ORDER OF REFERENCE This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. This application arises out of our judgment in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 258 of 1951 decided on the 25th April, 1952, and since reported in 1952 N.L.J. 373 ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 343). 2. The matter concerns the assessment of sales tax for the quarter ending with 12th November, 1947. The applicants had applied under Section 23 of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, requesting the Board of Revenue to refer certain questions of law for decision by this Court. That application was rejected. The applicants then applied to this Court and the Chief Justice directed the Board of Revenue to refer certain questions for decision by this Court. 3. The questions were referred to this Court and by our judgment we answered those questions. The present application is made for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The question is whether our decision amounts to "a judgment, decree or final order" within Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution. There have been some decisions which lay down that appeal does not lie in such matters and the decision is not a "judgment, decree or final order". See Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 29; 2 S.T.C. 73 (F.B.)), per Sarjoo Prasad and Rai, JJ.; Shearer, J., contra, and Pahlad Rai & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1952] 21 I.T.R. 523). Since the matter is important we think that this question should be authoritatively settled by a Full Bench. Let the papers be laid before my Lord the Chief Justice with a recommendation that a Full Bench be constituted to decide this application. In accordance with the abovesaid order of reference the case came up for hearing before the Full Bench and the following judgments were delivered:- Advocates Appeared: R. S. Dabir and R. M. Hajarnavis, for the assessees. T. P. Naik and W. K. Sheorey, for the State. JUDGMENT HIDAYATULLAH, J. - This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of Choudhuri, J., and myself in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 258 of 1951, decided on the 25th April, 1952, on a reference from the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh. The decision of the Division Bench has since been reported in 1952 N.L.J. 373 ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 343). 2. The decision of the Division Bench has since been reported in 1952 N.L.J. 373 ([1952] 3 S.T.C. 343). 2. The reference was occasioned in a case arising out of sales tax proceedings. The learned Chief Justice directed the Board on the application of the assessee to state a case and to refer certain questions for the decision of the High Court. Those questions were answered by the Division Bench, and it is against that judgment that the applicant proposes to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. The case was at first before a Division Bench consisting of Choudhury, J., and myself, but on a reference by the Bench that the point involved was important, it has been referred to this Full Bench for decision. 3. The question that arises is :- "Does an appeal lie against the judgment of the High Court on a reference by the Board of Revenue under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 ?" 4. Section 23 of the Act, inter alia, provides as follows :- "(5) The High Court upon the hearing of a reference under this section shall decide the question of law raised thereby and shall deliver judgment thereon containing the grounds of decision and shall send to the Tribunal a copy of the judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Register, and the Tribunal shall dispose of the case accordingly." 5. It is contended that the judgment of the High Court is appealable under Article 133(1)(a) or (c) of the Constitution of India because it is a civil proceeding and involves an amount exceeding Rs. 20,000 or is otherwise fit for appeal under clause (1)(c) ibid, and, alternatively, that even if it were not a civil proceeding, it is "other proceeding" and falls within Article 132(1) ibid, inasmuch as it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. 6. On the first point I have no doubt that this is not a civil proceeding at all. These proceedings arise out of collection of revenue and are before this Court merely for the purpose of advice which the Board of Revenue seeks or which this Court enjoins upon the Board, upon certain points of law. 6. On the first point I have no doubt that this is not a civil proceeding at all. These proceedings arise out of collection of revenue and are before this Court merely for the purpose of advice which the Board of Revenue seeks or which this Court enjoins upon the Board, upon certain points of law. The essence of the proceedings is the collection of revenue and not the decision of any dispute of a civil nature in the strict sense. Further, even if it be held that the proceedings are civil proceedings, the decision of the High Court cannot fall within the expression "judgment, decree or final order" for reasons to be given hereafter. In my opinion, the argument of the applicant that the appeal lies under Article 133 in not sound. 7. Indeed, the learned counsel for the applicant did not choose to state his case on this ground too strongly but relied rather upon the applicability of Article 132(1) of the Constitution. That Article reads :- "(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution." * * * * "Explanation. - For the purposes of this Article, the expression 'final order' includes an order deciding an issue which, if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case." 8. The first clause of the Article as reproduced above does seem to suggest as if it was intended that the Supreme Court should entertain appeals against all decisions and in all matters, whether civil, criminal or other, if the High Court certified that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that "order proceeding" is not ejusdem generis with what precedes and that in Pritam Singh v. The State ((1950) A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that income-tax cases came within Article 136 and the same reasoning applies to Article 132. The learned counsel for the applicant contended that "order proceeding" is not ejusdem generis with what precedes and that in Pritam Singh v. The State ((1950) A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that income-tax cases came within Article 136 and the same reasoning applies to Article 132. Granting that revenue proceedings are included in the expression "other proceeding", the question that arises for our consideration is whether the "judgment" of the High Court under the consideration can be said to fall within the phrase "judgment, decree or final order" as used in Article 132(1) of the Constitution. Those words are the sine qua non of the application of the Article. 9. In Mohammad Amin Brothers, Ltd. v. Dominion of India ((1950) S.C.J. 139 at p. 141), it was pointed out that if the order did not amount to a final order, judgment or decree the certificate granted by the Court under Section 205 of the Government of India Act was ineffectual. Unless we can say that the "judgment" falls within the above description, it cannot be held that an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 132(1). Whether an appeal would lie under Article 136 now or when the mater is decided finally by the Revenue Board in accordance with the decision of the High Court is no more relevant than whether the Privy Council granted special leave in any particular case in the exercise of the Prerogative of His Majesty. 10. That the "judgment" of the High Court on a reference is not a decree, whether in the sense in which it is used in the Civil Procedure Code or in its generic meaning as understood by the profession, does not admit of any doubt. It is not a decree in either sense. Therefore the present question can only be resolved in favour of the applicant if the "judgment" of the High Court falls within the other two expressions used, that is to say, "judgment" or "final order." 11. The interpretation of these expressions is not before the Court for the first time and numerous rulings exist dealing with the Letters Patent, the Civil Procedure Code and the Government of India Act, 1935. The interpretation of these expressions is not before the Court for the first time and numerous rulings exist dealing with the Letters Patent, the Civil Procedure Code and the Government of India Act, 1935. The expression "final order" was considered by the Federal Court in Mohammed Amin Brothers, Ltd. v. Dominion of India ([1950] S.C.J. 139 at p. 141), where the Federal Court was dealing with the meaning of a similar collocation of words in Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was then observed by their Lordships that :- "If the order appealed from does not amount to a final order, judgment or decree, a certificate given by the High Court is ineffectual by itself to attract the operation of Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act". The expression 'final order' has been used in contra-distinction to what is known as 'interlocutory order' and the essential test to distinguish the one from the other has been discussed and formulated in several cases decided by the Judicial Committee. All the relevant authorities bearing on the question have been reviewed by this Court in their recent pronouncement in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King ([1947] F.C.R. 180), and the law on the point, so far as this Court is concerned, seems to be well settled. In full agreement with the decisions of the Judicial Committee in Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas ((1920) L.R. 47 I.A. 124 (P.C.)), and Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons ((1920) L.R. 60 I.A. 76 (P.C.)), and the authorities of the English Courts upon which these pronouncements were based, it has been held by this Court that the test for determining the finality of an order is, whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. To quote the language of Sir George Lowndes in Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim & Sons ((1920) L.R. 60 I.A. 76 (P.C.)) : 'the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If after the order the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it.' The fact that the order decides an important and even a vital issue is by itself not material. If after the order the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it.' The fact that the order decides an important and even a vital issue is by itself not material. If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but if the suit is still left alive and has got to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order. Judged by the test, the order appealed from in the present case cannot certainly rank as a 'final order'." 12. To the same effect are the observations in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1) and in Premchand v. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 14; 1 S.T.C. 313). The latter was a case in which an order of the High Court declining to call upon the Board of Revenue to state a case under Section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, was not considered as a final order passed either in exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. In dealing with the case their Lordships also referred to the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724 (P.C.)) and quoted from In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society ((1892) 2 Q.B. 613 at p. 617). Their Lordships, on the authority of that case as also other English cases, held that since the jurisdiction of the High Court was only consultative, the fact that the taxing authority would deal with the case in the light of the opinion of the High Court did not render the order a "final order" because the High Court's order did not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the parties. 13. It is no doubt true that the explanation now added to Article 132 gives a modified meaning to the word "final" and renders these earlier rulings inapplicable to the facts contemplated by the explanation. 13. It is no doubt true that the explanation now added to Article 132 gives a modified meaning to the word "final" and renders these earlier rulings inapplicable to the facts contemplated by the explanation. Now an order deciding an "issue", which, "if decided in favour of the appellant", is "sufficient" for "the final disposal of the case", is a "final order." This explanation is intended to bring in the earlier rulings in Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v. C. A. Turner ((1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 155 (P.C.)) and Saiyid Muzhar Hossein v. Mussamut Bodha Bibi ((1895) I.L.R. 17 All. 112 (P.C.)). But the word "sufficient" shows that the order must still in its extent, if not of its own force, be sufficient to dispose of the whole case finally. The appellant in each case must show that the order, if in his favour, would finally dispose of the case and that the order involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. A certain measure of finality, short of decision of the case, is contemplated even under the explanation. 14. When the Board of Revenue asks for advice on certain points, the opinion of the High Court is binding on the Board but the sufficiency of the High Court's opinion for the final disposal of the case depends upon a variety of circumstances which it is impossible to generalise. The question may be a side issue and may not cover the whole case. Similarly, when the High Court orders the Board to state a case on a certain point or points, the decision of the High Court on that point or points may not be sufficient for the disposal of the case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the decisions referred to by me still govern the interpretation of the term "final order". The explanation which gives an added right of appeal in certain circumstances by treating an order as final, though it is not, can be applied in other contexts more easily than in the context of advisory or consultative judgments given under Section 23(5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. In that jurisdiction the order binds the taxing authority but whether the opinion of the High Court is sufficient to dispose of the whole case is not for the High Court to say. 15. In that jurisdiction the order binds the taxing authority but whether the opinion of the High Court is sufficient to dispose of the whole case is not for the High Court to say. 15. It remains to consider whether the "judgment" of the High Court is a "judgment" within the meaning of the term as used in Article 132. In the Letters Patent the words were "final judgment". In Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the qualifying word "final" was dropped. The only difference between that section and Article 132 is that while the former spoke of "a judgment, decree or final order of a High Court", the latter speaks of "a judgment, decree or final order......... whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding". The questions that arise are whether the omission of the qualifying word "final" in both these provisions and the addition of the words "other proceeding" in the present Constitution render the earlier acceptance of the term "judgment" inapplicable. 16. The leading case on the meaning of the term "judgment" is Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724). In that case their Lordships were concerned with the interpretation of Clause 39 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court which contained the expression "final judgment". No doubt, their Lordships said that a consultative opinion rendered by the High Court was not a "final judgment" but they gave as their reasons that it was not a judgment and much less final. From page 733 of the report the discussion begins and at page 736 their Lordships begin discussing the term "judgment" in all its implications and they observe :- "It would appear clear to their Lordships that the word 'judgment' is not here used in its strict legal and proper sense. It is not an executive document directing something to be done or not to be done, but is merely the expression of the opinions of the majority of the Judges who heard the case, together with a statement of the grounds upon which those opinions are based. It amounts only to a ruling that a certain deduction claimed by a taxpayer to be allowed from the sum for which he has been already assessed to income-tax is not permissible." 17. It amounts only to a ruling that a certain deduction claimed by a taxpayer to be allowed from the sum for which he has been already assessed to income-tax is not permissible." 17. It is imposible to say that these observations were dependent upon the presence of the word "final" qualifying the word "judgment". It is true that the existence of that qualification was held by their Lordships to be an additional circumstance tending to the result that there was no appeal against that "judgment". But the force of their Lordships' dictum quoted by me is not spent when the word "final" is not to be found. Indeed, such an argument was advanced and not accepted by the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77). In Mohammad Amin Brothers v. The Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77) and Premchand v. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1951 F.C. 14 1 S.T.C. 313) the meaning of the term "judgment" as laid down by the Judicial Committee has been accepted without reserve. The same is the view of the Patna High Court, though it was expressed in relation to Article 133 of the Constitution : See Tobacco Manufacturers (India) v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 29; 2 S.T.C. 73). These authorities are certainly more relevant and nearer the point than several others like C. T. Gogstad & Co. v. H. Newsum, Sons & Co. ([1921] 2 A.C. 528), or In re a Debtor ([1921] 3 K.B. 242). 18. These cases clearly establish that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, whether it be under the Income-tax Act or the Sales Tax Act, is merely advisory and consultative and the opinion given on the questions mooted neither ranks as a "final order" nor even as a "judgment". The order does not decide the controversies but merely gives expression to an opinion for the guidance of the referring authority. The opinion, though binding on the Board of Revenue, is not on an "issue" and is not "sufficient for the final disposal of the case". There might be a dozen questions in the case and the reference might be of one question only. Evidence might be required in the light of the interpretation of the law and that might lead to other questions which might have to be referred again. There might be a dozen questions in the case and the reference might be of one question only. Evidence might be required in the light of the interpretation of the law and that might lead to other questions which might have to be referred again. How can it be assumed that only arithmetical calculations are left ? In my opinion, the explanation cannot cover the present case and hence is not of assistance. 19. The accepted view in the Privy Council, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court has been that such decisions do not fall either within the expression "judgment, decree of final order" as used in the Letters Patent of the High Courts or in the Constitution Act in force before the present Constitution. The use of the words "civil, criminal or other proceeding" does not make the present Article wider than Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The phrase "judgment, decree or final order of a High Court" is certainly not less general than the corresponding phrase "judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in a civil, criminal or other proceeding" now used. If the ambit of Section 205 of the Government of India Act was not less, the rulings must govern our interpretation of Article 132 of the Constitution. The Explanation widens the ambit of Article 132 beyond that the Section 205 but the advisory opinion is not generally an order "sufficient" for the final disposal of the case, and certainly not in this case. 20. In my opinion, the use of the same expression, namely, "judgment, decree of final order" once again in Article 132 clearly imports the decisions above referred to for the interpretation of that phrase. The addition of the words "other proceeding" does not enlarge the ambit of the section beyond what was included in Section 205 of the earlier Constitution. It is not open to me to depart from the view so consistently taken. The addition of the words "other proceeding" does not change the meaning of the phrase "judgment, decree or final order" which are still the crucial words. The explanation does render certain orders final even though they are not, but it sets its own limitations. The decision in Election Commissioner v. Venkat Rao (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210) must be read in the light of its own facts. The explanation does render certain orders final even though they are not, but it sets its own limitations. The decision in Election Commissioner v. Venkat Rao (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210) must be read in the light of its own facts. There the position under Articles 133 and 132 is contrasted and the observation merely points out that there in a vital difference between the two Articles. Their Lordships' observations do not infringe on the meaning of the crucial words nor do they contain a full exposition of the explanation to Article 132 applicable to these facts. We have to see if the order would be sufficient to dispose of the case finally because it is on an "issue" vital to the case. Frankly speaking, I do not understand what is meant by liberal construction in this context. Either there is a right of appeal in such cases or there is not. We cannot by a liberal construction confer a right of appeal on a Court superior to this Court unless we say that the words of the Constitution warrant this. The constitutional point in this case concerns only extra-territoriality and is not of sufficient width to lead to a decision of the whole case. Considered in this light, I am of opinion that no leave can be granted in the present case. 21. It may be pointed out that in the Income-tax Act a special section (Section 66A) had to be added to obviate the difficulty of taking appeals to the Privy Council (now the Supreme Court) from such decisions. No such enactment has been made in the Sales Tax Act and it would be advisable to add such a provision in view of the large amounts involved. 22. The application shall be dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100 if certified. DEO, J. - This application for a certificate of fitness purporting to be under Article 135 of the Constitution, read with Order 45, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, was referred to this Full Bench as an important question of the interpretation of the term "judgment, decree or final order" in Articles 132 and 133 with reference to a decision under Section 23(5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was involved. In the order of reference mention was made of the decisions reported in Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 29; 2 S.T.C. 73) per Sarjoo Prasad and Rai, JJ., Shearer, J., contra, and Pahlad Rai and Co. v. Income-tax Commissioner (A.I.R. 1952 Punj. 299; 21 I.T.R. 523), bearing on the interpretation of the term. At the hearing, the learned Counsel for the applicant did not seriously rely on either Article 135 or Article 133. He pressed for a certificate under Article 132(1). 2. Section 23(5) of the Act is similar in terms to Section 66(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. These sections enjoin the High Court to do three things : to decide the questions of law raised by the reference, deliver a judgment containing the grounds of decision, and to send a copy of the judgment to the Tribunal. Thereafter the case has to be disposed of the Tribunal in accordance with the judgment of the High Court. 3. The controversy before the High Court in the instant case was whether the transactions in question were sales within the State and whether the provisions of the Act with regard to these sales in question were intra vires. As these questions were decided against the applicant, nothing further remained to be done by the Tribunal. Had they been decided in favour of the applicant, all that the Tribunal would have had to do was to exclude the amounts of such sales, which are already determined, from the computation of the turnover and to calculate the tax payable by the applicant. All this is consequential arithmetical calculation and does not involve any adjudication by the Tribunal. 4. Unlike Section 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, there is no provision in the Act for a regular appeal to the Supreme Court. In the absence of such provision the right of appeal must be traced to clause 29 of the Letters Patent or to the Constitution. It cannot be disputed that the judgment was not passed on appeal or in the exercise of original jurisdiction of this Court, or that the proceedings are not civil or criminal proceedings. It is not urged that the judgment amounts to a decree. The proceedings under Section 23 deal with matters pertaining to liability and assessment of tax and can properly be regarded as revenue proceedings. They are not civil proceedings. It is not urged that the judgment amounts to a decree. The proceedings under Section 23 deal with matters pertaining to liability and assessment of tax and can properly be regarded as revenue proceedings. They are not civil proceedings. Clause 29 of the Letters Patent and Article 133 of the Constitution have therefore no application. 5. On a perusal of the grounds of appeal and of the judgment of the Division Bench from which an appeal is sought to be taken to the Supreme Court, there can be no manner of doubt that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The only question for decision therefore is, "Whether the judgment under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act is 'a judgment or final order in the proceedings' within the meaning of Article 132(1) of the Constitution." 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the non-applicant that the words "other proceeding" in this Article should be construed ejusdem generis with what precedes is not acceptable. The decision in Pritam Singh v. The State (A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 169), on which he relies does not support this submission. The words "other proceeding" are words of wide amplitude and include all proceedings other than civil or criminal proceedings. They thus include revenue proceedings. 7. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Prem Chand v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 14; 1 S.T.C. 313) it was held in Pahlad Rai and Co. v. Income-tax Commissioner ([1952] 21 I.T.R. 523) that an appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of a High Court under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act is incompetent. A certificate was sought under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution which has no application unless the order is passed in civil proceedings. In Prem Chand v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 14; 1 S.T.C. 313) their Lordships were considering the right of appeal under clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court (which corresponds to clause 39 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and to clause 29 of that of this Court) against the order passed before the Constitution came into force, under Section 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, declining to require the Board of Revenue to state a case. Clause 31 refers to decisions in civil proceedings in the exercise of appellate or original jurisdiction. Since the proceedings in the High Court under the Income-tax Act or the Sales Tax Act are not civil proceedings and the order is not passed in the exercise of the appellate or original jurisdiction, clause 31 had no application. Having so held, it was not necessary to decide if the order was a final order within the meaning of that clause. The test of finality as laid down by their Lordships is that the order must "by its own force bind or affect the rights of parties." Their Lordships relied on Tata Iron and Steel Company, Limited v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) and In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613, at p. 617). It is not necessary to decide in the instant case the nature of the order passed under Section 23(3) of the Sales Tax Act (corresponding to Section 21(3) of the Bihar Act) or Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act. 8. In Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. The State ( (1951) 2 S.T.C. 73 ; A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 29) their Lordships were considering the right of appeal against an order under Section 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act under Section 109 and Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, Clause 31 of the Letters Patent and Article 133 of the Constitution. None of these has any application unless the decision of the High Court is in a civil proceeding. The majority view of the Full Bench is that it is not a civil proceeding. That being so, the discussion about judgment and final order is obiter. Sarjoo Prasad, J., with whom Rai, J., concurred, observed :- "....... the use of the term 'judgment' or 'final judgment' in the eye of law does not bear any different significance and the use of the word 'final' as qualifying 'judgment' is merely ex cautela. That being so, the discussion about judgment and final order is obiter. Sarjoo Prasad, J., with whom Rai, J., concurred, observed :- "....... the use of the term 'judgment' or 'final judgment' in the eye of law does not bear any different significance and the use of the word 'final' as qualifying 'judgment' is merely ex cautela. It is in this orthodox and juristic sense that the term 'judgment' appears to have been used in Sections 205 and 206, Government of India Act, 1935, or for the matter of that in Article 132, 133 and 134 of the present Constitution of India." This statement of law is not borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Tata Iron and Steel Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) or by English decisions relied on by the Judicial Committee. It was examined by one of us (Hidayatullah, J.), in Manohar v. Baliram (I.L.R. [1952] Nag. 471 (F.B.)). He remarked at page 498 :- "With all due respect to the learned Judge, this is not borne out by the dictum of their Lordships to which he has referred, because their Lordships throughout the ruling were considering the merit of a final judgment and the tenor of their Lordships' discussion clearly establishes that there is a distinction between a final and an interlocutory judgment." 9. The learned counsel for the non-applicant further relies on the decision in Mohammad Amin Brothers v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77) which follows S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1), Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas (A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 86) and Abdul Rahman v. D. K. Cassim and Sons (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 58). In Ram Chand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas (A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 86) it was held that an order refusing stay of suit under the Arbitration Act is not a final order within the meaning of Section 109, Civil Procedure Code, because it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties on merits but leaves them to be determined by the Courts in the ordinary way. In Abdul Rahman's case (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 58) it was held that an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 23, is not a final order within the meaning of Section 109 of the Code. In Abdul Rahman's case (A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 58) it was held that an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 23, is not a final order within the meaning of Section 109 of the Code. Ram Chand Manjimal's case (A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 86) was relied on and Rahimbhoy Habbibhoy v. C. A. Turner ((1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 115 (P.C.)) and Saiyid Muzhar Hossein v. Mussamat Bodha Bibi ((1895) I.L.R. 17 All. 112 (P.C.)), were distinguished. The order of remand did not decide the rights of the parties on merits but set aside the order of dismissal of the suit under Order 22, Rule 8(2), Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that the claim for damages in suit did not vest in the Official Assignee and directed the lower Court to proceed with the suit. Their Lordships had not considered the case of remand after adjudication of certain rights of the parties on merits. Following these decisions it was held in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1), that a preliminary or interlocutory order in a criminal case is not a judgment or final order. The words "final order" were used in contrast with "interlocutory order". 10. In Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy's case ((1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 155), it was held that a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts is final under Section 595 (109 of the present Code) though it does not finally determine the liability of the defendant because the liability to account which the defendant disputed was finally determined and could not be disputed again. In Saiyid Muzhar Hossein's case ((1895) I.L.R. 17 All. 112) it was held that a remand order which finally decides the title of the plaintiff is a final order of the High Court, notwithstanding that subordinate enquiries remained to be made by the first Court on remand. 11. Their Lordships distinguished these cases on the ground that they were decided with reference to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 in which the wording of the relevant sections materially differed from that of the Code of 1908. The right of appeal rested on clause 39 and was elaborated in Sections 595 and 596 of the Code of 1882 and now in Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of 1908. There was no change in clause 39 of the Letters Patent. The right of appeal rested on clause 39 and was elaborated in Sections 595 and 596 of the Code of 1882 and now in Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of 1908. There was no change in clause 39 of the Letters Patent. The words "final decree" and "decree" in Sections 595 and 596 were substituted by "decree or final order" and "decree or order" respectively in Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. The word "final" was omitted in view of the extended definition of "decree" in the new Act. Under the old definition, which had to be considered in Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy's case ((1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 155), an adjudication, in order to constitute a decree, must have decided the suit or appeal. As defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, "decree" is the formal expression of an adjudication of the rights of parties which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. It is therefore final; but it does not in all cases end the lis. The amended definition expressly includes a preliminary decree and certain decisions which are not decrees in the strict sense of the term. The amendment thus gives an extended meaning to the term. Clause 39 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and Section 595 of the Code of 1882 provided for an appeal against a final decree. Though a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts is not a final decree, it was held to be so in Rahimbhoy's case ((1891) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 155) because it finally determined the rights of the parties though the precise liability on further enquiry remained to be determined. The definition of "decree" must have been amended to give effect to this decision. If I may say so, with all respect, the decisions are not distinguishable. 12. Section 109, clauses (a) and (b), Civil Procedure Code, provide for an appeal as of right, while the right of appeal under clause (c) is in the discretion of the Court, Radhakisan v. Shridhar (I.L.R. [1950] Nag. 532). In the latter case it is not necessary that an order, in order to be appealable, must be a final order. 13. "Orders" are final or interlocutory. 532). In the latter case it is not necessary that an order, in order to be appealable, must be a final order. 13. "Orders" are final or interlocutory. The test of finality is stated in Sayid Muzhar Hossein's case ((1895) I.L.R. 17 All. 112). On a literal reading of Sections 595 and 596 of the Code of 1882 even final orders were not appealable. It must therefore have been thought necessary to amend the wording of these sections. As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have stated in the above case, the finality must be as to the rights of the parties on merits and not as to the proceedings. In the instant case the decision of the High Court under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act either way finally decides the rights of the parties and the decision in final so far as the Court and the parties are concerned, though consequential order may have to be passed to give effect to the decision and give relief to the parties. If the applicant succeeds in the Supreme Court, all that the Tribunal would be required to do is to make certain calculations. 14. In Mohammad Amin Brothers v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1953 F.C. 77), the High Court on the Appellate Side set aside the winding-up order of a Single Judge on the Original Side and directed the proceedings to be kept pending till the liability of the debtor to the creditor was determined in separate proceedings which were then pending. This order was held not to be a final order within the meaning of Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act though an important constitutional issue was decided. In delivering the judgment of the Court Mukherjea, J., stated, "The order of the trial Judge did dispose of the rights of the parties that were in controversy in the proceedings but the appellate Judge left the entire case undecided." 15. Substantial constitutional questions arise not only in civil and criminal proceedings but in other proceedings as well. The Supreme Court is the final authority on constitutional matters. It cannot therefore be the intention to exclude the right of appeal even though substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arise in revenue proceedings. Substantial constitutional questions arise not only in civil and criminal proceedings but in other proceedings as well. The Supreme Court is the final authority on constitutional matters. It cannot therefore be the intention to exclude the right of appeal even though substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arise in revenue proceedings. "Though the interpretation of the Constitution is subject to the ordinary principles applicable to the construction of statutes, it cannot be forgotten that we have to construe an organic instrument which must be interpreted not in any narrow and pedantic sense but in a broad and liberal spirit." (G. D. Karkare v. T. L. Shevda (I.L.R. [1952] Nag. 409, 419) and Bhailal v. Additional Deputy Commissioner ((1952) N.L.J. 613 Spl. B. 657)). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated in Election Commission v. Venkata Rao (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210, 212), "The whole scheme of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court clearly indicates that questions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution are placed in a special category irrespective of the nature of proceedings in which they may arise, and a right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed in cases involving such questions." With these observations their Lordships overruled the objection that an appeal does not lie under Article 132 from a decision of a Single Judge of a High Court. The words of Article 132(1) are very general and confer a right of appeal from "any judgment, decree, or final order". In the Government of India Act, 1915, there was no provision corresponding to this Article or to Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The right of appeal rested on the Letters Patent in the absence of a specific provision in the relevant Act. The change of language in Section 205(1) and in Article 132(1) is not without significance. The omission of the word "final" as qualifying "judgment" or "decree" is deliberate and has extended the right of appeal when substantial questions regarding interpretation of the Constitution are involved. There is no warrant for the view that the relevant English Acts and the Letters Patents used the word "final" without any significance. The omission of the word "final" as qualifying "judgment" or "decree" is deliberate and has extended the right of appeal when substantial questions regarding interpretation of the Constitution are involved. There is no warrant for the view that the relevant English Acts and the Letters Patents used the word "final" without any significance. The scope of final order has been enlarged by the Explanation to that Article which was designed to supersede the decision of the Federal Court in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1). "The object of Article 132 is to secure a speedy determination of Constitutional issues going to the root of a case" : Election Commission v. Venkata Rao (A.I.R. 195 S.C. 210, 212). The decision in Mohammad Amin Brothers v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77) and S. Kuppuswami's case (A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1) are of little assistance in view of this pronouncement of the Supreme Court. 16. In Tata Iron and Steel Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 742.) their Lordships were considering clause 39 of the Letters Patent which gives the right of appeal to the Privy Council against a "final judgment, decree or order" in the exercise of appellate or original jurisdiction in civil proceedings. To attract that clause the decision must be either a final judgment, final decree, or final order. In the view that the proceedings before the High Court in income-tax matters are not civil proceedings and the High Court does not exercise its appellate or original jurisdiction, there cannot be a right of appeal under clause 39. It was therefore not necessary for their Lordships to consider whether the decision of the High Court under Section 51(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918, was a final judgment. Their Lordships, however, proceeded to consider what a final judgment is as understood in English decisions and referred to the following :- Standard Discount Company v. Otard De La Grange ([1877-78] 3 C.P.D. 67), Ex parte Chinery ([1884] 12 Q.B.D. 342), Ex parte Moore ([1884] 14 Q.B.D. 627), Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue ([1890] 25 Q.B.D. 465), Ex parte County Council of Kent and Council of Dover ([1891] 1 Q.B.D. 725) and In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613). 17. 17. In Standard Discount Company's case ([1877-78] 3 C.P.D. 67), Cotton, L.J., stated :- "Without using an exhaustive definition it may be laid down that an order is interlocutory which directs how an action is to proceed; and the order before us is exactly of that kind". Bramwell, L.J., stated :- "... it is not the final order of the Court in the cause, because in order to entitle the plaintiffs to levy execution there must be a subsequent direction by the Court." Their Lordships were interpreting rule 1 of Order XIV of the Supreme Court Rules of England which allows a plaintiff, as soon as the defendant has appeared to a specially indorsed writ, to apply to a Master or a Judge and to obtain an order, which will prevent the action from going through its ordinary course, and will give the plaintiff liberty at once to sign judgment without taking the usual steps. As Cotton, L.J., stated :- "the order, however, relates to the procedure and therefore is only interlocutory." 18. In Ex parte Chinery ([1884] 12 Q.B.D. 342) it was held that a garnishee order absolute is not a "final judgment" against the garnishee within sub-section (1)(g) of Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and the judgment-creditor who has the order cannot issue a bankruptcy notice against the garnishee in respect of it. Garnishee is a person who is garnished or warned. A garnishee order is the order of the Court warning a debtor to pay his debt not to his immediate creditor but to a person who has obtained a final judgment against such creditor and attached the debt. In passing this order, there is no adjudication between the debtor and his creditor. The attaching judgment-creditor cannot proceed to execute his decree against the garnishee : Pannlal v. Mt. Bhagirathibai ((1924) 20 Nag. L.R. 11). He has to get the right of his judgment-debtor to recover the debt sold in execution; and the execution purchaser has to institute a suit to enforce the debt and obtain "final judgment" and to execute it. This "final judgment" is knows as decree in this country. Bhagirathibai ((1924) 20 Nag. L.R. 11). He has to get the right of his judgment-debtor to recover the debt sold in execution; and the execution purchaser has to institute a suit to enforce the debt and obtain "final judgment" and to execute it. This "final judgment" is knows as decree in this country. It is in this context that in interpreting the words "final judgment" in the aforesaid section of the Bankruptcy Act that Cotton, L.J., stated that the words have the restricted meaning, that is, "a judgment obtained in an action by which a previously existing liability of the defendant to the plaintiff is ascertained or established unless there is something to show an intention to use the words in a more extended sense." The distinction between "judgment" and "final judgment" was not lost sight of. An action, according to the English law is a civil proceeding commenced by writ or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of Court. 19. The judgment in Ex parte Chinery ([1884] 12 Q.B.D. 342) was explained in Ex parte Moore ([1884-85] 14 Q.B.D. 627) where Lord Chancellor, Earl of Selborne, observed :- "To constitute an order a final judgment nothing more is necessary than that there should be a proper litis contestatio, and a final adjudication between the parties to it on the merits." In an action in the Chancery Division for injunction, damages, dissolution of partnership and accounts, an ex parte decision granting injunction, dissolution of partnership and an enquiry about damages and accounts, was passed with costs on the 17th November, 1883. The defendant was ordered to pay damages when ascertained and certified within 14 days thereof. The costs were taxed on the 23rd January, 1884. Thereafter the plaintiff served on the defendant a bankruptcy notice stating in it that the unpaid costs were due on the final judgment dated the 17th November, 1883. The contention that it was not a final judgment because further enquiries were to be made and the lis had not come to an end was not accepted. Brett, M. R., stated :- "The question is whether in the Chancery Division there cannot be a 'final judgment' when everything which has to be done by the Court itself is finished. The contention that it was not a final judgment because further enquiries were to be made and the lis had not come to an end was not accepted. Brett, M. R., stated :- "The question is whether in the Chancery Division there cannot be a 'final judgment' when everything which has to be done by the Court itself is finished. Is that a final judgment which directs certain things to be done and certain inquiries to be made, and certain other things to be done on those inquiries being answered ? If the Court ordered the result of the inquiries to be reported to itself before the judgment was given, it would not be a final judgment. But, if the Court orders something to be done according to the answer to the inquiries, without any further reference to itself, the judgment is final, and an order for the payment of costs when taxed, which is part of the judgment, is a final judgment for the costs." The Judicial Committee had taken this view in Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v. C.A. Turner ((1881) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 155). According to the law of this country, the decision dated the 17th November, 1883, was a preliminary decree and the ground for that decision was judgment in an action. That judgment must be held to be a final judgment according to the nomenclature in England and in clause 29 of the Letters Patent of this Court. 20. In Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue ((1890) 25 Q.B.D. 465), the Court of Appeal was considering whether the decision of the Exchequer Court under Section 19 of the Stamp Act of 1870 was judgment or order within the meaning of Order LVIII, Rules 3 and 15, of the Supreme Court Rules. Determination of this question was necessary for the purpose of limitation and not for deciding the right of appeal. In interpreting these rules in the light of rule 9 of that Order Lord Esher, M.R., stated, "A 'judgment' therefore is a decision obtained in an action, and every other decision is an order." The judgment so defined is equivalent to a decree under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. In interpreting these rules in the light of rule 9 of that Order Lord Esher, M.R., stated, "A 'judgment' therefore is a decision obtained in an action, and every other decision is an order." The judgment so defined is equivalent to a decree under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Unless we restrict the meaning of "judgment" to that defined in the Civil Procedure Code, that is, statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order, "judgment" must have a wider meaning and must include decisions other than those in suits. In Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal v. The Dakore Temple Committee (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 155), the Judicial Committee held that the term "judgment" in the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court means in civil cases a decree and not a judgment in the ordinary sense. In a recent Full Bench of this Court Manohar v. Baliram (I.L.R. [1952] Nag. 471) this restrictive definition of "judgment" was not accepted by my brother Hidayatullah, J. He says, "I do not agree also with the opinion that the word 'judgment' means 'any final order, decree or judgment'." (p. 521). Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had in view the expression "final judgment" in clause 39 of the Letters Patent which alone gave a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council and used the word "judgment" in the sense of "final judgment". Clause 15 of the Letters Patent which provides for an appeal from the decision of a Single Judge to a Division Court, uses the word "judgment". 21. In Salaman v. Warner ([1891] 1 Q.B. 734), the Court of Appeal was interpreting Rules 3 and 15 of Order LVIII of the Rules of the Supreme Court which provided different periods for appeals and notices of appeal from judgments or orders, whether final or interlocutory, in actions or other matters. It was held that an order dismissing an action made at the hearing upon a point of law raised by pleadings before the trial under rules 2 and 3 of Order XXV was not a final order within the meaning of these rules. Lord Esher stated :- "If the decision of the Division Court, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. Lord Esher stated :- "If the decision of the Division Court, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory." The earlier decision to the contrary in Shubrook v. Tufnell ((1882) 9 Q.B.D. 621) was not followed. 22. In Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council ([1903] 1 K.B. 547), the decision in Shubrook v. Tufnell ((1882) 9 Q.B.D. 621) was followed and the decision in Salaman v. Warner ([1891] 1 Q.B. 734), on which the decision in Ramchand Manjimal v. Goverdhandas Vishindas (A.I.R. 1920 P.C. 86) was founded, was not followed. Lord Alverstone, C.J., laid down the following test :- "Does the judgment or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of the parties ? If it does, then I think it ought to be treated as a final order; but if it does not, it is then, in my opinion, an interlocutory order." In that case the Court passed an order that the question of liability and breach of contract only would be tried and the rest of the case if any would go to the official referee. At the trial the learned Judge made an order dismissing the action holding that there was no binding contract between the parties, upon which order judgment was subsequently entered for the defendants. The question was whether this judgment was a final order, and it was answered in the affirmative. In Shubrook v. Tufnell ((1882) 9 Q.B.D. 621), the order of reference required the arbitrator to state the case for the opinion of the Court and further provided that if the opinion of the Court be one way, the case was to be referred back to the arbitrator; if the other way, judgment was to be entered for the defendant with costs. The Court decided in favour of the plaintiff and referred the case back to the arbitrator. The Court decided in favour of the plaintiff and referred the case back to the arbitrator. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Jessel, M.R., and Lindley, L.J., held that this order was a final order upon the view that where the decision of the Court on the point submitted could not in any event necessitate the entering of final judgment for either party the decision was interlocutory, but that if it could enter final judgment in the event of coming to a different conclusion then the order passed, whichever way it went, was final. 23. Order XIV, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, corresponds to Order XXV, Rule 2, of the Supreme Court Rules of England which enables a Court to dispose of a suit on issues of law. If the suit is so disposed of at the state of issues or under Order XV, Rule 3, at any subsequent stage, the decision is a decree under the Civil Procedure Code, and grounds for decision a judgment, though if the decision is the other way the suit proceeds on the remaining issues. To apply the rule stated in Salaman v. Warner ([1891] 1 Q.B. 734) is to hold that the decision in interlocutory and unappealable. 24. In In re A Debtor ([1912] 3 K.B. 242), the plaintiff seller obtained a judgment for specific performance against the defendant purchaser under which the latter had to pay Pounds 2400 as price. It directed that the conveyance would be settled by the Judge in chambers and the date by which the purchase money was to be paid would be fixed. The defendant did not pay the amount on the date fixed. Plaintiff thereafter served a bankruptcy notice calling upon the defendant to pay within the time specified in the notice the sum of Pounds 2400 due on a final judgment or order obtained by him. In repelling the contention that there was no final judgment, it was stated by the Master of the Rolls :- "If this is not a final judgment, I cannot conceive anything that is. There is nothing more to be obtained in this matter. In repelling the contention that there was no final judgment, it was stated by the Master of the Rolls :- "If this is not a final judgment, I cannot conceive anything that is. There is nothing more to be obtained in this matter. It was a final adjudication of the rights of the parties result of which was that on a date thereafter named and special conditions which had to be fulfilled, and which in fact have been fulfilled, the sum of Pounds 2400 became payable......whether it is technically called a judgment or an order seems to me to be really of no moment at all. The real essence of the case is that, is it or is it not a 'final adjudication of the rights of the parties' to use the language of Lord Selborne in Ex parte Moore ((1884) 14 Q.B.D. 627)." 25. This controversy about final order loses its force in view of the Explanation to Article 132(1) of the Constitution. 26. In Ex parte County Council of Kent and Council of Dover (1891] 1 Q.B.D. 725) it was held that the jurisdiction of the High Court upon questions submitted to it under Section 29 of the Local Government Act, 1888, was purely consultative and not judicial because (a) the question was which set of authorities should be charged with particular portions of administration; (b) the question had not arisen and could be decided in the sense of expression of opinion how it ought to be decided when it does arise; (c) the question could be submitted only on the application of the authority specified which may be charged with the administration; (d) there was no obligation on the High Court to hear anybody who might be interested in the decision of the question; (e) the Legislature did not contemplate an actual determination of an existing dispute in which a private right was involved and in which the owner of that private right would have all the ordinary right of a citizen to maintain it in a Court of law; and (f) the decision was without prejudice to any other mode of settling it. The opinion of the High Court was called decision. That really did not make any difference. The jurisdiction is similar to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution on a reference by the President. The opinion of the High Court was called decision. That really did not make any difference. The jurisdiction is similar to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution on a reference by the President. The opinion is not a judgment and has no more binding effect than the opinion of the Law Officers of the Union or State concerned. This is not the nature of a "judgment" under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act with which we are concerned. 27. The decision in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613) was based on the words of Section 19 of the Arbitration Act of 1889 which ran thus :- "Any referee, arbitrator or umpire may at any stage of proceedings under a reference, and shall, if so directed by the Court or a judge, state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Court any question of law arising in the course of the reference." In agreeing with the opinion of Lord Esher, M.R., Bowen, L.J., stated :- "The section contemplates a proceeding by the arbitrator for the purpose of guiding himself as to the course he should pursue in the reference. He does not divest himself of his complete authority over the subject-matter of the arbitration. He still remains the final judge of law and fact." It was also held that if the umpire did not retain any control or conduct over the arbitration proceedings after the issue of the reference, the decision of the Court is a final order but if he retained any control then it was an interlocutory order. This statement of the law was accepted in subsequent cases. There is no legal obligation on the arbitrator to decide the case in conformity with the opinion of the High Court. It is not a decision or determination of the rights of the parties. Although a case may be stated at any stage of proceedings, it cannot be stated after an award is made : C. T. Gogslad and Co. v. H. Newsum Sons and Co. ([1921] 2 A.C. 528 at p. 536). 28. The decision in Tata Iron and Steel Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) has to be understood in the light of the statement of law in In re Knight's case ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613). v. H. Newsum Sons and Co. ([1921] 2 A.C. 528 at p. 536). 28. The decision in Tata Iron and Steel Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) has to be understood in the light of the statement of law in In re Knight's case ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613). Section 51 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918, so far as it is material was - "(1) If in the course of any assessment under this Act or any proceeding in connection therewith...................a question has arisen with reference to the interpretation of any provision of this Act or of any rule thereunder, the Chief Revenue Authority may either on its own motion or on reference from any Revenue Officer subordinate to it, draw up a statement of the case and refer it with its own opinion thereon to the High Court and shall so refer any such question on the application of the assessee unless it is satisfied that the application is frivolous or that the reference is unnecessary." "(2) The High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the questions raised thereby and shall deliver a judgment thereon containing the grounds on which the decision is founded and shall send to the Revenue Authority by which the case was stated a copy of such judgment under the seal of the Court and the signature of the Registrar and the Revenue Authority shall dispose of the case accordingly or if the case arose on reference from any Revenue Officer subordinate to it shall forward a copy of such judgment to such officer who shall dispose of the case conformably to such judgment." It will be noticed that a reference could only be made during the course of any assessment or proceeding in connection therewith and not after the proceedings come to an end. The Revenue Authority retained seisin and control over the case. It might therefore be said that the High Court exercised advisory jurisdiction under Section 51(3). Under the present Income-tax Act the assessment case or proceeding is finally decided by the Appellate Tribunal. Thereafter an assessee or the Revenue Authority, if aggrieved by such decision, has a right to require the Tribunal to state the case and refer the questions of law arising out of its decisions for the decision of the High Court. Under the present Income-tax Act the assessment case or proceeding is finally decided by the Appellate Tribunal. Thereafter an assessee or the Revenue Authority, if aggrieved by such decision, has a right to require the Tribunal to state the case and refer the questions of law arising out of its decisions for the decision of the High Court. There is no provision to enable the Appellate Tribunal to seek the advice of the High Court during the course of proceedings before it or before any authority judicially subordinate to it. If the Tribunal refuses to discharge this legal duty, the High Court has power to issue a writ of mandamus (Alcock Ashdown and Company Limited v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 742)), or now an order under Section 66(2) to require the Tribunal to do what it should have done in the first instance. The provisions of the Sales Tax Act are identical. The Board of Revenue in the latter case does not retain seisin over the case and does not make any reference during the course of any assessment proceeding. It cannot therefore be said that it is seeking guidance and assistance from the High Court in deciding the case before it. The question of reference arises after the case is finally decided. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kameshwarsing ([1933] 1 I.T.R. 94, at p. 112), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed :- "Their Lordships have also been embarrassed in disposing of the appeal by the absence of the formal decree by the High Court following upon their judgment of..........." Their Lordships thus regard the judgment of the High Court as adjudication of the rights of parties which is final so far as that Court is concerned. The observations in In re Knight ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613) as to the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 19 of the Arbitration Act of 1889 are inapplicable to the judgments under Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act or under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act. 29. The observations in In re Knight ([1892] 2 Q.B. 613) as to the nature of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 19 of the Arbitration Act of 1889 are inapplicable to the judgments under Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act or under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act. 29. No doubt, it was held in this Court that the function of the High Court under Section 66(5) is to decide the questions referred to it and that it cannot decide questions not stated thought arising out of the facts of the case : Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay v. Managing Trustee, Shri Radha Madho Trust, Saugor ((1946) I.L.R. 1946 Nag. 594, at p. 601; 14 I.T.R. 470), and Beohar Raghubir Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P., C.P. and Berar ((1947) I.L.R. 1947 Nag. 425; 16 I.T.R. 433). These decisions are based on Rajendra Narayan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa ([1940] 8 I.T.R. 495; A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 158), where the assessee sought to raise before their Lordships a question of law which was not referred for decision and which was not raised in the Court below. It is in this sense that the jurisdiction may be said to be advisory. 30. The Tata Iron and Steel Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) is thus distinguishable on two grounds; that clause 39 of the Letters Patent has no application to a revenue proceeding and that Section 51(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1918, is dissimilar to Section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act. Three months after this decision the Judicial Committee entertained an appeal against the order of the High Court affirming that of the Revenue Authority declining to state a case under Section 51 of the Act. (Alcock Ashdown and Company's case ((1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 742)). It seems anomalous that such an order should be appealable while the final decision of a High Court on a reference should not be appealable. It is no doubt true that the question whether an appeal lies was not raised and decided in the latter case, but that should make no difference since their Lordships allowed the appeal on merits. It seems anomalous that such an order should be appealable while the final decision of a High Court on a reference should not be appealable. It is no doubt true that the question whether an appeal lies was not raised and decided in the latter case, but that should make no difference since their Lordships allowed the appeal on merits. In Income-tax Commissioner v. Arunachalam Chettiar ([1953] 23 I.T.R. 180; A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 118), the appealability of an order of a High Court refusing to decide a reference under Section 66(1) of the Act was not considered; and leave was granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. 31. The final decision in a common law action was called a judgment while in a Chancery Court it was called a decree. Judgment and decree were thus synonymous terms. The English Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, provided that an appeal shall lie to the House of Lords from any judgment or order. The decision which is not a judgment in the strict sense is classed as order. It will thus be seen that "final judgment" as it is termed in Ex parte Chinery ((1884) 12 Q.B.D. 343) is not different from a decree as we understand in this country. By using the expression "judgment, decree, or final order" in Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the right of appeal is extended to cases where the decisions are not what are called "final judgments". Finality is required only in case of orders. The change of language is significant. The section apparently conferred on the Privy Council a wider jurisdiction than that conferred by the Letters Patent. The language of Article 132 is materially different. The words "civil, criminal, or other proceeding" are not to be found in sub-section (1) of Section 205. I consider that the change in language in Article 132(1) is deliberate and that it was intended by the makers of the Constitution to confer a right of appeal from a judgment, decree, or final order not only in civil and criminal proceedings but from a judgment or final order in other proceedings as well, provided a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved. The insertion of the words "or other proceeding" has widened the range of decisions which can be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court. The insertion of the words "or other proceeding" has widened the range of decisions which can be the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court. The principle enunciated by Gwyer, C.J., in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown ([1939] F.C.R. 159) that the words "judgment, decree, of final order" should receive no narrow interpretation should be applied to the interpretation of the words "judgment in other proceeding" occurring in Article 132(1). His Lordship observed :- "I have no doubt that this Court has jurisdiction in criminal as well as civil cases. It would indeed be very surprising if it were otherwise, since it has been in the criminal courts that many of the great constitutional questions of the past have been determined." The word "judgment" has been interpreted differently in dealing with appealability under the Civil Procedure Code, Letters Patent, and the Government of India Act, 1935. There is considerable divergence of judicial opinion as to the meaning of "judgment" in clause 10 of the Letters Patent, as noticed in Asrumati Debi v. Rupendra Deb (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 198). The minority judgment of Sulaiman, J., in Hori Ram's case ([1939] F.C.R. 159) is not therefore a safe guide to interpret "judgment" in Article 132(1). The observations were obiter and were not concurred in by Gwyer, C.J., and Varadachariar, J., who did not accept his narrow interpretation of "judgment". In view of the difference in language the decision of the Judicial Committee in Tata Iron and Steel Co.'s case (I.L.R. 47 Bom. 724) is inapplicable to the instant case. The discussion in P. A. Raju Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax ([1949] 17 I.T.R. 353) is instructive. 32. The term "judgment" is in my view used in Article 132(1) in the wider sense to include any decision given by the High Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to any proceeding properly before the Court which finally determines the rights of parties so far as the Court is concerned. In this sense a decision under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act or under Section 66(5) of the Income-tax Act is clearly a "judgment". It finally determines the rights of the parties so far as the High Court is concerned though the Tribunal may have to reopen the assessment proceedings and make or order further enquiry to give effect to the decision of the High Court. It finally determines the rights of the parties so far as the High Court is concerned though the Tribunal may have to reopen the assessment proceedings and make or order further enquiry to give effect to the decision of the High Court. The Letters Patent makes a distinction between "judgment" and "final judgment" : Manohar v. Baliram (I.L.R. 1952 Nag. 471 (F.B.)). As my brother Hidayatullah, J., stated in that case at page 519 :- "If the intention was that the term 'judgment' should mean only a final judgment, it would have been very easy to qualify the word 'judgment' with the word 'final' as has been done in the clause dealing with appeals to His Majesty in Council". 33. I therefore hold that the decision under Section 23(5) of the Sales Tax Act is a "judgment" in revenue proceedings. Consequently the applicant is entitled to a certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution. In this view I would allow the application with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100 if certified. SEN, J. - I agree with my brother Deo, J., and have nothing more to add. Application allowed.