Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Second Judge of Nagercoil denying maintenance to the first and second plaintiffs in O.S. No. 162 of 1122. That decision is based on the findings: (1) that the marriage which admittedly took place between the first plaintiff and the first defendant on 16-11-1118 was void because of the pregnancy of the first plaintiff at the time of the marriage; and (2) that the second plaintiff, the daughter that was born as the result of that pregnancy, on or immediately after 15-7-1119 was not the child of the first defendant. 2. According to the lower court the interval between the marriage and the delivery was too short for the first defendant to be the father of the second plaintiff and that forms the main foundation of the two findings mentioned above. 3. An attempt was made by the first defendant to insinuate a premarital connection between the first plaintiff and one Krishnamoorthi. The evidence on record provides no warrant for the suggestion and we need only state, and in the interest of the fair name of the first plaintiff, quite categorically, that the attempt has failed. It is very significant that the letters of the first defendant to P. W. 5, his father-in-law, Exhibits A to E, covering the period from 25-11-1118 to 3-3-1119 are not the letters of an indignant victim of a serious conspiracy as a result of which he was married to a pregnant woman but of a demanding son-in-law, conscious of his customary rights and anxious to obtain the maximum in money, perquisites and presents from the father of his bride. 4. If the date of the marriage is taken as the date of conception the second plaintiff was born over 8 months thereafter and there can be no doubt that she could very well be the child of the first defendant. The following passages from Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Volume II, 10th Edition, are instructive: "[a] Children born at the seventh month of gestation are capable of living, although they are more delicate, and in general require greater care and attention to preserve them, than children born at the ninth month. [Page 34]. [b] Hence it is established that children born at the seventh, or even at or about the sixth month, may be reared. [Page 36]. [Page 34]. [b] Hence it is established that children born at the seventh, or even at or about the sixth month, may be reared. [Page 36]. [c] It would be in the highest degree unjust to impute illegitimacy to offspring, or a want of chastity to parents merely from the fact of a six-months child being born living and surviving its birth. [Page 36]." 5. The last of the passages cited above was quoted with approval in Clark v. Clark, (1939) 2 All. E.R. 59, a remarkable case in which a child born after a foetal life of 174 days survived her birth and was alive some three years later, at the time the judgment was pronounced. 6. The first defendant has a case that he was incapacitated from having any sexual connection at the time of his marriage on 16-11-1118 as he had got himself circumcised a week before that date. The only evidence other than that of the 1st defendant as D.W. 6 regarding the circumcision is that of D.W. 1, the son of the surgeon who is alleged to have performed the operation. D.W.1 at the time of the operation was a student in the IV Form and about 15 years of age. He admits his friendship with the first defendant and that he had no summons to appear in court on the date he was examined. Even if we are prepared to accept his evidence, which we are not, and find that the defendant was incapacitated from having sexual intercourse with his wife for about 30 days from the date of the operation which according to D. W. 5 is the interval necessary between a circumcision and sexual intercourse - the time available, over seven months, is sufficient to justify the inference that the first defendant was the father of the second plaintiff and to leave unrebutted the presumption in that behalf under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 7. The lower court has followed a statement of Raghavachariar in his Hindu Law (Third Edition, page 62) to the effect that the marriage of a girl who is pregnant by intercourse with a stranger is invalid. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary for us to discuss the correctness or otherwise of that statement. 8. 7. The lower court has followed a statement of Raghavachariar in his Hindu Law (Third Edition, page 62) to the effect that the marriage of a girl who is pregnant by intercourse with a stranger is invalid. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary for us to discuss the correctness or otherwise of that statement. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has stated that we may proceed on the basis that Exhibit F, a partition deed dated 5-7-1122, and Exhibit G, a mortgage dated 6-7-1122, are valid and that his clients are satisfied with a decree charged on the share of the first defendant under Exhibit F and subject to the mortgage under Exhibit G. This eliminates completely the contentions regarding those documents raised in the court below. 9. For the reasons stated above we hold that the first plaintiff's marriage with the first defendant was valid, that the second plaintiff is the issue of that marriage and that the first and second plaintiffs are entitled to maintenance. Taking the financial position of the first defendant into consideration we think that a fair award will be at the rate of Rs. 10/- per month to the mother and Rs. 5/- per month to the daughter. The arrears claimed in the plaint will also be calculated at the rates mentioned above. The amount payable as maintenance will be a charge on the properties set apart to the share of the first defendant under Exhibit F and subject to Exhibit G as mentioned in the last preceding paragraph. 10. We allow the appeal, with costs, on the lines indicated above. Allowed.