of alienation. In other words, it is well settled now that the reversioner is bound by the decision against the female heir in her representative capacity. The right of a reversioner to impeach an alienation of property by a qualified Hindu female owner and his right to impeach an adoption by a Hindu widow rest in essence on identical ground, viz. the necessity to protect the reversionery interest, and, in both the cases the presumptive reversioner occupies a representative position. The right of a reversioner to impeach an alienation of property by a qualified Hindu female owner and his right to impeach an adoption by a Hindu widow rest in essence on identical ground, viz. the necessity to protect the reversionery interest, and, in both the cases the presumptive reversioner occupies a representative position. In a five Judges Full Bench case - 'Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chirvolu Perrazu', 29 Mad 390 (U), however, the view was expressed that though the right to impeach an alienation and the right to question the adoption rest upon the same basis, yet there is little in common between what disposes of one's whole life such as an adoption, and what relates to mere transfers of items of property. The vital distinction between the two classes of cases should therefore be kept in mind, and, it was added that the grave and important nature of disputes relating to adoptions makes it desirable that the adjudication in such cases should be made final as far as possible. It was therefore suggested in that case that where the presumptive reversioner, or with the permission of the Court, a more remote reversioner brings such a suit, the Court ought to require him to disclose the names of other persons interested in the reversion and direct notices to be served on them, to enable them to be made parties, should they do desire. In my opinion, though notices to other reversioners are not necessary for the validity of the proceedings, yet they may be issued ex abundanti cautela. 8. In the present case, the judgment of the learned District Judge does not indicate whether there are other reversioners in this case. Though there is no doubt that the suit as framed was clearly maintainable and could have been decreed if it had been proved that there was absence of an absolute testamentary disposition and that the plaintiff was the nearest reversioner. The learned trial Court has, however, not decided issue 7 and has not expressed any opinion on the question whether the plaintiff is the nearest reversioner, and, under these circumstances, in our judgment, the suit could not have been decreed. In this view of the matter the case will have to be sent back for determination of this issue which is essential for the disposal of the case. 9. In this view of the matter the case will have to be sent back for determination of this issue which is essential for the disposal of the case. 9. The next question is about the will of the late Kunwar Shambhu Singh which is dated 16-6-1928. Issue 5 was : whether the will dated 16-6-28 is valid and lawful? The learned Additional District Judge did not consider this issue to be necessary and has again not expressed any opinion on the point. In dealing with issues 3 and 4 i.e. whether the property in possession of the defendants was the self-acquired property of Shambhu Singh and whether he was entitled to dispose of it by a will, the learned Judge has expressed the opinion that only the movable property was the self-acquired property of Shambhu Singh while the immovable one was not his self-acquired property and that so far as the movable property was concerned the will was valid. The learned District Judge has, however, not given any clear reason for holding this view and it is not clear how he arrived at this conclusion. The approach to the question raised in this suit by the learned trial Court does not appear to be the correct one. The main question was: whether the plaintiff has any right of reversion to any property left by the deceased? There has also been some confusion about the term 'self acquired property'. As Mulla observes on page 263 of his Hindu Law (11th Edition), "In practice the expression 'self-acquired property' is used as referring to property acquired by a Hindu by his own exertions without the assistance of family funds." But in law there is no substantial difference between 'separate property' which is property acquired in one of the nine ways detailed in S.230 (page 262-263) of the learned author's treatise on Hindu Law, and 'self-acquired property'; both being subject to the incident mentioned in S.222; i.e., "the acquirer can make a gift of it, or bequeath it by will to any person he likes". The question in this case is : whether the property acquired from the money obtained in maintenance can be called to be separate property of the acquirer? If it can be so called, it can be disposed of by a will and the plaintiff can have no objection to the will. The question in this case is : whether the property acquired from the money obtained in maintenance can be called to be separate property of the acquirer? If it can be so called, it can be disposed of by a will and the plaintiff can have no objection to the will. If, however, it cannot be called separate property it cannot be bequeathed and so the next question to be determined in this suit was whether the property of Shambhu Singh was separate or not? In - 'Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi', AIR 1945 FC 25 (V), the observation of the Federal Court was to the effect that the expression "separate property" may be antithesis of the other three expressions viz. "ancestral property", "coparcenary property", and "joint family property". This observation was made while explaining implications of S. 3(1), Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, and so does not seem to apply to the facts of this case. 10. In my opinion, if the contention of the plaintiff is that the property which is acquired from money obtained from the Jagir in maintenance belongs to the Jagir and cannot be considered to be separate property of Shambhu Singh and must come back to the Jagir after his death, in that case a declaration was unnecessary. The plaintiff should have filed a suit on that basis and should have prayed for recovery of possession of the property which was considered by him to be Jagir's property. If he was of opinion that the will of Shambhu Singh D/-16-6-28 stood in his way, in that case he ought to have prayed for setting aside of that will. In - 'Tacoordeen Tewarry v. Ali Hossein Khan', 21 Suth WR 340 (2) (PC) (W), and - 'Joy Narain Giree v. Grish Chunder Mytee', 22 Suth WR 438 (X), it has been held that where a plaintiff asks to have a deed or will set aside there is a prayer for substantive relief and such plaint cannot come under the Court-fees Act Sch. II, Art.17 cl.3; but must be stamped according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit. II, Art.17 cl.3; but must be stamped according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit. The effect of the widow setting up a will giving her power to adopt has been held to challenge the absolute right of the plaintiff to succeed on her death if he survives her and to convert him in the language of English law from an heir-apparent into an heir presumptive -'Somayya v. Annapurnamma', AIR 1919 Mad 93(1) (Y). So it has been held that a suit to set aside such a will is maintainable under S.42, Specific Relief Act. AIR 1919 Mad 93(1) (Y); - 'Padmanabjudu v. Buchamma', AIR 1919 Mad 793 (Z); - 'Latchamma v. Appanna', AIR 1921 Mad 710 (Z1) and - 'Muthukrishna Mudaliar v. Harinaraya Mudaliar', AIR 1927 Mad 785 (Z2). The Privy Council had observed in - 'Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho', 1 All 688 (PC) (Z3), that a right to come to the Court to have a document or act which obstructs the title of enjoyment of property cancelled or set aside would be sufficient to sustain a declaratory decree. But, in my opinion, there must first be a prayer in the plaint to that effect. In the absence of a prayer to that effect the question about the genuineness of the will cannot be inquired into. The Court below can however consider whether the plaint can, at this stage, be amended, if the plaintiff so desires, to include such a relief. But in the absence of such a prayer, in my judgment, the will of the late Shambhu Singh cannot be impeached in an indirect way in a suit for declaration that the adoption was invalid. The only thing that can be seen is whether the late Shambhu Singh at the time of his death had full disposing power over the property which had been bequeathed by him in favour of his wife. It is well settled that the right to dispose of property by will is predicated on ownership and a person cannot give by will more than what he owns at that time. So if the property left by Shambhu Singh is found to be his separate or self acquired property, suit must fail. It is well settled that the right to dispose of property by will is predicated on ownership and a person cannot give by will more than what he owns at that time. So if the property left by Shambhu Singh is found to be his separate or self acquired property, suit must fail. The widow of Shambhu Singh must then be deemed to have taken an absolute estate on the death of her husband and her act in adopting a boy to her deceased husband cannot be challenged. 11. In order to avoid any misunderstanding on the point I think that it may be further made clear that it is only to decide the main question relating to the reversionary interest of the plaintiff in any property left behind by Shambhu Singh that we have to see whether the will included any property which was not the separate property or self-acquired property of Kunwar Shambhu Singh. If the plaintiff cannot prove that he has the right of reversion to any substantial portion of the property, which is the subject-matter of this suit, the Court will not be entitled to go at all into the question relating to the validity of the adoption of Suraj Singh appellant. Even if the plaintiff proves his right as reversionary only to a very small portion of the subject-matter of the suit that may again disentitle him to a declaratory decree. As the Privy Council observed in - 'Pirthi Pal Kunwar v. Guman Kunwar', 17 Ind App 107 (PC) (Z4), it is discretionary with a Court to refuse a declaratory decree with regard to the circumstances of the case. A Court has to bear in mind that it is not to make a declaration of an abstract right exclusive of practical utility especially when that declaration may not be productive of any benefit to the party obtaining the declaration - 'Rajkesh-war Singh v. Shyam Bihari Singh', AIR 1927 Pat 286 (Z5). A Court has to bear in mind that it is not to make a declaration of an abstract right exclusive of practical utility especially when that declaration may not be productive of any benefit to the party obtaining the declaration - 'Rajkesh-war Singh v. Shyam Bihari Singh', AIR 1927 Pat 286 (Z5). As Sheshagiri Aiyar J. observed in - 'Naganna v. Sivanappa', AIR 1915 Mad 348 (Z6), whenever a cloud is cast on the title of a plaintiff, he is entitled to come to Court under S.42, but it was pointed out by the same learned Judge in AIR 1919 Mad 793 (Z), that in many instances, the apprehended danger or the cloud on the title may be of such a shadowy character and so flimsy that the Court in its discretion might refuse to grant the relief prayed for; but that is no ground for saying that the suit is not maintainable. In fact as Varadachariar J. pointed out in AIR 1936 Mad 605 (A)', in dealing with the declaratory suits, the Courts have in recent years laid stress not so much on the question of their maintainability as that on the propriety and utility of questioning relief by way of declaration. So it is only when the Court finds that appellant (widow of Kunwar Shambhu Singh) had only a limited interest in the property left by her husband and that the plaintiff is the nearest reversioner that the question relating to the validity of adoption can be inquired into and if found that the adoption was invalid then a declaratory decree can be given in this case. The question whether a particular property left by Shambhu Singh should, after his death, revert to the plaintiff's Jagir is a question relating to the laws or rules governing Jagirs and merely on that footing no relief can be granted in this case. The question of reversion of property to the Jagir should not be confused with the question relating to the interest of a reversioner in Hindu law. The learned trial Court seems to have fallen into error on account of this confusion and its judgment cannot be sustained. The question of reversion of property to the Jagir should not be confused with the question relating to the interest of a reversioner in Hindu law. The learned trial Court seems to have fallen into error on account of this confusion and its judgment cannot be sustained. The plaintiff in this suit clearly wants a declaration as to the limited nature of the title of the widow to certain properties left by her husband and to which she sets up an absolute title under the will of June 1928. There is no doubt that such a suit is maintainable (Vide 'Surayya v. Subbamma', AIR 1920 Mad 361 (Z7)). The main question which the trial Court ought to have determined was whether the first appellant had a limited or an absolute estate, and, in this connection, in our opinion, the findings of the trial Court on Issue 7 as well as on Issue 5 were necessary for the disposal of this case, and, in the absence of findings on these issues, the suit could not have been decreed. 12. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court, and, remit the case back for disposal according to law and in the light of observations made above. Costs will abide the result of the suit. 13. SHINDE, C.J.: I agree. Appeal allowed and case remanded.