JUDGMENT : SHINDE, J. 1. This revision raises a very important point of law. The circumstances which have given rise to this revision are as follows : The village Bediya had a Nyaya Panchayat was part of the State of Madhya Pradesh. By an order called The Provinces and States (Absorption of Enclaves) Order, 1950 His Excellency the Governor General transferred the village to Madhya Bharat. This order which is published in the Madhya Bharat Gazette dated 26-2-1350 states that the order is to come into force on 20-1-1950. On 24-1-1950 Parsram filed a complaint against Babu and Sobharam under Ss. 504 and 503, I.P.C. and a complaint under S. 323, I.P.C. against Babu before the Naya Panchayat, Bediya. On 15-6-1950, Babu and Sobharam were convicted and sentenced under Ss. 504, 506 and 323 as follows : Babu : Fine Rs. 10/- under S. 504 I.P.C. Fine Rs. 20/- under S. 506 I.P.C. and Fine Rs. 15/- under S. 323 I.P.C. Sobharam : Fine Rs. 10/- under S. 504 I.P.C. and fine Rs. 20/- under Sec. 506, I.P.C. Against this order the accused filed an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nimar. That appeal was dismissed. Consequently the accused have filed this revision. 2. The revision was put up for hearing before the learned Chief Justice on 18-7-1951. He referred this revision to a Division Bench as it raises a question of law which is not free from doubt. Consequently this revision has been put up before this Division Bench. 3. The question that we have to consider in this case is whether the order passed by the Nyaya Panchayat on 15-6-1950, is ultra vires or intra vires. Before proceeding to consider this question, it is necessary to reproduce some of the relevant clauses of the order. Clause 1(2) of the Order is as follows : "It shall come into force on the twentieth day of January 1950". Clauses 2(a) states that "appointed day" means the date of commencement of this Order. Clause 8 of the Order is as follows : "All laws in force in an enclave immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day, cease to be in force in that enclave, and all laws in force in the absorbing unit shall, as from that day, extend to, and be in force in, that enclave". The learned counsel for the applicants referring to Cl. The learned counsel for the applicants referring to Cl. 8, contends that as from 20-1-1950 all laws in force in Bediya ceased to be in force and all laws in force in Madhya Bharat extended to, and came in force in, Bediya, Nyaya Panchayat had no jurisdiction to decide the case. He contends that Panchayat Act No. 58 of 1949 does not give power to the Nyaya Panchayat to function and hence Panchayat decision is without jurisdiction. The learned Advocate General counters this argument on two grounds. His first argument is that by virtue of Art. 372 read with explanation 1, Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act still continues-in force in village Bediya. His second argument id that on the principles of international law, in the event of State succession, the civil law of the former territorial sovereign continues ins operation until new laws have been enacted ? Consequently Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act still continues in force. In our opinion, both these arguments have a good deal of force. 4. It is true that Cl. 8 of the Order enjoins that all laws in force in an enclave immediately before the appointed day shall, as from that day cease to be in force in that enclave and all laws in force in the absorbing unit shall, as from that day, extend to and be in force in that enclave. Appointed day being 20-1-1950 all laws in Madhya Pradesh cease to be in force on 20-1-1950 and all laws in Madhya Bharat came into force on that day. Although Panchayat Vidhan Samvat 2006 came into force on 13-8-1949, it had not been given effect to in 1950. Section 51 of the Act states that Government will establish Nyaya Panchayats for a group of several villages. This was not done until 9-2-1952 for Bediya. Provision was made for an interim arrangement by adding a proviso to Sub-Section 3 of S. 1 of the Panchayat Vidhan. This proviso runs as follows : By this proviso the Act allowed Panchayat Boards of the integrating States to continue until election for new Panchayats was held. From these facts it is clear that both on 24-1-1950 when the complaint was filed and on 15-6-1950 when the Panchayat convicted the accused, there was no Nyaya Panchayat for Bediya under the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Vidhan of Samvat 2006. As already stated elections had not taken place in 1950. From these facts it is clear that both on 24-1-1950 when the complaint was filed and on 15-6-1950 when the Panchayat convicted the accused, there was no Nyaya Panchayat for Bediya under the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Vidhan of Samvat 2006. As already stated elections had not taken place in 1950. Nor was any provision made similar to the proviso to Sub-Section 3 of S. 1 for the enclaves. On the material dates, therefore, Madhya Bharat Panchayat Vidhan of Samvat 2006 had not provided for a Nyaya Panchayat for the village Bediya which was transferred from Madhya Pradesh to Madhya Bharat on 20-1-1950. That being the position we have to consider what law, if any, was to be followed on the material dates in the village Bediya. Article 372 Cl. (1) is as follows : "Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in Art. 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution all the law. In force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." Briefly stated the Article states that all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was to continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature. The expression "law in force" has been expounded by explanation 1 to the said Article. That explanation runs as follows : "The expression 'law in force' in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas." In the present case, Central Provinces and Berar Panchayats Act, 1946 ceased to be in force in Bediya on 20-1-1950 by the order of the Governor-General. But it was not repealed. Before the commencement of the Constitution the Central Provinces and Berar Panchayats Act was in force although it was not in operation in Bediya because it was not repealed. The expression "cease to be in force" is not analogous to repeal. All that the expression means is that its operation was suspended. But it was not repealed. Before the commencement of the Constitution the Central Provinces and Berar Panchayats Act was in force although it was not in operation in Bediya because it was not repealed. The expression "cease to be in force" is not analogous to repeal. All that the expression means is that its operation was suspended. As Madhya Bharat Panchayat Vidhan had made no provision for the formation of a Panchayat for Bediya in 1950, there was no Madhya Bharat Act in force in Bediya before the commencement of the Constitution. The operation of the Central Provinces and Berar Panchayats Act was suspended on 20-1-1950. By virtue of Art. 372, therefore, the Central Provinces and Berar Panchayats Act continues to be in force in Bediya after the commencement of the Constitution as it was the law in force as expounded by explanation 1 to the said Article. In this view of the matter the jurisdiction exercised by the Nyaya Panchayat of Bediya cannot be said to be ultra vires. 5. The general principles of international law which govern the State succession are stated by Schwarzenberger in his book on International Law. At p. 83, Vol. I of the 2nd Edn., the learned author states as follows : "In the event of State succession the civil law of the former territorial sovereign continues in operation until new laws have been enacted. In the absence of such legislation, it is not to be presumed that the new sovereign has intended automatically to apply its whole system of private law as distinct from public law to the newly acquired territory. In the case of German settlers in Poland (1923) the Permanent Court of International Justice observed : 'Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of sovereignty. No one denies that the German Civil Law, both substantive and adjective, has continued without, interruption to operate in the territory in question'. It can hardly be maintained that, although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished. No one denies that the German Civil Law, both substantive and adjective, has continued without, interruption to operate in the territory in question'. It can hardly be maintained that, although the law survives, private rights acquired under it have perished. Such a contention is based on no principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice." On the same subject Halsbury in his Laws of England states as follows : "In conquered or ceded countries which, at the time of their acquisition, had already laws of their own, the Crown has power to alter and change those laws, but until this is actually done the ancient laws of the country remain in force" (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 11, 1933 Edn., Page 239 para 456). This principle has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in - 'Edgar Sammut v. Strickland', AIR 1939 PC 39 (A). Their Lordships in this case observed as follows : "Where however the territory was acquired by cession or conquest, more particularly where there was an existing system of law, it has always been considered that there was an absolute power in the Crown, so far as was consistent with the terms of cession (if it was a case of that kind) to alter the existing system of law, though until such interference the laws remained as they were before the territory was acquired by the Crown". Similar observations have been made in - 'Freeman v. Fairlie', 1 Moo Ind App 305 (B). Similar observations have been made in - 'Freeman v. Fairlie', 1 Moo Ind App 305 (B). These observations read as follows : "I apprehend the true general distinction to be, in effect, between countries in which there are not, and countries in which there are, at the time of their acquisition, any existing civil institutions and laws, it being, in the first of those cases, matter of necessity that the British settlers should use their native laws, as having no others to resort to; whereas, in the other case, there is an established lex loci, which it might be highly inconvenient all at once to abrogate; and therefore, it remains till changed by the deliberate wisdom of the new legislative power." In 'Campbell v. Hall', 20 State Tr 239 at p. 325 (C) it is stated as follows : "If a king come to a kingdom by conquest, he may, at his pleasure, alter and change the laws of that kingdom; but, until he doth make an alteration, the ancient laws of that kingdom remain". In 'Forbes v. Cochrane', (1824) 2 B and C 448 (D), Holroyd, J. held that in a conquered country the old law prevails until altered by the King in Council. Our High Court has also taken the same view In - 'Anand Balkrishna Behare v. Police Lashkar', 1949 Madh-B LR 160 (E). It follows, therefore, from these decisions that in a ceded territory, the old law continues until the new sovereign enacts new laws. As already stated the Government had not established any Panchayat for village Bediya in 1950. There was no provision similar to the proviso to Sub-Section 3 of S. 1 for the newly transferred territory. The position, therefore, is that the new sovereign had not established any Nyaya Panchayat for Bediya in 1950. Until the constitution of the new Panchayat, that is, 9-2-1952, the old Panchayat had a right to function in accordance with the principles of the international law. On this ground also the jurisdiction exercised by the Nyaya Panchayat at Bediya cannot be said to be ultra vires. 6. For the reasons given above, the revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed. 7. NEWASKAR, J. – I agree. Revision dismissed.