Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of proceedings in execution of an eviction decree. The decree which was passed by the Court of the District Munsiff of Cochin on 9-2-1114 related to an item of immoveable property situate within the municipal limits of Mattancherry. The tenant had constructed three buildings thereon. As per the terms of the decree the decree-holder was entitled to recover possession of the holding together with past and future rent on payment of an amount of Rs. 245/- to the tenant towards value of improvements. This amount represented the value of the three buildings and other improvements. The decree allowed set-off of the amounts due by the tenant towards the value of improvements. As per an execution application (E. P. 704 of 1115) dated 30-3-1115 the decree-holder sought recovery of possession of the property and the court allowed delivery. Pursuant to the order the decree-holder obtained possession of the land and as for the buildings he said he did not press their delivery then. The execution petition was accordingly dismissed. Vide order dated 11-6-1115. The land was delivered on 18-4-1115. E. P. 704 of 1115 pursuant to which delivery of land was effected showed that after the set-off of the value of improvements the decree-holder had to obtain from the tenant Re. 5-7-10. Four subsequent execution petitions were thereafter filed by the decree-holder and the proceeding giving rise to this second appeal arose out of the objection raised to the fourth one viz., E. P. 1033 of 1122. By his objection petition - M. P. 1980 of 1122 - defendant 1 contended that under Proclamation XVI of 1122 (Cochin) the decree-holder was not entitled to obtain delivery of the buildings. The execution court upheld that objection and that was confirmed by the Temporary Additional District Judge of Anjikaimal who heard the decree-holder's appeal from the order of the execution court. Hence the second appeal by the decree-holder. 2. Throughout the decree-holder's contention has been that Proclamation XVI of 1122 had no application to the case in as much as the said Proclamation prevented only "the eviction from his holding of a verumpattomdar who has a house of his own in the holding and who or the members of whose family are residing therein". 2. Throughout the decree-holder's contention has been that Proclamation XVI of 1122 had no application to the case in as much as the said Proclamation prevented only "the eviction from his holding of a verumpattomdar who has a house of his own in the holding and who or the members of whose family are residing therein". The point of the contention was that when the execution court had allowed delivery of the holding to the decree-holder after satisfying itself that no amounts were due by him to the tenant the latter had lost his title to the buildings and that thereafter the buildings belonged to the decree-holder. This view-point did not find favour with the courts below and when the second appeal first came up for hearing the decree-holder obtained leave to raise an additional ground of appeal that the Proclamation was ultra vires the constitution of India. When the case was before the lower courts or when the second appeal was preferred there was no occasion to raise any such point as the Constitution came into force long afterwards. As the additional ground raised by the appellant related to a constitutional question the case was first referred to a Division Bench and afterwards to a Full Bench. However when the case came up before us the appellant's learned counsel stated that according to him the appeal must succeed on the merits and that he had taken the constitutional point only by way of abundant caution. We heard arguments on the merits and as we felt the appeal could be disposed of in favour of the decree-holder on the merits we did not hear arguments on the constitutional point. 3. To attract the application of Proclamation XVI of 1122 to the case the lower courts thought that it was enough if any portion of the decree subsisted. Such an approach is unwarranted by the terms of the Proclamation. It gives protection to a verumpattomdar who has a house of his own in the holding and who or the members of whose family are residing therein. The decree-holder does not dispute that the second requirement was satisfied here but his point is that the title to the buildings had long before the Proclamation passed to him. We cannot accept the view-point of the lower courts that the title will pass only with the delivery. The decree-holder does not dispute that the second requirement was satisfied here but his point is that the title to the buildings had long before the Proclamation passed to him. We cannot accept the view-point of the lower courts that the title will pass only with the delivery. No doubt, the delivery order was not made after notice to the defendants but they never raised a contention that the statement of accounts in the execution application was wrong or that under the terms of the decree any amount was due to them from the decree-holder when delivery was alleged and decree-holder got possession of the land. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the order dismissing E. P. 704 of 1115 is that the defendants were allowed to remain in the house by the decree-holder's leave and licence. That concession cannot postpone the passing of the title to the buildings to the decree-holder. After the order for delivery if the decree-holder had allowed the decree to get barred we could not think of any possible objection for him to bring a fresh suit to recover possession on the strength of his title nor could the defendants have effected a valid sale of the buildings after the said order. 4. That after the delivery of the land the defendants continued to live in the buildings by leave and licence of the decree-holder was their case itself at one time is further clear from an objection petition they filed on 4-1-1122 (M. P. 20 of 1122) before Proclamation XVI of 1122 (2-7-1122) was promulgated. In 1118 defendant 1 filed on original suit to restrain the execution of the decree and he succeeded in the court of first instance. The appellate court reversed that decision and the appellate court's decree was confirmed in second appeal. What the objection petition dated 4-1-1122 shows is that the defendants were allowed to continue in possession of the buildings under a fresh agreement. That was the basis of the original suit. 5. In the events that happened after the decree and before the promulgation of the Proclamation the defendants had lost title to the buildings and they are not therefore entitled to the benefits conferred by the Proclamation. Further, the defendants have no case that the title to the other improvements had not passed to the decree-holder. 5. In the events that happened after the decree and before the promulgation of the Proclamation the defendants had lost title to the buildings and they are not therefore entitled to the benefits conferred by the Proclamation. Further, the defendants have no case that the title to the other improvements had not passed to the decree-holder. By delivery of the land the integrity of the holding has been disturbed. As at present advised we are of the view that the Proclamation contemplates a case where the holding continues as such and not a case like the one before us where the decree-holder has obtained possession of a part of the holding. To hold otherwise would give rise to all sorts of complications regarding the adjustment of the rights of the parties with respect to the portion of the holding remaining undelivered. The proviso to the Proclamation expressly enables the court to give relief to landlords in respect of arrears of rent. Here the decree-holder has already set off the value of improvements towards arrears and to accept the contention of the defendants will be to hold that the decree-holder could get neither the buildings nor arrears of rent. The fact that the execution applications filed after E. P. 704 of 1115 was dismissed claimed past arrears over again cannot change the position as they constituted only wrong or untenable claims. Even in those petitions no rent was claimed for any period after the delivery of the land. 6. For the foregoing reasons we reverse the concurrent decisions of the two lower courts and dismiss M. P. 1980 of 1122. The order striking off E. P. 1033 of 1122 is vacated and the petition (E. P. 1033) remitted to the execution court for fresh disposal according to law. The lower courts have not made any order for costs and the same will be the case in this court also. Allowed.