JUDGMENT : SHINDE, J. 1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by Vishvanath Ayachit and Chaturbhuj Gupta, President and Vice-President, Municipal Committee, Ujjain for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction. The petition states the facts as follows : 2. In December 1949, the Government of Madhya Bharat acting under S. 11, Gwalior Municipal Act, dissolved the then Municipal Committee and published a notification in the Government Gazette to that effect. Under S. 11(2) the Government appointed a committee consisting of 18 members of which Vishvanath Ayachit was nominated President and Chaturbhuj Gupta was elected Vice-President. In the latter quarter of 1851, Government on various complaints appointed Revenue Commissioner, Ujjain Division, to inquire into the administration of the Ujjain Municipality. The Revenue Commissioner investigated the complaint and also examined the working of the administration and submitted his report. On his report the Government expressed their satisfaction of the work done by the Committee and issued a press note to the same effect on 3-12-1951. On 8-3-1952 the Government also filled up five vacancies by nominating five persons. On 28-11-1951, the Harijan employees of the Municipality served a notice upon the Committee stating their demands and intimating that if their demands were not considered by 5-12-1951 they would resort to Direct action. The committee in their meeting dated 4-12-1951 considered this notice and passed a resolution concerning them. In this resolution, the committee conceded certain demands but as that entailed a good deal of expense they submitted the recommendations to the Inspector General, Municipalities. The Inspector General of Municipalities by his letter dated 11-1-1952 did not accept the recommendations and informed the committee accordingly. The Harijan employees on receiving a reply in the negative served a notice upon the committee reiterating their demands and threatening to go on strike from 12-2-1952. On 28-1-1952 the committee considered the Inspector General of Municipalities' letter and the notice of the Harijan employees and resolved that the President should see the Government officials personally. On account of illness, the President could not go personally and hence he sent a telegram to the Inspector General of Municipality. The Inspector General of Municipalities came to Ujjain on 10-2-1952 and discussed the whole situation with the members of the Committee. The committee again met and resolved that they could not concede the demands of the Harijan employees. On account of illness, the President could not go personally and hence he sent a telegram to the Inspector General of Municipality. The Inspector General of Municipalities came to Ujjain on 10-2-1952 and discussed the whole situation with the members of the Committee. The committee again met and resolved that they could not concede the demands of the Harijan employees. The Harijan employees went on strike on 12-2-1952. On 2-3-1952 the Provincial Congress Committee intervened and submitted a proposal to the Committee. The Committee by their resolution of 3-3-1952 accepted the proposal. On 4-3-1952 the Collector Ujjain, forwarded a copy of the telegram received from the Secretary Local Self-Government informing the committee that the Government was taking decision in the matter of strike. On getting this information, the committee cancelled the resolution of 3-3-1952 and informed the Government accordingly. On 5-3-1952 Shri V.V. Dravid, Minister for local Self Government visited Indore and on inquiry the President of the Committee was informed that he was meeting some of the strikers. On the 6th, the strikers resumed their duties and a news item appeared in the Indore newspapers that on the intervention of Shri V.V. Dravid the strike was withdrawn. On 6-3-1952 the President of the committee had an interview with Shri V.V. Dravid at Indore. In this interview, the minister pressed that the committee should initiate a resolution for the payment of the strike period and also advised Vishvanath Ayachit to resign so that he might be free to dissolve the Board. The Minister also handed, to the President a draft resolution to be passed by the Committee. Vishvanath Ayachit expressed the difficulty of the committee to pass such a resolution and requested the Government to issue a direction to that effect. On 7-3-1952, the committee informed the Government that Harijan. employees had resumed the work and solicited information regarding the conditions under which, the strikers had begun the work. On 10-3-1952, a telegraphic communication was received by the-committee from the minister that as the committee had not acted upon the advice, the department was taking steps in the matter. On the telegraphic communication, the President saw the Minister on 18-3-1952 at Gwalior. The Minister accused the President and the committee of not carrying out his instructions and threatened that the Government would take appropriate action. On the telegraphic communication, the President saw the Minister on 18-3-1952 at Gwalior. The Minister accused the President and the committee of not carrying out his instructions and threatened that the Government would take appropriate action. On 21-3-1952, the Minister visited Ujjain and again asked the President and the members of the committee to implement his advice regarding payment for the strike period. The Committee expressed its inability to do so in the absence of any order or direction of the minister. The Madhya Bharat Government by a notification published in the Government Gazette of 29-3-1952 dissolved the said committee on the ground that the committee; (1) exceeded its powers; (2) failed to discharge its duties and, (3) committed other irregularities. 3. Mr. Sanghi the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that under S. 11, Gwalior Municipal Act, it is necessary to give an opportunity to the committee to show cause before the committee is dissolved. Without giving such an opportunity, the committee was dissolved by the Government. Consequently there being an excess of jurisdiction, the petitioners are entitled to a writ of certiorari. The learned counsel also contends in the alternative that as the petitioners were holding a public office and they are being deprived of that office without being given an opportunity to show cause they are entitled to a writ of mandamus. The learned Advocate General repels these contentions by stating that under Section 11, Municipal Act, determination by the Government being purely subjective, the act of dismissal is merely administrative and hence a writ of certiorari cannot be granted. With regard to the writ of mandamus the learned Advocate General contends that as the petitioners were nominated by the Government and were not elected, they have no right to the office. In any case, he further contends, as Mr. Ayachit was heard before the dismissal he was given an opportunity to show cause as contemplated by S. 11, Municipal Act. Consequently the writ of mandamus does not lie. 4. I do not think it can seriously be disputed that continuing in the office is a legal right. The right accrues in this particular case, not by way of election but by way of nomination. A legal right is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of legal justice. Section 11, Municipal Act, itself indicates that it is a legal right. The right accrues in this particular case, not by way of election but by way of nomination. A legal right is an interest recognised and protected by a rule of legal justice. Section 11, Municipal Act, itself indicates that it is a legal right. The section lays down that after giving an opportunity to the committee to show cause the committee can be dissolved. The fact that the statute requires Conditions precedent to be proved and an opportunity to show cause to be given, indicates that it is a statutory right. In - 'Lutfar Rahman v. Waliur Bahman', AIR 1943 Cal 59 (A), Pal, J. observed as follows : "A chairman of a District Board as such has a legal character and is prima facie entitled to a relief from a civil Court from any interference with his right in that character unless and until that relief is taken away by any express provision of law or by the necessary implication of any provision of law." I have no doubt, therefore, that the right to continue in office is a legal right irrespective of the fact that it came into existence by election or by nomination. 5. Before proceeding to consider the question whether the determination under S. 11, is subjective or otherwise, it is necessary to dispose of the point raised by the learned Advocate General that the committee appointed by the Government was appointed under Sub-S. (3) (Kha) of S. 11. Section 11 is as follows : The argument that the committee was appointed under Sub-S. (3) (Kha) of S. 11 is obviously advanced to get out of the obligation of the Government to give an opportunity to show cause imposed by S. 11 (1), Municipal Act. Sub-Section (3) uses the word The word has been defined by S. 3(2) of the Municipal Act. That definition is as follows : This definition clearly shows that the word has been used in the Act to indicate both an elected body as well, as an appointed body. The word used in Sub-S. (3) therefore, is intended to cover both an elected body as well as a nominated body. Consequently, the Government cannot appoint a committee under Sub-S. (3). It can only appoint a committee under Sub-S. (2) of S. 11. Besides Sub-S. (3) relates to the appointment of. The word used in Sub-S. (3) therefore, is intended to cover both an elected body as well as a nominated body. Consequently, the Government cannot appoint a committee under Sub-S. (3). It can only appoint a committee under Sub-S. (2) of S. 11. Besides Sub-S. (3) relates to the appointment of. These words can only refer to the appointment of one person or more than one person. The words cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to mean a committee. Consequently the argument advanced by the opposite parties cannot be accepted. 6. The most important question to consider at this stage is the question of construction of Sub-S. (1) of S. 11. This sub-section lays down the conditions, existence of all or some of which confers jurisdiction on the Government to take action against the committee. These conditions are : (1) the committee is incompetent to discharge the duties which are imposed by the Municipal Act or some other Act, (2) the committee fails continuously to discharge the said duties, (3) the committee exceeds its powers or (4) the committee abuses them. The section makes it abundantly clear that if one or more of these conditions are present, then the Government will have power to take action against the committee. In other words unless and until one or more of these conditions is or are present, the Government has no power to take any action against the committee. These collateral facts must be determined before the Government can assume jurisdiction in the matter. Halsbury in his Laws of England Vol. IX states as follows : "The case is more difficult where the jurisdiction of the Court below depends, not upon some preliminary proceeding, but upon the existence of some particular fact. If the fact be collateral to the actual matter which the lower Court has to try, that Court cannot, by wrong decision with regard to it, give itself jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess. The lower court must, indeed decide as to the collateral fact, in the first instance; but the superior Court may upon certiorari inquire into the correctness of the decision, and may quash the proceedings in the lower Court if such decision is erroneous, or at any rate if there is no evidence to support it. The lower court must, indeed decide as to the collateral fact, in the first instance; but the superior Court may upon certiorari inquire into the correctness of the decision, and may quash the proceedings in the lower Court if such decision is erroneous, or at any rate if there is no evidence to support it. On the other hand, if the fact in question be not collateral but a part of the very issue which the lower Court has to inquire into, certiorari will not be granted, although the lower Court may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it" (Vide 11 Edn. P. 881 Para 1485). It is clear from this passage that when the jurisdiction depends upon the existence of some particular fact the lower Court must decide as to the collateral fact in the first instance. It does not appear that the Government took any steps to prove the existence of the collateral facts before assuming jurisdiction in this matter. 7. It is argued on behalf of the non-petitioners that the decision in respect of these collateral facts is subjective and hence no inquiry is needed to prove them. It may be stated at once that there are no words in the section which indicate that the decision of these facts is in the subjective determination of the Government. In - 'Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani', AIR 1950 SC 222 (B), Das, J. observed as follows : "It is well established that if the Legislature simply confides the power of doing an act to a particular body if in the opinion of that body it is necessary or expedient to do it, then the act is purely an administrative, i.e., an executive act as opposed to a judicial or quasi-judicial act, and, in the absence of proof of bad faith the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with it and certainly not by the high prerogative writ of certiorari. Usually this discretion is confided by the use of expressions like "if it appears to" "if the opinion of" "if so and so is satisfied." (Vide Para 139). The same learned 'Judge further observed : "To the like effect are the following observations of Batty, J. in - 'Balvant Ramchandra v. Secy. Usually this discretion is confided by the use of expressions like "if it appears to" "if the opinion of" "if so and so is satisfied." (Vide Para 139). The same learned 'Judge further observed : "To the like effect are the following observations of Batty, J. in - 'Balvant Ramchandra v. Secy. of State', 29 Bom 480 at p. 503 (C) : "no doubt when a power has been conferred in unambiguous language by Statute, the Court cannot interfere with its exercise and substitute their own discretion for that of persons or bodies selected by the Legislature for the purpose." From these observations, it is clear that the question of subjective determination can only arise when the Legislature confides the powers to a particular body and that usually this power is conferred by the use of expressions like "if it appears to", "if in the opinion of" "if so and so is satisfied". I find that no such expression is used in the Sub-S. (1) of S. 11. There is nothing to indicate in the language of Sub-S. (1) that the Legislature confided the power of determining these facts subjectively to the Government. In the case cited above Mukherjea, J. made the following observations : "Leaving aside the cases, where the existence of a duty to act judicially is sought to be inferred from the provisions of a Statute relating to holding of enquiry or hearing of objections, the general rule that all the cases lay down is that if the foundation of the exercise of the powers by an authority is his personal satisfaction or subjective opinion about certain facts, the function is to be regarded as executive and not judicial. The facts may undoubtedly be and often are objective facts about which the authority has got to form his opinion. When a statute says that a minister can requisition property or order compulsory purchase if he deems it expedient to do so in the interest of public safety or the defence of the realm, the condition precedent to the exercise of his powers is not the actual existence of national interest, but his own opinion or belief that it exists. When a statute says that a minister can requisition property or order compulsory purchase if he deems it expedient to do so in the interest of public safety or the defence of the realm, the condition precedent to the exercise of his powers is not the actual existence of national interest, but his own opinion or belief that it exists. To quote the words of Lord Radcliffe : "if the question whether the condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wield the power the value of the intended restraint is in fact nothing. Vide - 'Nakkuda Ali v. M.P. De S. Jayratne', 54 Cal WN 883 at p. 888 (PC) (D). On the other hand, if the statute imposes an objective condition precedent of fact to the exercise of powers by an authority, and not merely his subjective opinion about it, the function, would be prima facie judicial. The distinction is beautifully illustrated by Lord Atkin in his classic judgment in - 'Liversidge v. Anderson', 1942 AC 206 (E). If it is a condition to the exercise of powers by A that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the authority is charged with determining these facts and it must ascertain judicially whether the conditions are fulfilled or not. If on the other hand, the condition is that the authority thinks or is of opinion that X has a right of way or Y has a broken ankle, the condition is purely subjective condition and the act cannot be a judicial act, as the existence of the condition is incapable of being determined by a third party by application of any rule of law or procedure" (Vide Para 77). Mukherjea, J. in the same case further observed as follows : "The Provincial Government has to satisfy itself that there is a public purpose before it proceeds to requisition any property. As this is an objective condition which has not been made dependent on the personal opinion of the Executive it has got to be determined judicially and whether a public purpose exists or not is itself a mixed question of facts and law which could be determined by application of well established principles of law to the circumstances of a particular case. There is undoubtedly a lis or point in controversy-or what is called a proposal, and an opposition. There is undoubtedly a lis or point in controversy-or what is called a proposal, and an opposition. On the one hand there is the interest of the public and on the other, the interest of the individual whose property is being requisitioned. No formal array of parties is necessary. It is enough that there is a point in issue which has got to be decided between parties having conflicting interests in respect to the same. The fact that the Provincial Government represents the interests of the public also is to my mind immaterial. If there is a duty to decide judicially, it would be a judicial act, and it is not necessary that there must be two opposing parties other than the deciding authority appearing in a regular or formal manner." (Vide para 96). This view although supported by Mahajan, J. did not find favour with the majority of the learned Judges who constituted the Bench in - 'Khushaldas Advani's case (B)'. Kania, C.J. in the same case made the following observations : "This last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of someone or the other. Because as executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari........ It seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed". (Vide Para 7). On the same subject Fazl Ali, J. made the following observations : "The framers of the Ordinance never intended to impose any duty on the Provincial Government to determine judicially whether a certain purpose is a public purpose or not. (Vide Para 7). On the same subject Fazl Ali, J. made the following observations : "The framers of the Ordinance never intended to impose any duty on the Provincial Government to determine judicially whether a certain purpose is a public purpose or not. There are no express words in S. 3 or any other section, to impose such a duty; nor is there anything to compel us to hold that such a duty is implied" (Vide para 19). In the same para the learned Judge further observed : "However that may be, the fact remains that there is nothing in the Ordinance to suggest that the public purpose is to be determined in a judicial way." Patanjali Sastri, J. as he was then, agreed with the view of Kania, C.J. 8. In the same case Das, J. expressed his opinion as follows : "Merely because such a matter involves a question of fact it does not follow at all that it must always, and irrespective of the language of the particular enactment, be determined judicially as an objective fact. When the Legislature leaves it to an executive authority to form an opinion on or to be satisfied about such a matter as a condition for the exercise of any power conferred on it, and to act upon such opinion what is condition precedent is not the actual existence of the matter but, the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority that it exists." (Vide para 158). The same learned Judge further observed in the same case : "if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially." (Vide para 173). 9. It is clear from the majority decision that even if the existence of a fact has to be determined objectively as a condition precedent to the exercise of powers conferred by a statute, the determination need not be judicial unless the statute requires it either expressly or impliedly. This Court has taken a similar view in the case of - 'Mrs. This Court has taken a similar view in the case of - 'Mrs. Lilawati Mutatkar v. State of Madhya Bharat', AIR 1952 Madh-B 105 (F). Dixit, J. made the following significant statement : "The decision of the authority is quasi-judicial if in reaching that decision the authority is required first to ascertain facts by means of evidence and is then free to take such action as it may think fit on the facts so ascertained." (At Page 111). 10. This being the law on the subject we have to examine whether S. 11, Gwalior Municipal Act, requires the Government to act judicially or not. In - 'Khushaldas S. Advani's case (B)', Fazl Ali, J. made the following observations : "To act as a court or a Judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some kind of inquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a Court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me." (Vide para 16). Kania, C.J. has expressed his views very succinctly by stating that the statute must require a judicial approach. Section 11, Municipal Act, has already been reproduced. That section in my judgment is rather clumsy. But there is no doubt that it does impose a duty on the Government to give an opportunity to the committee to show cause. This indicates that the approach to determine must be judicial. In the words of Fazl Ali, J. the inquiry involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation. To give an opportunity to show cause involves an opportunity to adduce evidence and an implied obligation on the authority to weigh the evidence. There is, therefore, no doubt that Section 11 of the Municipal Act contemplates a judicial inquiry. 11. There is, therefore, no doubt that the existence of collateral facts, which confers powers on the Government to take action against the committee has to be determined not only objectively but judicially or quasi-judicially. 12. There is, therefore, no doubt that Section 11 of the Municipal Act contemplates a judicial inquiry. 11. There is, therefore, no doubt that the existence of collateral facts, which confers powers on the Government to take action against the committee has to be determined not only objectively but judicially or quasi-judicially. 12. There is no evidence on record to show that any inquiry, much less a judicial inquiry, was held by the Government before the committee was superseded. Consequently the petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of certiorari. In - Khushaldas Advani's case (B)' Kania, C.J. made the following observations : "It is clear that such writ can be asked for if two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, the decision of the authority must be judicial or Quasi-judicial, and, secondly, the challenge must be in respect of the excess or want of jurisdiction of the deciding authority. Unless both those conditions are fulfilled, no application for a writ of certiorari can succeed." (Vide para 11). In the present case as already stated the decision of the Government in respect of the existence of collateral facts has to be judicial or quasi-judicial. The second requisite is also fulfilled in so far as in superseding the committee without holding a judicial inquiry, the Government acted without jurisdiction. There is no doubt, therefore, that a writ of certiorari is called for in this case. 13. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the other points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. I would, therefore, allow the petition and quash the notification No. 38 : 12 L. A. dated 26th March, 1952 published in the Madhya Bharat gazette dated 29th March, 1952 and the order of the Government dated 26th March, 1952 by which the committee was superseded. The Government is directed to reinstate the petitioners. Costs of this petition shall be borne by the State. We fix the counsel's fee at Rs. 100/-. NEWASKAR, J. 15. I agree with the judgment given by my Lord the Chief Justice. As the case involves some questions of importance I have chosen to give my reasons. 16. The Government is directed to reinstate the petitioners. Costs of this petition shall be borne by the State. We fix the counsel's fee at Rs. 100/-. NEWASKAR, J. 15. I agree with the judgment given by my Lord the Chief Justice. As the case involves some questions of importance I have chosen to give my reasons. 16. This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution was made by the petitioners (1) Vishwanath Vasudeo Ayachit and (2) Chaturbhuj Shaligram Gupta for directing the respondents 'The State of Madhya Bharat' and 'The Government of Madhya Bharat' to withdraw the order of dissolution of the 'ad hoc Committee' of Ujjain Municipality and 'for such other directions in this matter as may appear fit and proper for the purpose'. The petition was submitted by Vishwanath Vasudeo Ayachit and Chaturbhuj Shaligram Gupta, President and Vice President of the said Municipal Committee prior to its dissolution. 17. The petition was grounded on the allegations that the Government of Madhya Bharat in December 1949 in exercise of its power under S. 11, Gwalior Municipal Act (Kanun Municipality Hai Samvat 1993) ordered the dissolution of the then existing Municipal Committee and further in exercise of its power under S. 11(2) appointed the Committee which included the petitioners and that the petitioner Mr. Ayachit was nominated its President and petitioner No. 2 Mr. Chaturbhuj Gupta was elected to be the Vice President by the Committee. This Committee continued to function during the year 1950 and 1951. In the later part of 1951 various complaints were received by the Government regarding the working of the Committee. The Government thereupon directed the Revenue Commissioner Ujjain Division to investigate and report to the Government regarding the said working. The Revenue Commissioner investigated the complaints and examined the working of the administration of the Committee and submitted a report. On receipt of this report the Government expressed their satisfaction regarding the work of the Committee and issued a press-note to the same effect on 3-12-1951. However on 28-11-1951 Harijan employees of the Municipality served a notice upon the Committee stating their demands and threatened to resort to 'direct action' if their demands were not conceded before 5-12-1951. On receipt of this report the Government expressed their satisfaction regarding the work of the Committee and issued a press-note to the same effect on 3-12-1951. However on 28-11-1951 Harijan employees of the Municipality served a notice upon the Committee stating their demands and threatened to resort to 'direct action' if their demands were not conceded before 5-12-1951. The Committee it is alleged considered this in a meeting on 4-12-1951 and passed a resolution conceding certain demands but as this would involve additional expenditure they submitted their recommendations to the Inspector General of Municipalities who did not approve of the recommendations and informed the Committee accordingly. The Harijan employees on coming to know of the decision served a second notice upon the Committee reiterating their demands and informed the Committee that in case their demands were not conceded by 12-2-1952 they would go on strike. A meeting of the Committee was thereupon held on 28-1-1952 wherein the impending threat was considered. It was then decided to bring the situation to the notice of the Government Authorities. Inspector General of Municipalities was accordingly appraised of the situation and after collaboration and consultations with him and in view of his advice resolved on 11-2-1952 rejecting the demands. The strike was on from 12-2-1952. This continued for some time but on intervention by Provincial Congress Committee a resolution was passed on 3-3-1952 conceding to allow half pay for the strike period, for fixing their gradation of pay from 1-1-1952 and for reference to Industrial Court. On 4-3-1952 however a communication was received by the Committee from Secretary Local Self Government informing that the strikers were asked to resume work and Government would take decision in the matter. The Committee was also informed by the Collector that the compromise arrived at through Provincial Congress Committee was not acceptable to them. Thereafter, it is said, the Minister in charge came down to Ujjain and required the Committee to pass a resolution conceding pay of the Harijan employees for the full strike period. On 6-3-1952, the Harijan employees resumed work and the Committee thereupon requested the Government to let them know the terms on which they did. Thereafter the President saw the Minister in charge on 18-3-1952. He expressed his dissatisfaction for their not heeding to his advice for passing resolution of the nature suggested. On 6-3-1952, the Harijan employees resumed work and the Committee thereupon requested the Government to let them know the terms on which they did. Thereafter the President saw the Minister in charge on 18-3-1952. He expressed his dissatisfaction for their not heeding to his advice for passing resolution of the nature suggested. He came down to Ujjain again on 21-3-1952 and wanted the Committee to implement his suggestion for payment of wages to the Harijan employees for the entire strike period by passing a resolution without reference to him but this the Committee expressed its inability to do. 18. It was alleged that it is in this context that the Government ordered dissolution of the Committee on 26-3-1952. An affidavit in support of these facts was submitted. 19. The petitioners object to this dissolution of this Committee which affect their legal right as duly appointed members of a Committee on the following grounds : (1) While ordering dissolution no opportunity was given to the Committee to meet the charges found against the Committee by the Government as it was obligatory for the Government to do under S. 11(1) of the Act. (2) That the action of the Government was mala fide and was the result of a displeasure incurred by the Committee for not acting to the 'advice' of the Minister in charge. Return submitted on behalf of the respondents raised several contentions. Firstly, it was contended that the petitioners had no legal right to insist that the Government should continue their appointment under S. 11(3) (Kh) and that Government having power to appoint have power to remove also without following the procedure laid, down in S. 11(1) of the Act. 20. It was further contended that neither a writ of certiorari nor for mandamus can be issued against what was a fait accompli. 21. It was also alleged that even assuming that formalities under S. 11(1) of the Municipal Act in question were necessary they have in fact been complied with by an opportunity having been afforded to show cause against the complaints received against them that they mishandled the strike situation and passed conflicting resolutions. 22. Existence of mala fides on the part of the Government was denied and it was asserted that the action was not ultra vires. 23. 22. Existence of mala fides on the part of the Government was denied and it was asserted that the action was not ultra vires. 23. In the affidavit submitted on behalf of the Government it was asserted that the appointment of the petitioners and the rest of the Committee was in exercise of power vested in the Government under S. 11(3)(Kh). It was further stated in the affidavit that "there were charges made against Shri Ayachit (Petitioner No. 1) of high handedness and unconstitutional conduct of Municipal affairs" And that "Government caused an inquiry to be made and while that case was pending Government received further complaints in which another inquiry was caused to be made by Revenue Commissioner who while appreciating the improved financial conditions of the Municipality noticed some irregularities" And further that "Government issued a communication in terms of the findings of the Revenue Commissioner and called for explanation about the irregularities which the Committee did not submit in spite of repeated requisitions" For the purpose. 24. In the affidavit, the Government set forth their side of the version regarding the Harijan strike and stated that the Municipal committee in question had mis-handled the strike situated and that their conduct had been halting and vacillating' and that the two contradictory resolutions passed by them had exposed them to severe public criticism. It was further stated that the President and the ad hoc Committee had explained that interested elements were creating troubles, that they were fed up and would like to resign but later Mr. Ayachit chose to take a line of action different from the one he had proposed to adopt. This according to the Government created an impasse. They therefore by order' of 26-3-1952 superseded the Committee. 25. On these submissions on behalf of the petitioners and the Government the following questions arise for consideration : Firstly : Whether the petitioners possess a legal right to continue in office as members of a Municipal Committee of Ujjain ? Secondly : Whether orders passed by the Government dissolving the said Municipal Committee was in accordance with the provisions of law as contained in Kanun Municipality Hai Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1993 or contrary to them ? Secondly : Whether orders passed by the Government dissolving the said Municipal Committee was in accordance with the provisions of law as contained in Kanun Municipality Hai Riyasat Gwalior Samvat 1993 or contrary to them ? Thirdly : What is the nature of the decisions which the Government purported to take while exercising powers under S. 11(1) of the said Act in ordering the dissolution of the Municipal Committee ? Is this decision quasi-judicial or purely administrative ? Fourthly : Whether the action of the Government in ordering dissolution of the Committee is bona fide or mala fide on the materials appearing on record ? Lastly : What is the nature of the relief, if any, the petitioners are entitled to get from this Court in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ? 26. As regards the first question the contention is that the petitioners have no lawful right to apply for a writ, either for issue of a writ of mandamus or certiorari and secondly that they have no legal right to continue in office under S. 11(3)(Kh). 27. For the issue of a writ of certiorari what its essential is that the person applying must be in person aggrieved (vide Halsbury's Volume IX 1 Article 1481). 28. If the relief to be granted is for issuing a writ of mandamus then for such relief deprivation of an office of a mayor, alderman, recorder, town clerk, burgess or other Municipal position can be considered to be a sufficient legal injury giving rise to a legal right to pray for the same (vide Halsbury's Volume IX, Article 1271, page 746, Second Edition). Similarly, a writ of mandamus can be granted for enforcement of statutory rights and duties of public nature, (vide Halsbury's Volume IX, Article 1279, page 251). 29. In this case President and Vice President of the Municipal Committee Ujjain have applied for a writ on the ground that they are unlawfully removed along with the rest of the Committee. They certainly were holding a Municipal position. This gives them sufficient right but even apart from that they pray for enforcement of statutory duty which the Government are bound to fulfil before they seek to take action as provided by the Municipal Act. They certainly are the persons affected. 30. They certainly were holding a Municipal position. This gives them sufficient right but even apart from that they pray for enforcement of statutory duty which the Government are bound to fulfil before they seek to take action as provided by the Municipal Act. They certainly are the persons affected. 30. As regards second part of the contention on behalf of the Government on this question I may say that the contention involves an assertion that the appointment of the petitioners as the members of a body consisting of eighteen members was under S. 11(3)(Kh). It was argued in this connection that they are not entitled to be called a Committee of Ujjain Municipality but should be taken to be persons appointed under S. 11(3)(Kh) and can only continue during the pleasure of the Government. They have no legal right as members of a Municipal Committee contemplated under S. 11(1) of the Act. 31. I am unable to accept this contention. A Municipal Committee if it contains lesser number of persons than the strength fixed cannot cease to be a Municipal Committee and where a Committee is appointed and functioning as a Municipal Committee after the appointment of a President as contemplated under S. 20(1)(Kh) and election of Vice President under S. 20(2) it is difficult to say that it is not a Municipal Committee but a body of persons appointed under S. 11(3) of the Act. 32. It is clear from the action of the Government in removing the Committee, where they give grounds under S. 11(1) for their removal, that the Committee was always taken by the Government as a Municipal Committee and not a body of persons appointed under S. 11(3)(Kh) and there is nothing in the Act aforesaid to suggest that they could not hold the status of the Committee. 33. A distinction was sought to be drawn between the cases of a Committee coming in after an election and one nominated under S. 11(2) of the Act but a Committee nominated is as much a Municipal Committee as a Committee coming in as a result of election. In either case the right and interest arise not by reason of peculiar process by which they assume office but by reason of the fact of their holding the office. 34. In either case the right and interest arise not by reason of peculiar process by which they assume office but by reason of the fact of their holding the office. 34. In - 'AIR 1943 Cal 59 (A)', Pal, J. held that a Chairman of a District Board, who was removed by the Provincial Government in exercise of its powers under S. 28, Local Self Government Act for persistent neglect of duty, has a sufficient legal character to pray for a relief from Civil Courts. 35. I am therefore clearly of opinion that the petitioners possess sufficient interest to pray for either of these writs. 36. As regards second question it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Government purported to act under S. 11(1) in dissolving the Municipal Committee. In the notification which was issued in the Gazette dated 29-3-1952 under the signature of the Secretary it was stated that under the orders of Government "Ad hoc Committee Ujjain Municipality was dissolved for having acted in excess of its powers, for having failed to carry out responsibilities of its office and for having committed other irregularities." This order of removal which according to the petitioners was under S. 11(1) of the Act was passed without the Committee being afforded an opportunity for having their say in the matter. 37. In the return submitted on behalf of the Government it is no doubt stated that the formalities of Section 11(1) were complied with but this was explained by stating that the petitioners and other members of the Committee "were given opportunity to show cause against complaints received against them that they mishandled the strike situation and passed conflicting resolutions." In the affidavit submitted on behalf of the Government it was stated thus : "Hon'ble Minister in charge had contacted the members of ad hoc Committee at Ujjain and explained the situation (Strike). President Ayachit was at Indore. On his return to Indore, Shri Dravid, Minister in charge of Municipalities contacted Shri Ayachit and gave him friendly advice that to regain their prestige it was advisable that the members of Ad hoc Committee should themselves, with the consent of Government, grant some partial relief to the Municipal employees instead of leaving to the Government to intervene and a draft resolution was prepared." 38. It is difficult to say that explaining the strike situation to the members of the Committee at Ujjain or friendly advice given to Mr. Ayachit at Indore to regain their prestige and pursuading him to agree to a draft resolution amounted to a sufficient statutory requirement to afford the Committee an opportunity to have its say in respect of the proposed action of the Government for its dissolution on the grounds stated in the Gazette publication of 29-3-1951. There are hardly any materials in the return or affidavit to induce me to hold that the Government were fully aware of their statutory duty to Jet the Committee know what were the reasons weighing in their mind against the continuance of the Committee and to seek an enlightenment as regards its point of view with regard to the facts which were responsible for this mental attitude against the continuance of the Committee. 39. It is no doubt true that the Act does not contemplate any notice in writing to be given or charge-sheet to be prepared and handed over but the formality of informing the Committee, (preferably in writing) the facts which constituted the reasons for the Government to hold that the Committee had acted in excess of its powers, had failed to carry out the responsibilities of its office and had committed other irregularities and of seeking their explanation was absolutely essential. 40. On the materials placed before us I am not prepared to hold that this was done. 41. This takes us to the third and most important question in this case namely is the decision purely administrative or is it quasi judicial in nature ? 42. In order to determine this question, we will have to consider the provisions contained in S. 11(1) of the Act under which, in my opinion, Government purported to act and their true implications and then to further consider what are purely administrative decisions and what are quasi judicial decisions on the basis of authorities bearing on the point. 43. 42. In order to determine this question, we will have to consider the provisions contained in S. 11(1) of the Act under which, in my opinion, Government purported to act and their true implications and then to further consider what are purely administrative decisions and what are quasi judicial decisions on the basis of authorities bearing on the point. 43. Section 11(1) provides in effect as follows : "In case any Committee : (I) is incompetent to discharge such duties as are prescribed under this Act or any other law for the time being in force or, (II) persistently fails in discharge of its duties or, (III) acts in excess of its powers or, (IV) acts in abuse of the same, then the Government may, after giving the said Committee an opportunity to have its say, cause it to be dissolved by issuing a notification in the Gwalior Government Gazette." 44. The power vested in the Government to order dissolution of the existing Municipal Committee is therefore, subject to two kinds of limitations namely that it should find any of the four matters to exist against it and secondly to afford the Committee an opportunity to have its say in respect of facts found departmentally by the Government pertaining all or any of the aforesaid matters. 45. Next thing to be considered is what are purely administrative decisions and what are quasi judicial decisions. 46. This question is important because the High Court is empowered to issue writ of certiorari if the decision is that of a Quasi Judicial Tribunal and other conditions are satisfied for issuing the same. If the decision is purely administrative then this writ cannot be invoked. 47. Now the nature and conditions of Quasi-Judicial Tribunal are well described in words by Lord Atkin in - 'The King v. Electricity Commissioner', 1924-1 KB 171 (G) : "Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of King's Bench Division exercised in the writs." Vide Halsbury's Volume IX pp. 855-56 Section 7 Note 1449. 48. This definition suggests that persons lawfully empowered 'to determine questions affecting rights' of subjects and having duty to act 'Judicially' can appropriately be termed Quasi Judicial Tribunals. 49. 855-56 Section 7 Note 1449. 48. This definition suggests that persons lawfully empowered 'to determine questions affecting rights' of subjects and having duty to act 'Judicially' can appropriately be termed Quasi Judicial Tribunals. 49. Under our Constitution power is given to High Court to issue this kind of writ (viz. of certiorari) and it is held by the highest authority that the nature and scope of such a writ is the same as is recognised in England for such a writ. Difficulty often arises when we come across acts of administrative officers in discharge of their statutory duties and we have to determine whether the action they took was as a result of administrative decision or quasi-judicial decision. This question is exhaustively discussed at some length by the Supreme Court in - ' AIR 1950 SC 222 (B)'. 50. In that case the High Court of Bombay had directed a writ of certiorari to be issued against the Province of Bombay on the application of one Khushaldas, a refugee who was one of the assignees of the tenancy rights in a building in Bombay. The Provincial Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 3 of Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance V of 1947, had requisitioned these premises and had allotted the same to another refugee Mrs. Dayaram. The questions which were raised were whether the action of the Government was quasi-judicial, was it incumbent on the Government to find objectively that the requisitioning was for a public purpose and further whether the Government had failed so to find as a quasi-judicial tribunal. These were answered in the affirmative and a writ was issued. 51. In an appeal preferred against this decision the Supreme Court, by majority held that the decision was purely administrative decision and the Province of Bombay while making that decision did not act as a quasi-judicial tribunal. The case law bearing on the point was considered by the learned Judges and it is useful to set forth the observations of the learned Judges who held the majority view. 52. The case law bearing on the point was considered by the learned Judges and it is useful to set forth the observations of the learned Judges who held the majority view. 52. Kania, C.J. at page 225 observed : "Indeed, in the judgment of the lower Court while it is stated at one place that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from a ministerial act, certiorari will lie, a little later the idea has got mixed up where it is broadly stated that when the fact has to be determined by an objective test and when that decision affects rights of someone, the decision or act is quasi-judicial. This last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of facts and in most cases affects the rights of someone or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. Observations from different decisions of the English Courts were relied upon to find out whether a particular determination was quasi-judicial or ministerial. In some cases it was stated that you require a proposition and an opposition, or that a he was necessary, or that it was necessary to have a right to examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses. As has often been stated, the observations in a case have to be read along with the facts thereof and the emphasis in the cases on these different aspects is not necessarily the complete or exhaustive statement of the requirements to make a decision quasi-judicial or otherwise. It seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed." 53. It seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed." 53. Thus according to the learned judge if the law under which the decision is made, itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. 54. Fazl Ali, J. at page 228 observed : "To act as Court or a Judge necessarily involves giving an opportunity to the party who is to be affected by an order to make a representation, making some Kind of inquiry, hearing and weighing evidence, if any, and considering all the facts and circumstances bearing on the merits of a controversy, before any decision affecting the rights of one or more parties is arrived at. The procedure to be followed may not be as elaborate as in a Court of law and it may be very summary, but it must contain the essential elements of judicial procedure as indicated by me." 55. Das, J. after referring to certain authorities, English and Indian observed : "It is abundantly clear from the authorities cited above that questions of fact such as the existence of a public purpose or the interest of the public safety or the defence of the realm or the efficient prosecution of the war, or the maintenance of essential supplies and the like may well be and, indeed, are often left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority. Merely because such a matter involves a question of fact it does not follow at all that it must always, and irrespective of the language of the particular enactment, be determined judicially as an objective fact." 56. At another place after discussing different lines of cases, the same learned Judge observed at page 259 : "What are the principles to be deduced from the two lines of cases I have referred to ? At another place after discussing different lines of cases, the same learned Judge observed at page 259 : "What are the principles to be deduced from the two lines of cases I have referred to ? The principles, as I apprehend them, are : (i) that if a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each, other there is a lis and prima facie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In other words, while the presence of two parties besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the authority the duty to act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking the act or the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required by the statute to act judicially." 57. Turning to some of the English cases bearing on this point I may first refer to the case of - 'Errington v. Minister of Health', (1935) 1 KB 249 (H). In this case the question arose with regard to a provision in Act whereby minister was required to confirm a report of enquiry by an official under him. The inquiry contemplated was to be public. The minister after public local inquiry made ex parte inquiry of his own without knowledge of persons affected. It was held that the minister acted beyond the scope of his powers. His function was quasi-judicial. The inquiry contemplated was to be public. The minister after public local inquiry made ex parte inquiry of his own without knowledge of persons affected. It was held that the minister acted beyond the scope of his powers. His function was quasi-judicial. Maugham, L.J. in this case quoted the words of Lord Loreburn, L.C. in - 'Board of Education v. Rice', 1911 AC 179 at p. 182 (I) : "In ascertaining the law and ascertaining the facts. They must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." Roche, L.J. said at page 280 : "It is sufficient to say that whereas it is sometimes contended that the principles of natural justice are vague and difficult to ascertain fortunately the principles of British justice have been authoritatively laid down; and they at all events extend to the assertion of its principle, that where judicial functions, or quasi-judicial functions, have to be exercised by a Court or by a Board, or any body of persons it is necessary and essential in the words of Lord Lore-burn in - Board of Education v. Rice (I)', which have already been cited, that they must always give a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy to correct or to contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. In other words those principles of British justice proceed upon the basis that both sides have a right to be heard." In this case it is suggested that there was a lis in the sense that the authority making the report and the authority deciding were different. 58. In other words those principles of British justice proceed upon the basis that both sides have a right to be heard." In this case it is suggested that there was a lis in the sense that the authority making the report and the authority deciding were different. 58. An administrative body in ascertaining facts and law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of and are not agreeing with the practice of a Court of law as Lord Lore-fourn, L. C. said in - 1911 AC 179 at p. 182 (I).' "Comparatively recent statutes have extended if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments of Officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving no law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain, information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." 59. In a recent case reported in - 'R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee', 1952-1 All ER 480 (J), Parkar, J. after reviewing previous state of authorities in cases of quasi-judicial tribunal said at page 489 : "The true view, as it seems to us, is that the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it would be impossible, and, indeed, inadvisable, to attempt to define exhaustively. Where the decision is that of a Court then, unless, as in the case, for instance, of justices granting excise licences, it is acting in a purely ministerial capacity, it is clearly under a duty to act judicially. When, on the other hand, the decision is that of an administrative body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if, in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned has to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, then there is the duty to act judicially in the course of that inquiry." 60. At another place the same learned Judge said : "If, on the other hand, an administrative body in arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any stage to act judicially." 61. In - 'Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning', 1947-2 All ER 289 (K), question arose whether the decision of a Minister of Town and Country Planning under New Town Act, 1946 was judicial or purely administrative. 62. A Minister declared in a certain speech prior to the passing of the Act aforesaid that Stevenage was the most suitable site for a new town. He was under the Act empowered to determine the suitable area for a new town. At the inquiry held under the direction of the Minister as provided in the Act no evidence was led in support of the fact that Stevenage was the most suitable site but objections made at the inquiry were considered and rejected by the Minister. 63. On these facts and on the working of the Act it was held by the House of Lords that no duty judicial or quasi-judicial was imposed on the Minister in the discharge of his statutory duties, those duties being purely administrative. 64. In the course of his judgment Lord Thankerton observed as follows : "It would seem, accordingly, that the respondent was required to satisfy himself that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. 64. In the course of his judgment Lord Thankerton observed as follows : "It would seem, accordingly, that the respondent was required to satisfy himself that it was a sound scheme before he took the serious step of issuing a draft order. It seems clear also, that the purpose of inviting objections, and, where they are not withdrawn, of having a public inquiry, to be held by someone other than the respondent, to whom that person reports, was for the further information of the respondent, in order to the final consideration of the soundness of the scheme of the designation and it is important to note that the development of the site, after the order is made, is primarily the duty of the development corporation established under S. 2 of the Act. I am of opinion that no judicial duty is laid on the respondent in discharge of these statutory duties, and that the only question is whether he has complied with the statutory directions to appoint a person to hold the public inquiry, and to consider that person's report. On this contention of the appellants no suggestion is made that the public inquiry was not properly conducted, nor is there any criticism of the report by Mr. Morris." 65. The last case to which I wish to make a reference is the decision of their Lordships of Privy Council in - 54 Cal WN 883 (D)'. In this case a petition for issue of a writ of certiorari in respect of an order of Controller of Textiles cancelling a licence in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Regulation 62, was filed. This Regulation is as follows : "62. Where Controller has 'reasonable grounds to 'believe' that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer, the Controller may cancel the licence issued to that dealer." 66. Questions raised on behalf of the Controller of Textiles Mr. M.F. De S. Jayaratne were : "Whether the Controller of Textiles, acting under Regulation 62 is a Tribunal." 67. Where Controller has 'reasonable grounds to 'believe' that any dealer is unfit to be allowed to continue as a dealer, the Controller may cancel the licence issued to that dealer." 66. Questions raised on behalf of the Controller of Textiles Mr. M.F. De S. Jayaratne were : "Whether the Controller of Textiles, acting under Regulation 62 is a Tribunal." 67. It was argued that the Controller acting under power aforesaid is not a tribunal because the phrase 'has reasonable grounds to believe' has been interpreted by the majority of the House of Lords in - 'Liversidge v. Anderson (E)' to mean 'honestly supposes (or thinks) that he has reasonable grounds to believe' and if this interpretation is accepted it would depend purely on the subjective determination of the Controller whether the dealer is unfit or not and hence not subject to supervisory jurisdiction of the Courts. 68. Secondly it was argued that even without that interpretation and on the interpretation that the phrase reasonable grounds to believe means such grounds as may satisfy an ordinary man to be reasonable though objective element is introduced there are no provisions in the Act and nothing in the contest to indicate that he is bound to act 'judicially'. No writ of certiorari is therefore competent. 69. Their Lordships held on the first point against the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. Their Lordships said : "Indeed it would be unfortunate thing if the decision in - 'Liversidge's case (E)' came to be regarded as laying down any general rule as to the construction of such phrase when they appear in statutory enactments." 70. On the second question they held thus : "It is that characteristic that the Controller lacks (duty to act judicially) under Regulation 62. In truth when he cancels a licence he is not determining a question; 'he is taking an executive decision to withdraw a privilege because he believes he has reasonable grounds to believe that the holder is unfit to retain it'. But that apart no procedure is laid down by the Regulation for securing that the licence holder is to have notice of the Controller's intention to revoke the licence or that there must be inquiry, public or 'private before Controller acts. The licence holder has no right to appeal to the Controller' or from the Controller. But that apart no procedure is laid down by the Regulation for securing that the licence holder is to have notice of the Controller's intention to revoke the licence or that there must be inquiry, public or 'private before Controller acts. The licence holder has no right to appeal to the Controller' or from the Controller. In brief, the power conferred upon the Controller by Regulation 62 stands by itself upon the bare words of the Regulation and the mere requirement that the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe is insufficient to oblige him to act judicially." 71. The petition was therefore dismissed on this latter ground. 72. It appears from the aforesaid words of their Lordships that their Lordships drew distinction between 'determining a question affecting the right of a person' and 'taking an executive decision affecting such right' and although actual decision turns upon the absence of procedure as to notice to the licence-holder regarding Controller's intention to revoke a licence and absence of provision regarding any injury public or private and absence of right of appeal it is not clear from their Lordships' judgment whether they were prepared to hold that where it is a case of an executive decision rather than determination of a question even a provision, regarding the necessity of a notice to the person affected and his being afforded an opportunity to show cause why proposed action involving executive decision be not taken, would not make the case quasi-judicial. But from their basing the judgment on the absence of procedure regarding notice and inquiry it appears that these were regarded by them to be crucial. 73. We may therefore conclude on the basis of authorities discussed above that : "That where objective tests are provided as condition precedents to the proposed executive decision or action and further a procedure is provided for affording the person affected opportunity to show cause why the proposed action be not taken against him in respect of the acts found departmentally against him by a statutory provision a writ of certiorari can be issued if the authority acts in excess of its jurisdiction either by acting contrary to any material and relevant provisions of the Statute or against principle of natural justice." 74. Applying these tests to the facts of this case we find that, when the Government took an executive decision to remove the Committee in exercise of power conferred upon it under S. 11, Municipal Act aforesaid, it might have arrived at some conclusion with regard to all or any of the objective matters laid down in the Section which entitled it to take that decision. 75. Had the Act stopped there probably it could have been urged with force that the Government was not bound to act judicially because a mere provision regarding conditions for the exercise of powers invoking objective tests would be insufficient to make an executive decision quasi-judicial rendering it obligatory to the authority to act judicially. This is the view of the majority of Supreme Court in the case reported in - ' AIR 1950 SC 222 (B)'. 76. However the Act contemplates an opportunity being given to the Committee before its removal to have its say against it. No person can be expected to reply unless he knows the subject of his reply. No person can reasonably be expected to meet an objection unless he knows what the objection is. Therefore if the Committee were to be given an opportunity to have its say it necessarily means that it should be informed what those grounds are of which reply is to be given. 77. It follows that, although it is not definitely stated in the Act that the Committee should be informed of charges against it and called upon to satisfy the Government that the same either do not have reasonable basis or the circumstances were such that the drastic action of removal is not called for in spite of their existence still it is clearly within the contemplation of the Act, because it is permissible for the Government to act only when certain objective tests are satisfied and then too after informing the Committee the basis of their finding whatever be their source of information whether it be from the records of proceedings or on oral information gathered by them. The things do not stop there. There is further obligation to hear the party proposed to be affected by the contemplated decision of the Government. 78. Next question is what is the effect of the absence of clear provision for a judicial inquiry. The things do not stop there. There is further obligation to hear the party proposed to be affected by the contemplated decision of the Government. 78. Next question is what is the effect of the absence of clear provision for a judicial inquiry. Does this absence reduce the case to an administrative decision instead of a judicial one ? 79. There is no doubt no elaborate provision by which a Committee might vindicate its position before the Government but if the Committee is to be informed of charges against it which involve questions of fact and the Act contemplates a hearing being given to them it follows that if they contest these questions of fact and offer to disprove those objectionable data that are made known to them what is there in the Act to prevent them from so doing ? There is no provision in the Act that Government may give them only a partial opportunity of reply and the moment they propose to disprove the grounds held out by the Government against them they should be stopped from so doing. 80. It is next urged that even if the formality of allowing them to have their say is gone through it is open for the Government to come to the same decision to which they arrived before hearing the Committee. But that would be the case even with judicial tribunals. If one Court decides against a party and the law gives that party a right of appeal the appellate Court may come to the identical conclusion as the lower Court but if it gives a hearing it is acting judicially. 81. Even where this obligation to hear the party affected is cast upon the very public body which accuses that party of some objectionable conduct want of bona fides cannot be assumed in that public body. It will always be assumed that it is wedded to act fairly and would act fairly. If it acts unfairly or mala fide the Courts might interfere on that account. 82. It will always be assumed that it is wedded to act fairly and would act fairly. If it acts unfairly or mala fide the Courts might interfere on that account. 82. The learned Advocate General in this connection referred to us the case of - 'Lilavati Mutatkar v. State of Madhya Bharat (F)' decided by this Court and urged on the analogy of the facts involved in that case that the mere fact that there is a provision in the Act for allowing opportunity to show cause why action proposed be not taken against it would not entitle the Committee to say that the Government should determine the antecedent facts, on the basis of which administrative conclusion is based judicially. 83. In my opinion there is clear distinction between that case and the present case. In that case the opportunity that was to be afforded to the petitioner there was not an opportunity to meet the charges against her but an opportunity to show cause why proposed action be not taken. Moreover whether she was given notice as required under Article 311 of the Constitution was a disputed fact which the High Court thought could not be determined in those proceedings. In the present case the opportunity to show cause or to reply is in respect of objective matters on the existence of which alone the Government has jurisdiction to act. It is in fact a provision in the nature of 'an appeal' to the very authority that happens to formulate charges and proposes to take action in the words of Lord Radcliffe quoted above. 84. Moreover, I have already held that on the materials placed before us it is possible for me to hold that 'opportunity to reply' as contemplated under the Act was in fact not given. 85. One more objection is put forward by the learned Advocate General. He contended that the application in the present case is submitted only by the President and the Vice President. Other members have not joined in it. They are therefore apparently satisfied by their removal and have no ground of complaint. The office which they held is onerous and if a person holding an onerous office has been wrongly removed and does cot choose to complain he cannot be forced at the instance of some one else to take up that onerous situation. They are therefore apparently satisfied by their removal and have no ground of complaint. The office which they held is onerous and if a person holding an onerous office has been wrongly removed and does cot choose to complain he cannot be forced at the instance of some one else to take up that onerous situation. And, if it is correct that others have not chosen to challenge the action of the Government should the High Court take this to be an appropriate case for interference by issue of a writ ? 86. But we cannot in this case assume that those who are wrongly removed from an office are reluctant to be reinstated to their original position nor are we justified in assuming that the office even though it be onerous to a certain extent, as all public offices are it does not afford opportunities of public service which it may be in one's liking, or does not confer any position of honour or privilege. 87. After the Committee is restored to its position it is open for the Government to comply with the provisions of law and acting fairly may come to the same conclusion. We then cannot interfere. It is equally open for other members after they are restored to resign even before a further order of their removal is passed. Neither the present applicants nor any other member can complain then about it. But to deny the relief to those whose legal rights are affected and when they are entitled to a relief because others do not choose to complain is not warranted by any legal principles in such cases and no authority is cited in support. 88. On the other hand it appears from the case of - 'Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani (B)' referred to above that where there are more than one person affected by an order which is quasi-judicial the fact that others besides the petitioner did not join in the petition cannot prevent the Court from issuing a writ of certiorari. 89. 89. On the view taken by Bombay High Court writ was issued though petitioner Khushaldas alone had applied and although actual decision before the Supreme Court turned on the question whether the decision in question there was quasi-judicial or administrative it does not appear to have been contested that Khushaldas alone wan the petitioner and the petition therefore could, not succeed. The right which he claimed too was an onerous right. 90. As regards the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the action of the Government was mala fide I am not at ail prepared to hold that the action was any way mala fide. Having regard to facts stated in the affidavit of both the parties I am not convinced that in passing this order the Government was actuated by any ulterior motive. The strike situation gave an impression of a dead-lock and without sufficient regard to the provision of the Act the order appears to have been passed. To call this act as mala fide is wholly to misunderstand the phrase. 91. On consideration of the entire matter it have no hesitation in holding that the petitioners are entitled to the issue of a writ of certiorari as in my view, Government while acting under S. 11(1) of Kanun Municipal Hai Gwalior 1993, are under a duty to act judicially on the interpretation put by me on that Section. 92. The action of the Government in causing the Committee to dissolve without affording the Committee an opportunity to reply was clearly in excess of their powers under the Act. This affected the legal rights of the petitioners and a substantial one for the simple reason that the petitioners while performing a voluntary public duty were stamped as incompetent and dismissed. 93. The removal of the Committee under the provisions of S. 11(1) cannot be assumed to be a matter purely of administrative policy or expediency but is the result of a finding that the Committee acted in excess of its powers, failed to carry out its responsibilities under the Act and committed other irregularities. 94. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether a writ of mandamus can be claimed in this case. 95. I would therefore quash the order of the Government published in the Gazette dated 29-3-1952 referred to above. 96. 94. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether a writ of mandamus can be claimed in this case. 95. I would therefore quash the order of the Government published in the Gazette dated 29-3-1952 referred to above. 96. The result of this no doubt would be that all subsequent acts of Government consequent upon this order will fall through and the Committee will have to be reinstated. 97. I further direct respondent to pay costs of this petition to the petitioners. Counsel's fee to be taxed at Rs. 100/-. Petition allowed.