Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O.S. 881 of 1119 on the file of Munsiffs Court of Kottarakara appeals against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs on foot of a promissory note executed by him to the plaintiffs deceased father on 23-10-1113 (Ex. A) for Rs. 1,500. The plaintiffs are the only sons of the deceased payee of whom the 1st plaintiff died since. The 2nd plaintiff is the son-in-law of the defendant, having married his daughter in the year 1095. In connection with the marriage, to be clearer, by way of Varasulka, a promissory, note for Rs. 500/- was executed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' father on 13-10-1095 (Ex. I) after the marriage. This promissory note was renewed on 3-10-1101 (Ex. V) for Rs. 650 which represents the principal and interest. Ex.V was further renewed on 26-10-1107 (Ex. B) for Rs. 1,000 including the interest that accrued due till then. The promissory note sued on is the renewal of Ex. B. Exs. I, V and B contain endorsements of the aforesaid renewals. The plaintiffs' case was that the transaction evidenced by Ex. A is one for cash consideration as it purports to be. That story was disbelieved by the court below which found that Ex. A is really a renewal of Ex. B which in its turn was a renewal of Ex. V which again was a renewal of Ex. I. The court below nevertheless granted a decree because in its view the circumstance that the earliest of the promissory, notes was executed in connection with the marriage of the defendant's daughter did not vitiate it and render it unenforceable. 2. Another plea raised by the defendant that the promissory note sued on as well as its predecessors were vitiated by undue influence was repelled by the court below. Learned counsel for the appellant rightly did not canvass the correctness of that conclusion before us.' The contention that he mainly urged was that the conclusion reached by the court below that Ex. A is enforceable is erroneous on the finding recorded by it that it was the renewal of the earlier promissory notes, the earliest of which was executed in connection with the marriage of the defendant's daughter with the 2nd plaintiff and there was no cash advance in respect of any of those promissory notes. 3. A is enforceable is erroneous on the finding recorded by it that it was the renewal of the earlier promissory notes, the earliest of which was executed in connection with the marriage of the defendant's daughter with the 2nd plaintiff and there was no cash advance in respect of any of those promissory notes. 3. Whatever might be said about the enforceability of a promise to pay bride's price or Varasulka, when once a promissory note is, executed, the promise to pay is performed because a promissory note amounts in law to payment and what vitiates a promise does note vitiate a payment. The conception is that the amount was paid and re-invested with the promisor under the promissory note which is regarded as supported by cash consideration. This was the view taken by the Cochin High Court in Sivaramakrishna Iyen v. Venkitarama Rama Iyen (X Cochin 574) wherein a promissory note executed by the father of a girl to her father-in-law in connection with the marriage and in respect of jewels agreed to be paid thereon was sought to be enforced. The contention urged was that the promise to pay was opposed to public policy and the promissory note which only contained that promise was unenforceable as the promise that preceded it. The High Court of Cochin repelled this contention and held that the promissory note amounted in law to payment. This decision was followed by the same High Court in a Full Bench in XXXIII Cochin 362 wherein the question arose as regards the enforceability of a promissory note executed by a Hindu father in favour of his daughter. The contention urged by the sons of the promisor who was dead at the time was that under the Hindu Law a promise to make a gift could not be enforced though it is competent for a father to make a gift of a small portion of the family properties to the daughter. The Full Bench upholding the view taken in X Cochin 574 that a promissory note amounted in law to payment, found that the promissory note by the father amounted to payment and therefore the principles of Hindu law which it was contended would vitiate a promise to pay were held inapplicable. The Full Bench upholding the view taken in X Cochin 574 that a promissory note amounted in law to payment, found that the promissory note by the father amounted to payment and therefore the principles of Hindu law which it was contended would vitiate a promise to pay were held inapplicable. The controversy that was resolved in XXXIII Cochin 362 came before this Court at a later stage in the case reported in 1950 K. L. T. 6 (Krishna Iyer v. Lekshmi Ammal) wherein also the principle that a promissory note amounted to payment and any circumstance vitiating the promise to pay will not vitiate the document has been accepted. As against these decisions learned counsel for the appellant cited a decision of the Madras High Court in A. I. R. 1945 Madras 165 (Narayanan Nambudiri v. Patticharavoor) wherein it was held that a promise to pay Varasulka evidenced by a promissory note executed in favour of a bridegroom is unenforceable under Section 23 of the Contract Act. There is no consideration in that decision of the question as to whether when a promissory note is given it will amount to payment. 4. Following the view taken by this Court in 1950 K. L.T. 6 which is also the view taken by the Cochin High Court in the aforesaid two cases, we are of the opinion that a promissory note amounts to payment and any circumstance vitiating the earlier promise to pay does not attach to the enforcement of the document Which is a negotiable instrument. It may also be mentioned that learned counsel for the appellant did not place before us any decision concerning the question that was considered and decided in the aforesaid cases of the Cochin High Court and this Court, which has taken a different view. No other point was argued in this appeal. 5. In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs. Dismissed.