Order.- The petitioner is the owner of certain lands in Tanjore district. He had usufructuarily mortgaged those lands, an extent of 11 acres and odd, to a railway guard who, in his turn, leased out the properties to the first respondent, hereinafter known as the respondent for a period of four years, the term of which lease expired on 2oth March, 1953. During the pendency of that lease the usufructuary mortgagee died. His widow, as his legal representative, renewed the lease for a further period of two years, expiring in 1955. The application before the Conciliation Officer was under section 13 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannayal Protection Act, 1952, regarding the extent of 11 acres 31½ cents on the ground that the present respondent was a cultivating tenant on 1st December, 1951 and as such entitled to be in possession of the land for a period of five years as a lessee. It was opposed by the petitioner herein on the ground that since the extent is less than 3 velis or 20 acres of dry land, not irrigated from any Government source, the Act would not apply to such a holding under section 3(6) of the Act. The Conciliation Officer found that in addition to this 11 acres 31½ cents of dry land, another extent of 10 acres 1 cent comprised in T.S. No.24 which belongs to a Sahabsa Thaikal and of which the petitioner is a hereditary trustee is in his enjoyment and therefore the land held by the landowner is more than 3 velis of dry land. On that finding the Conciliation Officer held that the tenant was entitled to remain in possession of the 11 acres 31½ cents of land until he is legally evicted by the landowner under section 10(2) of the Act. The landowner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Court which was dismissed by that tribunal and hence this application to quash the orders of the lower tribunal. Admittedly the landowner possesses 11 acres 31½ cents of land, but the question is whether the land of which he is a hereditary trustee to the extent of 10 acres 1 cent is held by him. Admittedly the landowner possesses 11 acres 31½ cents of land, but the question is whether the land of which he is a hereditary trustee to the extent of 10 acres 1 cent is held by him. Section 3, clause (b) of the Act, is in the following terms: “The provisions of this Act shall not apply in respect of the land held by a landowner in any village if the land held by him in such village does not exceed one veli (6 2/3 acres) which is either wet land or dry land irrigated from any Government source, or 3 velies (20 acres) of dry land not irrigated from any Government source”. If a trustee is in possession and enjoyment of properties over which he has no absolute or beneficial rights, but his claim is only to possess and enjoy the same as a trustee for the benefit of the trust, then can it be said that such land is held by the trustee? There are no decided cases on the point and the decision must depend mainly on first impression and apriori reasoning. In Article 19(1)(f) of our Constitution it is stated that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. The word “hold” in that clause has been the subject of decision in a few cases. In Santhanakrishna Odayar v. Vaithilingam1, a Bench of this Court discussing the validity of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannayal (Protection) Ordinance, states that the expression “to hold property” has been interpreted as meaning “to enjoy property”. If the right to hold property means the right to enjoy property, then it is argued that there must be ownership as a necessary prerequisite for enjoyment. Another decision to which my attention was drawn is reported in Iswari Prosad v. N.R. Sen2. The Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in that case also takes the view that the right to hold property includes the right to enjoy property. It is also stated therein that the rights of enjoyment are part of a person’s rights to hold the property. Therefore “holding property” connotes a higher right than mere enjoyment of property. If there is any interference with the enjoyment of property, it is tantamount to interference with holding property. But from this decision also one can say that holding is not merely enjoyment but something more. Therefore “holding property” connotes a higher right than mere enjoyment of property. If there is any interference with the enjoyment of property, it is tantamount to interference with holding property. But from this decision also one can say that holding is not merely enjoyment but something more. There is a more elaborate discussion of the meaning of the word “hold” found in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution in a decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Manohar Ramkrishna v. G.G. Desai3. At page 36 we find the following observation:- The word ‘hold’ has several meanings one of which is no doubt ‘possess’ but then it also means be the owner of property’ .... Taken in the context of the preceding word ‘acquire’ and that of the following words ‘ dispose of it seems that the word ‘ hold ‘ can have no other meaning than ‘own’ or ‘be the owner of." In Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others1, this word has come in for a good lot of discussion. It was argued there that the word " hold " qualifies and includes " enjoyment of the benefits that are ordinarily attached to the ownership of property " and any restriction on such enjoyment would be an infringement of the fundamental rights. On the facts of that particular case, their Lordships came to the conclusion that there was no such restriction. It is clear from these authorities that though the enjoyment of certain property is one of the incidents or ingredients constituting some of the bundle of rights flowing from holding property, still if a person has merely the right of enjoyment, it would not be correct to say that he holds property. At page 1324 of Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Third edition, Volume II, the various meanings of the word " hold " are given. In Volume II of Roland Burrowe, Words and Phrases at page 473, it is stated as to how the word "hold" has been understood in legal parlance. In my opinion the phrase "land held by a landowner " certainly has reference to land over which the landowner has ownership and not land which he holds in a fiduciary or other capacity. In my opinion the phrase "land held by a landowner " certainly has reference to land over which the landowner has ownership and not land which he holds in a fiduciary or other capacity. This is made clear by the definition of the word "landowner" in section 2(g) of the Act, as meaning the owner or other person deriving rights under him, who lets land for cultivation by a tenant, and including the assignees, heirs or other legal representatives of such owner or person deriving rights under him. If a person is in possession of property which belongs to another in a different capacity than that of owner, such as a trustee, or a guardian of an infant or committee of a lunatic, then he cannot be said to hold property. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that in Exhibit R-2 the petitioner himself has treated this property as his own in dealing with it. On a reading of that document it is found that though in one place the petitioner states that the property is his own, in another place his enjoyment of the same as trust property is also mentioned. Nothing therefore turns upon Ex. R-2. But in Ex. R-3, the proceedings of the Collector, by which an application for loan was rejected, the Collector makes it clear that the property is trust property of a mosque of which the petitioner is only a hereditary trustee with a limited interest and over which he has no right to dispose or sell. It was on that ground that the application for the loan was rejected. It is further contended that if the property is wakf, even then it may be that the petitioner may have a beneficial or a personal interest in. the property. But no such point seems to have been taken in any of the tribunals below. In the view which I take that property enjoyed by a trustee, guardian of a minor or committee of a lunatic cannot be considered to be land held by the landowner as contemplated by section 3(b) of the Act, the order of the lower Courts concluding that the petitioner holds more than three velis of dry land cannot be justified, and they are therefore quashed. There will be no order as to costs in this petition. R.M. ----- Order quashed.