M. Homi v. Deputy Commr. Of Singhbhum — 1953 DIGILAW 54 (PAT)

Judgment Misra, J. 1. This petition is filed on behalf of two persons, M. Homi and Syed Taffajul Kari, who stood sureties on behalf of one Aly Khan. Aly Khan was fined a sum of Rs. 1,00,000.00 and was sentenced also to undergo rigourus imprisonment for four years by the 1st Special Tribunal, Calcutta. He filed an appeal against his conviction and sentence in this Court which was dismissed. Aly Khan tried thereafter to move the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and applied to the Provincial Government under Sec. 401, Criminal P. C. for suspension of the sentence passed on him pending the disposal of his appeal in the Privy Council. The Government of Bihar by a Resolution dated 17-10-1946, suspended the sentence and imposed certain conditions on Aly Khan. He was asked to furnish security worth Rs. 50,000.00 with two sureties of Rs. 25,000.00 each to the satisfaction of either the Sub-divisional Officer, Jamshedpur, or the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum and undertaking to furnish proof by 1-12-1946, of his having taken all necessary steps for the filing of his appeal and also to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy, Council if by the said order or judgment, the sentence was upheld wholly or in part. Aly Khan preferred his appeal to the Privy Council and furnished proof thereof to the Provincial Government as required under the first condition of his release. Aly Khan expressed his desire to be present personally in England to instruct his counsel and applied to the Government for a passport to enable him to undertake the journey. The Government was pleased to grant him the necessary passport, being No. 13030 dated 31-1-1949. In compliance with condition No. 2 of the Resolution, Aly Khan executed a bond for Rs. 50,000.00 and induced the petitioners to act as sureties for him. The petitioners accordingly executed two surety bonds of Rs. 25,000.00 each before the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. The application of Aly Khan for a passport was granted by the Provincial Government without any reference to the present petitioners. 2. 50,000.00 and induced the petitioners to act as sureties for him. The petitioners accordingly executed two surety bonds of Rs. 25,000.00 each before the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. The application of Aly Khan for a passport was granted by the Provincial Government without any reference to the present petitioners. 2. The appeal of Aly Khan to the Privy Council, which was admitted by special leave, was, however, not disposed of, as in the meantime, the Act abolishing the jurisdiction of the Privy Council was passed and all Indian Appeals pending in the Privy Council were transferred to the Supreme Court of India. It appears that the appeal of Aly Khan was dismissed by the Supreme Court some time in November, 1950. Thereafter the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum issued a notice on 8-12-1950, to the petitioners to procure the surrender of Aly Khan within three days of the receipt of the notice, failing which the petitioners were threatened with action under Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. On 16-12-1950, the petitioners showed cause stating that they had undertaken to produce Aly Khan after the decision of the appeal by the Judicial Committee, and since the appeal was actually decided by the Supreme Court, they were not bound by the terms of the bail bond. It was also contended that Aly Khan was given a passport by the Bihar Government and as such the petitioners were not bound to produce him. Certain other points of a technical nature were also pressed in the show cause petition. The learned Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum proceeded to hear the matter after due notice to the State when on 13-3-1951, he received a memo from the Sessions Judge of Manbhum-Singhbhum calling for the records of the case and staying further proceedings pending the disposal of the Criminal Revision filed in this Court. It appears that the petitioners moved the learned Sessions Judge for the quashing of the proceedings started by the Deputy Commissioner against the petitioners. The proceedings were accordingly stayed. 3. The learned Sessions Judge of Manbhum Singhbhum by his order dated 12-11-1951, dismissed the application of the petitioners holding that the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum had jurisdiction to start proceedings for forfeiture of the bail bonds. The petitioners thereafter moved this Court. The proceedings were accordingly stayed. 3. The learned Sessions Judge of Manbhum Singhbhum by his order dated 12-11-1951, dismissed the application of the petitioners holding that the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum had jurisdiction to start proceedings for forfeiture of the bail bonds. The petitioners thereafter moved this Court. In the meantime, the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in the Criminal Revision application referred to above was communicated to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum, who resumed further hearing in the proceedings against the petitioners and held that the petitioners were liable to forfeit their surety bonds, because the objection that on account of the transfer of the case from the Privy Council to the Supreme Court they were not bound to produce Aly Khan in terms Of the surety bonds was not entertainable. It was also held that it appeared that the accused Aly Khan had absconded and was probably now in Pakistan and since they were liable to produce him within three days after the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Supreme Court and they had failed to do so, the bail bonds executed by the two petitioners had been forfeited. He called upon them either to pay Rs. 25,000.00 each or to show cause why it should not be paid; the cause was to be shown by 5-12-1951. The present application in this Court came up for disposal before Bamaswami, J. who by his order dated 8-1-1952, was pleased to refer it for decision by a Division Bench. 4. Mr. R. S. Chatterji, who appears on behalf of the petitioners, contends that the learned Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter as the suspension of the sentence passed on Aly Khan by the Government of Bihar was evidently made in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 401, Criminal P. C. To such a case the provisions of Sec. 514, criminal P. C. will not apply. What is sought to be made out is that the authority of the Executive Government to exercise any of the powers conferred under Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. does not fall within the ambit of this section. What is sought to be made out is that the authority of the Executive Government to exercise any of the powers conferred under Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. does not fall within the ambit of this section. The bail bonds contemplated under Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. in relation to which alone there is provision for forfeiture, must be bonds which are executed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and must be taken by a Court. Sec. 514, Criminal P. C., in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, reads as follows: "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid." The surety bonds executed by the petitioners are neither bonds executed under the Code of Criminal Procedure taken by a Court, nor do they belong to the category, nor do they relate to a situation in which the forfeiture of these bonds could be considered only by the Court of the Presidency Magistrate or a Court of Magistrate of the first class. He has referred in this connection to the case of -- In re Hubert Crawford, AIR 1918 Bom 226 (A), wherein it was held that a bond taken by the police under the City of Bombay Police Act was not a bond taken in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as such Sec. 514 of the Code would not apply. The facts of that case were clearly distinguishable from the present one, because there the bond was taken by a police officer under a distinct enactment and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. It was obvious, therefore, that the provisions of Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. could not be attracted to that case. The facts of that case were clearly distinguishable from the present one, because there the bond was taken by a police officer under a distinct enactment and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. It was obvious, therefore, that the provisions of Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. could not be attracted to that case. He has next invited our attention to the case of -- Ballabhdas Motiram V/s. Emperor, AIR 1943 Bom 178 (B) which was followed in -- Karali Charan V/s. The King, AIR 1949 Pat 196 (C), for the proposition that it is the Court before whom the bailor is to produce the accused person which is alone competent to forfeit the bail bond in the case of the failure of the latter to comply with its condition. If, however, the case is transferred to some other Court the bailor is not bound to produce him in that Court, and such a Court is not competent to order the forfeiture of the bail bond. Thus, it appears that neither the case reported in -- AIR 1943 Bom 178 (B), nor the one in -- AIR 1949 Pat 196 (C) can have any application to the principle involved in the present case. Neither of these cases had occasion to consider the relation of Sec. 401, Criminal P. C. to Sec. 514 of the Code and it is not contended even on behalf of the State that the Deputy Commissioner is competent to forfeit the bail bonds as a Court different from the one before whom the bailor was to produce the accused person. Learned Counsel has next drawn our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in --Rameshwar Bhartia V/s. The State of Assam, AIR 1952 SC 405 at p. 408 (D), where it was held : "The High Court was in error in thinking that Sec. 514, Criminal P. C. applied. Action could be taken only when the bond is taken by the Court under the provisions of the Code such as Section 91 for appearance, the several security sections or those relating to bail. Action could be taken only when the bond is taken by the Court under the provisions of the Code such as Section 91 for appearance, the several security sections or those relating to bail. Clause CD of Sec. 514 runs: "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or when the bond is for appearance before a Court to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited; the Court shall record the grounds of such proof and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid." The language is perfectly clear; the power to forfeit and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the later parts of the section arise only if the preliminary conditions are satisfied." On fact, however, it would appear that this was also an undertaking given to the Procurement Inspector under a Jaimmanama or security bond executed in his favour by the accused person in that case. Hence it was held by their Lordships : "It is true that it contained the undertaking that the seized paddy would be produced before the Court, but still it was a promise made to the particular official and not to the Court." This decision, therefore, does not apply to the facts of the present case. These being the only cases referred to on behalf of the petitioners, it appears that the present case is one of first impression, and we have to decide it on a plain reading of the two sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure in question. 6. The learned Advocate-General in reply has contended that. Sec. 514 of the Code would apply to the present case as well as it would do to any other case of bail bond. He has endeavoured to establish this with reference to the terms of Section 514 that the words used in the first clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 514 are sufficiently comprehensive to include bail bond of any kind, whether executed under the provisions of this Code or otherwise. He has endeavoured to establish this with reference to the terms of Section 514 that the words used in the first clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 514 are sufficiently comprehensive to include bail bond of any kind, whether executed under the provisions of this Code or otherwise. His contention is that the bail bond furnished under the provisions of the Code would be confined to the Court by which the bond under this Code has been taken and whenever there is any bail bond executed outside the purview of this Code, the forfeiture or otherwise in relation thereto would be determined by the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. He has cited no authority in support of this contention but put forward the view point on the terms of the section itself. It is difficult for me, however, to accept this contention inasmuch as it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to include a bond executed otherwise than under the provisions of this Code to be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code is complete by itself, and if any bond could be executed outside the provisions of this Code, it is difficult to conceive that it might be governed by this Code. It is clear that if a bond is to be executed under any such enactment, relevant provisions are made in its terms or there would be a clause in the Act itself laying down that the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply either in whole or in part to that Aet. It is only in such an event that Sec. 514 of the Code can be deemed to apply to a case of bond arising under any other enactment as well. . As a matter of fact, to hold otherwise would be to give juris-diction to the Court of the Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class over a bond, whatever its nature may be which would be manifestly unreasonable. This contention on behalf of the State is, therefore, rejected. 7. . As a matter of fact, to hold otherwise would be to give juris-diction to the Court of the Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class over a bond, whatever its nature may be which would be manifestly unreasonable. This contention on behalf of the State is, therefore, rejected. 7. It is next argued by the learned Advocate-General that Sec. 401 of the Code refers to suspension of sentence, which power is given to the Governor General and the local Government, and in the present case it was the execution of the sentence on Aly Khan which was suspended by the Government of Bihar on condition that he would produce two sureties to furnish the necessary surety bonds. The petitioners did so of their own accord and undertook the burden of producing Aly Khan after the decision of his appeal by the Privy Council on pain of forfeiture of the bonds in case of their failure. They brought themselves thus within the terms of Sec. 514 because, after the decision of his appeal, Aly Khan had to surrender in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner of Singbhum, being a resident of Jamshedpur. The bond he furnished was in accordance with the condition imposed under Sec. 401 of the Code and as such it was a bond executed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and which was for appearance before a Court. Intriguing though the situation is, I find it difficult to accede to this argument as well. It is no doubt peculiar that when Aly Khan applied for suspension of the sentence on agreeing to furnish security bonds to be left at large in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 401 of the Code and the sureties knew what they were undertaking to do, they should now be permitted, when the question of forfeiture arises, to say that the Code does not apply to them or that it was not for appearance before a Court. The fact, however, remains that Sec. 514 being in the nature of a penal forfeiture it has to be given a strict construction. The word bond has not been referred to in Sec. 401, and if at all, it can come under the term conditions and not otherwise. The fact, however, remains that Sec. 514 being in the nature of a penal forfeiture it has to be given a strict construction. The word bond has not been referred to in Sec. 401, and if at all, it can come under the term conditions and not otherwise. The various bonds executable under the Code have been referred to in the relevant provisions being either bail bonds or security bonds or under Section 91, Criminal P. C. in the various contexts executed before a Court or for appearance before a Court. The present bonds, however, were executed by the petitioners for producing Aly Khan in accordance with the condition imposed by the Provincial Government in the imposition of which no Court had any hand. It might thus be an agreement between the Executive Government and the accused person and the sureties. In that view the bonds furnished to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum were not furnished to a Court, but the Deputy Commissioner acted merely as an agent of the Executive Government and it was accidental that a District Magistrate had to perform the function of taking the bonds. It was not in accordance with the direction of any Court of law in its criminal jurisdiction goverened by this Code. Mr. R. S. Chatterjis argument, therefore, that the taking of the bonds by, the Deputy Commissioner should be deemed to be an act done on the executive side appears to be sound. It this contention is accepted, it is clear that Section 514, Criminal P. C. cannot be invoked to support the forfeiture proceedings. It may be that the State Government has been put in a very awkward situation by the act of the petitioners on whose surety bonds alone the Government allowed Aly Khan to be left at large to proceed to England, and now that he has absconded it is deprived of the heavy fine to which he was liable and he has escaped the punishment of imprisonment as well. It is really unfortunate that it should be so. It is really unfortunate that it should be so. It may be that in future the Executive Government may find it very difficult to suspend the execution of a sentence where it might be inclined to do so on certain conditions because if the conditions are not enforceable in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, there will be a practical cessation of the use of this power by the Executive Government. It may be that the Government may realise the amount under the surety bonds under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act or otherwise. We are, however, not concerned with the latter contingency. It is for the Law Officers of the State to think out. It may even be that Sec. 401, Criminal P. C. may have to be suitably amended to bring in such bonds as having been executed under the provisions of the Code so as to obviate a position like the one that has arisen in the present case. As a matter of fact, various High Courts in the past in different cases have made suggestions for suitable amendment of this section. The facts of the present application also point in the same direction. 8. In view of the conclusions of law arrived at, the application must be allowed and the forfeiture proceedings in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum must be held to be without jurisdiction. Reuben, J. 9 I agree with my learned brother that the application must be allowed, and that the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner must be quashed. As the case is one of first impression and involves points of importance and interest I give my reasons in my own words. 10. The question for consideration is whether Sec. 514, Criminal P. C., applies to the forfeiture of the bond requiring Ali Khan "to surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee if by the said order or judgment the sentence is upheld either partly or wholly. In the constitutional changes which have occurred since the appeal was filed the order of dismissal was passed, not by the Judicial Committee, but by the Supreme Court. In the constitutional changes which have occurred since the appeal was filed the order of dismissal was passed, not by the Judicial Committee, but by the Supreme Court. It is not necessary to consider whether the fact that the appeal was disposed of by a tribunal other than the Judicial Committee affects the liability of the petitioners under the bond. 11. The relevant portion of Sec. 514 runs as follows: "Whether it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or on the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or, when the bond is for appearance before a court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall etc. etc." The italics (here in ) are mine. The section expressly refers to two classes of bonds; firstly, a bond under the Code taken by a Court, and secondly, a bond for appearance before a Court. The first class is subject to two limitations, the bond must be taken by a Court and it must be taken under the Code. It may be for appearance before a Court, for example a bond taken by a Magistrate under Section 86 of the Code; or for some other purpose, for example, a bond taken under Sec.107 to be of good behaviour. Bonds of the second class must be for appearance before a Court. They may be taken by some one other than a Court, for example, a District Superintendent or Commissioner of Police under Section 86 of the Code. It is possible that this class includes bonds taken under a provision of law other than the Code for appearance before a Court governed by the Code but it is not necessary to decide that point here. The words "such bond" relate back to the two kinds of bonds mentioned and the problem before us resolves itself into the question whether the bond given by the petitioners is a bond of either of these two classes. 12. I would answer this question in the negative. The bond is not a bond of the first class because it is taken by the Provincial Government and not by a Court. The actual steps for getting the bond executed were taken by the Deputy Commissioner who is also the District Magistrate. 12. I would answer this question in the negative. The bond is not a bond of the first class because it is taken by the Provincial Government and not by a Court. The actual steps for getting the bond executed were taken by the Deputy Commissioner who is also the District Magistrate. But he did so merely as the agent of the Government, and he cannot be treated as having taken the bond in his capacity as a District Magistrate. Further, although the bond was taken in pursuance of an order passed in exercise of a power conferred on the Provincial Government by the Code, I am doubtful whether it can be described as being "a bond taken under the Code". For the reason which I have already given, namely, that in this matter the Deputy Commissioner cannot be regarded as acting as a Court, I do not think that the bond is a bond of the second class. The fact that the form used for the bond is the form of bail bond prescribed for accused persons released on bail by a Court of Criminal Appeal makes no difference. The recitals therein contained about the appellate Court having passed an order for Ali Khans release on bail are obviously inappropriate. Nor does the undertaking by the petitioners at the foot of the bond that the accused shall attend "if so required by the said Court, in the said or any other Court, and that he shall, if under the said decision any sentence remains to be undergone by him, surrender to the trying Magistrate on being called upon to do so by the District Magistrate" make any difference. Merely by referring to the Deputy Commissioner as a Court the petitioners could not make him a Court, if in this matter he was not functioning as a Court. The fact is that the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, on whom was put the duty of drawing up the bond, used the form prescribed for an accused person released by an appellate Court, and the petitioners signed the form without considering what was the exact meaning conveyed by the words of the form. The District authorities were aware that this form was not in accordance with the Government order, and therefore took a separate bond on a stamped paper of Rs. The District authorities were aware that this form was not in accordance with the Government order, and therefore took a separate bond on a stamped paper of Rs. 10 in which the petitioners stood surety for the amount specified and bound "ourselves, our heirs, executors and successors" to the Government of Bihar to pay Rs. 60,000.00 in case Ali Khan "fails to.....surrender to the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum within three days of the receipt of the notice of the order or judgment of the Judicial Committee etc." In this bond the Deputy Commissioner is not described as a Court. 13 The learned Advocate-General has urged that Sec. 514 contemplates three and not merely two classes of bonds. He would, infer the third class of, bonds from the words "of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class". This class, he argues, consists of bonds which are not for appearance before a Court and which are not taken by a Court under the Code. With respect I am unable to accept this context-tion. According to this interpretation the third class would be an omnibus class including all bonds taken by any person or authority under any provision of law. It appears to me that the provision relating to "the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class" is intended to empower such Magistrate to deal with the two kinds of bonds which I have described. The reason for such a provision is easy to see. Where a bond under the Code has been taken by a Court it may happen that it is more convenient for some other Court to deal with the forfeiture of the bonds. To take only one instance, it may be that the Court which took the bond has been abolished. Exactly the same reasoning would apply to a bond for appearance before a Court. Ordinarily it is convenient that the Court before which the person bound is due to appear should deal with the forfeiture of the bond. It is for this reason that that Court, is empowered to deal with forfeiture, independent of whether it is the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first; class. Ordinarily it is convenient that the Court before which the person bound is due to appear should deal with the forfeiture of the bond. It is for this reason that that Court, is empowered to deal with forfeiture, independent of whether it is the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first; class. But it may happen that the Court has been abolished or has ceased to exercise jurisdiction after the forfeiture of the bond and before an order enforcing the forfeiture has been passed, as seems to have happened in the case of -- AIR 1949 Pat 196 (C). In such circumstances, if the bond which is forfeited has been taken by an officer who is not a Court, provision is necessary for some other Court to deal with the matter of forfeiture. Even where the bond has been taken by a Court it may be more convenient for some other Court to deal with it, or it may be that the Court which took the bond has also been abolished. It is to meet these contingencies that a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class has been empowered to deal with such matters. 14. I am aware that a different view was expressed by Beaumont, C. J. in -- AIR 1943 Bom 178 (B), but the case was decided on a different point, namely, that whereas the bond required the accused to attend in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, the forfeiture was said to have been incurred by his failure to attend before the 8th Presidency Magistrate. The view expressed by Beaumont C. J. was followed by Agarwala, C. J. in -- AIR 1949 Pat 196 (C). According to him in the absence of the Court before which the accused was bound to appear, the proper Court to deal with the forfeiture of the bond is the Court by which the bond was taken. With respect, X would observe that his Lordships attention was not directed to the words "of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class" in Sub-section (1) of Sec. 514. With respect, X would observe that his Lordships attention was not directed to the words "of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class" in Sub-section (1) of Sec. 514. If the special provision in this sub-section relating to bonds for appearance before a Court does not prevent the Court by which the bond was taken from dealing with the forfeiture of the bond I do not see why it should be held to prevent a Presidency Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class from dealing with the forfeiture of such a bond. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 514 empowers three classes of Courts to deal with matters of forfeiture of bonds: Courts which have taken bonds under the Code, Courts of Presidency Magistrate, and Courts of 1st class Magistrate. The special provision relating to bonds for appearance before a Court empowered a fourth class; it was not intended to restrict the general power given to the other three classes of Courts. 15. Secondly, the learned Advocate-General has argued that the suspension of the sentence under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 401 had the effect of restoring the status quo before the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeal and, therefore, gave the Court the power to demand bail with sureties. There is no authority for this contention, Sec. 401 confines the power of the Government to the suspension of the execution of the sentence or the remission of the whole or any part of the punishment. The conviction under which the sentence is imposed remains unaffected. The accused, therefore, was not by the order of suspension relegated to the position of an appellant before the High Court. The proceedings before the High Court were at an end & the Excused, in accordance with the sentence which was upheld by the High Court, was in the custody of the executive authorities. Government in exercise of the discretion vested in it under Sec. 401 thought, proper to suspend his sentence and to release him on bail. The order of the Government was given effect to by the Deputy Commissioner acting as the Agent of the Government, and the bond which was executed provided that in the event of the final decision requiring his further confinement Ali Khan, would surrender to the Deputy Commissioner, so that he might be reconveyed to jail custody. The order of the Government was given effect to by the Deputy Commissioner acting as the Agent of the Government, and the bond which was executed provided that in the event of the final decision requiring his further confinement Ali Khan, would surrender to the Deputy Commissioner, so that he might be reconveyed to jail custody. The Deputy Commissioner throughout was merely the agent of the Government, and the bond cannot be taken to be one to which Sec. 514 applies. 16. Neither -- AIR 1918 Bom 228 (A), nor -- AIR 1952 SC 405 (D), is of any help. In both these cases the bond was not taken under the Code and it was not a bond for appearance before a Court, Emperor V/s. Chintaram, AIR 1936 Nag 243 (E), is equally unhelpful. It relates to a bond for appearance which was drawn up in such a slovenly fashion that, there was no mention of the Court in which the accused was to appear.