Judgment.- This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.26 of 1948 on the file of the District Court, Anantapur, which confirmed the decree of the District Munsif, Penukonda, in O.S.No.238 of 1946. Defendants 6 and 7 are brothers and they owned items 1 and 2 and a half share in item 3 as co-sharers, each being entitled to a moiety thereof. On 5th August, 1932, they executed a deed of gift Exhibit A-1 settling the said properties along with others on the plaintiff who is the daughter of the 7th defendant. At that time the 6th defendant was indebted to the 4th defendant under pronotes dated 15th March, 1932 and 25th July, 1932. On 20th July, 1935, the 6th defendant agreed to sell item 3 to the 4th defendant in discharge of the promissory note dated 25th July, 1932; and he having defaulted in executing a sale deed in pursuance of the agreement the 4th defendant filed O.S.No.78 of 1937 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Penukonda, for specific performance of the agreement and that was decreed with costs on 3rd March, 1937. In execution of this decree, a sale deed was executed by the Court in favour of the 4th defendant under Order 21, rule 34, Civil Procedure Code, and possession was also obtained under the sale deed. The 4th defendant then filed O.S.No.232 of 1938, District Munsif’s Court, Penukonda, for a declaration that the gift deed Exhibit A-1 was in fraud of creditors and not binding on them and that was decreed on 17th September, 1940. There was an appeal against that decree, A.S.No.161 of 1940, District Court, Anantapur, and there in the decree in O.S.No.232 of 1938 was confirmed; “with the clarification that the decree does not affect the half share of Karnam Ramaswami (7th defendant) in the properties gifted, but only the half share of the 1st defendant (present 6th defendant).” This decision was affirmed on appeal to the High Court in S.A.No.858 of 1942. The 4th defendant then applied in execution to recover the costs decreed in O.S No.78 of 1937 and in E.P.No.310 of 1943 items 1 and 2 were sold on 5th June, 1944 and purchased by the 3rd defendant. The 4th defendant then applied in execution to recover the costs decreed in O.S No.78 of 1937 and in E.P.No.310 of 1943 items 1 and 2 were sold on 5th June, 1944 and purchased by the 3rd defendant. Thereupon, the appellant instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises for establishing her title to items 1 to 3 on the basis of the gift deed Exhibit A-1. Both the Courts have held that by reason of the decree in O.S.No.232 of 1938 her title cannot prevail as against that of defendants 3 and 4 and dismissed her action. The plaintiff prefers this second appeal. Mr.A. Bhujanga Rao, the learned Advocate for the appellant, urged that the decree in O.S.No.232 of 1938 declared Exhibit A-1 void only as against the creditors of the 6th defendant; that the right now claimed by the 4th defendant is not as a creditor of the 6th defendant, but as his transferee under an agreement dated 20th July, 1935 and perfected by conveyance in execution of the decree in O.S.No.78 of 1937, District Munsif’s Court, Penukonda, and that Exhibit A-1 is not void as against such a transferee. It was further contended that the Court sale of items 1 and 2 in execution of the decree in O.S.No.78 of 1937 could not confer greater rights than the transfer in pursuance of that decree in favour of the 4th defendant and that the 3rd defendant who is a purchaser of those items cannot set up his title as against the plaintiff as he is neither a creditor of the 6th defendant nor a transferee from him. It is undoubted law that when a transfer is declared void as against creditors under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, the result is not to annul it altogether, but only to render it inoperative as against creditors and that too only to the extent necessary to satisfy their claims; and subject to their claims, the transaction is valid and enforceable. In Storey on "Equity of jurisprudence" section 371, the law is thus stated: "A conveyance of this sort (it has been said, with great truth and force) is void only as against creditors; and then only to the extent in which it may be necessary to deal with the conveyed estate for their satisfaction. In Storey on "Equity of jurisprudence" section 371, the law is thus stated: "A conveyance of this sort (it has been said, with great truth and force) is void only as against creditors; and then only to the extent in which it may be necessary to deal with the conveyed estate for their satisfaction. To this extent, and to this only, it is treated as if it had not been made. To every other purpose it is good. Satisfy the creditor, and the conveyance stands." The effect of the declaration made in O.S.No.232 of 1938 that the gift deed was void as against creditors is, therefore, not to extinguish the title of the appellant under Exhibit A-1, but to render it subject to the claims of the creditors. The contention of the Advocate for the appellant thus far is unexceptionable. The next step in his argument is that though the 4th defendant was a creditor of the 6th defendant at the time of Exhibit A-1, he shed that character when he agreed on 20th July, 1935, to purchase item 3 from him in satisfaction of his debt and obtained a conveyance in enforcement of that agreement through Court in execution of the decree in O.S.No.78 of 1937 and that in consequence he can claim no benefit under the declaration granted in O.S.No.232 of 1938 which enures only for the benefit of the creditors and not transferees. The assumption underlying this contention is that where there is a transfer in fraud of creditors the only-right which the creditor has is to institute an action for its avoidance and that if he takes a transfer in satisfaction of his debt, that will not be protected under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. That, however, is not the true position. It is well-settled that a creditor having the right to avoid a transfer under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act can do so by any act which shows clearly and unambiguously an intention to avoid it. In Oakes v. Turquand and Harding1, it was held that voidable transactions may be avoided by any open or unequivocal declaration of an intention to avoid them. In Re Kingston Cotton Mills Co. In Oakes v. Turquand and Harding1, it was held that voidable transactions may be avoided by any open or unequivocal declaration of an intention to avoid them. In Re Kingston Cotton Mills Co. v. Mouat2, in discussing the rights of creditors with reference to two assignments which were impeached as in fraud to creditors under 13 Eliz, C. 5, Stirling, J. observed as follows:- "The effect of the statute appears to be this: that, as against creditors, an assignment which is within the statute is void both at law and in equity; and the property which is the subject matter of the assignment is to be treated as being the property of the testator at the time of his death .... According to the law which has been laid down in the cases I have just cited, the assignments became void the moment the creditors claimed to treat them as such; and thereupon the property which was comprised in those assignments ceased, as against the creditors, to be property of the assignee, and became assets for the payment of the creditors in such a way that they had a legal right to be paid out of those assets." In Ramaswami Chettiar v. Mallappa Reddiar3, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that a decree-holder is entitled to avoid a fraudulent transfer of the properties by the judgment-debtor by simply attaching those properties in execution of the decree. Wallis, C.J., after referring to the decision of the House of Lords in Oakes v. Turquand and Harding1, observed as follows:- "I am of opinion that it is open to the judgment-creditor by virtue of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to attach as the property of the judgment-debtor property which has been fraudulently transferred to the claimant with intent to defeat or delay creditors. If he knows of the transfer when he applies for attachment the application is sufficient evidence of his intention to avoid it; if he only hears of the transfer when a claim petition is preferred under Order 21, rule 58 and still maintains his right to attach, that again is a sufficient exercise of his option to avoid. If he knows of the transfer when he applies for attachment the application is sufficient evidence of his intention to avoid it; if he only hears of the transfer when a claim petition is preferred under Order 21, rule 58 and still maintains his right to attach, that again is a sufficient exercise of his option to avoid. In Ayya Perumal Asari v. Adinam Ashagiya Pillai1,the facts were that on 9th April, 1911, one Subramania Asari sold certain properties to the appellant and in August, 1912, he sold some of the same properties to the defendant who was a creditor. The defendant having got into possession of the properties, the appellant sued to eject him relying on the sale deed dated 9th April, 1911. Both the Courts below had found that that sale deed was in fraud of creditors and on that finding, dismissed the action. In second appeal two contentions were raised on behalf of the plaintiff: (1) That the defendant was not entitled to plead by way of defence that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff was in fraud of creditors as the same had not been set aside in an action under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and (2) that as the debt due to the defendant had become discharged when he took a sale deed, he was not entitled to relief as a creditor under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the first question it was held following the decision in Ramaswami Chettiar v. Mallappa Reddiar2,that it was sufficient if there was an open and unequivocal declaration by the creditor of his intention to avoid the transfer and that the taking of the sale deed was "an unequivocal expression of an intention by the defendant to avoid the alienation to the plaintiff". On the second question, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., observed: "The next question is, when did the defendant so avoid the sale of the 44 cents? If he avoided it after he became the transferee under Exhibit 1 and after his debt was thereby extinguished by the purchase money under the transfer, he cannot of course rely on section 53 so far as it says that a creditor can avoid a transfer intended to defeat him because he ceased to be a creditor on the transfer. If he avoided it after he became the transferee under Exhibit 1 and after his debt was thereby extinguished by the purchase money under the transfer, he cannot of course rely on section 53 so far as it says that a creditor can avoid a transfer intended to defeat him because he ceased to be a creditor on the transfer. But his intention to avoid had, in my opinion, clearly been made and expressed by conduct before (it may be only just before) he obtained the transfer under Exhibit 1 and therefore there is nothing in the contention of the appellant that the avoidance by the defendant was made as transferee and not as creditor." It is true that notwithstanding such unilateral expression of intention to avoid the transfer, it would be necessary for the creditor to establish when the transferee insists on his title and seeks to enforce it, that the transfer was in fraud of creditors and liable to be set aside under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. But the right to avoid does not depend on the ability to establish fraud in a Court of law, though its practical worth will be nothing without it. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it must be held that when the 4th defendant agreed on 20th July, 1935, to take a sale deed in respect of item 3 in discharge of the amount due to him under the promissory note, dated 25th July, 1932, he had avoided the gift deed in favour of the plaintiff and that as at that time and indeed till 1937 when the sale deed was actually executed, he was a creditor, the requirements of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied. His title therefore to item 3 must prevail as against that of the appellant. In this view, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the 4th defendant could claim relief under section 53 (2) of the Transfer of Property Act as a subsequent transferee. The claim of the 3rd defendant to items 1 and 2 has next to be considered. It is common ground that he was at no time a creditor of the 6th defendant. The claim of the 3rd defendant to items 1 and 2 has next to be considered. It is common ground that he was at no time a creditor of the 6th defendant. Nor is he a transferee from him, he having purchased the properties in Court-auction in execution of the decree for costs obtained by the 4th defendant in O.S. No. 78 of 1937. The question is whether such a person can claim the benefit of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv3, certain properties were attached and sold in execution of a decree and purchased by the defendant in the auction in 1909. In 1906 the judgment-debtor had conveyed the property to the plaintiff. In a suit by him to recover possession of the property from the auction-purchaser the latter pleaded that the sale deed of 1906 in favour of the plaintiff was in fraud of creditors. It was held that such a plea was not open to him as he was neither a creditor nor a transferee. Shah, J., with whom Heaton, J., agreed, observed as follows:- "It is quite clear that the defendant is not a creditor and that he does not seek to avoid the document for the benefit of any creditors. It was suggested, however, that the defendant would be a subse-quent transferee or a person having an interest in the property within the meaning of section 53, paragraph 1. But the defendant is an auction-purchaser at a Court sale, and not a transferee by any act of the original owner. Having regard to the preamble as well as section 5 of the Act, it seems to be clear that a person who steps in by operation of law and not by any act of the owner is not a subsequent transferee within the meaning of section 53. He is clearly not a person having an interest in the property within the meaning of the section, which apparently refers to interest, which exists in fact at the time of the transfer objected to. It is clear, therefore, that the deed is not voidable at the option of the defendant." In Bai Hakimbu v. Dayabhai Rugnath1, the facts were similar with this difference that the decree-holder himself became the purchaser in Court sale. It is clear, therefore, that the deed is not voidable at the option of the defendant." In Bai Hakimbu v. Dayabhai Rugnath1, the facts were similar with this difference that the decree-holder himself became the purchaser in Court sale. While agreeing with the observations of Shah, J., in Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv2, already quoted that an auction-purchaser is as such neither a creditor nor a transferee within the meaning of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, Lokur, J., held that the decree-holder who had the right to avoid the transfer under that section did not lose it by becoming in addition the purchaser of the properties. If the law as laid down in these two decisions is to be accepted as sound, then the claim of the appellant to items 1 and 2 must prevail as against defendant 3. This Court, however, has consistently taken the view that when a decree-holder who has the right to avoid a transfer as in fraud of creditors brings the properties covered by the deed of transfer to sale in execution of the decree, that itself is sufficient avoidance under section 53 of the Act and that the auction-purchaser is entitled to the benefit of the avoidance by the decree-holder. In Ayya Perumal Asari v. Adinam Askagiya Pillai3 dissenting from the view taken in Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv2, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., observed as follows: "If, however, Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv2, intended to hold that, notwithstanding that a suit to set aside the sale by a creditor was unnecessary and the creditor could set it aside by an unequivocal expression of intention, the auction-purchaser could not take advantage of the acts of the decree-holder, I must, with great respect, say that the decision is, in my opinion erroneous because the protection given to him to recover his debt by bringing the property to Court-auction sale notwithstanding the prior fraudulent purchase by another would be made of no effect and become a purely illusory right if the Court auction-purchaser is not to get a clear title overriding the fraudulent purchase. The very object of allowing the creditor or decree-holder to take advantage of his avoidance of a fraudulent transaction is to give the auction-purchaser in the sale brought about by the creditor a clear title." In Ramaswami Naik v. Lakshmana Kudumban4, the facts were that a judgment-debtor sold some properties to the defendant on 3rd January, 1927. The decree-holder then attached those properties on 12th March, 1927 and in the Court-auction which was held on 17th November, 1927 and 4th January, 1928, the plaintiffs became purchasers. In a suit by them to establish their title, they contended that the sale deed dated 3rd January, 1927, in favour of the defendant was in fraud of creditors and could not prevail as against their title under the auction-purchase. One of the defences to the action was that the auction-purchasers themselves were not creditors and that the right which the decree-holder had to avoid the transfer under section 53 of the Act did not pass to them. In rejecting this contention Venkataramana Rao, J., observed as follows: "If it is the law that a suit is not necessary and that by an open declaration of unequivocal conduct as aforesaid a creditor can avoid the transaction and thereupon the transaction becomes avoided and void from the beginning there is no necessity for the auction-purchaser to avoid the transaction again though he may be a subsequent transferee as slated in Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv2. The transaction having been avoided the property in the language of Stirling, J., was the asset of the judgment debtor available for satisfaction of the decree-holder’s debts, and the auction-purchaser gets a clear title and his suit is based upon that title. The only question in that suit is, whether the transaction has been avoided, as being in fraud of creditors, and if that is found, the auction-purchaser’s right for a declaration cannot be questioned. The only question in that suit is, whether the transaction has been avoided, as being in fraud of creditors, and if that is found, the auction-purchaser’s right for a declaration cannot be questioned. The decision in Vasudeo Raghunath v. Janardhan Sadashiv2 has been rightly dissented from by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Ayya Perumal Asari v. Adinam Ashagiya Pillai3." It is thus well settled in this Court that when a decree-holder entitled to avoid a transfer of property under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act has elected to do so by bringing the properties to sale in execution of his decree, that avoidance enures for the benefit of the auction-purchaser, notwithstanding that he is not himself a creditor 01 transferee. It was next contended that the sale under which the 3rd defendant claims was in execution of a decree for costs passed in favour of the 4th defendant in O.S. No.78 of 1937 on 3rd March, 1937, that that was not a debt which was in existence on the date of the gift in favour of the appellant on 5th August, 1932 and that, therefore, the 4th defendant was not himself entitled to avoid the deed of gift under section 53 and that the auction-purchaser succeeding to his rights could not claim higher rights. But the decree for costs was passed in an action for specific performance of the agreement dated 20th July, 1935, which in turn was for the discharge of the promissory note, dated 25th July, 1932. The decree can, therefore, be ultimately traced to a debt which was in existence on the date of the deed of gift. Apart from that, under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act it is not merely the creditors who are in existence at the date of the transfer but also subsequent creditors that are entitled to avoid it. The decree can, therefore, be ultimately traced to a debt which was in existence on the date of the deed of gift. Apart from that, under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act it is not merely the creditors who are in existence at the date of the transfer but also subsequent creditors that are entitled to avoid it. In Stileman v. Ashdown1,Lord Hardwick observed: “It is not necessary that a man should actually be indebted at the time he enters into a voluntary settlement, to make it fraudulent; for if a man does it with a view to his being indebted at a future time it is equally fraudulent, and ought to be set aside.” In Thomas Pillai v. Muthuraman Chettiar2, it was held that subsequent creditors are also within the rule enunciated in the first clause of section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and that a settlement could be avoided at the instance of subsequent creditors. In Rajagopala Chetti v. Sivagami Ammal3, it was again held that under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act it was not necessary that the creditor impugning the alienation should have been a creditor at the time of the alienation and that it was open to a subsequent creditor to avoid a deed of settlement as in fraud of creditors. On these authorities it must be held that the 4th defendant was in respect of the decree for costs in O.S.No.78 of 1937 a creditor who was entitled to avoid the gift deed dated 5th August, 1932, in favour of the appellant and that in consequence the title of the 3rd defendant as the auction-purchaser in execution of the decree in O.S.No.78 of 1937 prevails over that of the appellant under Exhibit A-1. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.