JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal is preferred by the plaintiff appellant Rajmal s/o Mulchand. 2. Plaintiff Rajmal and his three sons Ramniwas, Gulabchand and Ramanand, filed a suit for declaration that the sale of the house at Bombay Bazar, by the defendant No. 1 Parabai widow of Mulchand and step-mother of the plaintiff is without legal necessity and unauthorised-Parabai sold the house to defendant No. 2 Din Mohammad and the sale was made in favour of Din Mohammad despite the notice. Din Mohammad sold the property to defendants 3 and 4 Akabarali and Usufali. Plaintiff's case is that the sale is not binding on them. 3. In her written statement, defendant No. 1 Parabai contended that she is the absolute owner of the house in dispute, which was left to her by her deceased husband under a family arrangement made on 29th June, 1953 vide Ex. D/4. Parabai further contended that after the death of her husband Mulchand, when she came into possession of her husband's properties under the family arrangement Ex. D/4, the plaintiff brought a suit against her in the Indore High Court and that suit was decided on 20th January 1922, dismissing Rajmal's suit for possession (Vide Civil Original Suit No. 6 of 1917). Ex. D/2 is the copy of the judgment of the High Court. Parabai contended that the civil suit No. 6 of 1917 operated as res judicata. She pleaded bar of limitation. She further contended that the Court had no jurisdiction as the value of the suit is 4000/-. The court-fee paid was inadequate. 4. Plaintiff's suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that there was family arrangement as evidenced by Ex. D/4, whereby plaintiff Rajmal relinquished his rights to Mulchand's property. It was held that the sale by Parabai was not for legal necessity. Parabai was not in possession of the entire house, but some portion thereof and the purchaser defendant No. 3, is in possession of- only a portion and not the entire house. Ex. D/4 document shows the family arrangement. Parabai became the absolute owner of the properties of her deceased husband Mulchand under the family arrangement. The trial Court therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. 5. Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District Judge, but the District Judge also dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence this second appeal. 6. Ex. D/4 document shows the family arrangement. Parabai became the absolute owner of the properties of her deceased husband Mulchand under the family arrangement. The trial Court therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. 5. Plaintiff preferred an appeal to the District Judge, but the District Judge also dismissed the appeal with costs. Hence this second appeal. 6. The important point for consideration in this second appeal is as to the nature of document Ex. D/4 and whether it was a family arrangement which conferred an absolute title on Parabai. This document Ex. D/4 is executed by Rajmal on 29th June, 1913 and is signed by Rajmal. In this document Rajmal states that as there are frequent domestic bickerings, so, for maintaining the family's harmonious relations, he has agreed to separate himself from the family after taking his share. He has admitted having received Rs. 13000/- as cash, Rs. 1000/- as gold and silver ornaments and Rs. 2500/- worth one immovable property in Kunjada Bakhal. In all he admits having received Rs. 16500/- and states that he has now no rights or interest in the remaining property belonging to Mulchand. 7. Mr. Chitale, learned pleader for the appellant contended that Ex. D/4 is not a family arrangement, but it is a deed of relinquishment executed by Rajmal in favour of his father Mulchand. After the execution of document Ex. D/4, Mulchand did not make any disposition either oral or in writing in favour of Parabai. Mr. Chitale contended that this deed of relinquishment executed by Rajmal is hit by S. 6(a), T.P. Act, which states that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred. Rajmal had no authority to relinquish and thereby transfer to Parabai spes successionis, and therefore it is bad in law. Mr. Chitale argued that a Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the owner holds for life, until it. vests in him. His right becomes accrued only after the demise and therefore, he has nothing to transfer. Mr. Mr. Chitale argued that a Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the owner holds for life, until it. vests in him. His right becomes accrued only after the demise and therefore, he has nothing to transfer. Mr. Chitale argued that Rajmal, so long as his father was alive, had no right to transfer his spes successionis in favour of his mother and such a transfer is hit by Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. 8. Mr. Chitale mainly relied on a decision reported in - 'Balkrishna Trimbak v. Savitribai', 3 Bom 54 (A). In this decision it was held that the effect of a Hindu son relinquishing for a sum of money his share in the property of his father, natural or adoptive, and agreeing not to claim it during or after his father's life time, is to place him in the position of a separated son. The relinquishment does not amount to disherison. If, therefore, the father on such relinquishment makes an alienation of his estate, it will take effect, but otherwise his separated son will inherit in preference to his widow. A son by birth or adoption can for adequate reasons be disinherited, but the course of devolution prescribed by the law cannot be altered by a private arrangement, on the disherison of the son, the son's son becomes his grandfather's lawful heir. 9. In this case, Trimbak the adopted son of Govind, by receiving a sum of money in lieu of his share in estate, and by executing a document of Pharkat, placed himself in the position of a divided son. The community of property between the father and divided son was spes successionis and had Govind alienated his estate, Trimbak could not have interfered. Had Govind, therefore, bequeathed his estate to Radhabai and plaintiff Savitribai, the bequest would have taken effect. But in the absence of such a bequest or other exercise of the uncontrolled power vested in Govind, the succession to his estate must be governed by the provisions of Hindu Law. The Hindu Law assigned inheritance to even a separated son in preference to a widow. Their Lordships further observed that the course of devolution prescribed by law cannot be altered by a private arrangement. 10. The Hindu Law assigned inheritance to even a separated son in preference to a widow. Their Lordships further observed that the course of devolution prescribed by law cannot be altered by a private arrangement. 10. In the case of - 'Hardei v. Bhagwan Singh', AIR 1919 PC 27 (B), the facts were that a Hindu died in 1856 leaving him surviving a widow and three daughters, and his estate devolved upon the widow. In 1875 an arrangement was arrived at whereby the widow divided the whole of the property among her three daughters and her grandsons then living. The daughters and grandsons entered into immediate possession of their lots and mutation of names was effected in their favour. Subsequently each of the daughters dealt with the property allotted to her on the division as her own absolute property. In 1834 one of the daughters sold a portion of her share of the property to the defendant. She died in 1912, and in 1913, her surviving sister brought a suit for recovery of possession of the property alleging that the property had belonged to her father, and that in consequence of the death of her mother and sisters she had become the sole heir of her father and was entitled to possession. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the plaintiff was bound by her own agreement and that in view of the long period of time which had elapsed since the arrangement was made, she could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement and to impeach a sale which was made on the faith of it. In the case before us also Rajmal had entered into a distinct agreement with his father Mulchand that he should be given 16,500/- rupees and that he should be considered as having separated from the joint family and that he will have no claim in future, to the remaining property of his father and that his father may give the entire remaining property to his mother and it is to be considered absolute property of Parabai. In view of this agreement of family arrangement which was acted upon for such a long time, Rajmal cannot now repudiate the agreement and contend that his mother Parabai had no absolute estate and she could not alienate it. In view of this agreement of family arrangement which was acted upon for such a long time, Rajmal cannot now repudiate the agreement and contend that his mother Parabai had no absolute estate and she could not alienate it. Such a family arrangement is not against the provisions of Hindu Law, nor it is hit by S. 6(a), T.P. Act. 11. In a similar case, - 'Raj Kumar Singh v. Abhai Kumar Singh', AIR 1948 Pat 362 (C), the facts were in a partition suit between A and B, the parties arrived at a compromise. The shares of each were defined and they went into immediate possession of the properties. It was agreed that they would not claim any share which would otherwise have accrued to them on the death of either of the parties. It was held that the parties did not deal with any future rights in any other property. They were anxious that the property which was being allotted to either of the parties should never go out of that branch. The compromise was not hit by any rule of Hindu law or by the provisions of S. 6(a), Transfer of Property Act. It was further held in that case, that in order that an agreement between the members of the family can be treated as a family settlement, it is not necessary that it must be shown that there was a dispute as to title between the parties and that the agreement was by way of accepting the antecedent title of the parties to the properties. 12. In - 'Umashanker v. Ramcharan', AIR 1939 All 689 (D), it was held that the transfer or relinquishment for consideration of the interest of a Hindu reversioner would be void under Section 6(a) of Transfer of Property Act as the transfer of a mere spes successions, but such a transfer or relinquishment would be valid where it was a part and parcel of the family settlement or of a compromise in a dispute between rival claimants to property. 13. In - 'Mt. Jainath Kuar v. Dhanpal Singh', AIR 1947 Oudh 164 ,(E), a suit for possession of ancestral property was filed by the reversioners. V, the daughter's daughter of the last male owner claiming to be the next heir sought to be impleaded as one of the plaintiffs. 13. In - 'Mt. Jainath Kuar v. Dhanpal Singh', AIR 1947 Oudh 164 ,(E), a suit for possession of ancestral property was filed by the reversioners. V, the daughter's daughter of the last male owner claiming to be the next heir sought to be impleaded as one of the plaintiffs. A deed of family settlement was entered into between V and the plaintiffs reversioner. By this deed the parties agreed to fight out the case jointly on the title of all of them and to divide the property between them in certain specified shares. The rights alloted to all the parties were of the same nature and there was no limitation placed upon the rights of any with regard to the property allotted to his or her share. It was held that the rights of the parties to the deed were governed by its terms and not by any rule of law of inheritance and V had acquired a full estate in her share which on her death passed to her heirs. 14. On a careful construction of the document Ex. D/4 and in the light of the rulings cited by me above, it appears to me that Ex. D/4 is a family arrangement whereby in consideration of having received Rs. 16,500/- Rajmal separated from the joint family and agreed that he has no claim whatsoever to the remaining estate of his father and that his father could give absolute title of the properties to his mother Parabai. In my opinion, this family arrangement is not hit by the provisions of S. 6(a), Transfer of Property Act, because it is part and parcel of the family arrangements which have been recognized by several decisions referred to by me above. It is not necessary for Mulchand to make any disposition either oral or in writing in favour of Parabai as a part of the family arrangement, the document Ex. D/4 conferred on Parabai, an absolute title. This was done to keep the family peace and harmony. 15. For reasons aforesaid, the ruling in - 3 Bom 54 (A)', is concerned more with the fact that a separated son will inherit in preference to a widow. There is no consideration in this case about the family arrangement and what is its effect. This was done to keep the family peace and harmony. 15. For reasons aforesaid, the ruling in - 3 Bom 54 (A)', is concerned more with the fact that a separated son will inherit in preference to a widow. There is no consideration in this case about the family arrangement and what is its effect. There is a question simply of the widow's right of succession and naturally the Court held that the separated son is a preferential heir to a Widow. 16. For reasons aforesaid, I confirm the judgment and decree of the Courts below and dismiss the appeal with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.