Judgment :- 1. The learned Additional District Munsiff of Padmanabhapuram has ruled that the 6th defendant in 0. S. No. 248 of 1950, a practising advocate, cannot appear on behalf of the 5th defendant in the said case. This revision petition is by the advocate concerned and we have had the advantage of hearing able and elaborate arguments not only from counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent, but also from Mr. N. Kumaran Achan, on behalf of the Advocate General, and Messrs Mathew Muricken and P. Narayana Menon on behalf of the Advocates' Association and the Bar Association Ernakulam respectively. 2. We are of the opinion that the matter has to be decided solely with reference to the Travancore Bar Council Act VII of 1122, and the rules framed thereunder, and that consequently the various English and Indian decisions cited at the Bar do not arise for consideration. 3. The advocates practising in the State of Travancore were governed at the time the order was passed by the enactment and rules mentioned above and according to the respondent the foundation for the order was sub-rules (d) and (e) of Rule 2 of the Bar Council rules which provides that: "an Advocate shall not accept an engagement - [d] where he will be a material witness of fact in the case, and [e] where he knows or has reason to believe that his own professional conduct is likely to be impugned in the case." 4. There was no reference before the lower court as to the petitioner being a material witness in the case and it is curious that the allegation has been made for the first time in the affidavit filed in this court on the 22nd August 1951. 5. Any violation of the directions embodied in rule 2 may amount to professional misconduct (vide rule 32) and rule 29 clearly states: "that all disputes or differences in professional matters shall be brought up before the Bar Council in the first instance." 6. It follows that the learned Additional District Munsiff has arrogated to himself a power which legitimately belongs not to him but to a professional body like the Bar Council. It follows that the learned Additional District Munsiff has arrogated to himself a power which legitimately belongs not to him but to a professional body like the Bar Council. The circumstances under which an advocate should or should not accept an engagement and the manner in which he should discharge his professional obligations are essentially matters for his own discretion and judgment in the light of the traditions and trammels of his profession and subject only to the statutory controls and power embodied in the Bar Council Act and the rules framed thereunder. It will be a sad day, indeed, in the history of the profession when the right of an advocate to appear for a client is made dependent on the result of a preliminary process of judicial review. 7. The learned Additional District Munsiff has apparently relied on the decision in A.I. E. 1941 Madras 808 for the view that he has taken. It is clear from that judgment that their Lordships' attention was not drawn to the Indian Bar Councils Act, XXXVIII of 1926, and the rules framed thereunder, and that the actual question that arose for decision was whether an advocate who was accused with others of a criminal offence could appear at the trial as counsel for his coaccused. The observations of the House of Lords in 31 L.J. Ch. 297 and of Wilde, C. J. in 19 L. J. C. P. 374 are seen extracted in the judgment in support of the view adopted. All that the former decision laid down was "that a counsel cannot be heard to argue his own case with another counsel; he must either appear in person or by counsel" and the observation in the latter was only: "I do not think that a party in a civil or criminal case, who is also counsel, is in a different position from any other party. In a criminal matter, a party would not be entitled to sit in wig and gown among the bar as his own counsel." 8. We are not concerned in this case either with a party who wants to appear for himself both as counsel and in person or one who is seeking to appear on behalf of a co-accused at a criminal trial, and it is unnecessary for us to decide what should be the governing considerations in such cases. We are not concerned in this case either with a party who wants to appear for himself both as counsel and in person or one who is seeking to appear on behalf of a co-accused at a criminal trial, and it is unnecessary for us to decide what should be the governing considerations in such cases. We have no doubt that in the light of the provisions of the Travancore Bar Council Act, VIII of 1122, and the rules framed thereunder the learned Additional District Munsiff was not competent to adjudicate on the right of the 6th defendant to appear as counsel on behalf of the 5th and that his order has to be vacated. 9. We hereby set aside the order and direct the parties to bear their costs. Allowed.