Ranawat, J. —This is a revision application under sec. 115 C.P.C. by Khemchand and others against Niranjanlal and others which has been directed against an order of the District Judge, Alwar, of the 19th of April 1949. The facts of the case are that Khemchand and others held a decree against Swami Laxminarain and others of the date of 2nd August 1928 for Rs. 17,400/- with future interest at the rate of five annas per cent per month payable in instalments. The last execution application was filed by the decreeholders on the 9th of January 1948 for the recovery of Rs. 2996/- and it was prayed that this amount be collected by transfer of the proprietory interests of the judgment-debtors in their lands. 25th of February 1948 was fixed for consideration of certain objections filed by the judgment debtors and for receiving their evidence. On that date the case could not be taken up as a holiday was declared by the Government. The District Judge took up the case on the next date i.e., 26th February 1948. The judgment-debtors were present but the decree-holders failed to appear. The District Judge, therefore, dismissed the execution application stating that it should be deemed to have been dismissed for non-satisfaction of the decree. An application was filed by the decree-holders on the same day in which it was stated that they had been waiting outside the court throughout the day and that their case had not been called out. They prayed for giving them information as to what was done in their case. The District Judge, after taking a report from his office, informed the decree-holders that their case had been dismissed and non-satisfaction had been entered on the decree. They then filed an application on the 19th of March 1948 for setting aside the order of dismissal. After a long enquiry the learned District Judge dismissed the application of the decree-holders on the 19th of April 1949 against which order the decree-holders have come here. 2. The learned District Judge has remarked in his order of the 19th of April 1949 that the dismissal order should be treated to have been made under Order 21 Rule 57 C.P.C. as there was no other procedure in Order 21 relating to dismissal of execution application for default. 2. The learned District Judge has remarked in his order of the 19th of April 1949 that the dismissal order should be treated to have been made under Order 21 Rule 57 C.P.C. as there was no other procedure in Order 21 relating to dismissal of execution application for default. There being no rules of procedure in the Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the dismissal of applications under Order 21 Rule 57 C.P.C. the learned District Judge felt that he could not restore the execution application in the present case. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that in exercise of its inherent powers a court executing a decree could dismiss an execution application for default and at the same time it could restore such an application on its original number. In support of this argument cases of Harisingh vs. Bulaqimal and sons and others (1) (A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 20.); Abdul Karim and others vs. Ramsingh and another (2) (A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 350.); and Attarsingh vs. Bursingh and another (3) (A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 534.) have been cited. In Harisingh vs. Bulaqimal and sons and another Zafar Ali, J. has observed that— "The Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive and this being so the court may where the circumstances require it act ex debito justitiate and do what is necessary for the administration of justice......... Where an application for execution is dismissed for default in the absence of the judgment-debtor it can be restored without notice to him, and where the judgment-debtor has not even been served with the notice of the date fixed for his attendance in the Court, he is not entitled to receive notice of the decree-holders application for restoration." 4. The cases of Abdul Karim and others vs. Ramsingh and another and Attarsingh vs. Bursingh and another also contain similar observations. 5. On behalf of the other side, reliance has been put on (Vema-reddi) Ramaraghavareddi and others vs. Raja of Venkatagiri (4) (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 355.) in which it has been held that an application for execution dismissed for default cannot be restored on its original number under the inherent powers of the court under sec. 151 C.P.C. 6. 5. On behalf of the other side, reliance has been put on (Vema-reddi) Ramaraghavareddi and others vs. Raja of Venkatagiri (4) (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 355.) in which it has been held that an application for execution dismissed for default cannot be restored on its original number under the inherent powers of the court under sec. 151 C.P.C. 6. In Keshardeo Chamria vs. Radhakishan Chamria and others (5) (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 23.) it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that— "It is quite clear that the interests of justice demanded that the decree-holders pleader should have been informed that his request for adjournment had been refused, and further given opportunity to state what he wanted done in that situation. It was wholly unnecessary in such circumstances to speculate what the pleader would have done when faced with that situation. The solid fact remains that he was not given that opportunity and that being so, the order dismissing the execution was bad and was rightly corrected by the Court on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers." 7. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above does not appear to lay down good law. 8. The order of dismissal for default of the execution application cannot be regarded in the present case as one under Order 21 Rule 57 C.P.C. because no attachment of property had been made by the court executing the decree. Such an order of dismissal for default should be treated to be under sec. 151 C.P.C. and in our opinion the court has power to restore the case to its original number under sec. 151 C.P.C. We are fortified in this respect by the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted above. 9. The learned District Judge was therefore wrong in thinking that he had no power to restore the execution application on its original number when it was apparent that the dismissal of the execution application had been made in the absence of the decree-holder and when it could not have been otherwise than a dismissal for default under sec. 151 C.P.C. The learned District Judge had, therefore, in exercise of his inherent powers under sec. 151 C.P.C. authority to restore the case. 10. 151 C.P.C. The learned District Judge had, therefore, in exercise of his inherent powers under sec. 151 C.P.C. authority to restore the case. 10. This revision application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the lower court is set aside and the case is remanded to that court for decision of the restoration application on its merits. The costs of this revision shall abide the result in the court below.