Rajamannar, C.J.- The main question in. this second appeal is one of limitation. It came up in the first instance before Satyanarayana Rao, J., who directed that it may be posted before a Bench. The plaintiff who is the first respondent in the second appeal brought a suit inter alia to recover a sum of Rs. 3,960 from defendants 1 to 6 in the following circumstances: In execution of the decree in O.S. No.216 of 1931 in the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Kollegal, against defendants 1 to 5 and their father, the plaintiff’s father purchased the suit properties comprising six items on 19th September, 1935. But due to the pendency of various proceedings subsequent to the sale, the order of confirmation was not passed till 21st December, 1943. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s father took delivery of items 2, 3, 4 and 6 on 24th December, 1943, and of items 1 and 5 on 9th January, 1944. The plaintiff’s father died on 12th March, 1945. On 26th November, 1946, the plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of the profits of the several items from the date of the sale in execution, that is, from 19th September, 1935. The 6th defendant claimed to be the lessee of item 4. He pleaded that his lessors, i.e., defendants 1 to 5 and their father were borrowing money for their expenses from him and periodically the rent due by him was being adjusted against the amounts advanced by him. He, therefore, stated that he was not liable for the suit claim. He also raised the plea of limitation. The main issue was "Whether the suit is in time? " The learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore who tried the suit held that t he suit was in time under Article 120 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act as regards profits received by the defendants before the date of the confirmation of the sale and under Article 109 as regards profits subsequent to the sale. He found that there was no proof that the 6th defendant paid rent to the judgment-debtors. He, therefore, passed a decree against the 6th defendant for a sum of Rs.2,970 in respect of item 4. The 6th defendant appealed to the District Court. The learned District Judge took the same view as the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation and dismissed the appeal. He, therefore, passed a decree against the 6th defendant for a sum of Rs.2,970 in respect of item 4. The 6th defendant appealed to the District Court. The learned District Judge took the same view as the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation and dismissed the appeal. "Hence this second appeal by the 6th defendant. Mr.R. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that Article 109 applied to the case and the suit was barred except in respect of profits which accrued within three years before suit. That article runs thus: "Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For the profits of immoveable property, belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant. Three years When the profits are received." He contended that though the Court sale was confirmed only on 21st December, 1943, yet by virtue of the provision of section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code, the property shall be deemed to have vested in him, the purchaser, from the time when the property was sold and not from the time when the sale became absolute. So, when the sale was confirmed on 21st December, 1943, the property must be deemed to have belonged to the plaintiff’s predecessor from 19th September, 1935. As the property must be deemed to have belonged to the plaintiff, he was entitled also to the profits thereof from that date. Therefore, if the defendant received such profits, it must be held that he received them wrongfully. According to him all the conditions necessary for the application of the Article are fulfilled in this case, and as the time from which the period begins to run is the date on which the profits are received the suit was barred except in respect of profits received within the period of limitation, namely, three years. He relied on two decisions of the Calcutta High Court which related to the same subject-matter, viz., Nagendra Math Pal v. Sarat Kamini Dasi1 and Sarat Kamini Dasi v. Nagendra Math Pal2. He relied on two decisions of the Calcutta High Court which related to the same subject-matter, viz., Nagendra Math Pal v. Sarat Kamini Dasi1 and Sarat Kamini Dasi v. Nagendra Math Pal2. The facts were that in a suit brought by the purchaser at a mortgage sale against a person in whose favour the mortgagor had granted a usufructuary mortgage after the passing of the mortgage decree, it was held that the usufructuary mortgage was void as against the purchaser, owing to the application of the rule of lis pendens. The purchaser in that suit also claimed to recover from the usufructuary mortgagee the rents realised by the latter from tenants of the property before the plaintiff obtained possession under his purchase. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the profits could not be said to have been wrongfully received by the defendants at the time they were received because at that time he claimed to realise them as usufructuary mortgagee. This contention was overruled on the ground that the usufructuary mortgage was invalid against the plaintiff and “the words ‘wrongfully received’ in Article 109 include receipt of profits that cannot legally be substantiated”. The decision in Peary Mohan Roy v. Khelaram Sarkar1) was relied on. In that case, Article 109 was held to be the proper article to apply to a suit instituted by the owner of a patni for recovery of profits from the defendant who had purchased the patni at a sale and was in possession under that purchase which was subsequently set aside. The learned Judges, following this case, held that in respect of the profits received beyond three years before suit the suit was barred by time. They remanded the case to the lower appellate Court for findings upon evidence as to what portion of the profits was received within and what beyond three years before suit. The plaintiff’s predecessors purchased the properties in execution of the mortgage decree on 6th May, 1913. The judgment-debtor applied to have the sale set aside, but that application was eventually dismissed. Owing to the pendency of this application, the sale was not confirmed until 28th January, 1914. It was during the pendency of these proceedings that the usufructuary mortgage had been created. The judgment-debtor applied to have the sale set aside, but that application was eventually dismissed. Owing to the pendency of this application, the sale was not confirmed until 28th January, 1914. It was during the pendency of these proceedings that the usufructuary mortgage had been created. The plaintiffs instituted the suit on 16th September, 1916, for recovery of the profits realised by the defendant after the date of the Court sale. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that even if a portion of the profits had been received beyond three years of suit, the running of limitation had been suspended till the date of confirmation owing to the pendency of proceedings to set aside the sale. The learned District Judge to whom the case was remanded held that the proceedings to set aside the sale did not operate in law to suspend the running of the statute. Against this decision there was again an appeal to the High Court. The decision of the High Court in the subsequent appeal is reported in Sarat Kamini Dasi v. Nagendra Math Pal2. It was decided by Walmsley, J. and Mukerji, J., that limitation did not remain suspended between the date of sale and the date of the confirmation. Time had begun to run under Article 109 from the dates of the receipt of the profits. The entire discussion proceeded on the assumption that Article 109 applied and indeed it had been decided by the same Court at a prior stage of the case that Article 109 applied-and all that the learned Judges were called upon to consider at the subsequent stage was whether there was any period during which time ceased to run. If Article 109 applied, we are in entire agreement with the principle of this decision. If Article 109 applied, we are in entire agreement with the principle of this decision. We are unable however to fully comprehend what exactly Walmsley, J., had in mind when he observed: “Thirdly, although I can easily imagine events which would have produced an interval of full three years between the date of sale and the date of confirmation, I do not think it necessary to speculate on what our decision would have been in such circumstances, for in this case the judgment-debtor’s application caused a delay of only seven or eight months, and the plaintiff after receiving the sale certificate allowed more than two and a half years to pass without doing anything.” The ruling in Dullabhbhai Hansji v. Gulabchand Rupaji3, was also relied on by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. In that case, an insolvency Court set aside on 13th March, 1929, a sale by the insolvent which had taken place on 14th March, 1925. On 6th March, 1931, the receiver in insolvency brought a suit to recover from the alienees the mesne profits for the years 1925 to 1928. It was held that the suit was barred as to profits received more than three years before the institution of the suit, applying Article 109. The learned Judges assumed without any discussion that Article 109 applied to the case and the only point discussed was whether the starting point of limitation could be postponed to the date on which the sale was set aside. The learned Judges held that it could not, because under Article 109 the starting point was not the date on which the cause of action arose but the date when the profits were received. Mr. Raghavarama Sastri, counsel for the plaintiff respondent, contended on the other hand that Article 120 was the proper article to apply inasmuch as it could not be said that the defendants received the profits wrongfully until the date of the confirmation of sale. He admitted that by reason of section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code the title would date from the date of sale and, therefore, the purchaser would be entitled to the profits of the property from the date of the sale. But that fact alone would not render the receipt of the profits by the judgment-debtor till the confirmation of the sale wrongful. But that fact alone would not render the receipt of the profits by the judgment-debtor till the confirmation of the sale wrongful. In support of his contention, he relied upon the well-established rule that till the confirmation of sale the auction-purchaser has only an inchoate right in and to the property and on the incidents which flow from this position, namely, that an auction-purchaser cannot maintain a suit for possession till confirmation of sale and until that date a lessee of the property could properly pay the rent due thereon to the judgment-debtor. We agree with the contention of Mr. Raghavarama Sastri that Article 109 has no application to this case. The position of a purchaser at a Court auction in execution, whether it be the decree-holder himself or a stranger, between the date of sale and the date of confirmation of sale, has been discussed in several decisions. In Arunachala v. Vadla1, Satyanarayana Rao, J., if we may say so with respect, correctly described it thus: “The position of a purchaser after the sale and before the confirmation is that he has only 3 sort of inchoate interest, which might become a vested interest in the property after confirmation ......It has been established by decisions that before confirmation the judgment-debtor’s interest in the property could be attached and sold even by another creditor, i.e., his interest is not defeated and does not become vested in the auction-purchaser until there is a confirmation order. The confirmation order therefore has got a double operation of diverting the judgment-debtor of his title in the property and vesting it retrospectively in the auction-purchaser, to take effect from the date of the sale.” An auction-purchaser has a right of possession not from the date of sale but from the date of the confirmation of the sale because he can only get into possession after a sale certificate has been issued as provided by Order 21, rule 94 and not a moment earlier. Bhankumar Chand v. Lachmi Kant2. That is why Article 138 prescribes the starting point for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree as “the date when the sale becomes absolute”. Bhankumar Chand v. Lachmi Kant2. That is why Article 138 prescribes the starting point for a suit for possession by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree as “the date when the sale becomes absolute”. The corresponding article for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immoveable property at a sale in execution of a decree, namely, Article 180, also prescribes the starting point as the date when the sale becomes absolute. It follows as the result of this position of an auction-purchaser that the payment of rent by the lessee of the property to the judgment-debtor after the sale and before the date of the confirmation of the sale is quite proper, in spite of the fact that section 65, Civil Procedure Code, provides for a notional relation back so far as vesting of the title is concerned. Kondava Nayakar v. Ramaswami Naicker3. That the property even after sale but before confirmation must be deemed to be the property of the judgment-debtor is also evident from the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramakrishna Rao v. Chellayamma4. In our opinion, considerable light on the point is thrown by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Raghunandan Prasad Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa5, though that case related to assessment of income-tax. There, the assessee purchased property mortgaged to him at a Court sale in execution of a decree obtained by him on foot of the mortgage. One of the questions which arose in the assessment of income-tax in respect of the profits or gains arising to the assessee from the buying in of the mortgaged property was thus stated by the Commissioner of Income-tax: “If the profits or gains arising to the assessees from the buying in of mortgaged property are taxable, what is the date on which the profits are deemed to have arisen? Is it the date of the decree, the date of sale, the date of confirmation of sale, or the date of the delivery of possession?” Lord Macmillan, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Board, answered the question as follows: “The answer of the Commissioner and of the High Court was that the profits must be deemed to have arisen on the confirmation of the sales, i.e., on the 18th and 21st December, 1925, and their Lordships are of the same opinion. The decree is only a step towards realisation, and the date of the decree is therefore plainly not the date of realisation. Nor on the date of sale does the purchaser obtain an indefeasible right, for under Order 21, rules 89, 90 and 91, the sale may be set aside on various grounds. It is only where no application is made under these rules or where such application is made and disallowed that the Court under Order 21, rule 92 makes an order confirming the sale, whereupon ‘the sale shall become absolute’. It is then that the process of realisation is completed and any profit or income is realised by the decree-holder. This is so whether the property is purchased by the decree-holder himself or by a third party, for the right of set-off conferred on the purchasing decree-holder must also be dependent on the sale being rendered absolute by confirmation. No doubt section 65 of the Code provides that ‘where immoveable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute’, but this provision does not come into operation unless and until the sale has become absolute. The actual date of realisation is not affected by this retrospective vesting of the property.” We consider that the principle of this decision of the Privy Council would equally apply to the profits of the property sold. The fact that the suit is for recovery of the profits of immoveable property from a defendant who had been in possession of that property would not by itself attract the application of Article 109. The profits must have been wrongfully received, when they were received. There may be cases when a person in possession during a particular period may have to account for the profits during that period by virtue of a subsequent adjudication or agreement conferring a right on another person to the property from a time anterior to that period. In such cases, there may be a right to recover the profits during the period from the person in possession. But such profits might not have been wrongfully received during that period, in which case Article 109 would not apply. One of the decisions cited by Mr. In such cases, there may be a right to recover the profits during the period from the person in possession. But such profits might not have been wrongfully received during that period, in which case Article 109 would not apply. One of the decisions cited by Mr. Raghavarama Sastri illustrates this position. In Maharaja Kumar Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh v. Rai Bahadur Harihar Prasad Singh1, there was a compromise between the plaintiff and the defendant on 20th July, 1928, under which the plaintiff was entitled to all rents and profits accruing from 20th July, 1928, of certain properties. The defendant had as a matter of fact received the rent for a period subsequent to 20th July, 1928, in advance from the tenants before that date. The plaintiff sued to recover this amount from the defendant. It was held that Article 109 had no application to the suit, because the sum received by the defendant could not be said to have been “wrongfully received”, as it was received prior to 20th July. The decision of the Privy Council in Suryaprakasa Rao v. Maharaja of Pithapuram2is another instance in which it was held that rents and profits when received were not wrongfully received, though’ another person than the person who collected them became entitled to them, by reason of a subsequent adjudication. The facts in that case were that during the pendency of an appeal by the plaintiffs to the High Court from a decree pronounced in favour of the defendnat by the lower Court holding him entitled to succeed to a zemindari estate, the defendant applied to and was recognised by the Collector as the landholder of the estate for the purposes of the Madras Estates Land Act by an order dated 12th January, 1924, which entitled him to collect the rents and profits thereof. In pursuance of this order, the defendant entered into possession and collected the rents and profits. The litigation finally ended on 15th July, 1935, in favour of the plaintiffs, who were found by the Privy Council to be entitled to the estate. Thereon the Collector cancelled his prior order and recognised the plaintiffs as the landlords. In October, 1935, the plaintiffs brought a suit for the recovery of the rents and profits received by the defendant during the period of his possession from 12th January, 1924. Thereon the Collector cancelled his prior order and recognised the plaintiffs as the landlords. In October, 1935, the plaintiffs brought a suit for the recovery of the rents and profits received by the defendant during the period of his possession from 12th January, 1924. In was held by the Privy Council, affirming the decision of the High Court on this point, that Article 109 of the I Schedule to the Limitation Act was inapplicable to the case because the defendant had statutory authority for collecting the rents and profits during the period and his receipt of them was not wrongful. In the present case, during the period between the date of the Court sale and the date of the confirmation of the sale, the only person who was entitled to be in possession of the property sold and who was entitled to enjoy or to collect the rents and profits from the property was the judgment-debtor. Till the date of the confirmation, the auction-purchaser could not have sustained a suit either for possession or for mesne profits. Till that date, he had only an inchoate right. The receipt of the rents and profits during that period by the judgment-debtor cannot, therefore, be held to be wrongful. No doubt, because of the special provision in section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on confirmation, the title, might vest in the auction-purchaser retrospectively from the date of the sale. But that could not have the effect of rendering the prior receipt of rents and profits by the judgment-debtor, wrongful though the judgment-debtor would undoubtedly be under a liability to account to the auction-purchaser for the rents and profits during the period, Bhankumar Chand v. Lachmi Kant1. The analogy of a person in possession of property under a decree subsequently reversed on appeal is not apposite because in such a case the possession was always wrongful, in spite of an intermediate decision in favour of the person in possession. But in the case of a sale pending confirmation, the possession of the judgment-debtor before the confirmation is not wrongful because before that date the auction-purchaser himself would not be entitled to possession. The judgment-debtor, therefore, would not be keeping out a person entitled to possession. But in the case of a sale pending confirmation, the possession of the judgment-debtor before the confirmation is not wrongful because before that date the auction-purchaser himself would not be entitled to possession. The judgment-debtor, therefore, would not be keeping out a person entitled to possession. We hold that in the present case, there is no wrongful receipt of the rents and profits by the defendants at any time before the date of the confirmation of sale, and therefore Article 109 would have no application. If Article 109 does not apply, it is common ground that Article 120 would apply, which gives a period of six years from the date when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the right to sue for the profits of the entire period between the date of the sale and the date of confirmation accrued to the plaintiff only on the date of the confirmation of the sale. It cannot be said that the right to sue for the pro-fits of each year accrued at the end of that year. This point is concluded by the authority of the Privy Council in Suryaprakasa Rao v. Maharaja of Pithapuram2 already referred to. Their Lordships held, differing from the High Court, that the plaintiffs therein had no right of suit for the rents and profits till the prior order of the Collector recognising the defendant as landholder was cancelled in consequence of the decision of the Privy Council. It was only thereafter that a right of action to recover the rents and profits accrued to the plaintiffs. In the case before us, the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff only on the date of the confirmation of sale. In this view, the decision of the Courts below was right. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar next contended that in any event the appellant was not liable as he was only a tenant of the judgment-debtors and he had paid the rent for the material period to them in good faith. If this be a fact he would not be liable (vide Kondava Nayakar v. Ramaswami Naicker3.) The trial Judge however found that there was no proof that the appellant had paid any rent as such to the judgment-debtors. The case actually put forward by him was that he had advanced moneys to the judgment-debtors and the rents due by him were periodically adjusted towards the advances. The case actually put forward by him was that he had advanced moneys to the judgment-debtors and the rents due by him were periodically adjusted towards the advances. The appellant himself did not give evidence, nor did he produce his accounts. The trial Judge was perfectly justified in finding that he had not proved his case. In the lower appellate Court this point was apparently not pressed. In our opinion there is no substance in this plea. In the result the second appeal is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.