JUDGMENT : NEWASKAR, J. Petitioner Shantilal Chaudhary, an Advocate of Rajgarh and opponents Nos.1 to 6 were nominated as candidates in the last general elections for the general seat prescribed for constituency No.48 for Madhya Bharat Legislative Assembly. Out of these 7 candidates opponents Nos.4, 5 and 6 withdrew their candidature and opponent No.1 Raghurajsing Dashrathsingh was declared elected after contest. 2. On 22-4-1952 petitioner submitted an election petition under S.80, Representation of the People Act calling in question opponent No.1's election on the ground that the same had been procured by the commission of 'major corrupt practices etc' This was received in the office of Election Commissioner on 25-4-1952. The petition was accompanied by Schs.A to G containing the particulars of these corrupt and illegal practices. 3. The Election Commission by their Secretary's letter dated 21-5-1952 called upon the petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed under S.85 of the Act as Schs.A to G referred to above had not been duly verified as provided by S.83(2). 4. The petitioner thereupon submitted verification to all the aforesaid Schedules by getting them typed on a single sheet of paper. The Election Commission then admitted the petition and forwarded the same to the Election Tribunal for trial on merits. 5. The Election Tribunal thereupon fixed on 20-9-1952 as the date for hearing the petition which was later adjourned to 22-10-1952 and on this date opponent Raghurajsingh and opponent Kailashnarayan in their written statement raised a preliminary objection that the Schs.A to G were not verified as required by law and the petition was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 6. After hearing arguments on this objection the Tribunal by its order dated 1-12-1952 held that the Schedules could be permitted to be verified even at that stage and accordingly granted permission to 'add to several Schedules necessary verifications i.e. to verify every single Schedule'. In compliance with this leave the petitioner filed several pieces of paper each containing verification in respect of each of the Schedules without actually appending verification underneath each of the Schedules. These several loose sheets were ordered to be filed by the order of the Chairman dated 7-11-1951. 7. On 28-11-1952 respondent 1 repeated his objection that the Schedules were still not duly verified and hence the allegations of fact contained in them could not be adjudicated upon. 8. These several loose sheets were ordered to be filed by the order of the Chairman dated 7-11-1951. 7. On 28-11-1952 respondent 1 repeated his objection that the Schedules were still not duly verified and hence the allegations of fact contained in them could not be adjudicated upon. 8. This objection was upheld by the Tribunal after hearing arguments on the point by its order dated 28-11-52. 9. The present petition under Art.227 of the Constitution is directed against this order of the Tribunal. 10. The main contention raised by the learned counsel Mr. S.R. Joshi for the petitioner is that the view of the Tribunal that it was essential to append the verification underneath each individual Schedule is manifestly erroneous and has resulted in obvious miscarriage of justice because the petitioner now, if the decision of the Tribunal stands, will be wholly prevented from proving the allegations of facts contained in the Schedules aforesaid. 11. Before considering the correctness or otherwise of the view of the Tribunal on this question of verification, we shall have first to see whether the decision such as this can very well be assailed by resorting to power of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution. 12. The question with regard to the meaning and scope of Art.227 of the Constitution has been subject of consideration both before the Supreme Court and High Courts of States including this Court. 13. In - 'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee', AIR 1951 Cal 193 (A) it has been held that 'Superintendence' does not vest the High Court with unlimited power to correct all species of hardship. The word has gathered legal force and signification. It does not involve responsibility of the superintending tribunal for correctness of the decision of inferior Courts either in fact or in law. 14. If the inferior Court, after hearing the parties, comes to an erroneous decision, on a matter within its jurisdiction the Court having power of superintendence never interferes. 15. The only mode of questioning the propriety of such a decision is by way of an appeal where one is provided or not at all. 16. 14. If the inferior Court, after hearing the parties, comes to an erroneous decision, on a matter within its jurisdiction the Court having power of superintendence never interferes. 15. The only mode of questioning the propriety of such a decision is by way of an appeal where one is provided or not at all. 16. The general superintendence conferred by this Constitutional provision over all jurisdictions subject to appeals, involves a duty to keep them within bounds of their authority, to see that they do, what their duty requires them to do and that they do it in a legal manner. 17. In - 'D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee', AIR 1953 SC 58 (B) Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. has remarked: "Unless there is any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for an intervention, it is not for the High Court under Art.226 or 227 of the Constitution to interfere." 18. In - 'Jamuna Prasad v. Lachhiram', AIR 1953 Madh B 197 (C) a Division Bench of this Court has considered this question. The judgment in this case was given by Dixit J. with which the learned Chief Justice concurred. In this decision following words of Lord Esher M.R. in - 'R. v. Income-tax Special Purposes Commr.', (1888) 21 QBD 313 (D) were quoted with approval: "When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain thing, it shall have jurisdiction to do such thing, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. But there is another state of things which may exist. The Legislature may entrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were so to decide without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." In Para.14 of the judgment the learned Judge further on held: "The law to be gathered from the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the opponents - 'Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi', AIR 1952 SC 319 (E) and - 'Parry and Co. Ltd. Dara House, Madras v. Commercial Employees Association Madras', AIR 1952 SC 179 (F) and especially from the English cases referred to above, is that, if a certain state of facts has to exist before an inferior Tribunal has jurisdiction to do certain things, the Tribunal must, to enable itself to obtain jurisdiction, find that those facts exist. The Tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on them and the Superior Court may by means of proceedings for certiorari, inquire into the correctness of the decision. The decision as to those facts is collateral because, though the existence of jurisdiction depends thereon, it is not the main question which the Tribunal has to decide. The Tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on them and the Superior Court may by means of proceedings for certiorari, inquire into the correctness of the decision. The decision as to those facts is collateral because, though the existence of jurisdiction depends thereon, it is not the main question which the Tribunal has to decide. If on the other hand the Tribunal is given jurisdiction to determine certain facts and those facts form a part of the very issue which the Tribunal has to decide and the Act constituting the Tribunal gives it the power to come to a final decision on that matter then the decision of the Tribunal cannot be treated as one going to its jurisdiction and cannot, therefore, be questioned in any Court." 19. The ratio decidendi of these cases is that where there is any grave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law or where the Court or Tribunal failed to act within bounds of its authority or contrary to the provisions of law prescribing the mode of its acting and which has materially affected its decision the High Court might interfere to remedy obvious error or grave injustice. It may also interfere where machinery of law has been harnessed 'fraudulently' by a party to achieve his end or the Court or the Tribunal has acted contrary to the principles of natural justice. But it certainly cannot be exercised where the effect of such interference would be practically to exercise powers of an appellate Court when in fact no appeal is provided. Nor can it be exercised on the ground that the order or decision is erroneous on merits. 20. Applying these tests to the present case it is clear that it is for the Election Tribunal to determine whether the forms of Schedules attached to the election petition fulfil the legal requirements of the Act under which the Tribunal acts. That is the very issue which the Tribunal has to determine before proceeding further to determine, the issues involved in the petition and the reply thereof on merits. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not depend upon the facts whether the Schedules are properly verified or not but is independent of it. That is the very issue which the Tribunal has to determine before proceeding further to determine, the issues involved in the petition and the reply thereof on merits. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not depend upon the facts whether the Schedules are properly verified or not but is independent of it. The Legislature in giving the Tribunal power to dismiss the petition for failure of the petitioner to supply Schedules duly verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure has empowered the Tribunal to determine whether the Schedules are duly verified or not and while in so doing even if it arrived at an erroneous decision it could not be said to have acted in a manner calling for the interference by the High Court in exercise of its powers of superintendence as in that (case?) it would be acting as a Court of appeal to correct errors of law. 21. It is contended by Mr. Joshi that if it is assumed that the view of the Tribunal is incorrect then there is no remedy to avoid the harm and the injury is substantial and material. He further submitted that grave injustice in this case will result by reason of a technical view of the matter involved which is erroneous inasmuch as a party will be entirely shut out and prevented from proving the corrupt practices relied upon in the petition. 22. I have anxiously considered these submissions but I feel having regard to the settled law bearing on the question as discussed above, our interfering will only be tantamount to one for correcting an error of law and nothing more. All erroneous decisions in a way affect adversely one or the other of the parties. The circumstances giving rise to the present state of things were brought about by the petitioner himself. 23. The result is that the present petition for exercise of powers of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution cannot be entertained. It is accordingly dismissed with costs to opponents Nos.1 and 5.Counsel's fee to be taxed at Rs.50/-. 24. SHINDE, C.J. :- I agree.