Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. 31 of 1118 on the file of the District Court of Parur appeal against the order of the District Judge dated 11.5.1124 refusing their application to remove the two respondents to this appeal (who were defendants 1 and 3 in the court below) from their position as receivers and to appoint a stranger receiver instead. That suit had been preceded by O.S. 13 of 1111 of the same court which, as the present, related to the Vadakara Jacobite Syrian Church, Parur, and was removal of the old Kaikkars and entrustment of management to new ones. The contesting old kaikkars compromised with the opponents and the litigation accordingly terminated by the end of the year 1117. The management of the church was, from the start of the litigation to its finish, done under the orders of court through its receiver. At the close of the litigation it was entrusted to the parties agreed upon in the compromise. Within a few days of the presentation of the compromise before court, it is stated that 365 parishners objected to its acceptance by the court but the objection was of no avail. 2. The present suit was filed in Vrischigam 1118 impeaching the aforesaid compromise and claiming other and independent reliefs. The parties who secured management under the compromise were for various reasons assailed as being unfit therefor. The suit was accompanied by an application for appointment of a receiver pending its disposal. The parties in management, namely, the respondents took notice of the application and opposed it. On 17.4.1118 the court appointed them receivers. The statement in the order that the appointment is as a temporary measure has led to a controversy as regards its construction and it subsists. Construing that expression to mean merely an ad interim appointment, the plaintiffs, on 18.5.1121 applied for final orders. The application was rejected as the order characterised as interim was held to be final. Plaintiff's attempt at securing redress by resort to the erstwhile High Court of Travancore in C.M.A. 108/1121 did not enable them to achieve their object, the High Court having dismissed the C.M.A. observing that the appellants have to move by a substantive application for the relief that they sought, viz., removal of the receivers. Plaintiff's attempt at securing redress by resort to the erstwhile High Court of Travancore in C.M.A. 108/1121 did not enable them to achieve their object, the High Court having dismissed the C.M.A. observing that the appellants have to move by a substantive application for the relief that they sought, viz., removal of the receivers. In other words, the construction put on the order dated 17.4.1118 by the court below in favour of its finality was confirmed in appeal. The order of the High Court was passed towards the end of the year 1121. Early in 1123 the respondents who had been by that time functioning for about 5 years thought that the record of their work would justify a prayer for remuneration at a rate to be fixed by the court though they accepted office agreeing not to claim it. On hearing the plaintiff's opposition and to a certain extent giving effect to it, the Court, in Makaram 1123, ordered that the receivers be paid 6 per cent of the collections in the future. No remuneration was awarded for work done in the past though that was found to be very satisfactory and much to the advantage of the institution. On 19.10.1123, C.M.P. 2585/1123 the order whereon has led to this C.M.A. was presented by the plaintiffs praying that their application dated 12.4.1118 may be taken up and orders passed removing the respondents from their position as receivers and that an impartial stranger may be appointed receiver. The application was signed by the 3rd plaintiff and was accompanied by his affidavit. The 3rd plaintiff furnished a supplementary affidavit on 22.11.1123 containing details of charges. The receivers opposed the application. An objection petition was presented by their counsel and one of the receivers filed a counter affidavit on 26.11.1123 repudiating in detail every one of the complaints and allegations made against them. Mention must be made of the fact that specific objection is taken by the plaintiffs to the claim made by the receivers for remuneration which was allowed by the court against the tenor of their express antecedent undertaking. Objection is also seen taken to the various items of expenditure entered in the accounts submitted by the receivers. 3. Mention must be made of the fact that specific objection is taken by the plaintiffs to the claim made by the receivers for remuneration which was allowed by the court against the tenor of their express antecedent undertaking. Objection is also seen taken to the various items of expenditure entered in the accounts submitted by the receivers. 3. The court below passed the order appealed against on 11.3.1124 in the following terms: "Heard the advocates The defendants 1 and 2 who were appointed party receivers were discharging their duties very satisfactorily and in recognition of their work the court granted remuneration also to be paid to them. (Vide order dated 14.6.1123 on C.M.P. 853 of 1123). No ground also is made out for the interference of this court at this stage. As such I find no bona fides in this petition. The petition is accordingly rejected. No costs." The order in question could have been more happily worded. Reference should have been made to the various complaints raised against the receivers' management and the answers thereto given. The circumstances under which remuneration, which was undertaken not to but happened to be claimed and granted, and the terms of the grant and the period of its operation should have been adverted to. The claiming and grant of remuneration which is complained of as a vice by the plaintiffs is held against them as a virtue on the part of the receivers justifying their continuance. There is however no difficulty in understanding the import of the order as the learned judge distinctly states that no ground is made out for the interference of that court at that stage. This conclusion he is entitled to reach in his discretion, though the various processes and steps leading up to it have not been detailed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants mentioned before us that though those who with the plaintiffs and those that go with the defendants constitute different parties, one called the Patriarch's party and the other that of the Catholicos, both perform their worship in the same church and there is no complaint whatsoever as regards the proper conduct of the services of the church. 5. 5. The main complaint urged against the respondents as receivers is that they asked for and obtained remuneration contrary to the express undertaking on the faith of which they first accepted appointment as receivers and that they are discriminating in their treatment of priests and metropolitans of their party by incurring expenditure on their behalf from church funds, while not doing so as regards the priests and metropolitans of the plaintiffs' party. Except the allegations in the third plaintiff's affidavit and the answers thereto contained in the counter filed by one of the receivers, nothing was brought to our notice to substantiate any of the charges nor were the accounts submitted by the receivers pointed out to us in support of appellants' version. We have therefore to concur in what the learned judge said that no ground is made out for the interference of the court. 6. It is not urged before us either that no receiver should have been appointed at all or that there is no more need to continue the court's management through a receiver. The case is confined to the question whether the court below should have refused to remove the existing receivers and appointed a new receiver or receivers instead. The application before the court below proceeded on the basis that the earlier application dated 12.4.1118 was still pending final orders. As already stated the erstwhile Travancore High Court was of the view that the order passed on 17.4.1118 was final. Nevertheless the present application assumes the old position which was negatived and applies for a consideration of the application dated 12.4.1118 and for passing final orders. The order dated 17.4.1118 is, in our judgment, by no means an interim order. An interim order is one passed to enure until a specific date or event or until another order. In this case the order dated 17.4.1118 is final though it states that the order is passed as a temporary measure. The order was passed perhaps without a full discussion or consideration of all matters but the characterisation of the order as having been passed as a temporary measure can only mean that that will not debar any of the parties from applying afresh regarding the subject matter on new events happening or developments arising or otherwise. Anyway, no further order making the one passed absolute was contemplated. Anyway, no further order making the one passed absolute was contemplated. We agree with the view of the Travancore High Court as regards the nature of the order passed on 17.4.1118. 7. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal. He contends that this being an order refusing to remove a receiver, though coupled with an incidental and consequential refusal to appoint another receiver on removal of the existing receivers, no appeal lies. 0.43 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Cl. (s) renders only orders under Rr.1 and 4 of 0.40 appealable. A order refusing to remove a receiver, it is contended, is not an order under either of the said two rules, though an order removing a receiver would come within the ambit of R.1 of O.40 as held by the Federal Court in Rayarappan v. Madhavi Amma (1949 F.C.R. 667 = A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140) reversing the decision of Horwil and Balakrishna Iyer, JJ., of the Madras High Court in A.I.R. 1950 Madras 212. In Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. Ltd. v. Premananda (1914 (20) C.W.N. 789 = 34 I.C. 789) Woodroffe, J., (Mr. Justice Coxe concurring) upheld a preliminary objection against the maintainability of an appeal challenging an order refusing to remove a receiver who had already been appointed. In Ramaswami Naidu v. Ayyalu Naidu (1924 (46) M.L.J. 196 = A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 614) Krishnan and Waller, JJ., took the same view. In Surendra Nath v. Nagar Chand (A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 418 = I.L.R. 25 Pat. In Ramaswami Naidu v. Ayyalu Naidu (1924 (46) M.L.J. 196 = A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 614) Krishnan and Waller, JJ., took the same view. In Surendra Nath v. Nagar Chand (A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 418 = I.L.R. 25 Pat. 779) Fazl Ali, C.J., (as he then was) referring to the case law on the question of the appealability of orders removing receivers said at page 419 of the A.I.R.: "On this point there seems to be some conflict of opinion and I shall refrain from expressing any opinion on it in this case." An order refusing to remove a receiver was, in the view of the learned Chief Justice, different, about which he said: "But it appears that the balance of authority is in favour of the view that the order refusing to discharge a receiver is not appealable and I have no hesitation in coming to the same conclusion." The balance of authority referred to comprises the aforesaid decisions of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, against which there was a decision of the Rangoon High Court reported in A.I.R. 1938 Rangoon 387. Reuben, J. concurred with Fazl Ali, C.J. in his view. In Rayarappan's case (1949 F.C.R. 667) the Federal Court, referring to this Patna case (A.I.R. 1947 Patna 418) said that "the Patna High Court held that an order refusing to discharge a receiver was not appealable" and proceeded to observe that "no opinion was expressed on the point whether there was a right of appeal in respect of an order removing a receiver". The Patna High Court's decision against appealability of orders refusing to remove receivers was therefore distinguished by their Lordships. The head-note to the A.I.R. report (1950 F.C. 140) which shows that "A.I.R. 34 (1947) Pat. 418 overruled" is erroneous. The head-notes of the corresponding reports are different and do not contain this error and they are correct. (See Mulla's C.P.C., 12th Edition, 1953, page 1175, foot-notes (c) and (d) and page 1234, footnote (f)) One sentence in Their Lordships' judgment (A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140) at page 141) after referring to Ramaswami Naidu's case reads thus: "There the order appealed against was one refusing to remove a person from his position as receiver. This distinction, however, does not materially affect the question. This distinction, however, does not materially affect the question. In this case also no reference was made to S. 16, General Clauses Act." This statement of Their Lordships that "this distinction, however, does not materially affect the question" must, in our judgment, be understood as confined to the specific question that arose in the particular case with which their Lordships were dealing and that question is stated by their Lordships at the commencement of paragraph 2 of the judgment thus: "The only point for determination is whether an appeal lies against an order removing a receiver." Thus understood it appears to us that what their Lordships meant to say was merely that the circumstance that in the Madras case (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 614) which was one relating to an order refusing to remove a receiver in which the view against appealability was taken does not affect materially the question that arose in the case before them which was not one of refusal to remove but one actually removing a receiver which is appealable applying the provisions of S. 16, General Clauses Act. Referring to the Patna case (A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 418) Their Lordships of the Federal Court recognise the distinction and give effect to it as was done by Fazl Ali, C.J. who was a party to the Federal Court judgment as well. Following the said Patna decision, this Court in Kochu Kumari v. Janardhanan (1952 K.L.T. 139) held that an order refusing to remove a receiver is not appealable. It is clear that a right of appeal is not inherent in a party but must be granted to him should he have it. The rule of interpretation contained in S. 16, General Clauses Act, helps to include an order of removal as comprised in the provision for appeals against orders of appointment as per R.1, 0. 40, Code of Civil Procedure. An order refusing to remove is not an order of removal and it certainly is not an order of appointment because removal there has not been and appointment there could not be, those sought to be removed having been already appointed receivers. It is therefore, not possible to bring an order refusing to remove a receiver within the ambit of R.1, 0.40, as an order of removal could be. Again, orders under Rr. 2 and 3, 0. 40, are not made appealable. It is therefore, not possible to bring an order refusing to remove a receiver within the ambit of R.1, 0.40, as an order of removal could be. Again, orders under Rr. 2 and 3, 0. 40, are not made appealable. One of the grounds on which removal of the respondents is sought in this case is that they claimed and the court granted them remuneration contrary to their earlier undertaking. R.2 of 0.40 provides that: "The court may by general or special order fix the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver." An order of the court for remunerating a receiver cannot, therefore, be canvassed in an appeal. Then, R.3 enacts that: "Every receiver so appointed shall - (a) furnish such security (if any) as the court thinks fit, duly to account for what he shall receive in respect of the property; (b) submit his accounts at such periods and in such form as the court directs; (c) pay the amount due from him as the court directs; and (d) be responsible for any loss occasioned to the property by his wilful default or gross negligence." It may be mentioned that the charges levelled against the receivers in the affidavits presented by the third plaintiff relate to non-submission of proper accounts and occasioning of loss to the estate on account of expenses incurred for purposes not binding on the estate. Assuming the charges are true, any decision thereon rendered by the subordinate court cannot be made the subject-matter of an appeal because orders under R. 3 are not made appealable. In the generality of cases the reasons for removing receivers are likely to be comprised in the matters mentioned in the various clauses of R.3. Matters coming under Rr. 2 and 3 are specially for the subordinate courts appointing receivers to consider and if on a consideration thereof no ground is seen to remove a receiver, it is not for a court of appeal to entertain and redress the grievance of the party feeling aggrieved thereby as an order of appointment of receiver once made subsists until it is vacated or, at any rate, the purpose of the appointment is achieved or its period expires. When it is said that the court refuses to remove a receiver and appoint another, it only means that the court is satisfied with the personnel of the pending receiver. When it is said that the court refuses to remove a receiver and appoint another, it only means that the court is satisfied with the personnel of the pending receiver. The receiver is an officer of the court and who the personnel to fill that office should be is a matter pre-eminently, if not exclusively, within the province of the court into whose management the estate is taken. When a court is satisfied with its officer, it is not for an appellate court to say that the subordinate court should not be so satisfied. There is thus good reason why, unlike an order appointing, or removing, or even an order refusing to appoint, an order refusing to remove should not be subject to challenge before a superior court by way of appeal. Questions concerning surcharge for unauthorised expenditure can and are to be considered in proceedings to pass the receivers' accounts. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the application is not merely to remove the existing receivers but is also for making a fresh appointment of receivers. The latter part of the prayer is ancillary to and would come into operation only on the grant of the first, namely, the removal of the existing receivers, for, if the existing receivers be not removed, there is no scope for any fresh appointment. The circumstance, therefore, that the application of the appellants contains a prayer for making a fresh appointment will not in any way help the appellants in substantiating this appeal. In Ramaswami Naidu's case (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 614) the learned judge repelled a similar contention raised before them. Their Lordships said: "It is contended first by the appellant's vakil, that this is a case which would fall under 0. 40, R.1(a) itself on the ground that they wanted not only to get the present receiver removed but another man appointed in his place and he, therefore, contends that this is a case where the court has refused to appoint a receiver. We are unable to accept this contention, for, till the present receiver is removed, there will be no scope for appointing another receiver in his place." 9. Learned counsel for the appellants lastly urged that if this appeal be not held sustainable, it may be treated as a petition for revision and relief given as on a revision. We are unable to accept this contention, for, till the present receiver is removed, there will be no scope for appointing another receiver in his place." 9. Learned counsel for the appellants lastly urged that if this appeal be not held sustainable, it may be treated as a petition for revision and relief given as on a revision. Our jurisdiction to interfere in revision is limited to cases coming under S. 115 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure which has been extended to this State as from 1st April 1951. The order complained of is one that the court below had jurisdiction to pass and we have not been shown any illegality or material irregularity in the manner in which that jurisdiction was exercised and the conclusion reached by the court below. Reference may be made to Keshardeo Chamria v. Radhakissen Chamria (1953 S.C.R. 136 = A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 23). 10. In the result, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.