JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant's claim for setting aside an auction-sale of a land for recovery of arrears of land-revenue confirmed in favour of the respondent was dismissed by both the Courts below. He now comes up with this second appeal. 2. The facts are somewhat complicated and may be stated and are not in dispute. Land No. 29 of mouza Siwania, Tahsil Sehore was held by minor sons of Ram Pyaribai as their guardian, but was cultivated in Fasli year 1949 by the defendant-respondent who did not pay the land-revenue therefor. The land was attached on 2-5-42 for recovery of the said revenue. Mst. Ram Pyaribai, however, sold the land to the appellant on 24-5-43 by private sale and the latter took possession. The land was then auctioned on 10-4-44. 3. On 15-4-44 the appellant applied for setting aside the sale and deposited the amount due together with the costs of sale, on 17-4-44, but the application was rejected and the sale was confirmed on 16-5-44. The appellant's first appeal to the Nazim failed on 6-6-44 and his second appeal to the Government followed suit on 18-7-44. His application for review failed on 7-8-45 it was then that he brought this suit only on 15-4-46 for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud and illegalities so called. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the sale, by Mst. Ram Pyaribai, to the appellant was illegal and invalid as the latter was not an agriculturist by profession and thus acquired no interest; that the private sale to the appellant being after the attachment took no effect as against the claim for arrears of land-revenue enforceable against the land. He further held that the suit was not barred by limitation as S. 14, Limitation Act applied to it. On appeal to the learned District Judge, he upheld the above findings, but he also held that S. 14 did not apply to the suit which was barred by limitation. On all these grounds, the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge was confirmed. 5. In this Court it is now contended that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to examine the finding as to the application of S. 14, Limitation Act in the absence of any cross-objection and that S. 14, Limitation Act was applicable to. On all these grounds, the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge was confirmed. 5. In this Court it is now contended that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to examine the finding as to the application of S. 14, Limitation Act in the absence of any cross-objection and that S. 14, Limitation Act was applicable to. the suit and the time spent in the Revenue litigation was liable to be excluded and the suit was within time; that the private sale of 1943 was merely voidable and passed title to the appellant; that the sale to the appellant was not invalid under S. 188(3), Bhopal Land Revenue Act. 6. Taking up the first contention, it appears, that in the lower appellate Court the finding of the trial Court on the point of applicability of S. 14, Limitation Act was attacked by the respondent. The question is whether he had a right to do so. In my opinion, O. 41, R. 22(1) of the Code is perfectly clear. A cross-objection is necessary only when the decree is sought, by the respondent, to be varied e.g. when the decree in his favour is for Rs. 500/- which he desires to enhance to one for Rs. 600/- or when the decree is for part of the property and he wants it to be in respect of the whole property. To be brief, it is only when the decree or part thereof that he challenges that a cross-objection or a cross-appeal need be filed. Where the decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and there is no question of any cross-objection, he is entitled to raise any objection to the findings of the lower Court. In - 'Ma Lon v. Ma Mya May', AIR 1939 Rang 59 (A) it has been held that "a respondent to a second appeal is not precluded from attacking even the findings of fact of the lower Court in supporting the decree of that Court." In the case on hand, the decree was entirely in his favour as the suit was wholly dismissed; though the finding as regards the suit being barred by limitation was against him. He could, therefore, support the dismissal of the suit not only by supporting the other findings in his favour, but also attack the above finding in support of the dismissal on a further ground. He could, therefore, support the dismissal of the suit not only by supporting the other findings in his favour, but also attack the above finding in support of the dismissal on a further ground. The contention, therefore, has no force and falls to the ground. 7. It is not necessary to quote S. 14, Limitation Act. The most important Questions relevant for the purpose of the contention are firstly whether the proceedings in Revenue Courts, which the appellant took out, were civil proceedings. It must be noted that the words used are "another civil proceedings" and not "proceedings in a Civil Court", and therefore, the essential is substantially complied with if the proceeding is of a civil nature. In 'Mt. Ananti v. Chhannu' AIR 1930 All 193 (FB) (B) it has been held that "Revenue Courts are Courts under this section." Therefore, in my opinion, this essential is complied with. The next question is whether these Revenue Courts were "a court of first instance or Court of appeal." In so far as the Court of Second Appeal (Government) was concerned, it falls under the latter expression i.e. "the Court of appeal." This appeal was admittedly decided on 18-7-44. It is not disputed that Art. 12, Limitation Act is applicable to the suit for which a period of one year from the date of the confirmation of the auction-sale sought to be set aside, is prescribed. Under S. 14, the period till the decision of the second appeal was, therefore, liable to be excluded and the prescribed period of one year must commence at least from 18-7-44. 8. It is urged that the period till the decision dated 7-8-45, of the application for review, was liable to be excluded. It must be remembered that the application could not be one for revision, but only for review. It need not be pointed out that an application for revision does not lie to the same Court, taut to a Court of higher jurisdiction while only an application for review can lie to the same Court. It is urged that the order dated 7-8-45 described the application as one for revision. In my opinion, the description was incorrect as the application was admittedly made to the same Court i.e. the Government. It is urged that the order dated 7-8-45 described the application as one for revision. In my opinion, the description was incorrect as the application was admittedly made to the same Court i.e. the Government. It must be further noted that no provision has been made for a review under the Bhopal Land Revenue Act except by a Revenue Officer, under S. 34, Bhopal Land Revenue Act. The Government, to which the second appeal lay, could not, therefore, entertain an application for a review and the period from the date of the decision of the second appeal till the date of the decision of such application was not liable to be excluded under S. 14, Limitation Act. 9. Even accepting for a moment, for the sake of argument, that the Government had power to deal with such an application, in my opinion, the next important essential under S. 14 of the Act cannot be said to have been complied with viz. : "in good faith." In - 'Laxmandas v. Chunnilal', AIR 1931 Nag 17 (C), it has been held that "the question of 'good faith' depends and has to be decided on the circumstances in each case." It is observed that : "The principle, that a party who proceeds contrary to a clearly expressed provision of law, cannot be regarded as prosecuting another civil proceeding in good faith is perfectly sound taut the rule should not be enforced with rigidity." In 'Hamida Bibi v. Patima Bibi', AIR 1918 All 180 (D) the High Court assumed that "the duration of a Civil Revision Proceeding was deductible under S. 14," but refused to exclude the period of delay that elapsed after the disposal of the revision petition. In 'Narayan Ambaji v. Hari Ganesh', AIR 1930 Bom 505 (E) the Bombay High Court declined to exclude the time taken by the revision proceedings on the same ground and observed that "there was no good faith on the part of the plaintiff." The Madras High Court in - 'Baiznath v. Ramadoss', AIR 1915 Mad 405 (F) and the Rangoon High Court in - 'S.R.M.M.A. Firm v. Maung Po Saung', AIR 1929 Rang 297 (G) observed that "where another remedy was open, the time spent in revision could not be considered to be spent in good faith." 10. It must be remembered that in the above cases, as in this case, a suit was provided for under the law itself and a revision petition could also lie under the same law. In the case on hand, the position of the appellant is worse as not only was a review petition on the order in the second appeal to the Government not provided for, but a suit could lie under the Bhopal Land Revenue Act. In the circumstances, I am clear that prosecuting the revision petition, decided on 7-8-45, could not be held to be in 'good faith' as required under S. 14, Limitation Act. 11. The appellant is also not able to show that he failed in the Revenue litigation from "defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature." It is neither said nor is it true that the application and the appeals in the Revenue Courts were dismissed for want of jurisdiction or any defect therein or any other such cause as is required under the above section. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the period of time-since 18-7-44 to 7-8-45 was not liable to be excluded in the case on hand. The period of limitation, therefore, must be held to have expired at least on 18-7-45 and the suit was, therefore, barred by time under Art. 12, Limitation Act. 12. The next contention is that the private sale to the appellant in 1943 was merely voidable, but passed title to him. Under S. 141(2), Bhopal Land Revenue Act "after attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached on of any interest therein shall be void as against the claims enforceable under the attachment." It is, therefore, clear that the sale of 1943 was not merely voidable, but void as against the claim for the amount for recovery of which that land was brought to sale. It is true that the voidness of the private sale is confined, as under S. 64, Civil P.C., only as against the claim enforceable against the property. In the case on hand, the private sale, therefore, could not hold good, but was void and inoperative as against they claim for arrears of land-revenue for the recovery of which the land was brought to sale. The contention, therefore, falls to the ground. 13. In the case on hand, the private sale, therefore, could not hold good, but was void and inoperative as against they claim for arrears of land-revenue for the recovery of which the land was brought to sale. The contention, therefore, falls to the ground. 13. The next question is whether the sale was not invalid under S. 188(3), Bhopal Land Rev venue Act. Under that section, Sub-Section (1), "an occupant is entitled to transfer permanently his holding or a part of his holding to "an agriculturist by profession" and under Sub-Section (3) "any permanent transfer of a holding or a part of a holding shall be invalid and any person in possession may be ejected under S. 64 except as provided for in Sub-Section (1)." The question, therefore, is whether the appellant, on the date of this private sale viz., 24-5-43 was an agriculturist by profession." This expression has been defined in S. 2(4) on the Act as "a holder who shall have held land, otherwise than as mortgagee, in the Bhopal State continuously for 5 years, and cultivated at least one-third of the area of such land either him self or by means of hired labour or by a batia." It was not said that the appellant fell within the purview of this definition. Therefore, Mst. Rampyaribai could not sell the holding to the appellant and the latter could not accept the sale as he was not "an agriculturist by profession" and the sale, therefore, was invalid and' could not take effect. The finding in this behalf, therefore, of both the Courts is correct and the appellant having not validly acquired any interest in the holding could not seek a declaration as sought and the suit was rightly dismissed. 14. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs and the appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent in this appeal. The decree of the lower appellate Court, confirming the decree of the Subordinate Judge, dismissing the suit, together with the order for costs in the first appeal and the suit is confirmed. Counsel's fees in this Court will be upto the maximum, if certified in time. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal dismissed.