Judgment.- In a suit for recovery of certain money of the plaintiff alleged to have been deposited with the first defendant, the first defendant pleaded in his written statement that the money deposited with him was really the second defendant’s money and not the plaintiff’s and that as the money had been deposited on the understanding that the money was to be payable to the second defendant’s order, the first defendant had already obtained full discharge in respect of the obligation which the plaintiff sought to enforce by the adjustment of the said money between the second defendant and himself towards the debts due by the second defendant to the first defendant. There was thereafter an application made to the Court below to enable the first defendant to avail himself of the third-party procedure provided under Order 8-A of the Civil Procedure Code. The application having been rejected by the Court below, the first defendant has come up in revision to this Court. Mr. P.S. Chandrasekhara Ayyar, learned advocate for the petitioner, has contended in the first instance that the main reason given by the Court below for its order under revision is that the second defendant was already a party to the record and therefore the procedure prescribed by Order 8-A did not apply to the case. This, it is common ground before me, proceeds upon a mistake about what Order 8-A of the Civil Procedure Code provides; for, while where a person against whom a third-party procedure is sought to be availed of is not already a party to the record he has to be impleaded on an application to be made for that purpose, it does not, in my opinion, follow that the third-party procedure cannot be availed of as against a person already on record. This ground given by the learned Subordinate Judge in fact has not been supported or rather seriously supported by Mr. T. R. Srinivasan, learned advocate for the respondent, in view of Order 8-A, rule 8, of the Civil Procedure Code. The point pressed by Mr. This ground given by the learned Subordinate Judge in fact has not been supported or rather seriously supported by Mr. T. R. Srinivasan, learned advocate for the respondent, in view of Order 8-A, rule 8, of the Civil Procedure Code. The point pressed by Mr. Srinivasan, however, is that the application of the third-party procedure to the circumstances of this case is calculated to involve his client as well as the Court in embarrassment for the reason that that would result in the joinder of what substantially would be two suits between two different parties in one and the same trial and that it would also have the effect of prolonging the disposal of his own suit as against the first defendant which would without this application of the third-party procedure be a simple suit for recovery of money deposited with the first defendant in the name of his client. Learned counsel points out that the third-party procedure ought not to be applied by a Court ordinarily in cases where its application would have this effect. As pointed out by Venkataramana Rao, J., in Venkatakrishna Naidu v. Narayanaswami Iyer1, the considerations governing the application of the third-party procedure to any particular case are substantially similar to those considerations which influence the discretion of the Court in impleading parties under Order 1, rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Agreeing with this view of the matter which I myself expressed in the course of arguments, I am of opinion that what I have to see is whether the joinder of the claims in question, that is to say, between the first defendant and the second defendant on the one hand and the plaintiff and the first defendant on the other, would be so far improper if really they were claims litigated in two different suits separately instituted. Applying this test, as in my opinion a proper test applicable to the class of case before me, I am of opinion that this was pre-eminently a case in which the Court below ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of allowing the application of the first defendant. Applying this test, as in my opinion a proper test applicable to the class of case before me, I am of opinion that this was pre-eminently a case in which the Court below ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of allowing the application of the first defendant. As pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioner before me there is at least one common question which would arise as between the two claims which would get combined for trial if Order 8-A of the Civil Procedure Code were to be applied to the present case, viz., whether the moneys in question originally deposited by the second defendant belonged to the plaintiff or belonged to the second defendant or were merely placed in the name of the plaintiff with the first defendant. Were the suit of the respondent before me a suit on a negotiable instrument, different considerations might possibly arise. But all that Mr. Srinivasan, learned advocate for the respondent, has urged is that his simple suit for recovery of money on deposit with the first defendant would get enlarged in its scope by the addition to the record of the pleadings as between the first defendant and the second defendant and by the issues that might be consequential upon those pleadings. As I have already stated, that, in my opinoin, is not a ground for refusal of the application of Order 8-A of the Civil Procedure Code to a case otherwise appropriate. For the reasons given by me, it follows that this revision must be allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs so far as this Court is concerned. R.M. ----- Revision allowed.